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
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Henry Jackson Dobbin -

George Campbell D.D.

Published by J. Ritchie Edinburgh 15 May 1806.

THE

FOUR GOSPELS,

Translated from the Greek:

WITH

PRELIMINARY DISSERTATIONS,

AND

NOTES

CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY.

By GEORGE CAMPBELL, D.D. F.R.S. Edin.
PRINCIPAL OF MARISCHAL COLLEGE, ABERDEEN.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

THE THIRD EDITION,

WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS, AND A STRIKING LIKENESS, OF THE AUTHOR.

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TO THE

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JOHN DOUGLAS, D. D.

LORD BISHOP OF CARLISLE.

My Lord,

THE trouble you were laſt year ſo good as to take, in peruſing a conſiderable part of this work in manuſcript, and the favourable ſentiments you were pleaſed to expreſs of what you had got time to peruſe, have emboldened me to dedicate it to your Lordſhip. I mean not thus to beſpeak your future patronage, or even approbation of the whole, when you ſhall become acquainted with it. That can be only as your better judgment ſhall direct. I well know that, if the book have no merit of its own, no patron whatever can long preſerve it, or ought

to

to preſerve it, if he could, from its natural fate, *oblivion*. But I am happy in this opportunity of expreſſing to the world my gratitude for the patronage you have already beſtowed both on it and on its author. I am happy alſo to have it in my power to inſcribe a work intended for promoting the beſt intereſts of mankind, the cauſe of truth and probity, to one who, to the ſatisfaction of the candid and judicious, has approved himſelf an able defender of the moſt important truths, as well as a ſucceſsful detector of fraud and falſehood.

I have the honour to be, with great reſpect,

MY LORD,

Your Lordſhip's moſt obliged
and moſt obedient ſervant,

GEORGE CAMPBELL.

ABERDEEN,
September 17. 1788.

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SOME ACCOUNT

OF THE

LIFE AND WRITINGS

OF

THE AUTHOR.

GEORGE CAMPBELL, D. D. the author of the following Work, was the youngeſt of three ſons of Mr COLIN CAMPBELL, one of the miniſters of Aberdeen, a man of much reſpect and popularity. He was born on Dec. 25. 1719. He was deprived of his father, by his death, before he was nine years of age. He was educated at the grammar ſchool, and afterwards at the Mariſchal College of Aberdeen. Even in youth, he was noted for ſtudiouſneſs and ability. Having been intended for the profeſſion of the law, he ſerved an apprenticeſhip with this view to a Writer to the Signet in Edinburgh; a circumſtance which muſt have contributed to extend his general knowledge, and to increaſe the acuteneſs and ingenuity which he ſo eminently poſſeſſed.

While thus engaged, he attended the lectures on the law of Scotland, delivered by the late JOHN ERSKINE, Eſq.* a neceſſary branch of education for this employment. It was then that an inclination aroſe in his mind, not very likely to be excited by it, of devoting himſelf to a very different object

* Father of the late Dr JOHN ERSKINE, one of the miniſters of Edinburgh.

during his life. So much was he ſmitten with the preciſion and perſpicuity of Mr ERSKINE's lectures, and inſtructed by the information they contained, that he reſolved to employ himſelf more entirely in the purſuits of literature, and made choice of the profeſſion of a clergyman, to prepare himſelf for which, his ſtudies were thenceforth directed.

He began to attend the theological lectures of Profeſſor GOWDIE, at Edinburgh, before the concluſion of his apprenticeſhip, and became profeſſedly a ſtudent of divinity at King's and Mariſchal Colleges, Aberdeen, in 1742.

He was licenſed to preach by the preſbytery of Aberdeen in 1746, but did not obtain a charge for nearly two years after this.

He was preſented to the pariſh of Banchory Ternan, about ſeventeen miles from Aberdeen, in the preſbytery of Kincardine-o'Neil, and ordained there in June 1748. In this pariſh, he laid the foundations of the following Work, which he continued to enlarge, improve, and correct, for forty years. While ſettled there, he married a lady of reſpectable parentage, and of great worth and talents, with whom he lived in mutual comfort till 1792, when he was deprived of her by death in her 73d year.

After having continued miniſter of this pariſh for nine years, he was removed to the town of Aberdeen in 1757. It was here that his diſtinguiſhed abilities were ſo greatly improved and diſplayed, and the amiableneſs of his diſpoſitions and character became generally known. He found aſſociates in this ſituation in literary purſuits, with whom alſo he was united in the ſtricteſt friendſhip Such were Dr REID, Dr JOHN GREGORY, and Dr BEATTIE, with ſeveral others. In 1759, he

was

was appointed Principal of Mariſchal College, in conſequence of a preſentation from the Crown. Previous to this, the public were not made acquainted with his talents. He had publiſhed indeed in 1752, a ſermon preached before the ſynod of Aberdeen, on Matt. v. 13, 14. "Ye are the ſalt of the earth. Ye are the light of the world." But no one would have been led by the peruſal of this diſcourſe to have expected ſuch works as he afterwards produced. The ſentiments indeed are ſimilar, but they are not ſet in that ſtriking light, nor expreſſed with that chaſteneſs and beautiful ſimplicity, which is ſo much the character of the ſtyle of his ſubſequent writings. It may be preſumed that theſe were his own thoughts of this performance, as it is not included in the collection of his diſcourſes in two volumes, publiſhed by him not long before his death.

Soon after his advancement, however, to his office in the Univerſity, he publiſhed, in 1762, that maſterly diſſertation on Miracles, firſt preached as a ſermon before the ſynod of Aberdeen, which has been received with ſuch univerſal admiration, and which even extorted unwilling acknowledgments from the author of the ſophiſm which he ſo triumphantly refuted. It were indeed to have been wiſhed that the Doctor, without deviating from the meekneſs and courteouſneſs which are the duty of Chriſtians in ſuch circumſtances, and which are proper means to lead the adverſaries of the goſpel to repentance, had, in this Work, been more ſparing in the compliments he beſtowed on Mr Hume. When the groſs proſtitution is conſidered of the eminent talents beſtowed upon that celebrated writer; when the atheiſm, infidelity, and immoral ſentiments are taken into view, propagated, and ſtill ſpreading, by means of his works,

works, in the world, but eſpecially among men of letters, or thoſe who would be thought ſuch, with the eternal ruin of ſo many, which muſt have been, and will be the effect of theſe; methinks the language of zeal and of benevolent indignation is dictated by the love of truth, and of our fellow-creatures, and might have mixed with the acute and convincing reaſonings, which, in the opinion of all the world, have ſwept away the foundations of his peſtilent fallacy as chaff before the wind *. This Eſſay has gone through three editions, has been tranſlated into the French, Dutch and German languages, and muſt continue to be read as long as the ſubject of miracles is ſtudied among men.

In 1771, Dr CAMPBELL was choſen, by the Town Council of Aberdeen, Profeſſor of Divinity in the Mariſchal College; an office which he continued to fill, and the duties of which he performed with great ability and applauſe, for twenty-four years. To his engagements in theſe, we are indebted for a great part of the admirable Preliminary Diſſertations prefixed to his Tranſlation of the Goſpels, and for the prelections on Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory, with which the Public have been favoured ſince his death. From the general view of theſe lectures given us by Mr SKENE KEITH, in his late account of his Life and Writings, they ſeem to have been ſo truly valuable, that it cannot but be much regretted that no other part of them was prepared for the preſs. Hopes indeed have been entertained that the part, On Pulpit Eloquence, might yet ſee the light; but theſe expectations have not hitherto been

* So little regard had Mr HUME for truth or conſiſtency, that he continued to re-publiſh the Eſſay on Miracles, without any alteration, in every ſubſequent edition of his Works.

been gratified. The ſentiments and inſtructions on that ſubject, occaſionally introduced in his other works, render the publication of theſe, even though they were unfiniſhed, a great *deſideratum*.

His next publication was a Sermon preached before the Synod of Aberdeen on the 9th of April 1771. The ſubject was 2 Tim. i. 7. and the title of this diſcourſe, 'The Spirit of the Goſpel neither a Spirit of Superſtition nor of Enthuſiaſm.' It extends to 123 pages 8vo.; and whether we regard the critical examination of the text, or the liberal, enlarged, and ſcriptural views it contains, few diſcourſes will ſo well reward a careful peruſal. Thoſe who have been charmed with the Preliminary Diſſertations, will here find the ſame ſtrain of thinking, and the ſame animated and free ſpirit which dictated theſe. The ſermon was attacked by Papiſts, Nonjuring High Churchmen, and Methodiſts, and a conſiderable noiſe reſpecting it prevailed for ſome time; but the author preſerved to the laſt a dignified ſilence, and publiſhed no reply to the many invectives poured upon him.

One of his moſt important and maſterly works was publiſhed in 1756, entitled, 'The Philoſophy of Rhetoric,' in 2 vols. 8vo. The depth, the ingenuity, and the taſte diſplayed in theſe volumes, eſtabliſhed the character of their author as a philoſopher and critic of the firſt rank. The title indeed does not at firſt ſuggeſt an idea of all the contents of the book, which embraces ſome of the moſt abſtract parts of metaphyſics, and pours the cleareſt light upon the moſt obſcure of them. The principles of taſte, of criticiſm and elocution, are here diſcuſſed with great diſcernment and originality, and the compoſition, throughout elegant and ſimple, though not every where unornamented, exemplifies the

the rules laid down by the author. The acute detection of various faults in writing, and the deſcription of the qualities of that ſtyle which ſhould be ſtudied by thoſe who are deſirous of pleaſing or impreſſing their hearers or readers, cannot be too cloſely attended to, eſpecially by the young, and thoſe who have not formed habits incapable of correction and improvement. It may perhaps recommend this work to ſome of our readers, and eſpecially to thoſe who are deſirous, or preparing to preach the goſpel of Chriſt, if we mention that this was a book which the late Dr ERSKINE held in the very higheſt admiration, and uſed often to recommend as far preferable to the lectures of Dr BLAIR, which, compared with it, though valuable, he always ſpoke of as a mere compilation.

In the ſame year, 1776, he alſo publiſhed a ſermon which he had preached on the faſt-day appointed by Government, during the American war. The ſubject is, the nature, extent, and duty of allegiance. It does not ſeem to have much connexion with the text, Prov. xxiv. 21. but is unqueſtionably handled with great ability, although perhaps objections might be made to ſome parts of it, not eaſily to be anſwered on the principles which Dr CAMPBELL adopted. A ſecond edition in 12mo ſize, with the addition of many notes and illuſtrations, and with a ſhort analyſis of the whole, was printed at Aberdeen in 1778, and 6000 copies of it, at the deſire of the late Dr TUCKER, the Dean of Glouceſter, were circulated in America. The world are not now to be informed, that this meaſure had no ſucceſs. In the preface, he expreſſes his apprehenſions that the republican principles then diſſeminated might iſſue in the moſt direful calamities; but profeſſes to expect, that the viſionary de-

fences

fences of them would be examined and expoſed, and ſo be abandoned by every body. Events have ſhewn that his predictions have in part been contradicted, and in part too fatally fulfilled, and that the deſertion of republican theories has not put a ſtop to the calamities which the broaching and adoption of them produced.

Dr CAMPBELL's next publication was a Sermon before the Society in Scotland for Propagating Chriſtian Knowledge, preached June 6. 1777, and printed ſoon afterwards. The ſubject is that ſtriking paſſage, 1 Cor. i. 25. However frequently treated, it may be confidently ſaid, that it was never illuſtrated in a more beautiful, ſimple and impreſſive manner. The doctrine of the croſs—the character of the miſſionaries—the effects produced by their miniſtry—are admirably ſtated. The contraſt between the meaſures of the apoſtles, and thoſe of the church of Rome, is drawn by the hand of a maſter, and the argument for the truth of the goſpel from its propagation and ſucceſs, is deduced with ſuch fairneſs, and wound up with ſuch force, that, to every one who attends, it muſt be irreſiſtible. Not a few popular prejudices are diſcuſſed in the courſe of his illuſtrations, and much occaſional diſquiſition render it, independent of the main argument, and of the taſte with which it is compoſed, a performance of great value.

It is ſingular that the publication immediately ſucceeding this ſhould have been an Addreſs to the People of Scotland upon the alarms that have been raiſed in regard to Popery. This was publiſhed in 1779, in conſequence of a bill brought into Parliament, to aboliſh certain penalties to which profeſſors of the Popiſh religion were ſubjected, by ſtatutes enacted ſoon after the Revolution in 1688.

An outcry was raiſed, particularly in Scotland, on this ſubject, which afterwards led to the commiſſion of great atrocities. Dr CAMPBELL had, in the two diſcourſes already mentioned, expreſſed his moſt decided abhorrence of Popery, pointing out its oppoſition to the ſpirit of true Chriſtianity, and had provoked its adherents in a high degree; but he conſidered the zeal againſt it prevailing at that time in this country, the means uſed to excite it, and the way in which it was expreſſed, as too ſimilar in their nature and effects to the cauſe they oppoſed. Many wiſe and worthy men, equally friends with him to religious toleration, and averſe to reſtrain falſe religion, *as ſuch*, by temporal penalties, were yet however differently minded from the Doctor; and replies, ſome of them more, and others leſs temperate and able, were publiſhed to his Addreſs, which without regard to its immediate object, muſt be allowed to contain much ſound argument, moſt admirably expreſſed, equally dictated by juſt policy, as by the doctrine of the New Teſtament.

It is curious enough, that three and twenty years after the publication of this Addreſs, he has been charged by the biographer of the late Dr GEDDES with ranking "among the bigots of Scotland, (as he thinks proper to call them), who did not conceive themſelves ſafe while the remoteſt degree of favour was evinced towards Roman Catholics in any part of the iſland *." He is even repreſented by this writer as the author of a tract entitled, A Vindication of this Oppoſition, &c. although on the title-page of that tract, it appears that it was written in anſwer to his Addreſs. Mr GOOD is ſo very ignorant, as to imagine that the Principal had afterwards

* Memoirs of the Life and Writings of ALEX. GEDDES, L. L. D. By JOHN MASON GOOD. Lond. 1803. p. 73.

afterwards changed his ſentiments; in proof of which, he appeals to the "liberality and candour which blazes forth in every page of his Lectures on Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory." The truth is, that the ſentiments of his Addreſs and of his Lectures are not only perfectly conſiſtent with each other, but that both appear to have been entertained by him at a very early period, and were ſtedfaſtly held and openly profeſſed during his whole life.

In the ſame year, he publiſhed a Sermon preached at the Aſſizes at Aberdeen, at the requeſt of the late Lord GARDENSTONE, the Judge. The ſubject was Prov. xiv. 35. "Righteouſneſs exalteth a nation." In a very juſt and beautiful introduction, he adverts to the inconſiſtency and abſurdity of libertines, (ſuch libertines, alas! are the generality of mankind), who treat religion with contempt, conſider it as a reſtraint, and repreſent it as an intolerable burden, while yet they maintain that its origin and reception upon earth is owing to the deſigns of politicians, who find it neceſſary to keep the people in ſubjection, and to add authority to the laws. Having made ſome pertinent animadverſions on this ſubject, he proceeds to ſhew that Chriſtianity conduces to the exaltation and felicity of the body politic in four different ways: 1ſt, By the tendency and extent of its laws; 2d, By the nature and importance of its ſanctions; 3d, By the aſſiſtance it gives the civil magiſtrate, both in ſecuring fidelity and in diſcovering truth; 4th, By the poſitive enforcement of equity and good government on the rulers, and of ſubmiſſion and obedience on the people. Each of theſe points he illuſtrates and proves in ſuch a way "as oft was thought, but ne'er ſo well expreſs'd."

May we be permitted however to ſay, that much as we reſpect Dr CAMPBELL's Writings, we cannot aſſent to the concluſions on this ſubject, which are ſtated very largely in the latter part of the ſermon.

The firſt of them is, that the ſecular power ought to give *all poſſible* countenance to religion, and to the ordinances of divine worſhip.—That ſuch ſecular powers as believe the goſpel, ought to give countenance to religion, and to the ordinances of God, is perfectly juſt, and that this will be their conduct, unleſs where the prejudices of certain ſyſtems miſlead them, is undoubtedly true. But *that* countenance muſt be of a kind ſuitable to, and limited by the ſpirit and genius of religion, and calculated to promote its *proper* influence and proſperity. Dr CAMPBELL, in illuſtrating his ſecond propoſition, has juſtly obſerved, that " religion operates ſolely by faith, and has no influence further than it is believed " Should we deſire then, or is it fit, that ſecular powers, who are not themſelves Chriſtians, aſſume a form of godlineſs, and become hypocrites, to promote the welfare of the community? God neither permits nor approves of any worſhip which is not conducted in ſincerity and truth. To the wicked he ſays, " What haſt thou to declare my ſtatutes, or to take my covenant in thy mouth?" The means which ſuch would employ to promote what they may call Chriſtianity, will never ſurely anſwer any end but that of corrupting it. It is true, religion is not without influence, even on thoſe who do not cordially embrace it; and it is the inſtrument by this means, though indirectly, of no ſmall advantage to civil communities, and to the world at large. But this is not an end to which either Jeſus Chriſt or his

his apoſtles applied it, nor are his diſciples at liberty to promote this, although they may obſerve it taking place. Even falſe religion, ſo far as mixed with what is true, is, upon the whole, better for the world than Atheiſm, which excludes all regard to a ſupreme Governor upon earth, and acknowledges no unchangeable diſtinction between moral good and evil. But no Chriſtian is at liberty, on that account, to afford it any countenance. They can produce good fruit only by making the tree good.—In the ſecond concluſion from his premiſes, Dr CAMPBELL ſeems to have forgotten that he had proved only *the conduciveneſs* of religion to the proſperity and happineſs of ſtates. He here aſſumes, however, *its indiſpenſable neceſſity for their ſupport*, and reaſons from this, that all who appear enemies to Chriſtianity, are enemies to their country, as, no doubt, indirectly they are, although not amenable to the magiſtrate on that account. The whole which he has advanced on this head, is at variance with many parts of his Writings, and eſpecially with the ſentiments of his laſt work, the Lectures on Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory; ſee particularly ch. xxv. Did he advert, that the great end of civil governments is protection and comfort in this life; that its great bond is ſelf-intereſt; and, that the majority in all the kingdoms of this world, whether governors or governed, have been, and are influenced to ſtudy its welfare by no principle ſuperior to this? Did he attend to the aſſurances which are contained in the Scriptures, that the church of God ſhall never be extinct; aſſurances, as he elſewhere ſays, 'which do not ſtand in need of any engagements from kings or parliaments to fulfil them*?' Did he conſider, that whatever may come of falſe religion, or falſe profeſſors

* Addreſs in regard to Popery, &c. p. 12.

feſſors of true religion, no weapon formed againſt his cauſe ſhall proſper, or finally prevail? Unqueſtionably if God had not a people upon earth, the world ſhould ere this time have been as Sodom and Gomorrah, and when they are all gathered out, "the conſumption decreed ſhall overflow in righteouſneſs." It is indeed but too true, as he foreboded, that open atheiſm, and groſs corruption of morals, have advanced with rapid progreſs during the twenty-five years which have paſſed ſince he publiſhed this diſcourſe. Virtue, laws, liberties and conſtitutions have gone down together in general ruin. And what further miſeries await the world, who at this period will venture to ſay? All this furniſhes no proof of the poſſibility, and no argument for the neceſſity or obligation of promoting or protecting true religion, by departing from its ſpirit, or by employing the carnal weapons, which are requiſite and proper in the kingdoms of this world.

The reader will forgive this digreſſion. We have imbibed the ſpirit of Dr CAMPBELL's Writings too deeply to encourage implicit faith even in them.

The laſt and greateſt work which he publiſhed during his life, was the Tranſlation, Diſſertations, and Notes, the third edition of which is now preſented to the Public. This elaborate performance firſt appeared about eighteen years ago, in two volumes 4*to*, and it gives us now great ſatisfaction to bring it within the reach of a claſs of readers, who could not formerly obtain it on account of the price. We may venture to ſay, that it has obtained the greateſt approbation from thoſe who are beſt qualified to judge of its merit and utility. The verſion we do not ſuppoſe to be every where faultleſs, or preferable to that in common uſe, and there may be a few inſtances in which the meaning

ing of the original is not expreſſed in the moſt exact and the plainneſt language. It muſt be owned however, that, in very many places, it ſeems far ſuperior to the ordinary tranſlation ; and, in others, difficulties are removed which muſt greatly embarraſs thoſe who rigidly adhere to it. But the reader who is truly deſirous of underſtanding the New Teſtament, will be agreeably diſappointed, if he has conſidered it merely as a tranſlation of the Goſpels, an interpretation of difficult paſſages, and an introduction to theſe books. Independent of the numerous paſſages in other parts of the Scriptures illuſtrated and explained incidentally, the Preliminary Diſſertations contain a fund of knowledge, which, rightly employed, will ſerve as a key to the whole New Teſtament, and to great part of the Old Teſtament ; and he who properly uſes it will be able, we may venture to ſay, to unlock treaſures inacceſſible to careleſs or ordinary readers. Though theſe volumes are not a commentary on Scripture, they enable every perſon of tolerable talents, who will apply himſelf to the ſubject, to become his own commentator; they qualify him for throwing off undue dependence on human authority and opinion, and to be ſatisfied in his own mind and judgment concerning the true and certain import of the dictates of the Spirit of God. To uſe Dr CAMPBELL's own compariſon*, the ſcope of this book is to lead the ſtudent of the ſacred writings to take them into his own hand, to furniſh him with a ſupply of light, and to direct his attention to the compariſon of one part with another. Though the character be old, familiarity and application will ſooner ſurmount difficulties, than if he truſted to the eyes of other people,

* Mr SKENE KEITH's View of his Prelections, &c. Vol. I. P. 67.

people, and ſaved himſelf the expence of thought and reflection.

The firſt requiſite for entering into the ſpirit of the Scriptures is, without doubt, to underſtand with certainty the meaning of words and phraſes. It was well obſerved by Melancthon, 'that Scripture cannot be underſtood theologically, until it be known grammatically.' Juſt tranſlation then muſt always be regarded as the moſt important ſervice by thoſe readers of the word of God, who do not thoroughly underſtand the languages in which it is written. Such was the well-founded ſentiment of thoſe learned men who have favoured us with a comparative view of the tranſlations of it into no leſs than ten different languages, under the name of "the Polyglott," all of them prior to the date of any manuſcripts at preſent known to exiſt. Deſtitute of ſome advantages enjoyed by theſe very early tranſlators, we are yet poſſeſſed of ſome which did not belong to the learned men, who were employed two hundred years ago to produce the Engliſh verſion now in uſe. Great cauſe of gratitude to God as this tranſlation, in many reſpects moſt excellent, preſents, it muſt yet be owned, that the art of criticiſm, and the knowledge of languages, were, in their days, comparatively in their infancy. It cannot but be confeſſed, that many of their words and idioms are now obſolete and obſcure, and that they themſelves ſeem to have been uncertain about the import of ſome paſſages, miſtaken in others, and have debaſed the dignity and propriety of not a few. Among thoſe* who have undertaken ſince their time to render the New Teſtament into Engliſh, it will be generally allowed that Dr CAMPBELL far excels every one

* Mice. Whetham, Doddridge, Wells, Purver, Worſley, Wynne, Harwood, Wakefield, Newcome, Haweis, Scarlett, and others.

one of them in fidelity, perſpicuity, and ſuitableneſs to common uſe, as much as in elegance, dignity, and unaffected ſimplicity. We cannot help entertaining hopes, that this Work will not only be placed in more libraries than yet poſſeſs it, but that it will be found in general circulation among thoſe who are deſirous to ſearch the Scriptures that they may obtain eternal life.

The laſt part of his Writings which has ſeen the light, are his Lectures on Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory, with an Eſſay on Chriſtian Temperance and Self-denial. Theſe lectures were publiſhed from his manuſcript by GEORGE SKENE KEITH, Miniſter of Keith Hall, Aberdeenſhire, about ſix years ago. They formed, as has been already mentioned, a part of his courſe of theological inſtruction, were tranſcribed and reviſed by himſelf, and had been improved, enlarged, and corrected every year during the whole time of his being engaged in delivering them. If it has been remarked with juſtice that it is not poſſible to ſay from his verſion of the Evangeliſts to what religious denomination he belonged, this holds ſtill more true reſpecting theſe two moſt intereſting volumes, which no one certainly ſhould have expected from the pen of a Preſbyterian clergyman. They conſiſt of twenty-eight lectures, all of them compoſed in a bold and ardent ſtyle, and every where diſcovering the talents and erudition of the author. They are not intended to make perſons acquainted with the facts of eccleſiaſtical hiſtory, who are ignorant of them, but to exhibit ſome of the chief of theſe as connected with the riſe and progreſs of clerical uſurpation. They are introduced with ſome juſt remarks on the ſacred hiſtory contraſted with that of Joſephus, with an account of the canon of Scripture,

ture, of the peculiar nature of the Jewiſh government, and of the origin and advancement of the Chriſtian church. After this he proceeds to trace the gradual and inſenſible innovations of time, their cauſes and the manner of their operation. He marks the diſtinguiſhing character of things civil and ſacred, and points out the evil of confounding them. A great part of his labours is beſtowed in delineating the characters of the Papacy, the inſtruments of its eſtabliſhment and ſecurity, and the progreſs and cauſes of its decline. The dreams of ſuperſtition vaniſh before him as he proceeds, and he has ſtormed and demoliſhed the ſtrongeſt fortreſſes of ſacerdotal influence and authority. It muſt be remarked, however, that the field is after all imperfectly occupied. The corruptions of the goſpel, and the fundamental doctrines and laws of Jeſus Chriſt, as connected with the extent and ſucceſs of a worldly hierarchy, are no where taken into view. The revival of what Luther called the *articulus ſtantis vel cadentis eccleſiæ**, is not mentioned; and its influence in circumſcribing and conſuming the power of the man of ſin, is altogether unnoticed It muſt alſo be owned, that the ſtyle of theſe lectures too often approaches the borders of levity; ſo that the perverſions of Chriſtianity which they record, and the vile arts employed to uphold them, may ſeem expoſed rather to ridicule than to juſt abhorrence and deteſtation. It may alſo be obſerved, that if the Doctor had been better acquainted with the ſtate of religious profeſſion in his own country, he would ſcarcely have ſaid, 'that in all the different religious ſects, he had not found one which perfectly coincided with

* Juſtification by faith without works.

with the model of the apoſtolic church *.' Some ſuch at leaſt there certainly were and are, though perhaps too inconſiderable to attract his obſervation, reſembling pretty cloſely the draught which he has himſelf exhibited of this model.

If he had conſidered too, how it came about that all the churches of apoſtolic times were ſo exactly alike in their government and diſcipline, he could ſcarcely have hazarded the remark, 'that if a particular form of polity had been eſſential to the church, it had been laid down in another manner in the ſacred books †.' He does not appear to have adopted the primitive opinion: 'Conſtat id eſſe ab apoſtolis traditum quod apoſtolorum eccleſiis ſacro ſanctum;' nor to have believed that the directions of the apoſtles to the churches were the perſonal injunctions of their Maſter, or the infallible and unalterable dictates of his Holy Spirit. Deficient and imperfect in theſe reſpects as Dr CAMPBELL'S Lectures may ſeem to ſome; anarchical, or even ſeditious and unfounded, as they may appear perhaps to others; they will continue, we doubt not, to be conſidered and ſtudied as one of his moſt maſterly works.

Pity it is that the Eſſay on Temperance and Self-denial ſhould be the only ſpecimen we poſſeſs of his Writings on moral ſubjects! Although it be leſs practical than might have been expected, and though the other Eſſays which he left behind him are unfiniſhed, yet, as they appear to have been intended for the preſs, his friends would certainly perform an acceptable ſervice by publiſhing them. Even the firſt ſketches of ſuch a maſter ought to be preſerved, and would undoubtedly tend to the inſtruction of mankind.

* Vol. I. p. 1. 41. † P. 141.

Dr CAMPBELL was of a feeble conſtitution; the form of his body was unfavourable to health, and he was ſubject to frequent attacks of diſeaſe. He was rather of low ſtature, and ſtooped much; but his features were animated, agreeable and full of meaning, and his eye uncommonly expreſſive, eſpecially when he was engaged in converſation or public ſpeaking. His manners were amiable, mild and unoſtentatious, and his behaviour in company unaſſuming and attentive. The outline of his head, prefixed to theſe volumes, was taken at Edinburgh, when on his way to London in 1787. to publiſh his Tranſlation. It is a moſt correct likeneſs, and no one who knew him at that time can fail to recognize the original.

He was ſeized with a violent illneſs in 1791, from which it was not expected that he could have recovered. His own expectations and the fears of his friends, however, were agreeably diſappointed, and he was able to return to his former ſtudies and engagements, though not with all his uſual application. About four years after this, being ſenſible of decline both in body and mind, he reſigned his profeſſorſhip and his pariſh, and in no long time his office alſo of Principal of Mariſchal College. He was ſucceeded in both by the preſent incumbent, Dr W. L. BROWN, formerly of the Univerſity of Utrecht, and had a penſion of L. 300 per annum aſſigned him by Government. A few months after this, March 31. he was affected with a paralytic ſtroke, was deprived of ſpeech, and languiſhed till the day of April 1796, when he died, beloved, eſteemed, and regretted by all who had the pleaſure of his acquaintance, and highly valued by great numbers who had never ſeen him, but had known him only in his works.

Edinburgh, Jan. 1. 1807. PRE-

PREFACE.

In compliance with a cuſtom, which is not without its advantages, I purpoſe, in this place, to lay before the reader ſome account of the following work, its riſe and progreſs, nature and deſign. To do ſo will, perhaps, be thought the more neceſſary, as there have been, in this and the preceding century, many publications on the Goſpels, both abroad and at home, in ſome or other of which, it may be ſuppoſed, that all the obſervations of any conſequence, which can be offered here, muſt have been anticipated, and the ſubject in a manner exhauſted. I am not of opinion that the ſubject can be ſo eaſily exhauſted as ſome may ſuppoſe. I do not even think it poſſible for the richeſt imagination to preclude all ſcope for further remark, or for the greateſt acuteneſs to ſuperſede all future criticiſm. On the other hand, it muſt be owned poſſible, that a man may write copiouſly on a ſubject, without adding to the ſtock of knowledge provided by thoſe who wrote before him, or ſaying any thing which has not been already as well, or perhaps better, ſaid by others. How far this is applicable to the preſent publication, muſt be ſubmitted to the judicious and intelligent reader. In the mean time, it may be hoped that it will not be judged an unfair attempt at beſpeaking his favour, to give him a brief account of the origin and preparation of the work now offered to his examination.

As far back as the year 1750, ſoon after I had gotten the charge of a country pariſh, I firſt formed the deſign of collecting ſuch uſeful criticiſms on the text of the New Teſtament, as ſhould either occur to my own obſervation, or as I ſhould meet with in the courſe of my reading; particularly, to take notice of ſuch propoſed alterations on the manner of tranſlating the words of the original, as appeared not only defenſible in themſelves, but to yield a better meaning, or at leaſt, to expreſs the meaning with more perſpicuity or energy. Having, for this purpoſe, provided a folio paper book, which I divided into pages and columns, correſponding to the pages and columns of the Greek New Teſtament which I commonly uſed, I wrote down there, in the proper place, as they occurred, ſuch alterations on the tranſlation as, in my judgment, tended to improve it, and could be rationally ſupported. And having divided the pages in the middle, I allotted the upper part of each for the

verſion, and the lower for *ſcholia*, or notes, containing the reaſons (wherever it appeared neceſſary to ſpecify reaſons) of the changes introduced. In this way I proceeded many years, merely for my own improvement, and that I might qualify myſelf for being more uſeful to the people intruſted to my care. I did not aſſign to this occupation any ſtated portion of my time, but recurred to it occaſionally, when any thing occurred in reading, or offered itſelf to my reflections, which appeared to throw light on any paſſage of the New Teſtament.

Things proceeded in this train, till I found I had made a new verſion of a conſiderable part of that book, particularly of the Goſpels. The *ſcholia* I had added, were indeed very brief, being intended only to remind me of the principal reaſons on which my judgment of the different paſſages had been founded. But ſoon after, from a change of circumſtances and ſituation, having occaſion to turn my thoughts more cloſely to ſcriptural criticiſm than formerly, I entered into a minute examination of many points concerning which I had thrown together ſome hints in my collection. On ſome of the points examined, I have found reaſon to change my firſt opinion: on others I have been confirmed in the judgment I had adopted. I have always laid it down as a rule in my reſearches, to diveſt myſelf, as much as poſſible, of an exceſſive deference to the judgment of men; and I think that in my attempts this way, I have not been unſucceſsful. I am even confident enough to ſay, that I can with juſtice apply to myſelf the words of the poet:

Nullius addictus jurare in verba magiſtri;

or rather the words of one much greater than he; I have learnt, in things ſpiritual to *call no man Maſter upon earth.* At the ſame time that I have been careful to avoid an implicit deference to the judgment of any man, I have been ready to give a patient hearing, and impartial examination, to reaſon and argument, from what quarter ſoever it proceeded. That a man differs from me on ſome articles, has given me no propenſity to reject his ſentiments on other articles; neither does the concurrence of his ſentiments with mine on ſome points, make me prone to admit his ſentiments on others. Truth I have always ſought (now there is no reſpect of perſons in this purſuit): and, if a man may pronounce ſafely on what paſſes within his own breaſt, I am warranted to ſay I have ſought it in the love of truth.

It muſt be acknowledged that though a blind attachment to certain favourite names has proved, to the generality of mankind, a copious ſource of error; an overweening conceit of their own reaſon has not proved leſs effectual in ſeducing many who affect to be conſidered as rational inquirers. In theſe I have often obſerved a fundamental miſtake, in relation to the proper province of the reaſoning faculty. With them reaſon is held the ſtandard of truth;

truth; whereas, it is, primarily, no more than the teſt or the touchſtone of evidence, and in a ſecondary ſenſe only the ſtandard of truth. Now the difference between theſe two, however little it may appear, on a ſuperficial view, is very great. When God revealed his will to men, he gave them ſufficient evidence, that the information conveyed to them by his miniſters, was a revelation from him. And it cannot be juſtly doubted that, without ſuch evidence, their unbelief and rejection of his miniſters would have been without guilt. *The works*, ſaid our Lord, *which the Father hath given me to finiſh, bear witneſs of me that the Father hath ſent me*, John v. 36. And again: *If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had ſin*, John xv. 24. His works were ſufficient evidence that what he taught was by commiſſion from God; and without ſuch evidence, he acknowledges their unbelief would have been blameleſs: whereas, on the contrary, having gotten ſuch evidence, there was nothing further they were intitled to, and conſequently their diſbelief was inexcuſible.

Some modern rationaliſts will ſay, 'Is not the ſubject itſelf 'ſubmitted to the teſt of reaſon, as well as the evidence?' It is readily granted, that a ſubject may be poſſeſſed of ſuch characters as are ſufficient ground of rejecting it in point of evidence, and is, therefore, in this reſpect, ſubmitted to the teſt of reaſon. If any thing were affirmed that is ſelf-contradictory, or any thing enjoined that is immoral, we have ſufficient internal evidence, that ſuch things cannot proceed from the Father of lights, and the Fountain of good, which all the external proofs that could be produced on the other ſide, would never be able to ſurmount. The proofs, in that caſe, might confound, but could not rationally convince the underſtanding. We may, for example, venture to aſſert, that no conceivable evidence from without, could render the theology of Heſiod or Homer, in any degree, credible. Thus far, therefore, it will be allowed, that reaſon is intitled to examine and judge concerning the ſubject itſelf: for there may be ſomething in the ſubject that may ſerve as evidence, either in its favour, or againſt it. At the ſame time it muſt be owned that, the more the ſubject is above the things which commonly fall under the diſcuſſion of our faculties, the narrower is the range of our reaſon; inſomuch that, in things ſo far beyond our reach as thoſe may be ſuppoſed to be which are conveyed by revelation from God, there is hardly any internal character that can be conſidered as ſufficient to defeat a claim, otherwiſe well ſupported, but either, as has been ſaid, abſurdity or immorality.

Now here lies the principal difference between the impartial ſeekers of truth, whoſe minds are unbiaſſed on every ſide, and thoſe who, under the appearence of exalting human reaſon, idolize all their own conceptions and prejudices. I ſpeak not of thoſe

thoſe who reject revelation altogether; but of thoſe who, whilſt they admit the truth of the Chriſtian revelation in general, conſider their own reaſon as competent to determine, and prejudge, as I may ſay, what it is fit for God, either to declare as truth, or to command as duty. Such people, for example, if they do not diſcover an uſeful purpoſe that any particular declaration in Scripture can anſwer, boldly conclude, in defiance of the cleareſt poſitive evidence, that it is not there: if they cannot divine the intention of Providence in the production of any being, or order of beings, of which there may be frequent mention in holy writ, they infer, that ſuch being, or order of beings, notwithſtanding the notice there taken of them, does not exiſt. They will not admit the reality of an operation of which they do not perfectly comprehend the manner, though the former may be a matter clearly revealed in Scripture, the latter not. Now, the rejection of the aid of reaſon altogether (the common error of fanatics of every denomination), and ſuch a conviction as that now deſcribed of its all-ſufficiency, are extremes which the judicious, but humble-minded Chriſtian, will think it incumbent on him equally to guard againſt.

Indeed thoſe deifiers of human reaſon, of whom I have been ſpeaking, ſeem, all the while to miſtake the proper province of reaſon. They proceed on the ſuppoſition that, from her own native ſtock, ſhe is qualified for the diſcovery of truth: of all ſuch truths, at leaſt, as are of any conſequence to a man to be acquainted with. The fact is nearly the reverſe: for except thoſe things which paſs within our own minds, and which we learn ſolely from what is called conſciouſneſs, and except the deductions made from ſelf-evident or mathematical axioms, all our information relating to fact, or exiſtence of any kind, is from without. Hence all our knowledge of arts, ſcience, languages; of hiſtory, philoſophy, and every thing in which human life is concerned. Do I, by this, mean to depreciate human reaſon as a thing of little conſequence? Far from it. Reaſon, I am ſenſible, is abſolutely neceſſary to render us capable of that information from without, by which we are enabled to make ſo great progreſs in knowledge. For want of this power entirely, or at leaſt in the requiſite degree, how little, comparatively, is the greateſt knowledge which the moſt ſagacious of the brute creation can attain? I cannot, therefore, be juſtly thought to derogate from a faculty which, by my hypotheſis, conſtitutes the radical diſtinction between man and beaſt. Would a man be underſtood to depreciate that admirable organ of the body, the eye, becauſe he affirmed, that unleſs the world, which is without the body, furniſhed us with light, our eyes could be of no ſervice to us? Reaſon is the eye of the mind: it is in conſequence of our poſſeſſing it, that we are ſuſceptible either of religion

gion or of law. Now the light by which the mental eye is informed, comes alſo from without, and conſiſts chiefly in teſtimony, human or divine.

I would recommend it, therefore, to thoſe who are accounted the moſt refined rationaliſts in religion to take the trouble to reflect a little, and inquire what is the method which they, and indeed all, muſt follow, in the acquiſition of human knowledge. In natural hiſtory, for example, how inſignificant would be our progreſs, if our conviction were to be regulated by the ſame maxims by which thoſe men ſeem to regulate their faith in matters of revelation? If our not knowing the uſe of any thing were a ſufficient reaſon for diſbelieving its exiſtence, how many animals, how many vegetables, how many inanimate ſubſtances, apparently uſeleſs, or even noxious, ſhould we diſcard out of our ſyſtems of nature, inflexibly denying that they exiſt any where, except in the diſordered imaginations of men? Nor ſhould we make greater proficiency in the other branches of ſcience. Of nothing have we clearer evidence than of this, that by means of the food which animals ſwallow, life is preſerved, the body is nouriſhed, the limbs gradually advance in ſtrength and ſize, to their full maturity. Yet, where is the philoſopher, where is the chemiſt, who can explain, or will pretend to underſtand, the proceſs whereby the nouriſhment is converted into chyle, and the chyle into blood, and the blood into ſkin, and fleſh, and bones and ſinews?

Now if, in matters of ſcience, merely human, our ignorance of the uſe, in the one caſe, and of the manner of operation, in the other, does not preclude our belief of the fact, a belief which ultimately reſts, in moſt caſes, on the teſtimony of our fellow-creatures; can we think it reaſonable to be more ſhy of admitting a fact, on the teſtimony of God, when, in effect, we admit that ſufficient ground is given us to conclude that we have his teſtimony? For I do not here argue with the deniers of revelation, but with thoſe who, profeſſing to believe it, reject its obvious meaning. Are we better acquainted with things divine than with things human? or with things eternal than with things temporal? Our Lord, in his converſation with Nicodemus, ſeemed to conſider it as an acknowledged truth, that things earthly are more level to the natural capacity of man than things heavenly, John iii. 12. Yet how ſoon would an effectual ſtop be put to our progreſs in every branch, even of earthly ſcience, were we to lay down as maxims, that the exiſtence of any being, however well atteſted, whereof we cannot diſcover the uſe, is not to be believed; and that the production of an effect, if we do not comprehend the mode of operation in the cauſe, is incredible? The much greater part of all human knowledge, whether of things corporeal or things ſpiritual, things terreſtrial, or

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things celeſtial, is originally from information. Revelation means no other than information from God; and whatever human knowledge we derive from the teſtimony of our fellow-mortals, which is more than ninety-nine parts in a hundred of all we are poſſeſſed of, is, if I may be allowed the expreſſion, a revelation from man. In regard to both, we ought, no doubt, in the firſt place, to be ſatisfied that we have the proper teſtimony; but when this point is aſcertained, I think it unaccountable to reject the obvious meaning of the divine teſtimony (which is indirectly to reject the teſtimony), on grounds which no judicious perſon would think ſufficient to warrant him in rejecting the teſtimony of a man of character. If ye have not ſatisfactory evidence, that what claims to be the teſtimony of God is really ſuch, ye are no doubt entitled to reject it. But do not firſt admit the teſtimony, and afterwards refuſe your aſſent to what it manifeſtly implies; and that for ſuch a reaſon as would prove no obſtacle to your aſſent, on the information of a fellow-mortal. This is ſurely the reverſe of what might be expected from a humble pious Chriſtian. *For if we receive the witneſs of men, the witneſs of God is greater.* 1 John v. 9.

Beſides, this conduct, in rejecting the obvious ſenſe of the divine teſtimony, is the more inexcuſable, as the circumſtance on which the rejection is founded, is ſuch as the whole analogy of nature leads us to expect in all the works of the Creator. If, in every part of the creation, we find that there are many creatures, the purpoſe of whoſe exiſtence we cannot inveſtigate; and that there are hardly any natural productions in which, though, from experience, we may diſcover the cauſe, we can trace its operation; it is but juſt to conclude, that this unſearchableneſs to human faculties, is a ſort of ſignature impreſſed on the works of the Moſt High, and which, when found in any thing atteſted as from him, ought to be held at leaſt a preſumption in favour of the teſtimony.

But though nothing can be more different from an implicit adoption of all the definitions, diſtinctions and particularities of a ſect, than the general diſpoſition of the rationaliſt; there is often a great reſemblance in their methods of criticiſing, and in the ſtretches which they make for diſguiſing the natural interpretation of the ſacred text. Each is, in this, actuated by the ſame motive, namely, to obtrude on others that interpretation which ſuits his favourite hypotheſis. And, if we may ſay of the one, that he is too fooliſh to be improved by teaching; we may, with equal juſtice, ſay of the other, that he is too wiſe to attend to it. Revelation, ſurely, was never intended for ſuch as he Our Lord ſaid to the Phariſees, that he came not *to call the righteous, but ſinners, to repentance,* Mat. ix. 13. We may, with like reaſon, ſay, he came not to inſtruct the *learned,* but the *ignorant.* Nay he, in effect,

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ſays ſo himſelf. It was to *babes* in knowledge, not to *ſages*, that the things of God were revealed by him, Math. xi 25. The diſpoſition of children, ſo often recommended as neceſſary for our giving a proper reception to the Goſpel, and obtaining admiſſion into the kingdom, refers as clearly to the teachable temper of children, free from prepoſſeſſions and ſelf-conceit, as to their humility and innocence. How ſtrongly is this ſentiment expreſſed by the Apoſtle: *If any man among you ſeemeth to be wiſe in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wiſe*, 1 Cor. iii. 18. The judicious and candid will not miſtake me, as, in matters of religion, decrying the uſe of reaſon, without which, I am ſenſible, we cannot proceed a ſingle ſtep; but as pointing out the proper application of this faculty.

In what concerns revelation, reaſon has a two-fold province; firſt, to judge whether what is preſented to us as a revelation from God, or, which is the ſame thing, as the divine teſtimony to the truth of the things therein contained, be really ſuch or not; ſecondly, to judge what is the import of the teſtimony given. For the former of theſe, firſt, the external evidences of Chriſtianity offer themſelves to our examination, prophecy, miracles, human teſtimony; and then the internal, ariſing from the character of the diſpenſation itſelf, its ſuitableneſs to the rational and moral nature of ſuch a creature as man. As to the ſecond point, the meaning of the revelation given; if God has condeſcended to employ any human language in revealing his will to men, he has, by employing ſuch an inſtrument, given us reaſon to conclude that, by the eſtabliſhed rules of interpretation in that language, his meaning muſt be interpreted. Otherwiſe the uſe of the language could anſwer no end, but either to confound, or to deceive. If the words of God were to be interpreted by another ſet of rules than that with which the grammar of the language, founded in general uſe, preſents us; with no propriety could it be ſaid, that the divine will is revealed to us, till there were a new revelation furniſhing us with a key for unlocking the old. This conſideration points to the neceſſity of the grammatical art, and of criticiſm, by means of which, readers, eſpecially of a diſtant age and country, muſt arrive at the requiſite proficiency in the language. As to both theſe, it is evident that the ſacred writers addreſs themſelves to our reaſon. *Why*, ſaid our Lord, Luke xii. 57. *even of yourſelves, judge ye not what is right?* And the Apoſtle Paul, 1 Cor. x. 15. *I ſpeak as to wiſe men, judge ye what I ſay.* With the firſt, the evidences of the truth of our religion, I am not here concerned. The great deſign of this work is, to deliver with plainneſs, in our own tongue, a very eſſential part of what was, more than ſeventeen centuries ago, communicated in another tongue, to the inhabitants of countries remote from ours. It was in order the more effectually

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to anſwer this end, particularly, to remove all prejudices and prepoſſeſſions which might prove obſtructions in the way, that I determined, on reflection, to add to the Verſion, the Preliminary Diſſertations, and the Notes.

The neceſſary aids for acquiring the knowledge of an ancient and foreign tongue, are more or fewer, according to the circumſtances of the caſe. The diſtance of time and place, and the great difference, in reſpect of cuſtoms, manners, and ſentiments, between thoſe to whom the ſacred writers firſt addreſſed themſelves, and the preſent inhabitants of this iſland, could not fail to occaſion our meeting with ſome difficulties. And, although it cannot be juſtly doubted, that a good deal of light has been thrown on ſome points, by the labours of former critics; it can as little be denied that, by the ſame means, many things have been involved in greater darkneſs. In other critical inquiries, wherein religion is not concerned, there is little to bias the judgment in pronouncing on what ſide the truth lies. But where religion is concerned, there are often, not only inveterate prejudices, but ſecular motives, to be ſurmounted, to whoſe influence few can boaſt an entire ſuperiority. Beſides, I ſhall have an opportunity to obſerve, in the ſequel, that, in what relates to this ſubject, there has come a gradual change on the meaning of many words, conſequent on the changes which have been gradually introduced into the church, in religious ceremonies, modes of government, and formularies of doctrine. Old names are given to things comparatively new, which have, by inſenſible degrees, ariſen out of the old, and have at laſt ſupplanted them.

To trace ſuch changes with accuracy, is an eſſential quality of philology. A tranſlator, when he finds that the words uſed by former tranſlators, though right at firſt, have ſince contracted a meaning different from that in which they were originally employed, ſees it neceſſary, that he may do juſtice both to his author and to his ſubject, to ſubſtitute ſuch terms as, to the beſt of his judgment, are adapted to convey thoſe ſentiments, and thoſe only, intended by the author. When a change is made from what people have been long accuſtomed to, it is juſtly expected that the reaſon, unleſs it be obvious, ſhould be aſſigned. Hence ariſes the propriety of *ſcholia*, or notes, both for vindicating the verſion, and for ſupplying further information, which, if not neceſſary to all, is, to moſt readers, highly uſeful. The frequent alluſions to rites, cuſtoms, and incidents, well known to the natives of the writer's country, and to his contemporaries, render ſuch occaſional illuſtrations, as can be given in the notes, very expedient for thoſe of diſtant lands and ages. It is not on account of any peculiar obſcurity in ſacred writ, that more has been judged requiſite in this way, with regard to it than with regard to any other writings; but partly on account of certain peculiarities in the caſe, and partly

partly on account of the ſuperior importance of the ſubject. Of both theſe I ſhall have occaſion to take notice in the Preliminary Diſſertations. There is a further uſe in bringing additional light for viewing theſe ſubjects in, though we admit that the light abſolutely neceſſary was not deficient before. To brighten our perceptions is to ſtrengthen them; and to ſtrengthen them, is to give them a firmer hold of the memory, and to render them more productive of all the good fruits that might naturally be expected from them. The moſt we can ſay of the beſt illuſtrations which, from the knowledge of Chriſtian antiquity, critics have been enabled to give the ſacred text, is like that which the ingenious author of Polymetis ſays, in regard to the utility of his enquiries into the remains of ancient ſculpture and painting, for throwing light upon the claſſics. "The chief uſe," ſays he, Dialogue VI. "I have found in this ſort of ſtudy, "has not been ſo much in diſcovering what was wholly un-"known, as in ſtrengthening and beautifying what was known "before. When the day was ſo much overcaſt juſt now, you "ſaw all the ſame objects that you do at preſent; theſe trees, "that river, the foreſt on the left hand, and thoſe ſpreading "vales to the right: but now the ſun is broke out, you ſee all "of them more clearly, and with more pleaſure. It ſhows "ſcarce any thing that you did not ſee before; but it gives a "new life and luſtre to every thing that you did ſee."

But it cannot be denied, that, on this ſubject, many things have been advanced, in the way of illuſtration, which have ſerved more to darken, than to illuminate, the ſacred pages. I have great reaſon to think that, in my reſearches into this matter, I have been impartial; but, whether I have been ſucceſsful, is another queſtion: for, though partiality in the method of conducting an enquiry, ſufficiently accounts for its proving unfruitful, the utmoſt impartiality will not always enſure ſucceſs. There are more conſiderations which, in a work of this kind, muſt be taken into view, than even readers of diſcernment will at firſt have any apprehenſion of. Several of the changes here adopted, in tranſlating both words and idioms, will, I know well, upon a ſuperficial view, be judged erroneous; and many of them will doubtleſs be condemned as frivolous, which, it is to be hoped, will, on deeper reflection, be admitted, by well informed judges, both to be more appoſite in themſelves, and to render the matter treated more perſpicuous.

In illuſtrating the principles on which ſome of the changes here made are founded, a great deal more, in the way of critical diſcuſſion, was found neceſſary, in order to do juſtice to the argument, than could, with propriety, be thrown into the notes. A conviction of this, firſt ſuggeſted the deſign of diſcuſſing ſome points more fully in preliminary diſſertations. This, however,

is not the only uſe which theſe diſcourſes were intended to anſwer. Though there has appeared, ſince the revival of letters in the Weſt, a numerous liſt of critics on the Bible, little has been done for aſcertaining the proper, and, in ſome reſpect, peculiar, rules of criticiſing the ſacred books; for pointing out the difficulties and the dangers to which the different methods have been expoſed, and the moſt probable means of ſurmounting the one, and eſcaping the other. Something in this way has been attempted here. Beſides, I have been the more free in applying my philological remarks in theſe diſcourſes, to various paſſages in the other apoſtolical writings, as I had a more extenſive view in tranſlating, when I firſt engaged in it, than that to which at laſt I found it neceſſary to confine myſelf.

I have endeavoured, in the interpretations given, to avoid, with equal care, an immoderate attachment to both extremes, *antiquity* and *novelty*. I am not conſcious that I have in any inſtance, been inclined to diſguiſe the falſity of an opinion, becauſe ancient, or with partial fondneſs, haſtily to admit its truth, becauſe new. That an opinion is the opinion of the multitude is, to ſome, a powerful recommendation; to others it appears an infallible criterion of error; to thoſe who are truly rational it will be neither. There are, indeed, many caſes wherein antiquity and univerſality are evidences of ſome importance. It has been, all along, my intention never to overlook theſe circumſtances, where they could be urged with propriety; for certain it is, that ſingularity is rather an unfavourable preſumption. But I hope that, with the help of ſome things which are treated in the Preliminary Diſſertations, the intelligent and candid reader will be convinced, that nowhere have I more effectually reſtored the undiſguiſed ſentiments of antiquity, than where I employ expreſſions which, at firſt ſight, may appear to proceed from the affectation of novelty. I have, to the utmoſt of my power, obſerved the injunction which God gave to the Prophet Jeremiah, Jer. vi. 16. I have *ſtood in the ways;* I have *looked and aſked for the old paths.* And if, in this reſearch, I have, in any inſtances proved ſucceſsful; men of diſcernment will, I am perſuaded, be ſenſible, that nowhere have I been luckier in conveying the genuine conceptions of the moſt venerable antiquity, than in thoſe places which, to a ſuperficial examination, will appear, in point of language, moſt chargeable with innovation. The very command, to look and to aſk for the old paths, implies that it may happen that the old paths are deſerted, conſequently untrodden, and known, comparatively, to very few. In that caſe, it is manifeſt that the perſon who would recommend them, runs the riſk of being treated as an innovator. This charge, therefore, of affecting novelty, though very common, muſt be, of all accuſations, the moſt equivocal; ſince, in certain

certain circumſtances, nothing can more expoſe a man to it, than an inflexible adherence to antiquity.

I may, in this work, have erred in many things; for to err is the lot of frail humanity; and no merely human production ever was, or ever will be, faultleſs. But I can ſay, with confidence, that I have not erred in any thing eſſential. And wherefore am I thus confident? Becauſe I am conſcious that I have aſſiduouſly looked and aſked for the old paths; that I have ſought out the good way; that I might, at all hazards, both walk therein myſelf, and recommend it to others: and becauſe I believe the word of the Lord Jeſus: *Whoſoever will do the will of God, ſhall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.* John vii. 17. This I think a ſufficient ſecurity, that no perſon, who is truly thus minded, ſhall err in what is eſſential. In what concerns the vitals of religion, rectitude of diſpoſition goes farther, even to enlighten the mind, than acuteneſs of intellect, however important this may be, in other reſpects. But the exerciſe of no faculty is to be deſpiſed, that can be rendered, in any degree, conducive to our advancement in the knowledge of God. Nay, it is our duty to exert every faculty in this acquiſition, as much as poſſible.

In an age like the preſent, wherein literary productions are ſo greatly multiplied, it is not matter of wonder, that readers, when they hear of any new work, enquire about what, in modern phraſe, is called the *originality* of the thoughts, and the beauties of ſtyle it poſſeſſes. The preſs teems daily with the labours of the learned. Plenty in this, as in every other commodity, makes people harder to be pleaſed: hence it happens that authors are ſometimes tempted, for the ſake of gratifying the over-nice and faſtidious taſte of their readers, to affect paradoxes, and to lay things extravagant and incredible, being more ſolicitous about the newneſs, or even the uncommonneſs, than about the truth of their ſentiments. Though I cannot help thinking this preference injudicious, whatever be the ſubject, it is highly blameable in every thing wherein religion or morals are concerned. To this humour, therefore, no ſacrifice can be expected here. The principal part of the preſent work is tranſlation. A tranſlator, if he do juſtice to his author and his ſubject, can lay no claim to originality. The thoughts are the author's: The tranſlator's buſineſs is to convey them unadulterated, in the words of another language. To blend them with his own ſentiments, or with any ſentiments which are not the author's, is to diſcharge the humble office of tranſlator unfaithfully. In the tranſlation here offered, I have endeavoured to conform ſtrictly to this obligation. As to the remarks to be found in the Diſſertations and Notes, nothing was farther from my purpoſe than, in any inſtance, to ſacrifice truth to novelty. At the ſame time I will, on the other hand,

hand, frankly acknowledge that, if I had not thought myſelf qualified to throw ſome light on this moſt important part of holy writ, no conſideration ſhould have induced me to obtrude my reflections on the Public. If I have deceived myſelf on this article, it is, at the worſt, a misfortune which appears to be very incident to authors. But, if ſome readers, for different readers will think differently, ſhould find me, on ſome articles, more chargeable with the extreme of novelty, than with that of triteneſs of ſentiment; I hope that the novelty, when narrowly examined, will be diſcovered, as was hinted above, to reſult from tracing out paths which had been long forſaken, and clearing the ancient ways of part of the rubbiſh in which, in the tract of ages, they had unhappily been involved. Thoſe who are profoundly read in theological controverſy, before they enter on the critical examination of the divine oracles, if they have the diſcernment to diſcover the right path which their former ſtudies have done much to prevent, and if they have the fortitude to perſevere in keeping that path, will quickly be ſenſible, that they have more to unlearn, than to learn; and that the acquiſition of truth is not near ſo difficult a taſk, as to attain a ſuperiority over rooted errors and old prejudices.

As to the expoſition of the text, where there is thought to be any difficulty, it is ſeldom that any thing new can be reaſonably expected. If, out of the many diſcordant opinions of former expoſitors, I ſhall be thought, by the judicious, to have generally choſen the beſt (that is, the moſt probable), I have attained, in regard to myſelf, my utmoſt wiſh. On this article, the exerciſe of judgment is requiſite, much more than of ingenuity. The latter but too often miſleads. In adopting the interpretation of any former tranſlator or expoſitor, I commonly name the author, if at the time he occur to my memory; but not when the expoſition has been ſo long, and is ſo generally, adopted, that it would be difficult to ſay from whom it originated. Let it be obſerved, alſo, that when no perſon is named, I do not claim to be conſidered as the diſcoverer myſelf. A perſon will remember to have heard or read a particular obſervation or criticiſm, though he does not recollect from whom, or in what book; nay, more, to reading and converſation we doubtleſs owe many ſentiments, which are faithfully retained, when the manner wherein they were acquired is totally forgotten.

For my own part, I do not pretend to much reading in this way. I have not been accuſtomed to read whole commentaries. My way is (what I recommend to others, eſpecially ſtudents), to conſult them only occaſionally, when, in reading, I meet with any difficulty; and not even then, till after other helps, particularly the various readings, the ancient verſions, the context, and the uſe of the ſacred writers in other paſſages, have been, with the

the aid of concordances, in vain recurred to. Some ſeem to make the whole ſtudy of Scripture merely an exerciſe of memory; in my opinion it conſiſts much more in the exerciſe of judgment and reflection. It is only thus that we can hope to attain that acuteneſs, and preſerve that impartiality, in judging, which will ſecure us againſt calling any *man father upon earth*. In this way, we ſhall avail ourſelves of the ſervices of the beſt expoſitors, on different, and even oppoſite, ſides, without ſubjecting ourſelves to any. We may expect to meet, in all of them, with faults and imperfections: but, if I can ſafely reaſon from experience, I do not heſitate to ſay, that the leaſt dogmatical, the moſt diffident of their own judgment, and moderate in their opinions of others, will be ever found the moſt judicious. Thoſe, on the contrary, who are either the idolaters of their own reaſon, or blindly devoted to that of ſome favourite doctor, to whom they have implicitly reſigned their underſtandings, diſplay as often the talent of darkening a clear paſſage, as of enlightening a dark one. However I am far from thinking that even ſuch may not be ſometimes conſulted with advantage. Conſiderable abilities are often united in the ſame perſon with conſiderable defects. And whatever a man's prepoſſeſſions in point of opinion may be, there are ſome things in Scripture which cannot be ſaid to have any relation to them. In regard to all ſuch, it may juſtly be expected, that learning and talents will produce ſome light. There are few, therefore, who have really the advantages of literature and abilities, who, whatever be the party or ſyſtem to which they have attached themſelves, may not occaſionally prove uſeful aids.

For the readings here adopted, I have been chiefly indebted to the valuable folio edition of the Greek New Teſtament publiſhed by Mill, and that publiſhed by Wetſtein, but without blindly following the opinion of either. In the judgments formed by theſe editors, with reſpect to the true reading, they appear to be in extremes, the former often acquieſces in too little evidence, the latter requires too much. This, at leaſt, holds in general. But whether I agree with, or differ from, either, or both of theſe, about any particular reading by which the ſenſe is affected; that every intelligent reader may judge for himſelf, I commonly aſſign my reaſon in the notes. I do not, therefore, mean to enter farther into the ſubject, or to examine the critical canons on which they found, or the opinions they have given on the comparative excellence of different manuſcripts and verſions. What has been written on this ſubject by Simon, Bengelius, Michaelis, and others, render any diſcuſſion here the leſs neceſſary.

For the ancient verſions, where it appeared proper, I have had recourſe to Walton's Polyglot; of ſome, as the Syriac, the Gothic,

Gothic, or as it is now with greater probability accounted, the Frankiſh, the Anglo-Saxon, the modern Greek, and the Vulgate, I have copies, as well as of all the modern tranſlations quoted in this work. All the late Engliſh tranſlations, of any account, I had provided. There is indeed one, or perhaps two, that I have not met with, about which, to ſay the truth, from the accounts I have had of their plan and method, and from ſome ſpecimens, I have not felt much ſolicitude. I am, however, far from ſaying that theſe may not alſo have their uſe, and be, in expreſſing ſome things, luckier than verſions which are, on the whole, ſuperior.

As to the language, particularly of the verſion itſelf, ſimplicity, propriety, and perſpicuity, are the principal qualities at which I have aimed. I have endeavoured to keep equally clear of the finery of Arias, and the finery of Caſtalio. If I have hazarded, on any occaſion, incurring the cenſure of the generality of readers, on account of the diction, I am certain it is in thoſe places where, from a deſire of conveying neither more nor leſs than the exact thought of the author, I have ventured to change ſome expreſſions to which our ears have been long acuſtomed. But on this point I mean to ſay nothing further in this place. The reaſons on which I have proceeded, in ſuch alterations, are fully explained in the preliminary diſcourſes, which I conſider as ſo neceſſary to the vindication of many things in the tranſlation, that I do not wiſh the judicious reader, if, in any degree, acquainted with the original, to read the Verſion, till he has given theſe Diſſertations a very attentive and ſerious peruſal.

As I have never yet ſeen a tranſlation of the Bible, or of any part of it, into any language I am acquainted with, which I did not think might be, in ſeveral places, altered for the better, I am not vain enough to imagine that the verſion here preſented to the public will, by any claſs of readers, be accounted faultleſs. Part of this work has long lain by me in manuſcript; for I may juſtly ſay of it what Auguſtin, if I remember right, ſays of one of his treatiſes, *Juvenis inchoavi, ſenex edidi.* Now, in that part I have been making corrections, or at leaſt alterations, every year; and I have no reaſon to doubt that, if it were to lie longer by me, I ſhould ſtill be altering and correcting. As I am not an implicit follower of any man, becauſe I think no man can plead an exemption from either faults in practice, or errors in opinion, I am, at the ſame time, far from arrogating to myſelf a merit which I refuſe to acknowledge in others. It is not difficult to make me diſtruſt my own judgment, and impartially re-examine my own reaſoning. I ſay *impartially*, becauſe I am conſcious that I have often, in this manner, reviſed what I had advanced, when I found that it was objected to by a perſon of diſcernment; and,

and, in consequence of the revisal, I have been convinced of my mistake. I will venture to promise therefore, that I shall give all due attention to any criticisms or remarks, candid or uncandid, which shall be made on any part of this work. Criticisms made in an uncandid manner may, as to the matter of them, be well founded, and, on that account, deserve attention. But if there appear neither reason in the matter of the criticism, nor candour in the manner of producing it, the most prudent part in an author is to let it pass without notice.

If the language of the translation, in the second volume, shall be thought not unsuitable, and sufficiently perspicuous, I have, in what concerns the expression, attained my principal object. The rest, I imagine, will be intelligible enough to those who are conversant in questions of Christian antiquities and criticism. Sensible of the disadvantages, in point of style, which my northern situation lays me under, I have availed myself of every opportunity of better information, in regard to all those terms and phrases in the version, of which I was doubtful. I feel myself under particular obligations on this account to one gentleman, my valuable friend and colleague, Dr Beattie, who, though similarly situated with myself, has, with greater success, studied the genius and idiom of our language; and of whom it is no more than justice to add, that the acknowledged purity of his own diction is the least of his many qualifications as an author. But if, notwithstanding all the care I have taken, I shall be found in many places to need the indulgence of the English reader, it will not much surprise me. One who often revises and alters, will sometimes alter for the worse; and, in changing, one has not always at hand a friend to consult with. The apology which Ireneus, bishop of Lyons in Gaul, in the second century, makes for his language, in a book he published in defence of religion, appears to me so candid, so modest, so sensible, and at the same time so apposite to my own case, that I cannot avoid transcribing and adopting it:—"Non autem exquires a nobis qui apud Celtas "commoramur, et in barbarum sermonem plerumque avocamur, "orationis artem quam non didicimus, neque vim conscriptoris "quam non affectavimus, neque ornamentum verborum, neque "suadelam quam nescimus: sed simpliciter et vere et idiotice, ea "quæ tibi cum dilectione scripta sunt, cum dilectione percipies; "et ipse augeas ea penes te, ut magis idoneus quam nos, quasi "semen et initia accipiens a nobis; et in latitudine sensus tui, in "multum fructificabis ea, quæ in paucis a nobis dicta sunt; et "potenter asseres iis qui tecum sunt, ea quæ invalide a nobis re-"lata sunt."—Adversus Hæreses, Lib. i. Prefatio.

Need I, in so late and so enlightened an age, subjoin an apology for the design itself, of giving a new translation of any part of Scripture? Yet there are some knowing and ingenious men, who

who ſeem to be alarmed at the mention of tranſlation, as if ſuch an attempt would ſap the very foundations of the Chriſtian edifice, and put the faith of the people in the moſt imminent danger of being buried in its ruins. This is no new apprehenſion. The ſame alarm was taken ſo early as the fourth century, when Jerom was employed in preparing a new tranſlation of the Bible into Latin; or, at leaſt, in making ſuch alterations and corrections on the old Italic, as the original, and the beſt Latin manuſcripts, ſhould appear to warrant. The people in general exclaimed; and even the learned were far from applauding an attempt which, in their judgment, was ſo bold and ſo dangerous. I do not allude to the abuſe thrown out by Ruffinus, becauſe he was then at variance with Jerom on another account; but even men, who were conſidered as the lights of the age, were not without their fears. Auguſtin, in particular, who admired the profound erudition of Jerom, and had a high eſteem of his talents, yet dreaded much, that the conſequence of ſuch an undertaking would prove prejudicial to the authority of Scripture, and did not heſitate to expreſs his diſapprobation in very ſtrong terms. That interpreter, however, perſevered, in ſpite of the greateſt diſcouragements, the diſſuaſion of friends, the invectives of enemies, and the unfavourable impreſſions which, by their means, were made upon the people. The verſion was made and publiſhed; and thoſe hideous bugbears of fatal conſequences, which had been ſo much deſcanted on, were no more heard of.

Luckily, no attempt was made to eſtabliſh the new verſion, by public authority. Though Damaſus, then biſhop of Rome, was known to favour it, the attempt to obtrude it upon the people, would probably have awaked ſuch a perſecution againſt it, as would have ſtifled it in the birth. On the contrary, its ſucceſs was left entirely, as it ought to be, to the efficiency of its own merit. In conſequence of this, the prejudice very ſoon ſubſided: many of thoſe who were at firſt declared enemies of the undertaking, were entirely reconciled to it. Auguſtin, himſelf, came to be convinced that it was guiltleſs of thoſe horrors which his warm imagination had foreboded. Nay, he did not ſcruple to recur to it for aid, in explaining the Scriptures. The verſion, thus quietly introduced about the end of the fourth, or the beginning of the fifth, century, and left to its fate, to be uſed by thoſe who liked it, and neglected by thoſe who diſliked it, advanced in reputation every day. The people very ſoon, and very generally, diſcovered that, along with all the ſimplicity they could deſire, it was, in every reſpect, more intelligible, and, conſequently both more inſtructive, and more agreeable, than the old. The immediate effect of this general conviction, was greatly to multiply the copies, which proved, in a very few centuries, the total extinction of the Italic, formerly called the Vulgate,

gate, verſion, and the eſtabliſhment of the preſent Vulgate, or Jerom's tranſlation in its room. To make this ſudden revolution, which is a matter of ſo much importance, better underſtood by the unlearned, it is proper to obſerve, that it was in conſequence of no law of the church, or indeed of any Chriſtian country, that the old Italic firſt, and the preſent Vulgate afterwards, were uſed in churches in the offices of religion. Such matters were regulated in every individual church, by the biſhop and preſbyters of that church, as appeared moſt for the edification of the people. Now the general and growing reputation of the new verſion, made it ſoon ſupplant the old. As it was not to any law of church or ſtate, that the Italic owed its promotion at firſt; ſo it required no law of either to make it give place quietly to a better verſion. After this of Jerom had come gradually to obtain every where the preference, and to be uſed in private families by individuals, it might be expected that ſo general an approbation would gradually uſher it into the churches. For an authoritative ſentence, of either pope or council, in favour of any tranſlation, was a thing unheard of till the 16th century, when the decree of the council of Trent was obtained in favour of the preſent Vulgate. Now the Vulgate, we may obſerve by the way, had been, for ages before, by the tacit conſent of all ranks, in full poſſeſſion of all the prerogatives conferred by that council.

But, though the introduction of a new tranſlation produced none of thoſe terrible conſequences which had been preſaged; though, on the contrary, by rendering the ſtyle of Scripture purer, as well as more perſpicuous, it came ſoon to be read by the people with greater pleaſure and improvement; yet it muſt be owned, that the clamour and jealouſies that had been raiſed on this ſubject, were productive of one very unfavourable effect upon the interpreter. Though it did not make him deſiſt from his undertaking, it made him proſecute it with a timidity which has proved hurtful to the work itſelf. Many things which, by the old interpreter, had been improperly rendered; many things which had been obſcurely, or even unintelligibly expreſſed, Jerom, through dread of the ſcandal which too many changes might occaſion, has left as he found them. We have, therefore, the utmoſt reaſon to conclude, that to this cauſe alone it is imputable, that the preſent Vulgate is not greatly ſuperior to what we find it. Jerom was ſtrongly impreſſed with a ſenſe of the danger to which his attempt expoſed him. This appears from many parts of his writings; particularly from his letter to Pope Damaſcus, prefixed to the Tranſlation of the Goſpels:—"Periculoſa pre-"ſumptio," ſays he, "judicare de cæteris, ipſum ab omnibus "judicandum: ſenis mutare linguam, et caneſcentem mundum "ad initia retrahere parvulorum. Quis, enim, doctus pariter vel

 "indoctus;

" indoctus; cum in manus volumen assumpserit; et a saliva quam " semel imbibit, viderit discrepare, quod lectitat; non statim " erumpat in vocem, me falsarium, me clamans esse sacrilegum, " qui audeam aliquid in veteribus libris, addere, mutare, corri- " gere."

How dismal were the apprehensions which were entertained immediately after the Reformation, on account of the many translations of Scripture which came in quick succession, one after another! Have men's fears been justified by the effect? Quite the reverse. The violent concussion of parties at the Reformation produced, as might have been expected, a number of controversies, which were, for some time, hotly agitated; but the greater part of these were in being before those versions were made. And if a few have arisen since, many have subsided, which once made a great noise, and produced a great ferment in the church. Nothing will be found to have conduced more to subvert the dominion of the metaphysical theology of the schoolmen, with all its interminable questions, cobweb distinctions, and wars of words, than the critical study of the sacred Scriptures, to which the modern translations have not a little contributed. Nothing has gone farther to satisfy reasonable men that, in many of the profound disputes of theologians, revelation could not, with justice, be accused of giving countenance to either side. Yet no disputes have been productive of more rancour in the disputants, or been carried on with greater virulence, than those which are merely verbal.

It has been said, that the introduction of different translations tends to unsettle men in their principles, particularly with regard to the authority of sacred writ, which, say they, is made to speak so variously in these productions. For my part, I have not discovered that this is, in any degree, the effect. The agreement of all the translations, as to the meaning in every thing of principal consequence, makes their differences, when properly considered, appear as nothing. They are but like the inconsiderable variations in expression which different witnesses, though all perfectly unexceptionable, employ in relating the same fact. They rather confirm men's faith in Scripture, as they shew, in the strongest light, that all the various ways which men of discordant sentiments have devised of rendering its words, have made no material alteration, either on the narrative itself, or on the divine instructions contained in it. People are at no loss to discover, that the difference among interpreters lies chiefly in this, that one renders the account of things which that book exhibits, more intelligible, more perspicuous, or even more affecting, than another. These differences are, I acknowledge, of great moment to readers; they are such as may shew one version to be greatly superior to another in point of use; yet, as they are all

all compatible with juſtneſs of repreſentation in every thing eſſential to the hiſtorical and didactic parts of the work, they are ſo far from affecting the credibility of the whole, that they ſerve not a little to confirm it. A gentleman, who knows neither Greek nor Hebrew, but underſtands Latin, and ſeveral modern tongues, told me once, he had read the New Teſtament in different languages, and that he had reaped conſiderable benefit from the practice in more ways than one; particularly in this, that thoſe verſions ſerved as vouchers for the fidelity of one another, by their concurrence in every thing eſſential in that book; for when it was conſidered that the tranſlators were not only men of different nations, but of hoſtile ſects, Roman Catholics, church of England men, Lutherans, Calviniſts, Remonſtrants, &c. their perfect harmony on all material points, is the beſt pledge we could deſire of their veracity.

Of nearly the ſame kind and conſequence have been the fears which even judicious men have entertained about the publication of the various readings of the Scriptures. Theſe readings are tremendous only when conſidered in a general view, and when we are told of the number they amount to. Nothing ſerves more to undeceive us, than to conſider them in detail, and fairly examine thoſe collections. I will acknowledge, for one, that I believe I ſhould not have been eaſily perſuaded till I made the experiment, that the authority of Scripture could be ſo little injured by them. The actual collection is, therefore, of great conſequence for ſatisfying candid and reaſonable men, that there is nothing in them ſo formidable as the vague and general repreſentations of their number and weight would lead men to conclude. Now, if ſuch a man as Dr Whitby, a man of diſtinguiſhed learning and abilities, was alarmed at Mill's publication, as dangerous to the cauſe, not only of Proteſtantiſm, but of Chriſtianity itſelf, we need not be ſurpriſed that men of inferior talents, and leſs acquainted with the ſcience of criticiſm, ſhould look on the edition of the Old Teſtament by Kennicot, or of the New by Mill, or by Wetſtein, as, at leaſt, a very hazardous experiment. Yet, now that the experiment has been made, is there any appearance of thoſe evils which have been dreaded from it? I am not ſenſible that there is. It is true, that Kennicot's publication of the Old Teſtament is ſo recent, that we have ſcarcely yet had time to diſcover its conſequences; but if we may judge from the reception given to the New, we have no ground to fear them. Mill's work has been now in the hands of the Public for more than half a century, and Wetſtein's for not much leſs. Yet it is not in my power to diſcover that, in the judgment of any reaſonable man, or even in the judgment of the people, the cauſe of Chriſtianity has ſuffered by theſe publications. I know that the moſt enlightened readers have judged them to be,

be, in many reſpects, of ſervice to the cauſe; and the opinion of the moſt enlightened, where there is no interference of ſecular motives, or of violent meaſures, will always prove at laſt the opinion of the generality.

Soon after Mill's edition appeared, which was about the beginning of the laſt century, the various readings of the New Teſtament became a topic for declamation to ſceptics and free-thinkers. There needed but a little time, in which men might canvaſs thoſe variations, to convince every perſon who reflected, that there was nothing terrible in the caſe. Accordingly, he would now be deemed but a ſorry advocate for the infidel hypotheſis, who ſhould have recourſe to an argument which, if allowed to have any validity, would ſubvert our belief in all hiſtory whatever, as well as in that of the goſpels; for the writings of the Old and New Teſtament have not been expoſed to more hazards from tranſcribers, than other ancient writings. Now, if any one ſhould ſay, We can believe nothing in ancient hiſtory, on account of the variations to be found in the different editions and manuſcripts of the different authors, no man of common ſenſe would think him fit to be argued with. Yet there is one reaſon, without recurring to a miraculous interpoſition, to think, that we have more ſecurity of a faithful tranſmiſſion of the Scriptures, than of any compoſition merely human. The ſuppoſed ſacredneſs of the former, ſerves as a guard to them, and makes at leaſt the greater part of tranſcribers afraid to take thoſe freedoms with them which they would, without ſcruple, take with other writings. The exceſſive, nay, even ſuperſtitious ſcrupuloſity, which has given riſe to ſo many abſurdly literal verſions of Scripture, is a ſtrong preſumption of the truth of what I ſay.

Thoſe who conſider religion as no other than a political engine, have reaſon, I own, to be alarmed. But thoſe, on the contrary, who are perſuaded that the religion of Jeſus is founded in truth, and conſequently divine, are inexcuſable in their fears of canvaſſing it as much as poſſible. It is falſehood, not truth; it is guilt, not innocence, which ſtudiouſly excludes the light, and flies examination. This our reaſon teaches; this our religion alſo teaches. *For whoſoever doth evil*, ſays our Lord, John iii. 20, 21. *hateth the light, and ſhunneth it, leſt his deeds ſhould be detected. But he who obeyeth the truth, cometh to the light, that it may be manifeſt that his actions are agreeable to God.* Fears of this kind, in theſe latter ages, (for from the beginning they were not), originated with the Romaniſts. The Proteſtants thought they ſaw clearly the reaſon of their apprehenſions on this ſubject, and were not ſurpriſed at them. The meaſures employed by the party were all of a piece, and not badly ſuited to the end they had in view. Such were their *index expurgatorius*, their inquiſitions, their licenſers of books, their prohibitions, and other

ether methods, for diſcouraging tranſlations of the Scriptures, and for preventing the people's becoming acquainted with them. Of ſuch meaſures the ſecret ſprings, as well as the manifeſt tendency, furniſhed ample matter of declamation to the adverſaries of the Romiſh eſtabliſhment.

It is not with pleaſure that I add, but impartiality obliges me, for it is too true, that when matters in any place took ſuch a turn, as to throw the ſecular power into the hands of any party of ſuch adverſaries, thoſe of that party too often betrayed a propenſity to recur to ſome of the meaſures they had before ſo univerſally and ſo loudly reprobated. We may, however, now, with ſome confidence, affirm, that it is rather too late a period in the age of the world to think of ſuch odious expedients. By the invention of printing, and by the many diſcoveries and improvements which have extended the intercourſe of nations, the acquiſition of knowledge is, at preſent, ſo much facilitated and accelerated, in all civilized countries, that it will not be checked in its progreſs, nor will truth be overborne, by thoſe expedients which were found fully ſufficient for the purpoſe formerly. Nay, ſo evident is this become, that even that formidable power which ſo long made ignorance a principal engine of government, ſeems compelled at length to ſhift her ground, and to appear among the foremoſt in patronizing what muſt conduce to the furtherance of knowledge.

It is little more than two centuries ſince the authenticity of the Vulgate verſion was formally affirmed, by a decree of the council of Trent. Immediately after that ſentence, it appears to have been the prevalent opinion of zealous Romaniſts, that that tranſlation ought to be conſidered as inſpired, and conſequently as abſolutely faultleſs. On this account, the champions of the party did not heſitate to exalt it far above the original, which, though they acknowledged to have been inſpired, they affirmed to have been, ſince that time, miſerably corrupted in paſſing through the hands of collators and copiſts. In about a century after, how much more moderate the opinions, even of Romaniſts, were become, appears ſufficiently from what we are informed of on this ſubject in Simon's Critical Hiſtory. The high ſtyle, ſo common with former theologians and controvertiſts, was heard no more. All moderate and judicious Romaniſts were aſhamed of it. The prevalent opinion of ſuch was then, what no reaſonable Proteſtant will diſſent from at this day, that, in every thing eſſential to the faith and practice of a Chriſtian, it was a good verſion, and might be ſafely uſed. "Opinionum commenta delet "dies." Let not the hand of power interfere; let there be neither bribes nor terrors to bias the mind on either ſide; and men of the moſt oppoſite factions will ſoon become reaſonable, and learn to underſtand one another. Free and fair diſcuſſion will

will ever be found the firmeſt friend to truth. At the time I ſpeak of, the moſt moderate of the Roman Catholic party were, however, convinced that, in deference to the council's declaration, every true ſon of the church, who purpoſed to tranſlate the Scriptures into the vulgar tongue, for the uſe of the people, ought to tranſlate from the Vulgate verſion only. What then would thoſe people have thought of a new tranſlation into Latin, by one of their own prieſts, from the original Hebrew and Greek? They had ſome ſpecious grounds, I acknowledge, for conſidering it as preſumptuous, at leaſt in the appearance which it has, of ſetting up the opinion of an individual, in oppoſition to the declared judgment of the church. Yet, in little more than half a century after the publication of the Critical Hiſtory, another prieſt of the oratory undertook, and, with the Pope's approbation, executed a new tranſlation of the Old Teſtament from the original into Latin, in which he corrects the errors of the Vulgate, with as much freedom as any candid Proteſtant could have done. Is there not reaſon then to ſay, that Rome ſeems to have changed her meaſures? How great was the encouragement which was given lately by the moſt eminent perſonages in that church, to the labours of an Engliſh Proteſtant, who undertook to give the Public a more correct edition of the Hebrew Scriptures, with the various readings, than the Chriſtian world had enjoyed before?

But if Rome, from whatever motive it may ariſe, ſhall now, at length, judge it proper to contribute to the advancement of knowledge, and aſſiſt in furniſhing the world with light and information; is it incumbent on Proteſtants, in oppoſition to all their former maxims, to do their utmoſt to with-hold the light, and involve matters, as much as poſſible, in darkneſs? Might it not, in that caſe, be juſtly concluded, that they were actuated, not by the love of truth, but by the ſpirit of faction; and that they had become at laſt enemies to the light, finding, upon further inquiry, that the light was no friend to their cauſe? As no judicious Proteſtant can ſeriouſly think that there is ground for ſuſpecting this, let not any one act as if he ſuſpected it. If there were ground for ſuſpicion, this itſelf would be an additional reaſon for inquiry; unleſs we are abſurd enough to be more attached to a ſect than to truth; and to have more of that bigotry, and implicit faith, which are of the eſſence of ſuperſtition, than we have of genuine religion, which is ever found a reaſonable ſervice, and as completely amiable as the other is hateful.

Yet, is there not, even in ſome who are the friends of truth, and the friends of freedom, who, in religion, as in other matters, would give ſcope to inquiry and communication; a ſort of jealouſy, on the article of tranſlation, which makes them leſs equitable, leſs candid, judges, in regard to it, than in regard to any other

other matter that comes under their diſcuſſion? They are jealous for the honour of the common verſion; and though they are far from aſcribing any ſupernatural power to the tranſlators, they are afraid of the detection of any error which might make that verſion ſink in the opinion of the people. 'This,' ſay they, 'could 'not be productive of a good effect, either on the faith of the 'nation, or on their practice; for, as the people cannot be ſup-'poſed nice in diſtinguiſhing, their Bible and their religion are to 'them the ſame thing. By diſcrediting the one, ye injure the 'other; and, by introducing queſtions about the proper render-'ing of a particular paſſage, ye weaken the effect of the whole.' As there is ſome plauſibility in this method of arguing, I beg leave to offer a few more thoughts on the ſubject.

In every queſtion relating to fact, where experience may be had, our ſafeſt recourſe is to experience. Since the beginning of the ſixteenth century, many Latin tranſlations of the Bible, of very different characters, have been publiſhed. Can we juſtly ſay that, by means of theſe, the authority of Scripture, among thoſe who do not underſtand the original, but are readers of thoſe verſions, has been weakened, and ſcepticiſm has been promoted? I do not think that, with any ſhadow of reaſon, this can be aſſerted. If people will but reflect, they will ſoon be ſenſible, that it is not among the readers of Scripture, either in the original, or in tranſlations, that thoſe evils chiefly abound. But there are many other ſpecies of reading, and many other cauſes to be traced, by which the effects above mentioned may be amply accounted for. To me it is evident, that of all ſorts of reading and ſtudy, that of the Scriptures is the moſt innocent of thoſe evil conſequences. So the ſacred writers, themſelves, have thought, by whom this reading is often and warmly recommended, and not only reading the Scriptures, but ſearching into them, and meditating on them. Now, thoſe who ſeriouſly comply with theſe injunctions, will never reject any aid by which they may be enabled to diſcover what lies deeper than the ſurface; ſo, alſo, have thought thoſe pious men celebrated in Scripture, as having drawn much profit and delight from this exerciſe. I would not ſay ſo much for the reading of theological controverſy; yet I would not that men, who liked this ſpecies of reading, were reſtrained from uſing it. The accidental bad conſequences which may accrue to individuals, from any literary purſuit, are of no conſideration, compared with the general advantage reſulting from the liberty of ſearch, and free communication of knowledge. No perſon would think it better for the world that all men were enſlaved, becauſe ſome men make a very bad uſe of their freedom.

On the firſt publication of Eraſmus' tranſlation of the New Teſtament into Latin, much offence was taken by many, and diſmal

diſmal apprehenſions were entertained of the hurt it would do to the cauſe of religion and Chriſtianity. Even men who were eſteemed both moderate and judicious, ſeemed to think that it was, at leaſt, a hazardous experiment. The experiment, however, has been tried, not only by him, but by ſeveral others ſince his time. Yet there is not one, as far as I can learn, who has pretended to deduce from that, or any other tranſlation, the irreligion and incredulity of the times.

To come to our own caſe; Have the attempts which have been made in this iſland, I may almoſt ſay, ſince the days of Wickliff, to tranſlate the Scriptures into Engliſh, ever been found to leſſen their authority? I have not heard this affirmed by any body. Yet every new verſion altered, and pretended to correct, many things in thoſe which had preceded. But whatever may be the private judgment of individuals, concerning the comparative merit of the different tranſlations, we cannot diſcover any traces of evidence, that their number did, in the ſmalleſt degree, derogate from the veneration for holy writ generally entertained by the people. Againſt the common tranſlation, in uſe at preſent, which was made and authoriſed in the beginning of the reign of James the Firſt, there were preciſely the ſame exceptions taken, founded in the like apprehenſions of pernicious conſequences. Whoever will conſult the preface of that tranſlation, and read the paragragh which is titled on the margin, *The ſpeeches and reaſons both of our brethren and of our adverſaries againſt this work*; will be ſurpriſed to find how much they coincide with what has been thrown out, of late, againſt any new attempt of the ſame kind. It is remarkable that, from the days of Jerom to the preſent, the ſame terrible forebodings have always accompanied the undertaking, and vaniſhed on the execution, inſomuch that the fatal effects predicted, have never afterwards been heard of.

Now, to take the matter in another view; the cauſe aſſigned is nowiſe adequate to the effect. If the different ways of rendering one paſſage may make the unlearned doubtful with regard to the meaning of that paſſage, the perfect harmony of the different interpreters, as far as regards the ſenſe, in many more paſſages; nay I may juſtly ſay, in every thing that can be conſidered as eſſential in the hiſtory and doctrine, ſerves as the ſtrongeſt confirmation of theſe in particular. The different tranſlators are like ſo many different touchſtones. Thoſe truths which can ſtand ſuch numerous trials, are rendered quite indubitable. I know not any, even of the common people that are poſſeſſed of an ordinary meaſure of underſtanding, who need to be told, that it is in the meaning, and not in the ſound, that the doctrine of the Goſpel lies: or, as the Engliſh tranſlators have well expreſſed it: "Is the kingdom of God become words or ſyllables? Why

"ſhould

"ſhould we be in bondage to them, if we may be free?" When people find thoſe tranſlations, though differing in words, yet in every thing material, agreeing in ſenſe, they prove to them, as was hinted before, like ſo many different witneſſes, each in his own ſtyle, and in his own manner, atteſting the ſame things, the great truths of our religion. They are witneſſes, who perfectly agree in the import of their teſtimony: their differences in expreſſion, far from derogating, in the judgment of any ſenſible reader, from their veracity, ſerve to eſtabliſh it, and, conſequently, prove confirmations of the facts atteſted. Various tranſlations are, therefore, upon the whole, much better calculated for confirming, than for weakening, the faith of the unlearned.

Has the margin, in the Engliſh Bible, which, in a very great number of paſſages, gives every reader his choice of different tranſlations, ever been found to endanger the faith of the people? or, has it ever been ſuggeſted to have the ſame tendency with the arguments of the deiſts? Yet what ſhould more readily, upon the principles of thoſe gentlemen with whom I am arguing, have produced this effect, than the confeſſion (for their margin manifeſtly implies no leſs) of thoſe learned men who were employed in the work, of the numerous doubts which they had to encounter in the execution. They have honeſtly told their doubts, and, as far as I know, were never ſuſpected of having done any hurt to the cauſe by this ingenuous conduct. On the other hand, I am ſorry to obſerve men of knowledge, diſcernment, and probity, appearing in ſupport of meaſures which ſeem to proceed on the ſuppoſition, that a ſort of diſingenuous policy muſt be uſed with the people for the defence of the truth. However neceſſary diſſimulation and pious frauds, as they are called, may be for the ſupport of falſe, I have never ſeen them of any ſervice to true religion. If not treacherous, they are dangerous allies at the beſt.

That one verſion expreſſes the ſentiment more intelligibly, more perſpicuouſly, or more emphatically than another, will indeed occaſion its being read with more pleaſure, and even more profit; but it will never, on that account, be conſidered by any as giving a contradictory teſtimony. Yet it is ſuch oppoſition of evidence that is the only circumſtance which can affect the veracity of holy writ, and conſequently the credit given to it by the people. And ſurely whatever can, on the contrary, be rendered conducive to the emolument of the reader, cannot be prejudicial to the cauſe of religion, or diſreſpectful to the word of God, which does not conſiſt in the words of any tranſlation, but in the dictates of the divine Spirit.

The words of a tranſlation that has been long in common uſe, have an advantage, of which they cannot be of a ſudden diveſted. The advantage reſults from this very circumſtance, that it

has been long in general uſe, and men are familiarized to its expreſſions. But, notwithſtanding this, it may have conſiderable faults; it may, in ſeveral places, be obſcure; and, though it ſhould very rarely convey a falſe ſenſe, it may be often ambiguous. In this caſe, a new verſion will be of great utility, if it were but for rendering the old more intelligible. For my part, I ſhall think my labour more than ſufficiently recompenſed, if, by the pious and the impartial, I ſhall be judged to expreſs no extravagant opinion, and to form no preſumptuous hope, when I ſay, in the words which Eraſmus employed on a ſimilar occaſion: "Illa [Vulgata editio] legatur in ſcholis, canatur in templis, ci-"tetur in conſcionibus, nullius obſtat. Illud auſim polliceri, quiſ-"quis hanc noſtram domi legerit, ſuam rectius intellecturus."—Eraſm. in Apolog.

Some perhaps are ready to interpoſe, 'If tranſlations were to 'be uſed only as private helps for underſtanding the Scriptures, 'as commentaries and paraphraſes are uſed, they would not be ob-'jected to; but what has alarmed the minds of men on this article, 'is that, of late, ſome attempts have been made to perſuade the 'public of the need there is for a new and more correct tranſlation 'of the Bible, with the ſanction of the higher powers, for the uſe 'of churches.' As to any project of this kind, I can ſay very little, as I know not, in particular, what is projected. At the ſame time I muſt acknowledge that, in the general view, it appears to me a very delicate point. To eſtabliſh a verſion of Scripture by human authority, to be uſed by the people (without any regard had to their ſentiments) in the public ſervice of God, to the expreſs excluſion of every other verſion, is a meaſure, about the propriety of which, at any time, I am far from being ſatisfied. The public uſe of particular tranſlations of the Bible in the churches, oriental and occidental, for many centuries, took its riſe ſolely from the general uſe in private; and to this private uſe, no doubt, the favourable opinion of the paſtors, ſuch eſpecially as were eminent for piety and learning, greatly contributed. But then, the effect was produced gradually and tacitly; in conſequence of which, it appeared the reſult of the people's free choice, though not formally declared, well enough underſtood. It was in this way, certainly, that the old Italic firſt came into uſe in the Latin church; and it was in this way, from the growing predilection of the people, that the preſent Vulgate came at length to ſupplant it. It was fortunate for the ſucceſs of Jerom's verſion, that no ſanguine patron ſtood forth to puſh it into notice, and that no law was made commanding its reception, and prohibiting the public uſe of the Italic. Though mens opinions and attachments, even in matters which do not ſo deeply affect them as religion, cannot, at the command of a ſuperior, be changed in a moment, the ſame effect will often, by proper means, be

be produced in a gentle and gradual manner. When the Italic was firſt introduced, there was probably no other Latin tranſlation of any account. In conſequence of this, and of that deſire of religious inſtruction, which univerſally animated the primitive Chriſtians, they would receive it with joy. To read it to them, would be highly to gratify them; for we ought to reflect, that books were then matters of very difficult acquirement, compared to what they are now. But when the introduction of one book was the diſpoſſeſſion of another to which they had been long accuſtomed, and were, from habit, warmly attached, the caſe was very different. Yet even this effect, which it is probable would not have been produced by ſtronger meaſures, was ſilently, and (as it were) imperceptibly, brought about by time. If, in ſome places, tumults were occaſioned by the change, this, I ſuſpect, when impartially examined, will be found imputable more to the raſhneſs and imprudence of the paſtors, than to any want of docility in the people. Immediately after the Reformation, the opportunity was very favourable for procuring, among thoſe who favoured the meaſures of the Reformers, a welcome reception to any verſion of the Bible into the vulgar tongue, which had the approbation of the heads of the party. If gratified in the thing chiefly wanted, they would not be critical as to the mode of introduction; and if, from the changes in their rulers, there had been ſome changes in relation to the Scriptures to be read in the congregation; what was eſtabliſhed, in ſome places, was of ſo ſhort continuance, that the mind could hardly be ſaid to be preoccupied by it.

But the caſe, at preſent, is widely different. Learning is in more hands. Critics are multiplied. The preſs is open; and every cavil, as well as every argument, is quickly circulated. Beſides, the prepoſſeſſion in favour of the tranſlation to which we have been ſo long habituated, is, at this day, very ſtrong. Add to all this, that the religious, as well as the civil, rights of mankind were never better underſtood; the genuine principles of toleration had never greater influence. How then ſhould we be affected, upon hearing that we are commanded, under pains and penalties, by our ſuperiors, to read, and cauſe to be read, in our churches, ſuch a particular tranſlation of the Bible only, and never more to admit into the ſacred ſervice, that verſion to which we have been hitherto all our lives accuſtomed, and for which we have contracted a high veneration. For my part, I will not diſſemble the matter. I ſhould think ſuch a meaſure exceedingly incongruous to the ſpirit of that religion which the legiſlators perhaps intended to ſerve by it; and no leſs unſeaſonable, in reſpect of the age and country wherein we live. I perfectly agree with Tertullian, that religion and coercion of any kind, are utterly incompatible. "Humani juris et naturalis poteſtatis eſt, "unicuique

" unicuique quod putaverit, colere." Again: " Nec religionis " eſt cogere religionem, quæ ſponte ſuſcipi debeat, non vi." I cordially ſubſcribe to the ſentiment of Lactantius, who deems it eſſential to the value of every thing in religious ſervice, in reſpect both of the object and of the mode, that it be voluntary: " Nihil eſt tam voluntarium quam religio, in qua ſi animus ſacri- " ficantis averſus eſt, jam ſublata, jam nulla eſt." Nor does it make any difference in the nature of the thing, whether the power that would compel us be called civil or eccleſiaſtical.

But is there nothing then which can, with propriety, be attempted by the higher powers, ſpiritual or temporal, for promoting the ſucceſs of an accurate tranſlation of the Bible? The utmoſt which, in my judgment, can be done, if ſuch a verſion ſhould in any future period be offered to the Public, is to remove the obſtructions which thoſe powers have heretofore raiſed to prevent its introduction, and to permit (not command) the uſe of it wherever it ſhall be found agreeable to the people, and judged by the paſtors to be edifying. In the reign of Chriſtian charity, which ſubſiſted in times truly primitive and apoſtolical, it was not neceſſary that the limits of juriſdiction and authority ſhould be ſo accurately aſcertained as afterwards, when love began to give place to ambition and ſecular proſpects. Eſteem and love are unſuſpicious. In ſuch a ſtate of things, the opinion of no perſons would go ſo far with the congregation as that of their paſtors; nor would the paſtors know any motive ſo powerful as that of contributing to the edification of the people. 'But,' it will be objected, 'to leave things in this manner, would appear like giving a ſanction to different tranſlations at the ſame time.' If it ſhould, I can perceive no abſurdity in ſuch a ſanction; no evil conſequence that would follow from it. In fact, would it be any more, with reſpect to the whole Bible, than that which has long obtained in England, with regard to one conſiderable book, the Pſalms, of which two very different verſions, one in the Bible, the other in the Common Prayer, have equally the ſanction of the higher powers? Are the people ignorant of this difference? Thoſe who know any thing of the religion of the country, who read their Bible at home, and attend the ſervice of the church, know it perfectly. Yet I have not heard that any private Chriſtian was ſcandalized at it; much leſs, that any one pretended to deduce from this cauſe the libertiniſm and infidelity of the times. Yet, in no part of Scripture would the people have ſo many opportunities of remarking the variations, as in that book, which they hear in church not ſeldomer than twelve times a-year. So much cannot be ſaid of any other part of the ſacred volume, the New Teſtament being read only thrice a-year, and the Old Teſtament but once. If the people were ſo eaſily alarmed as ſome ſeem to imagine, how has it happened that the ſtriking difference

ference between the two authoriſed tranſlations above mentioned, have not, long ere now, raiſed a clamour, either againſt the common tranſlation, or againſt the Common Prayer?

I ſhould not have thought it neceſſary to ſay any thing on this head, if the ſubject had not been ſtarted of late, and warmly agitated (I believe with the beſt intentions on both ſides) by ſome learned and worthy men. As my ſentiments on the ſubject do not entirely coincide with thoſe of either party, I thought it incumbent to add the explanation now given. The publiſhing of a new tranſlation is not to be conſidered as implying a condemnation of any that preceded. This was objected to thoſe employed by James the Firſt, in preparing the tranſlation uſed at preſent; and the reply which thoſe tranſlators made to their opponents in this buſineſs, as it had ſerved Jerom before them, and ſerved them, will equally ſerve me, or any tranſlator, who ſhall afterwards beſtow his time and labour in the ſame way. "We "anſwer them," ſay they, "with St Hierom, *Do we condemn the* "*ancient? In no caſe; but, after the endeavours of them that* "*were before us, we take the beſt pains we can in the houſe of* "*God.* As if he ſaid, Being provoked, by the example of the "learned that lived before my time, I have thought it my duty "to aſſay whether my talent in the knowledge of the tongues "may be profitable, in any meaſure, to God's church, leſt I "ſhould ſeem to have laboured in them in vain, and leſt I ſhould "be thought to glory in men (although ancient) above that "which was in them." So ſaid thoſe worthy men, who, as they did not think themſelves precluded from making improvements on the valuable labours of their predeceſſors, ſhow ſufficiently that they did not conſider their own labours as ſuperſeding all attempts at ſtill farther improvements, by thoſe who ſhould come after them.

The due conſideration of the progreſſive ſtate of all human knowledge and arts, will ever be unfriendly to the adoption of any meaſure which ſeems to fix a barrier againſt improvement, and to ſay to ſcience, *Thus far ſhalt thou come, and no farther.* And if, in matters merely of ſcience, ſuch meaſures would prove hurtful, how much more in any thing wherein religion is concerned? My opinion, therefore, on this queſtion, I freely acknowledge, favours the removal of all legal reſtraints, as much as poſſible, and not barely the change of the object. Indeed, this will be found the natural reſult of the argument, as it has heretofore been conducted. There is not a topic, which the preſent adverſaries of an improved tranſlation in Engliſh employ now, which was not with the ſame plauſibility employed againſt Jerom's Latin tranſlation, called the Vulgate, at preſent in univerſal uſe in the Latin church, and which was not alſo employed againſt the Engliſh tranſlation of James the Firſt, that very verſion

ſion for which our adverſaries on this article now ſo ſtrenuouſly contend. On the other hand, there was not any plea which Jerom urged in ſupport of his attempt, or which the Engliſh tranſlators urged in ſupport of theirs, that will not equally ſerve the purpoſe of any preſent or future well meant attempt of the like kind, and conſequently that does not ſtrike againſt every meaſure which might effectually preclude any ſuch attempt in time to come.

There are only two differences in point of circumſtances, between us and the inhabitants of this iſland, in the beginning of the laſt century, which impartiality obliges me to mention, and which, as they render more delicacy requiſite in theſe days than was neceſſary in thoſe, if attended to, may prevent men from concluding too haſtily, that thoſe meaſures cannot fail of ſucceſs now, which have ſucceeded formerly. Though ſome verſions had been publicly authorized before that of James the Firſt, none of them had been of near ſo long ſtanding as that which is in uſe at preſent; and conſequently the people's attachment to any one of them was not ſo much ſtrengthened by habit, as the preſent attachment to the Engliſh Bible may be ſuppoſed to be. An alteration, therefore, in reſpect of the public uſe, might be a much more difficult attempt now than it was then. The other difference ariſes from the conſideration that the ſpirit of liberty is much higher at preſent in the nation, than it was at that period; the rights of conſcience are better underſtood, and the abſurdity, as well as tyranny, of employing coercion in matters of religion, are almoſt univerſally acknowledged.

All theſe conſiderations, whilſt they give the utmoſt encouragement to the ſtudy of biblical criticiſm, ſhow ſufficiently the danger of all meaſures that can be juſtly accounted compulſory, in a matter that ſo nearly affects the rights of conſcience. For my own part, it is enough for me, that common ſenſe aſſures me, that, if God condeſcends to ſpeak to us mortals, it is our duty to attend to what he ſays; and if, in any writing, he has revealed his will to us, it is our duty carefully to read that writing, and do our utmoſt rightly to underſtand it. The language of the Chriſtian revelation, we quickly ſee, concurs with that of reaſon, in enjoining this practice; nay, it excites us ſtill more ſtrongly, by the example it ſets before us, of thoſe who have found much comfort and improvement in it. Can I require ſtronger motives to induce me to make God's word the ſubject of my ſtudy and meditation, day and night? And if I have reaſon to think that, by the bleſſing of Heaven, I have been, in ſome meaſure, ſucceſsful in this application of my time, does not our common Chriſtianity, one of the great commandments of which is, *Thou ſhalt love thy neighbour as thyſelf*, oblige me, for the benefit of others, to communicate any lights I may have received

received from this exercise? When they are communicated, I have discharged a Christian duty. The reception will be such as it pleases Providence to give them.

Though, in these volumes, I have not affirmed any thing, as my opinion, which did not at the time, and does not still, appear to me probable; and though many things, in them, appear certain, I desire nothing to be admitted, by the reader, upon my affirmation: my wish is, that every thing may be candidly and deliberately examined; that my reasons, which I commonly give, where the subject requires it, may be impartially weighed, and the opinion adopted, or rejected, as the reader, on due reflection, shall find cause. If to make proselytes by the sword, is tyranny in rulers, to resign our understanding to any man, and receive, implicitly, what we ought to be rationally convinced of, would be, on our part, the lowest servility. Now, *tyranny* and *servility*, how much soever adapted to the genius of worldly domination, are by no means suited to the heavenly character of Christ's kingdom. The only means the gospel itself permits us to employ, for promoting this spiritual power, is *persuasion*, which operates upon the understanding, and, by it, upon the will and affections: the great engine of secular dominion is *force*, which, without regarding understanding, will, or affections, lays hold of the body. The language of our Lord to his hearers was, *If any man* WILL *come under my guidance;* Ει τις ΘΕΛΕΙ οπισω μυ ελθειν. Nothing is obtruded or forced upon the unwilling. Now, as the great source of the infidelity of the Jews, was a notion of the temporal kingdom of the Messiah, we may justly say, that the great source of the corruption of Christians, and of their general defection, foretold by the inspired writers, has been an attempt to render it, in effect, a temporal kingdom, and to support and extend it by earthly means. This is that spirit of Antichrist, which was so early at work, as to be discoverable even in the days of the apostles.

Every thing, therefore, here, is subjected to the test of Scripture and sound criticism. I am not very confident of my own reasonings. I am sensible that, on many points, I have changed my opinion, and found reason to correct what I had judged formerly to be right. The consciousness of former mistakes, proves a guard to preserve me from such a presumptuous confidence in my present judgment, as would preclude my giving a patient hearing to whatever may be urged, from reason or Scripture, in opposition to it. TRUTH has been, in all my inquiries, and still is, my great aim. To her I am ready to sacrifice every personal consideration; but am determined not, knowingly, to sacrifice her to any thing. To Lucian's advice to the historiographer, Μονη θυτεον τη αληθεια, which I have inscribed in the title, it is my intention sacredly to adhere.

PRELI-

PRELIMINARY

DISSERTATIONS.

DISSERTATION THE FIRST.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE LANGUAGE AND IDIOM OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, ON THE DIVERSITY OF STYLE, AND ON THE INSPIRATION OF THE SACRED WRITERS.

PART I.

The Language and Idiom.

IF the words and phraſes employed by the apoſtles and evangeliſts, in delivering the revelation committed to them by the Holy Spirit, had not been agreeable to the received uſage of the people to whom they ſpoke, their diſcourſes, being unintelligible, could have conveyed no information, and conſequently would have been no revelation to the hearers. Our Lord and his apoſtles, in publiſhing the goſpel, firſt addreſſed themſelves to their countrymen the Jews; a people who had, many ages before, at different periods, been favoured with other revelations. To thoſe ancient Jewiſh revelations, now collected into one volume, Chriſtians give the name of the Old Teſtament; and thereby diſtinguiſh them from thoſe apoſtolical and evangelical writings, which, being alſo collected into one volume, are called the New Teſtament. In the latter diſpenſation, the divine authority of the former is preſuppoſed and founded on. The knowledge of what is contained in that introductory revelation, is always preſumed in the readers of the New Teſtament, which claims to be the conſummation of an economy of God for the ſalvation of man; of which economy the Old Teſtament acquaints us with the occaſion, origin, and early progreſs. Both are therefore intimately connected. Accordingly, though the two Teſtaments are written in different languages, the ſame idiom prevails in both; and in the hiſtorical part at leaſt, nearly the ſame character of ſtyle.

§ 2. As the writings of the Old Teſtament are of a much earlier date, and contain an account of the riſe and firſt eſtabliſhment, together with a portion of the hiſtory of the nation to whom the goſpel was firſt promulged, and of whom were all its firſt miſſionaries and teachers, it is thence unqueſtionably that we muſt learn, both what the principal facts, cuſtoms, doctrines, and precepts are, that are alluded to in the apoſtolical writings, and what is the proper ſignification and extent of the expreſſions uſed. Though the New Teſtament is written in Greek, an acquaintance with the Greek claſſics (that is, with the writings of profane authors in that tongue in proſe and verſe) will not be found ſo conducive to this end, as an acquaintance with the ancient Hebrew Scriptures. I am far from denying that claſſical knowledge is, even for this purpoſe, of real utility; I ſay only, that it is not of ſo great utility as the other. It is well known that the Jews were diſtinguiſhed by all Pagan antiquity, as a nation of the moſt extraordinary and peculiar manners; as abſolutely incapable of coaleſcing with other people, being actuated, eſpecially in matters wherein religion or politics were thought to be concerned, by the moſt unrelenting averſion to every thing foreign, and the moſt violent attachment to every thing national. We cannot have a clearer evidence of the juſtneſs of this character, than their remaining to this day a diſtinct people, who, though they have been for many ages ſcattered over the face of the earth, have never yet been blended in any country with the people amongſt whom they lived. They are, beſides, the only wandering nation that ever exiſted, of which this can be affirmed.

§ 3. Before the tribes of Judah and Benjamin returned from captivity in Babylon to the land of their fathers, their language, as was inevitable, had been adulterated, or rather changed, by their ſojourning ſo long among ſtrangers. They called it Hebrew, availing themſelves of an ambiguous name *. It is accordingly always called Hebrew in the New Teſtament. This, though but a ſmall circumſtance, is characteriſtical of the people, who could not brook the avowal of changing their language, and adopting that of ſtrangers, even when they could not avoid being conſcious of the thing. The dialect which they then ſpoke might have been more properly ſtyled Chaldee, or even Syriac, than Hebrew. But to give it either of theſe appellations, had appeared to them as admitting what would always remind both themſelves and others of their ſervitude. After the Macedonian conqueſts, and the diviſion which the Grecian empire underwent among the commanders, on the death of their chief,

* *Hebrew* was ambiguous, as it might denote either the language ſpoken on the other ſide of the river (that is *Euphrates*, which is commonly meant when no river is named) or the language of the people called *Hebrews*. Preface to Matthew's Goſpel, § 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.

chief, Greek ſoon became the language of the people of rank through all the extenſive dominions which had been ſubdued by Alexander. The perſecutions with which the Jews were haraſſed under Antiochus Epiphanes, concurring with ſeveral other cauſes, occaſioned the diſperſion of a great part of their nation throughout the provinces of Aſia Minor, Aſſyria, Phenicia, Perſia, Arabia, Lybia, and Egypt; which diſperſion was in proceſs of time extended to Achaia, Macedonia, and Italy. The unavoidable conſequence of this was in a few ages, to all thoſe who ſettled in diſtant lands, the total loſs of that dialect which their fathers had brought out of Babylon into Paleſtine. But this is to be underſtood with the exception of the learned who ſtudied the oriental languages by book. At length a complete verſion of the Scriptures of the Old Teſtament was made into Greek; a language which was then, and continued for many ages afterwards, in far more general uſe than any other. This is what is called the Septuagint or verſion of the *Seventy* (probably becauſe approved by the Sanhedrim), which was begun (as has been ſaid) by order of Ptolemy Philadelphus, king of Egypt, for the uſe of the Alexandrian library. At firſt no more than the Pentateuch was tranſlated, which was ſoon followed by a verſion of the other books. This is doubtleſs the firſt tranſlation that was attempted of the Sacred Writings.

§ 4. It will readily be imagined that all the Jews who inhabited Grecian cities, where the oriental tongues were unknown, would be ſolicitous to obtain copies of this tranſlation. To excite in them this ſolicitude, patriotiſm would concur with piety, and indeed almoſt every motive that can operate upon men. In one view their Bible was more to them than ours is to us. It is religion alone, I may ſay, that influences our regard; whereas their ſacred books contained not only their religious principles and holy ceremonies, but the whole body of their municipal laws*. They contained an account of their political conſtitution, and their civil hiſtory, that part eſpecially which is moſt intereſting, the lives of their Patriarchs, and the gradual advancement of that family from whom they gloried to be deſcended; the hiſtory of their eſtabliſhment as a nation; the exploits, victories, and conqueſts of their anceſtors; the lives and atchievements of their kings and heroes, prophets and reformers. Nay, more, the Scriptures might alſo be juſtly conſidered as a collection of the writings, both proſaic and poetical, of all the moſt eminent authors their country had produced. A copy of ſuch a verſion was therefore, in every view we can take of it, an ineſtimable treaſure to every Jew who underſtood Greek, and could not read the original. And hence we may eaſily conceive that the copies would ſoon be greatly multiplied, and widely ſcattered.

§ 5.

* See Lowth, De Sacra Poëſi Hebræorum, Præl. viii.

§ 5. Let us attend to the conſequences that would naturally follow. Wherever Greek was the mother-tongue, this verſion would come to be uſed not only in private in Jewiſh houſes, but alſo in public in their ſchools and ſynagogues, in the explanation of the weekly leſſons from the law and the prophets. The ſtyle of it would conſequently ſoon become the ſtandard of language to them on religious ſubjects. Hence would ariſe a certain uniformity in phraſeology and idiom among the Grecian Jews, wherever diſperſed, in regard to their religion and ſacred rites, whatever were the particular dialects which prevailed in the places of their reſidence, and were uſed by them in converſing on ordinary matters.

§ 6. That there was, in the time of the apoſtles, a diſtinction made between thoſe Jews who uſed the Greek language and the Hebrews, or thoſe who ſpoke the language of Paleſtine and of the territory of Babylon, which they affected to call Hebrew, is manifeſt from the Acts of the apoſtles. There (Acts vi. 1. &c.) we are informed, that *there aroſe a murmuring of the Grecians againſt the Hebrews, becauſe their widows were neglected in the daily miniſtration.* That thoſe Grecians were Jews, is evident from the hiſtory; for this happened before Peter was ſpecially called to preach the goſpel to Cornelius and his family, who were the firſt fruits of the Gentiles to Chriſt. Beſides, though the word *Grecian* made uſe of in our tranſlation is ſynonymous with *Greek*, yet the term employed in the original is never applied in the New Teſtament to Pagan Greeks, but ſolely to thoſe Jews who had reſided always or moſtly in Grecian cities, and conſequently whoſe common tongue was Greek. The Gentile Greeks are invariably called in Scripture Ἕλληνες, whereas the term uſed in the place quoted is Ἑλληνιστάι, a word which even in claſſical authors does not mean Greeks, but *imitators of the Greeks*, or *thoſe who write or ſpeak Greek;* being a derivation from the word ἑλληνίζειν, *to ſpeak Greek*, or *imitate the Greeks.* The term occurs only thrice in the New Teſtament, that is in two other paſſages of the Acts beſide that now quoted. One of theſe is (Acts ix. 29.) where we are told that Saul, alſo called Paul after his converſion, being at Jeruſalem, *diſputed againſt the Grecians*, πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλληνιστάς, who went about to ſlay him. This alſo happened before the converſion of Cornelius, and conſequently before the goſpel was preached to any Gentile; but, as at their feſtivals, there was a general concourſe of Jewiſh people at Jeruſalem from all the parts of the world into which they were diſperſed, a conſiderable number of thoſe Helleniſts or Grecizers, as in our idiom we ſhould be apt to term them, muſt have been preſent on that occaſion. The only other paſſage is where we are told, (Acts xi. 20.) that ſome of thoſe being Cypriots and Cyrenians, who were ſcattered abroad on the perſecution that aroſe about Stephen,

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ſpake unto the Grecians (προς τους Ελληνιστας) at Antioch, *preaching the Lord Jeſus.* Whether this was before or after the baptiſm of Cornelius, recorded in the foregoing chapter, is not certain; but one thing is certain, that it was before thoſe diſciples could know of that memorable event. Concerning the others who were in that diſperſion, who were probably Hebrews, we are informed in the verſe immediately preceding, that in all thoſe places, Phenicia, Cyprus and Antioch, through which they went, they preached the word to none but Jews.

§ 7. The learned Baſnage makes a principal handle of this paſſage for ſupporting an opinion, which had been advanced before by Beza, that by the *Helleniſts* is meant *the proſelytes to Judaiſm*, they being contraſted here not with the *Hebrews*, but with the *Jews*. But let it be obſerved, that the word *Jew* was not always, in thoſe days, uſed in the ſame ſenſe. Moſt commonly indeed it referred to the nation, in which ſenſe it was ſynonymous with Iſraelite. A man of Jewiſh extraction was not the leſs a Jew, becauſe he was neither a native nor an inhabitant of Judea, and underſtood not a ſyllable of its language. Sometimes, however, it referred to the country, in which acceptation it belonged particularly to the inhabitants of Judea or Paleſtine, including thoſe neighbouring regions wherein the ſame tongue was ſpoken. That the Samaritans (though mortally hated as ſchiſmatics) were comprehended in this application of the term Jew, is evident from what we learn from the Acts, (ch. viii. 5. &c.) where we are informed of their being converted by Philip, and receiving the gifts of the Holy Spirit by the hands of Peter, ſome time before the converſion of Cornelius, the firſt fruits of the Gentiles. Nay ſometimes, in a ſtill more limited ſignification, it regarded only the inhabitants of the diſtrict belonging to the tribes of Judah and Benjamin, which had anciently conſtituted the kingdom of Judah. In this ſenſe we underſtand the word as uſed by the evangeliſt John, chap. vii. 1. *After theſe things Jeſus walked in Galilee; for he would not walk in Jewry* (Ιουδαια, Judea) *becauſe the Jews ſought to kill him.* Yet Galilee was a part of Judea in the larger and even more common acceptation of the word, and the Galileans, of whom were the apoſtles, were, in every ſenſe except this confined one, Jews as well as the others. The ſame diſtinction is made between Judea and Galilee by Matthew, ch. ii. 22. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that the term *Jews* in the paſſage under examination, ought to be underſtood in the ſecond ſenſe above mentioned, as equivalent to Hebrews.

A little attention to the caſe puts this concluſion beyond a doubt. Why ſhould they, in preaching the goſpel, make a diſtinction between *Jews* and *proſelytes*, perſons who had received the ſeal of circumciſion, and ſubjected themſelves, without reſerve

ſerve, to the Moſaic yoke? The law itſelf made no diſtinction; nay, it expreſsly prohibited the people from making any. *When a ſtranger ſhall ſojourn with thee, and will keep the paſſover to the Lord, let all his males be circumciſed, and then let him come near and keep it, and he ſhall be as one that is born in the land; for no uncircumciſed perſon ſhall eat thereof. One law ſhall be to him that is home born, and to the ſtranger that ſojourneth among you.* Exod. xii. 48, 49. See alſo Numb. xv. 14, 15, 16. 29. This laſt phraſe (though ſometimes uſed with greater latitude) became a common periphraſis for a proſelyte. We find accordingly, that though a queſtion aroſe early in the church, and was for a time hotly agitated, concerning the lawfulneſs of admitting the uncircumciſed to baptiſm (for ſuch was Cornelius, though no idolater), there is no hint given that the ſmalleſt doubt was entertained concerning the admiſſion of proſelytes who had already embraced the Jewiſh ritual, and were circumciſed. So far from it, that the keeneſt advocates for uniting Judaiſm with Chriſtianity, inſiſted only that the Gentile converts might be circumciſed, and compelled to join the obſervance of the law of Moſes to their faith in Chriſt. Where then could be the difficulty of receiving thoſe who were already diſciples of Moſes, and had been circumciſed? It will perhaps be retorted, "If the Chriſtians could have no ſcruple to preach to proſelytes, ſtill leſs could they have to preach to thoſe native Jews, who differed in nothing from their brethren in Paleſtine but in language." True, indeed, they could have no ſcruple; but thoſe who came at that time to Antioch, were not all qualified for preaching in Greek, for all had not the gift of tongues. And the hiſtorian has rendered it evident that the want of the language was the reaſon they did it not, having obſerved that thoſe who came thither and preached to the Helleniſts, were men of Cyprus and Cyrene, places where Greek was the prevailing tongue.

In regard to the murmuring mentioned in the ſixth chapter, which gave riſe to the appointment of deacons, nothing can be more improbable than Beza's hypotheſis. The number of the proſelytes of righteouſneſs, as they are ſometimes called, could not be great; for though ſeveral, like Cornelius, had been gained over from Paganiſm to the worſhip of the true God, few, comparatively, were induced to adopt the Moſaic ceremonies. Now, converts of the firſt ſort were ſtill by the Jews accounted heathens, and had acceſs to no part of the temple inacceſſible to Gentiles. Of the Jewiſh proſelytes, it was a part only that was converted to Chriſtianity; and of that part, thoſe who were both widows and indigent, could not ſurely be a great proportion. Further, if by Helleniſts be meant proſelytes, where was the occaſion for claſſing them ſeparately from the Jews, or for ſo much as enquiring who was a Jew by birth, and who a proſelyte? It

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was not agreeable, as we have ſeen, either to the ſpirit or to the letter of the law, to make ſo invidious, not to ſay odious, a diſtinction; and if not to the law, ſtill leſs, if poſſible, to the goſpel. Whereas the diſtinction, on the other hypotheſis, being founded on their uſing different languages, was not barely convenient, but neceſſary. They were claſſes of people who could not be addreſſed in the ſame tongue; and, for this reaſon, it was probably found expedient to employ different agents in ſupplying them. Certain it is, they were in the conſtant practice of aſſembling in different ſynagogues; for in Jeruſalem there were Greek ſynagogues for the accommodation of the Helleniſts of different nations, who came thither either occaſionally, or to attend the great feſtivals, as well as Hebrew ſynagogues for the uſe of the natives. Such were moſt of thoſe mentioned in the Acts, ch. vi. 9. the Cyrenian ſynagogue and the Alexandrian, the Cilician and the Aſian.

That Nicolas, one of the deacons elected on that occaſion, was a proſelyte, is a circumſtance of no moment in this queſtion. If four, or even three of the ſeven, had been of that denomination, it might have been pleaded with ſome plauſibility, that there muſt have been in this a deſign of deſtroying in the proſelytes all ſuſpicion of partiality. As it was, had it been they who murmured, it would have rather increaſed than diminiſhed their jealouſy, to find that they had gotten only one of their own claſs choſen for ſix of the other. This therefore muſt be conſidered as a circumſtance merely accidental. As to that ſingular conceit of Voſſius, that the Helleniſts were thoſe who favoured the doctrine of ſubmiſſion to a foreign yoke, as it is deſtitute alike of internal credibility and external evidence, it requires no refutation.

§ 8. So much for the diſtinction that obtained in thoſe days between Hebrew Jews and Grecian Jews, or Helleniſts; among the latter of whom, the verſion of the Seventy was in conſtant uſe. The Greek had been for ages a ſort of univerſal language in the civilized world, at leaſt among people of rank and men of letters. Cicero had with truth ſaid of it, (Pro Archia Poeta) at the time when Rome was in her glory and Greece declining—"*Græca leguntur in omnibus fere gentibus: Latina ſuis finibus, exiguis ſane continentur.*" This continued to be the caſe till the time of the publication of the Goſpel, and for ſome centuries afterwards. As the Greek was then of all languages the beſt underſtood, and the moſt generally ſpoken throughout the empire, the far greater part of the New Teſtament, which contained a revelation for all mankind, was originally written in that tongue. I ſay, the far greater part, becauſe ſome critics are of opinion that the goſpel of Matthew (ſee the preface to that goſpel) and the epiſtle to the Hebrews, were originally written in that

that dialect of the Chaldee, which was then the language of Jeruſalem, and by Jewiſh writers called Hebrew. It muſt be remembered that all the penmen of the New Teſtament were Jews—the greater part Hebrews, not Helleniſts; but whether they were Hebrews or Helleniſts, as they wrote in Greek, the verſion of the Seventy would ſerve as a model in what concerned propriety of expreſſion on religious ſubjects. It was, beſides, the idiom which would be beſt underſtood by all the converts to Chriſtianity from among their brethren the Jews, whereſoever ſcattered, and that whereby their writings would more perfectly harmonize with their own Scriptures, which the whole of that people had in ſo great and deſerved veneration; for let it be obſerved that, though the Jews afterwards came to loſe entirely their reſpect for the Septuagint, and even to depreciate it as an unfaithful, as well as inaccurate tranſlation; this change of their ſentiments was the mere effect of their diſputes with the Chriſtians, who, in arguing from it, went to the oppoſite extreme—conſidered it as the immediate work of inſpiration—and, in every inſtance wherein it differed from the original Hebrew, with which they were unacquainted, gave it the preference, treating the latter as a compilation which had been corrupted by the Jews, in ſpite to Chriſtianity. But of the high eſteem which this people once entertained for that verſion, particularly about the time of the publication of the goſpel, their own writers, Philo and Joſephus, are the moſt unexceptionable witneſſes.

§ 9. From the conformity and peculiarity in language above taken notice of, ſome critics, in order to diſtinguiſh the idiom of the Septuagint and New Teſtament from that of common Greek, have termed it Helleniſtic; not with exact propriety, I acknowledge, if we regard the etymology of the word, but with juſtneſs ſufficient for the purpoſe of characteriſing the peculiar phraſeology of thoſe writings. The diſputes raiſed on this ſubject by Salmaſius and ſome others are ſcarcely worth naming, as they will, upon examination, all be found to terminate in mere diſputes about words. I readily admit, that this ſpeciality of diction is properly not a peculiar language, nor even a peculiar dialect, in the ſame ſenſe as the *Attic*, the *Ionic*, the *Eolic*, and the *Doric*, are called different dialects; for there are in it no peculiarities in the inflexions of either nouns or verbs. In ſtrictneſs of ſpeech, the peculiarity does more properly conſtitute a difference of idiom, than either of language or of dialect. The phraſeology is Hebrew, and the words are Greek. This ſingular manner in the ancient tranſlators, is to be conſidered as partly intentional, and partly accidental: partly intentional, becauſe, from the ſcrupulous, I may even ſay, ſuperſtitious, attachment of the Jews not only to the words, but to the letters and ſyllables, to every jot and tittle, of the original, they would be led

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to attempt a manner of tranſlating ſo ſervilely literal, as is always incompatible with purity in the language into which the tranſlation is made;—partly accidental, becauſe, even without deſign, a perſon ſpeaking or writing a foreign language, frequently mingles in his ſpeech the idioms of his native tongue. One ſource of the peculiarities in idiom, may have ariſen from this circumſtance, that the tranſlators, though Jews, were Alexandrians. In a language ſpoken, as Greek was then, in many diſtant countries, all independent of one another, there inevitably ariſe peculiarities in the acceptations of words in different regions. Perhaps we ought to impute to this, that ſometimes terms have been adopted by the Seventy which appear to us not the moſt appoſite for rendering the import of the original, ſuch as διαθηκη for ברית *berith*, and οσιος for חסיד *chaſid*. But whatever be in this, the habit which the apoſtles and evangeliſts had of reading the Scriptures, and hearing them read, whether in the original, or in the ancient verſion, would, by infecting their ſtyle, co-operate with the tendency which, as natives of Paleſtine, they would derive from converſation, to intermix Hebraiſms and Chaldaiſms in their writings.

§ 10. It is not to be diſſembled, that the ſacred penmen of the New Teſtament have, eſpecially in modern times, had ſome ſtrenuous advocates, both among foreigners and amongſt our own countrymen, who have, in my opinion, with more zeal than judgment, defended their diction, as being, when judged by the rules of grammar and rhetoric, and the practice of the moſt celebrated writers in Greece, altogether pure and elegant. They ſeem to ſuſpect, that to yield, even on the cleareſt evidence, a point of this nature, though regarding ornaments merely human and exterior, might bring diſhonour on inſpiration, or render it queſtionable. I cannot help thinking that theſe people muſt have very indiſtinct ideas on this ſubject, and may be juſtly ſaid to incur the reproof which Peter, on a memorable occaſion, received from his Maſter—that *they ſavour more the things of men than the things of God*, Matt. xvi. 23. Are words of any kind more than arbitrary ſigns? And may not the ſame be ſaid with juſtice of phraſes and idioms? Is there a natural fitneſs in one word or phraſe more than in another, for denoting the thing ſignified? Is not the connection between ſounds and ideas merely artificial—the reſult of human, though tacit conventions? With regard to thoſe rules which conſtitute purity in the language of any country, what are they, in effect, but the conventions which have happened to obtain among the natives, particularly thoſe of the higher ranks? Vulgariſms, and foreign idioms, which may obtain among ſtrangers, and thoſe of the lower ranks, have no more natural unfitneſs to convey the ſenſe which they that uſe them intend to convey by them, than the terms and phraſes

which, in consequence of the preference given by their superiors, may be regarded as elegancies. It may be as reasonably objected against our religion, that the persons by whom it was propagated, were chosen from what men, in high life, account the dregs of the people, as that the Holy Spirit should accommodate himself to the language of those who were actually chosen. Nay, language as well as dress being in fact no more than a species of mode, it may with as good reason be maintained, that the ambassadors whom Christ sent for promulgating his doctrine, should have been habited like gentlemen, and men of fashion, as that they should have spoken the dialect of such. Splendid style had no more connection with the purpose of their mission than splendid apparel. The cloth which they wore, how coarse soever, answered all the essential purposes of clothing; the same may be said of the language which they spoke. And if it be argued, that good language would create greater respect to their persons, and closer attention to what they said, and consequently would contribute to its making a deeper impression; as much may be affirmed, with truth, of a genteel appearance both of person and of dress. Nothing serves more powerfully to quash curiosity and expectation, and consequently to destroy attention, than such an external figure as generally accompanies poverty and ignorance, and suggests a total want of the advantages of education, and more especially, of that indispensable advantage which the fashionable world calls *seeing good company*.

But these very disadvantages or defects, both in speech and in outward figure, are assigned by the inspired writers as the reasons of God's preference, whose thoughts are not our thoughts, nor are our ways his ways. Paul argues, that the success of the preachers of the gospel, in spite of the absence of those accomplishments in language then so highly valued, was an evidence of the divine power and energy with which their ministry was accompanied. He did not address them, he tells us, 1 Cor. i. 17. *with the wisdom of words*—with artificial periods and a studied elocution, *lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect*;—lest to human eloquence that success should be ascribed which ought to be attributed to the divinity of the doctrine, and the agency of the Spirit, in the miracles wrought in support of it. There is hardly any sentiment which he is at greater pains to enforce. He *used none of the enticing* or persuasive *words of man's wisdom*. Wherefore?—*That their faith might not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God*, 1 Cor. ii. 4, 5. Should I ask, What was the reason why our Lord Jesus Christ chose for the instruments of that most amazing revolution in the religious systems of mankind, men perfectly illiterate, and taken out of the lowest class of the people? your answer to this will serve equally for an answer to that other question—Why did the

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Holy Spirit chuſe to deliver ſuch important truths in the barbarous idiom of a few obſcure Galileans, and not in the politer and more harmonious ſtrains of Grecian eloquence? I repeat it, the anſwer to both queſtions is the ſame—That it might appear, beyond contradiction, that the excellency of the power was of God, and not of man *.

§ 11. There are ſome collateral purpoſes which Providence has effected by the ſame means. One is, that the writings of the New Teſtament carry, in the very expreſſion and idiom, an intrinſic and irreſiſtible evidence of their authenticity. They are ſuch as, in reſpect of ſtyle, could not have been written but by Jews, and hardly even by Jews ſuperior, in rank and education, to thoſe whoſe names they bear. And what greatly ſtrengthens the argument is that, under this homely garb, we find the moſt exalted ſentiments, the cloſeſt reaſoning, the pureſt morality, and the ſublimeſt doctrine. The homelineſs of their diction, when criticiſed by the rules of grammarians and rhetoricians, is what all the moſt learned and judicious of the Greek fathers frankly owned. And is it modeſt in us, petty critics of modern times, to pretend to be nicer judges of purity and elegance in the Greek language, than Origen and Chryſoſtom, whoſe native tongue it was; and who, beſides, were maſters of uncommon ſkill, as well as fluency, in that language? I have heard of a French critic who undertook to demonſtrate that Ariſtotle did not underſtand Greek, nor Livy Latin. There is hardly an opinion ſo paradoxical or abſurd as not to find ſome admirers. What wonder then that we ſhould meet with people who eſteem a Pfochinius and a Blackwall † better judges of Greek than the greateſt orators among the Grecians, and maintain that Paul's ſtyle, in ſpite of his own verdict, is as claſſical as Plato's. The writings of the ancient Greeks have been rummaged for the diſcovery of words and phraſes, which, in the import given them, might appear to reſemble what has been accounted Hebraiſm or Syriaſm in the New Teſtament. The ſucceſs of ſuch endeavours

* Thoſe who deſire to ſee this argument treated as it affects infidels (who make a handle of the badneſs of the ſtyle to diſcredit revelation) may conſult the late Biſhop of Glouceſter's Doctrine of Grace, B. I. ch. viii, ix, and x. I here conſider the queſtion chiefly as affecting ſome well-meaning but miſtaken Chriſtians. It may be proper further to obſerve, that the opinion of the very acute and learned author of the work above mentioned, does not, on the ſubject of inſpiration laid down in ch. vii. in every thing coincide with that here ſupported. A diſtinction is made by him, not only between the ſtyle and the ſentiments, but between the ſentiments of greater and thoſe of leſs moment, in the ſeveral books, The latter diſtinction leads to a controverſy which is quite foreign from my argument, and with which for that reaſon I have not meddled.

† A. Blackwall, author of "The Sacred Claſſics defended and illuſtrated."

vours has been far from giving ſatisfaction to readers of diſcernment. It will readily be acknowledged, by the impartial, that ſeveral idioms in the New Teſtament have been miſtaken for Oriental, which may be as truly denominated Grecian. But there remains a much larger number of thoſe brought under that claſs, concerning which there can be no reaſonable doubt *.

§ 12. The methods by which our opponents, on this article, ſupport their hypotheſis are, I ſay, unſatisfactory. There are ſuch negligencies in the ſtyle, even of the beſt writers, as to render it unſafe to pronounce on the goodneſs of an expreſſion which we have only once met with, though in a celebrated author. Much leſs ought a ſingular phraſe found in one ſingle claſſic, ſimilar to an idiom frequent in the New Teſtament, to be accounted evidence that the idiom was in general, and approved, uſe, which always determines purity in every tongue. The ſingularity, in the one caſe, oppoſed to the frequency in the other, ſhould lead us to a very different concluſion. The evidence cannot be more ſatisfactory which ariſes from a particular turn of expreſſion occurring in ſome poetical work, and coinciding with an idiom current in the New Teſtament, which is written

* The very firſt words of the goſpel, Βιβλος γενεσεως, for *genealogy* or *lineage*, are one example amongſt hundreds that might be produced. How many meanings are given to the word σαρξ, *fleſh*, in that ſacred volume, for which you will not find a ſingle authority in any profane writer? Beſide the original meaning of the word univerſally admitted, it denotes ſometimes the whole body conſidered as animated, as in Matt. xxvi. 41. *The ſpirit is willing, but the* fleſh *is weak* —This may indeed be thought to be of all the deviations from the proper ſenſe, the moſt defenſible on claſſical and rhetorical principles, being not an unnatural ſynecdoché of the part for the whole.—Secondly, It ſometimes means a human being, as in Luke iii. 6. *All* fleſh *ſhall ſee the ſalvation of God*;—ſometimes, 3dly, a perſon's kindred collectively conſidered, as in Rom. xi. 14. *If by any means I may provoke to emulation them which are my* fleſh;—ſometimes, 4thly, any thing of an external or ceremonial nature, as oppoſed to that which is internal and moral, as in Gal. iii. 3. *Having begun in the ſpirit, are ye now made perfect by the* fleſh?—ſometimes, 5thly, the ſenſitive part of our nature, the ſeat of appetite, as in 2 Cor. vii. 1. *Let us cleanſe ourſelves from all filthineſs of the* fleſh *and ſpirit*, where there can be no doubt that the pollutions of the fleſh muſt be thoſe of the appetites, being oppoſed to the pollutions of the ſpirit or thoſe of the paſſions. 6thly, and laſtly, It is employed to denote any principle of vice and moral pravity of whatever kind. Thus among *the works of the fleſh* (Gal. v. 19, 20, 21.) are numbered not only *adultery*, *fornication*, *uncleanneſs*, *laſciviouſneſs*, *drunkenneſs*, and *revellings*, which all relate to criminal indulgences of appetite, but *idolatry*, *witchcraft*, *hatred*, *variance*, *emulations*, *wrath*, *ſtrife*, *ſeditions*, *hereſies*, *envyings*, and *murders*, which are manifeſtly vices of a different kind, and hold more of the diabolical nature than of the beaſtly. Now, for any of the ſix meanings above mentioned, except perhaps the firſt, as to which I will not be poſitive, we may defy thoſe critics to produce claſſical authority. Yet no man accuſtomed to the oriental idiom, and the ſtyle of the ſacred writers, can miſtake the ſenſe in any of the paſſages quoted.

written in profe. We know that the Greek poetry had a peculiar dialect, and many peculiar words; and that their poets were, by the laws of their verfification, allowed a latitude in this refpect, with which their profe writers were not indulged: nor is there any thing that their critics more loudly condemn, as favouring of artifice and affectation, than what may be called a poetic phrafeology in profe. Let it not be imagined that I think the facred penmen chargeable with any thing affected or artificial in their phrafeology. There is no character of ftyle for which they are more diftinguifhable than the reverfe. But what would be juftly denominated artificial, affected, and foreign in a native of Attica, might be the refult of the moft undefigning and natural fimplicity in an inhabitant of Paleftine, becaufe conformable to the idioms of his native language. Further, a ftrong refemblance, in an expreffion admitted to be claffical, will not fuffice for removing the charge of foreign idiom from the refembling but different expreffion. In moft cafes, nothing lefs than identity will ferve*. Recourfe to fynonymas, analogy, and etymology,

* I fhall illuftrate this by an example in regard to which every Engliſh reader can with fafety be more decifive than even men of literature are qualified to be in regard to an example taken from a dead language. In a letter during the late war from the captain of a French privateer to the magiſtrates of a ſeaport demanding a contribution, and threatening in caſe of non-compliance to deſtroy the town, there was this expreſſion, "I will *make* my duty." No Engliſhman, we are certain, would have expreſſed himſelf ſo, unleſs he had done it for a diſguiſe. Yet I can eaſily conceive that a foreigner, who has learned our language only by book, might ſpeciouſly maintain, that the expreſſion, ſo far from being a Gallicifm, is unexceptionable Engliſh. "Is it not," he would argue, "common to ſay, I will do my duty? Now, if this expreſſion be claſſical, where is the impropriety in ſubſtituting one ſynonymous word for another?" And to ſhow that *do* and *make* are ſynonymous, he might urge, firſt, that in moſt other tongues one word ſerves for both. Thus each of them is rendered into Latin, *facere;* into Italian, *fare;* into French, *faire.* Secondly, though he had not found in any Engliſh book the identical phraſe, to *make duty*, he could produce expreſſions in which there is an entire ſimilarity. *To make court, to make obeiſance*, are both good; nay, it ſtrengthens the argument, that *to do obeiſance*, is alſo uſed in the ſame ſignification. Shakeſpear ſays, "What *make* they there?" which is equivalent to, What do they there? Dryden ſpeaks of "the faults he had made;" though doubtleſs the more uſual expreſſion would have been, "the faults he had done." Now, from the firſt principles of analogy, we are warranted to conclude, that if *making a fault* be proper to expreſs *doing wrong*, *making a duty* is proper to expreſs *doing right*. All this is very plauſible, and would probably be ſufficient to convince moſt ſtrangers, but would only extort a ſmile from an intelligent native, on whom a thouſand ſuch arguments could make no impreſſion. Yet I will venture to affirm that, if there be no ſolidity in this reaſoning, nine tenths of what has been ſo pompouſly produced to ſhow that the ſuppoſed Hebraiſms of the New Teſtament are in the genuine idiom of the Greek tongue, are no better than arrant trifling. It was to triflers of this ſort that Chryſoſtom ſaid very appoſitely, Ἵνα μὴ καταγελώμεθα ὑπὸ τῶν διαλεγομένων πρὸς Ἕλληνας, ἐπειδὰν ἡμῖν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀγων

mology, is neceſſary and often ſucceſsful in diſcovering the ſenſe of an obſcure expreſſion, whereof nothing leſs than the uſe of good authors will warrant the propriety or elegance. Sufficient evidence in the one caſe, is often no evidence in the other.

§ 13. Blackwall * admits freely that there are many Hebraiſms in the New Teſtament, at the ſame time aſſerting that they are real beauties, which add both vigour and ornament to the expreſſion. In this opinion, if he was ſerious, I believe that, upon examination, we ſhall not be found to differ. Abſtracting from that loweſt kind of beauty in language, which reſults from its ſoftneſs and harmony, conſidered as an object to the ear, every excellency of ſtyle is relative, ariſing ſolely from its fitneſs for producing, in the mind of the reader, the end intended by the writer. Now in this view it is evident, that a ſtyle and manner may, to readers of one denomination, convey the writer's ſentiments with energy as well as perſpicuity, which, to thoſe of a different denomination, would convey them feebly, darkly, and, when judged by their rules of propriety, improperly. This I take to have been actually the caſe with the writers of the New Teſtament. I ſpeak particularly of the hiſtorical books. I look upon the language of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, as better adapted to the readers for whoſe uſe the Goſpels and Acts were at firſt compoſed, than the language of Plato or Demoſthenes would have been.

I ſhould at the ſame time think it unreaſonable to deny, that the latter muſt have been more intelligible to an Athenian, and much more pleaſing, nervous, and animated than the former. Nay, if ſuch a one had even denominated the idiom of the New Teſtament *barbarous*, I ſhould not have thought it an unpardonable offence. The word indeed ſounds harſhly; but we know that from the mouths of native Greeks it could only mean that the idiom of that book is not conformable to the rules of their grammarians and rhetoricians, and to the practice of their writers of reputation; a conceſſion which we may eaſily make them, without derogating in the leaſt from the apoſtles and evangeliſts—a conceſſion which (as was obſerved before) the moſt learned and oratorical of the Greek fathers did not ſcruple to make.

αγων ην, καταγελωμεν αποστολων ως αμαθων, η γαρ κατηγορια αυτη εγκωμιον. Chryſ. Hom. 3. in 1 Cor. i. "That we may not render ourſelves ridicu-" lous arguing thus with Grecians, for our diſpute is with them; let us " accuſe the apoſtles of being illiterate, for this accuſation is an enco-" mium." Origin goes ſtill farther, and ſays, Ουκ αισυνεσθητοι οι αποστολοι τυγχανοντες των εν οις προσκοπτουσι, φασιν ιδιωται ειναι τω λογω, αλλ' ου τη γνωσει. Philoc. c. 4. "The apoſtles, not inſenſible of their own defects, profeſs " themſelves to be of the vulgar in ſpeech, but not in knowledge."

* Sacr. Claſſ. Part I. Ch. i.

make. In such cases it is evident, that a native of common sense is a much better judge than a learned foreigner *.

§ 14. I expressed myself dubiously of Blackwall's seriousness in affirming that the Oriental idioms, with which the sacred authors abound, are highly ornamental to their compositions; because nothing can be plainer than that he is indefatigable in controverting their claims to the greater part of those ornaments. I cannot think he would have willingly injured them; yet it is impossible not to perceive, that he is at infinite pains, though on the most frivolous pretexts †, to divest them of almost every beauty of this sort ascribed to them by others! I desire only to restore to them the merit, of which he has not very consistently, though I believe with a pious intention, endeavoured to strip them. This critic did not consider, that when he admitted any Hebraisms in the New Testament, he in effect gave up the cause. That only can be called a Hebraism in a Greek book, which, though agreeable to the Hebrew idiom, is not so to the Greek. Nobody would ever call that a Scotticism, which is equally in the manner of both Scots and English. Now, such foreign idioms as Hebraisms in Greek, Grecisms in Hebrew, or Latinisms in either, come all within the definition of barbarism, and sometimes even of solecism—words which have always something relative in their signification; that turn of expression being a barbarism or a solecism in one language, which is strictly proper in another—and I may add, to one set of hearers which is not so to another. It is then in vain for any one to debate about the application of the names *barbarism* and *solecism*.

To do so is at best but to wrangle about words, after admitting

* Hardly any foreigner of the last century has been more conversant with English men and English books than Voltaire. Yet his knowledge of our language, on which I have been told he piqued himself not a little, has not secured him from blundering when he attempted to write it. In a letter to the Parisians, prefixed to his comedy *L' Ecossaise*, which he thought proper to introduce to the world as a translation, he quotes the following sentence as part of a letter he had received from the English author: "You have quite empoverished the character of Wasp; and you have blotted his chastisement at the end of the drama." An Englishman might have guessed what he meant by the first clause, but must have remained in total darkness about the second, if he had not explained himself by subjoining the translation. *Vous avez affaibli le caractere de Frelon; et vous avez supprime son chatiment a la fin de la piece.* An explanation not less necessary to many of his English readers than to his French.

† The following is a specimen, Vol. II. Part I. ch. ii. § 2. "Καταβολη κοσμου in the sacred writers, seemed to some gentlemen conversant in these studies unexampled in the old Grecians. Indeed it is very rare; but it is found in the lofty Pindar, (Nem. Od. 2.) Καταβολαν ἱερων αγωνων." A most extraordinary way of proving that the phrase Καταβολη κοσμου is not unexampled in the old Grecians. About the noun Καταβολη no doubt was ever made, nor was any doubt made about Κοσμος; the question was solely about the phrase.

ting all that is meant by them. The apoſtle Paul, leſs ſcrupulous, does not heſitate, by implication, to call every tongue barbarous to thoſe who do not underſtand it. *If I know not the meaning of the voice, I ſhall be a barbarian to him that ſpeaketh; and he that ſpeaketh ſhall be a barbarian to me,* 1 Cor. xiv. 11. Nor does it make any difference, as appears from the whole of the apoſtle's argument, even if what is ſpoken be ſpoken by the Spirit. Surely, with equal reaſon, we may ſay of thoſe foreign idioms in any tongue, which render what is ſaid unintelligible or even obſcure to the natives, that in reſpect of them they are barbariſms. Nor is it, I think, denied by any judicious perſon, that there are ſome idiomatical expreſſions in the New Teſtament which muſt have puzzled thoſe who were abſolute ſtrangers to the language of holy writ *. My intention in obſerving this, is chiefly to ſhow, that if we would enter thoroughly into the idiom of the Septuagint, we muſt accuſtom ourſelves to the ſtudy, not only of the original of the Old Teſtament, but of the dialect ſpoken in Paleſtine between the return of the Jews from the Babyloniſh captivity and the deſtruction of Jeruſalem by the Romans; for this laſt, as well as the Hebrew, has affected the language both of the old Greek tranſlation and of the New Teſtament. But of this, more afterwards.

§ 15. Such is the origin and the character of the idiom which prevails in the writings of the apoſtles and evangeliſts, and the remarkable conformity of the new revelation we have by them, though written in a different language, to the idiom of the old. It has been diſtinguiſhed in the former by the name Helleniſtic, not with critical accuracy, if regard be had to the derivation of the word, but with ſufficient exactneſs, if attention be given to the application which the Hebrews made of the term Helleniſt, whereby they diſtinguiſhed their Jewiſh brethren who lived in Grecian cities and ſpoke Greek. It has been by ſome of late, after

* Take the two following for examples: Ουκ αδυνατησει παρα τω Θεω παν ρημα, Luke i. 37. and ου αν σωθη πασα σαρξ, Matt. xxiv. 22. phraſes which in my apprehenſion would not have been more intelligible to a Greek author than Arabic or Perſian would have been. Ρημα for *thing*, παν ου and πασα ου for *no* or *none*, σαρξ for *perſon*, &c. would to him, I ſuſpect, have proved inſurmountable obſtacles. Indeed the vulgar tranſlation of the laſt phraſe is no more Latin than the original is claſſical Greek. *Non fieret ſalva omnis caro*, which we may venture to affirm would have been no better than a riddle to Cicero or Ceſar. Caſtalio has expreſſed the ſenſe in proper Latin, *Nemo prorſus evaderet.* Our tranſlators have not unfitly kept in their verſion the one Hebraiſm *fleſh* for perſon, to which our ears are by ſcriptural uſe familiariſed, and not leſs fitly rejected the other ſaying, *No fleſh ſhould be ſaved;* for every body muſt be ſenſible that if they had preſerved alſo the other idiom in Engliſh, and ſaid, *All fleſh ſhould not be ſaved*, the ſenſe would have been totally altered. This is but a ſmall ſpecimen, not the hundredth part of what might be produced on this ſubject.

after father Simon of the *Oratory*, more properly termed the Greek of the ſynagogue. It is acknowledged that it cannot ſtrictly be denominated a ſeparate language, or even dialect, when the term dialect is conceived to imply peculiarities in declenſion and conjugation. But, with the greateſt juſtice, it is denominated a peculiar idiom, being not only Hebrew and Chaldaic phraſes put in Greek words, but even ſingle Greek words uſed in ſenſes in which they never occur in the writings of profane authors, and which can be learnt only from the extent of ſignification given to ſome Hebrew or Chaldaic word, correſponding to the Greek in its primitive and moſt ordinary ſenſe. This difference in idiom conſtitutes a difficulty of another kind from that which is created by a difference in dialect; a difficulty much harder to be ſurmounted, as it does not affect the form of the words, but the meaning.

§ 16. It is pertinent, however, to obſerve that the above remarks on the Greek of the New Teſtament, do not imply that there was any thing which could be called idiomatical or vulgar in the language of our Lord himſelf, who taught always in his mother tongue. His apoſtles and evangeliſts, on the contrary, who wrote in Greek, were, in writing, obliged to tranſlate the inſtructions received from him into a foreign language of a very different ſtructure, and for the uſe of people accuſtomed to a peculiar idiom. The apparently reſpectful manner in which our Saviour was accoſted by all ranks of his countrymen, and in which they ſpoke of his teaching, ſhows that he was univerſally conſidered as a perſon of eminent knowledge and abilities. It was the amazing ſucceſs of his diſcourſes to the people, in commanding the attention and reverence of all who heard him, which firſt awaked the jealouſy of the Scribes and Phariſees.

PART II.

The Style and Inſpiration.

We are not however to imagine, that becauſe all the writers of the New Teſtament wrote in the idiom of the ſynagogue, there is no diſcernible diverſity in their ſtyles. As the ſame language admits a variety of dialects, and even of provincial and foreign idioms, ſo the ſame dialect and the ſame idiom is ſuſceptible of a variety of ſtyles. The ſtyle of Paul has ſomething peculiar, by which, in my opinion, there would be no difficulty in diſtinguiſhing him from any other writer. A diſcerning reader would not readily confound the ſtyle of Luke with that of either of the

evangeliſts who preceded him, Matthew or Mark; and ſtill leſs, I imagine, would he miſtake the apoſtle John's diction for that of any other penman of the New Teſtament. The ſame differences of ſtyle will be diſcovered by one who is but moderately converſant in Hebrew in the writers of the Old Teſtament. In it we have ſtill greater variety than in the New. Some of the books are written in proſe and ſome in verſe: and in each the differences between one book and another are conſiderable. In the book of Job, for inſtance, the character of the ſtyle is remarkably peculiar. What can be more diſſimilar in this reſpect, though both are excellent in their kind, than the towering flights of the ſublime Iſaiah, and the plaintive ſtrains of the pathetic Jeremiah? In the books of Scripture we can ſpecify the conciſe ſtyle and the copious, the elevated and the ſimple, the aphoriſtic and the diffuſe.

The difference, I own, is not ſo remarkable in tranſlations as in the original. The reaſon will be evident on a little reflection. Every man, and conſequently every tranſlator, has his peculiar diction and manner, which will rarely fail to affect, not only his own compoſitions, but alſo the verſions he makes from other authors. In every verſion of the Bible, therefore, wherein the different books have the ſame tranſlator, there will be more or leſs of an aſſimilating quality, by which the works tranſlated are brought, in point of expreſſion, to bear ſome reſemblance to the ordinary ſtyle of the tranſlator. Now, by being all brought nearer the ſame thing, they are brought nearer one another. Tranſlation, therefore, is a ſort of leveller. By its means, generally, not always, (for ſome can adapt themſelves to different ſtyles more eaſily than others), the lofty is depreſſed, the humble elevated, the looſer ſtrains are confined, and the laconic rendered more explicit. The learned reader will be ſenſible of the juſtneſs of this remark, when he reflects how much more diſtinguiſhable the ſtyles of the ſacred penmen above mentioned are in their own language, than even in the beſt tranſlations extant. Add to this, that if, of any two ſacred authors who differ greatly in their ſtyle, we compare together ſome paſſages, as they are rendered in the ſame tranſlation, we ſhall commonly find the ſameneſs of the tranſlator's ſtyle more remarkable in them all, than the differences there may be of the ſtyles of the authors. We ſhall be oftener at a loſs to diſcover in the quotations (if the recollection of the ſentiments do not aſſiſt us) Iſaiah and Amos, Matthew and John, than to recognize Caſtalio and Beza, the Vulgate and Junius. Every tranſlator, however, is not equally chargeable with this fault. I think none indeed ſo much as Caſtalio.

§ 2. But it may be aſked, How is this diverſity in the diction of the ſacred penmen reconcilable with the idea of inſpiration? Is not the ſtyle of all inſpired writers the ſame, as being the

ſtyle

ſtyle of the ſame Spirit by which they were alike directed? That in ſome ſenſe the ſtyle of all thoſe writers is the ſtyle of the Holy Spirit, who ſpoke by them, and was the ſame in them all, is not to be denied; but that the Holy Spirit ſhould always employ the ſame ſtyle in conveying celeſtial truths to men, is no more neceſſary than that he ſhould always uſe the ſame language. People do not ſufficiently advert, when they ſpeak on this ſubject, to the difference between the expreſſion and the ſentiment, but ſtrangely confound theſe, as though they were the ſame; yet no two things can be more widely different. The truths implied in the ſentiments, are eſſential, immutable, and have an intrinſic value: the words which compoſe the expreſſion, are in their nature circumſtantial, changeable, and have no other value than what they derive from the arbitrary conventions of men. That the Holy Spirit would guide the minds of the ſacred penmen in ſuch a manner as to prevent their adopting terms unſuitable to his deſign, or which might obſtruct his purpoſe; and that in other reſpects he would accommodate himſelf to their manner and diction, is both reaſonable in itſelf, and rendered unqueſtionable by the works themſelves, which have the like characteriſtic differences of ſtyle that we find in other literary productions.

Can it be accounted more ſtrange that the Holy Spirit ſhould, by the prophet Amos, addreſs us in the ſtyle of a ſhepherd, and by Daniel in that of a courtier, than that by the one he ſhould ſpeak to us in Hebrew, and by the other in Chaldee? It is as reaſonable to think, that the Spirit of God would accommodate himſelf to the phraſeology and diction, as to the tone of voice and pronunciation, of thoſe whom he was pleaſed to enlighten; for it cannot be denied, that the pronunciation of one perſon in uttering a prophecy might be more articulate, more audible, and more affecting than that of another—in like manner as one ſtyle has more harmony, elegance, and perſpicuity than another. Caſtalio ſays juſtly, "Res dictat Spiritus, verba quidem et linguam loquenti aut ſcribenti liberam permittit *;" which is to the ſame purpoſe with what Jerom had ſaid more than a thouſand years before—"Nec putemus in verbis ſcripturarum evangelium eſſe, ſed in ſenſu †." Allow me to add the teſtimony of a late writer of our own—than whom none has done more to make men apprehend the meaning, and reliſh the beauties of the ſacred poeſy: "Hoc ita ſacris vatibus tribuimus, ut nihil deroge mus Divini Spiritus afflatui: etſi ſuam interea vim propriæ cujuſque ſcriptoris naturæ atque ingenio concedamus. Neque enim

* "The Spirit dictates the things, leaving the words and language free to the ſpeaker or the writer." Defenſio contra Bezam.

† "Let us not imagine that the goſpel conſiſts in the words of Scripture, but in the ſenſe." Comment. in Epiſt. ad Gal. cap. i.

" enim inflinctu divino ita concitatur vatis animus, ut protinus " obruatur hominis indoles : attolluntur et eriguntur, non extin- " guuntur aut occultantur naturalis ingenii facultates ; et quan- " quam Mofis, Davidis, et Ifaiæ, fcripta ſemper ſpirent quiddam " tam excelſum tamque cœleſte, ut plane videantur divinitus " edita, nihilo tamen minus in iis Moſem, Davidem, et Iſaiam, " ſemper agnoſcimus *."

§ 3. In this there was an eminent diſparity between the prophets of God and thoſe among the Pagans, ſaid to be poſſeſſed of the ſpirit of *Python*, or ſpirit of divination. Theſe are reported to have uttered their predictions in what is called ecſtacy or trance, that is, whilſt they underwent a temporary ſuſpenſion both of their reaſon and of their ſenſes. Accordingly they are repreſented as mere machines, not acting but acted upon, and paſſive like the flute into which the muſician blows. This is what has been called organic inſpiration. In imitation of one remarkable claſs of theſe, the ſorcerers and ſoothſayers among the Jews (who, like thoſe of the ſame craft among Pagans, reaped conſiderable profit from abuſing the credulity of the rabble), had acquired a wonderful mode of ſpeaking in which they did not appear to employ the common organs of ſpeech, and were thence termed ἐγγαστρίμυθοι, *ventriloqui* belly-ſpeakers. It is in alluſion to this practice that Iſaiah denominates them *the wizzards*, viii. 19. that peep and that mutter, whoſe ſpeech ſeemed to riſe out of the ground, and to whiſper out of the duſt, xxix. 4.

Totally different was the method of the prophets of the true God. The matter, or all that concerned the thoughts, was given them : what concerned the manner, or enunciation, was left to themſelves. The only exception the Rabbis mention is Balaam, whoſe prophecy appeared to them to have been emitted in ſpite of himſelf. But this caſe, if it was as they imagine, which may be juſtly doubted, was extraordinary. In all other caſes the prophets had, when propheſying, the ſame command over their own actions, over their members, and organs, as at other times. They might ſpeak or forbear ; they might begin and deſiſt when they pleaſed ; they might decline the taſk aſſigned them, and diſobey the divine command. No doubt when they acted thus, they ſinned very heinouſly, and were expoſed to the wrath of Heaven. Of the danger of ſuch diſobedience we have two ſignal examples, in the prophet who was ſent to propheſy againſt the altar erected by Jeroboam at Bethel, and in the prophet Jonah.

But that men continued ſtill free agents, and had it in their power to make a very injudicious uſe of the ſpiritual gifts and illuminations which they received from above, is manifeſt from the regulations on this ſubject, eſtabliſhed by the apoſtle Paul in the

* De Sacra Poëſi Heb. Præl. xvi.

the church of Corinth. The words wherewith he concludes his directions on this topic are very appoſite to my preſent purpoſe. *The ſpirits of the prophets*, ſays he, 1 Cor. xiv. 32. *are ſubject to the prophets.* Such is the difference between thoſe who are guided by the Spirit of truth, and thoſe who are under the influence of a ſpirit of error. There is, therefore, no reaſon to doubt, that the ſacred writers were permitted to employ the ſtyle and idiom moſt familiar to them, in delivering the truths with which they were inſpired. So far only they were overruled in point of expreſſion by the divine Spirit, that nothing could be introduced tending in any way to obſtruct the intention of the whole. And ſometimes, eſpecially in the prediction of future events, ſuch terms would be ſuggeſted, as would, even beyond the prophet's apprehenſion, conduce to further that end. The great object of divine regard, and ſubject of revelation, is things, not words. And were it poſſible to obtain a tranſlation of Scripture abſolutely faultleſs, the tranſlation would be in all reſpects as valuable as the original.

§ 4. But is not this doctrine, it may be ſaid, liable to an objection alſo from the gift of tongues conferred on the apoſtles and others for the promulgation of the goſpel? In the languages with which thoſe primitive miniſters were miraculouſly furniſhed, it may be objected, they could not have any ſtyle of their own, as a ſtyle is purely the effect of habit, and of inſenſible imitation. This objection, however, is eaſily obviated: Firſt, as they received by inſpiration thoſe tongues only whereof they had previouſly no knowledge, it is not probable, at leaſt it is not certain, that this gift had any place in the writings of the New Teſtament: that in moſt of them it had not, is manifeſt. But, 2dly, if in ſome it had, the moſt natural ſuppoſition is, firſt, that the knowledge of the tongue, wherewith the Holy Ghoſt inſpired the ſacred writers, muſt have been in them preciſely ſuch a knowledge and ſuch a readineſs in finding words and expreſſions, as is in others the effect of daily practice. This is even a neceſſary conſequence of ſuppoſing that the language itſelf, and not the words of particular ſpeeches (according to Dr Middleton's notion *), was the gift of the Spirit: 2dly, That their acquaintance with the tongue, ſupernaturally communicated, muſt have been ſuch as would render their teaching in it beſt adapted to the apprehenſions of the people with whom they would be moſt converſant, or ſuch as they would have moſt readily acquired among them in the natural way. Now on this hypotheſis, which appears on many accounts the moſt rational, the influence of habit, of native idiom, and of particular genius and turn of thinking, would be the ſame on the writer's ſtyle as though he had acquired the language in the ordinary way.

As

* Eſſay on the Gift of Tongues.

As to the hypotheſis of the author above mentioned, it is not more irrational in itſelf, than it is deſtitute of evidence. It is irrational, as it excludes the primary uſe, the converſion of the nations, for which, by the general acknowledgment of Chriſtians in all ages, the gift of tongues was beſtowed on the apoſtles, and repreſents this extraordinary power as ſerving merely to aſtoniſh the hearers; the only purpoſe, according to him, for which it ever was exerted. And as to evidence, the great ſupport of his ſyſtem is an argument which has been ſufficiently conſidered already, the defects of the ſtyle of the ſacred writers, when examined by the rules of the rhetoricians, and the example of the orators of Athens. For, becauſe Cicero and the Greek philoſophers were of opinion, that if Jupiter ſpoke Greek, he would ſpeak like Plato, the learned doctor cannot conceive that a ſtyle ſo unlike Plato's as that of the evangeliſts, can be the language of inſpiration, or be accounted worthy of God. It was not, we find, peculiar to the Greeks, or to the apoſtolic age, to ſet too high a value on the words which man's wiſdom taacheth. Nor was it only in the days of Samuel, that men needed to be taught that *the Lord ſeeth not as man ſeeth*, 1 Sam. xvi. 7.

DISSERTATION THE SECOND.

THE CAUSES TO WHICH THE PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCES IN LANGUAGES ARE IMPUTABLE; THE ORIGIN OF THE CHANGES PRODUCED ON THE LANGUAGE AND THE IDIOM OF THE JEWS, AND THE PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTIES TO BE ENCOUNTERED IN TRANSLATING THE SACRED BOOKS.

PART I.

The Causes of the Differences in Languages.

WHEN we compare one tongue with another, if we enter critically into the genius and powers of each, we ſhall find that neither the only nor the chief difference is that which is moſt obvious, and conſiſts in the ſounds or words employed, the inflexions, the arrangement, and the conſtruction. Theſe may ſoon be learnt from a tolerable grammar, and are to be conſidered as affecting only the form of the language. There are others, which more intimately affecting its ſpirit, it requires a nicer diſcernment to diſtinguiſh. Theſe ſerve much more to characteriſe both the language and the people who ſpeak it. Indeed, the knowledge of one of theſe has a great effect in advancing the knowledge of the other. We may ſay with the greateſt juſtice, that as, on the one hand, the real character of a nation will not be thoroughly underſtood by one who is a perfect ſtranger to their tongue; ſo, on the other, the exact import of many of the words and combinations of words made uſe of in the language, will never be perfectly comprehended by one who knows nothing of the character of the people, who is totally unacquainted with their hiſtory, religion, law, polity, arts, manners, and cuſtoms. Whoever, therefore, would be a proficient in either kind, muſt be a ſtudent in both. It is evident, that the particulars enumerated, or whatever regards the religion, the laws, the conſtitution, and the manners of a people, operate powerfully on their ſentiments; and theſe have a principal effect, firſt on the aſſociations of ideas formed in their minds in relation to character and to whatever is an object of abſtract reflection; ſecondly, on

on the formation of words, and combination of phraſes, by which theſe aſſociations are expreſſed. But this will be better underſtood from what follows.

§ 2. There are certain words in every language to which there are other words perfectly correſponding in other languages. There are certain words in every language which but imperfectly correſpond to any of the words of other languages. There are certain words in every language, to which there is nothing in ſome other languages in any degree correſpondent. I ſhall exemplify theſe three claſſes in Greek, Latin, and Engliſh, which will ſufficiently illuſtrate my meaning.

§ 3. In all languages, the words whereby the obvious productions of nature, and the plaineſt diſtinctions of genera and ſpecies known to the people are ſignified, correſpond reſpectively to one another. Thus to the Greek words ἥλιος, σελήνη, ὄρνις, δένδρον, α�ετος, ἄμπελος, λίθος, the Latin words *ſol, luna. avis, arbor, aquila, vitis, lapis,* and the Engliſh, *ſun, moon, bird, tree, eagle, vine, ſtone,* are perfectly equivalent in ſignification; and we are ſure that we can never miſtake in rendering the Greek word ἥλιος, wherever it occurs, into Latin by the word *ſol,* and into Engliſh by the word *ſun.* The ſame thing holds true of the other terms in the three languages, taken ſeverally in the order in which I have placed them.

To this claſs we muſt add the names of natural and obvious relations, as πατὴρ, μήτηρ, υἱος, θυγατὴρ, ἀδελφος, ἀδελφη, to which the Latin words *pater. mater, filius, filia, frater, ſoror,* and the Engliſh words *father, mother, ſon, daughter, brother, ſiſter,* perfectly correſpond.

To the ſame claſs we ought alſo to aſſign thoſe words whereby the moſt common and neceſſary productions of the mechanic arts are expreſſed; for though, in different countries, and diſtant ages, there are conſiderable differences in the faſhion and appearance of their productions, we attend ſolely, in tranſlating, to the principal uſes which a piece of work was intended to anſwer. Conſequently, when in theſe we find an entire coincidence, we, without further examination, pronounce the names equivalent. Thus οἰκος, ναυς, κλίνη, in Greek, and *domus, navis, lectus,* in Latin, anſwer ſufficiently to *houſe, ſhip, bed,* in Engliſh, on account of the coincidence in uſe of the things ſignified, notwithſtanding the leſs important differences in ſtructure and workmanſhip.

Theſe, however, are not entirely on the ſame footing with natural objects, in which there is every where, and in every age, a more perfect uniformity. The names βιβλιον, *liber, book.* are in moſt caſes ſuited to one another. But as the books of the ancients were in outward form and conſtruction very different from ours, when we find any thing advanced concerning βιβλιον in Greek, or *liber* in Latin, with an evident alluſion to the outward make,

make, we know that the Engliſh word *book* is not a proper verſion. Thus the words ουρανος απεχωρισθη ως βιβλιον ειλισσομενον, Rev. vi. 14. if rendered, "heaven departed as a book that is rolled up," would not be intelligible, though nothing conveys a more diſtinct image than the words in the original. Their books conſiſted of long ſcrolls, commonly of parchment, ſewed or paſted together, and faſtened at the ends to two rollers. Our tranſlators properly therefore employed here the more general word *ſcroll*, which perfectly conveys the meaning. Again, the word βιβλιον occurs in an application wherein the term *book* could not be rightly apprehended by a mere Engliſh reader: Βιβλιον γεγραμμενον εσωθεν και οπισθεν, Rev. v. 1. in the common verſion, *a* book *written within and on the back-ſide*. To ſuch a reader, the laſt term thus applied would be underſtood to mean the cover, which is not very fit for being written on, and could, beſides, contain no more than might have been contained in one additional leaf, though the book had conſiſted of a thouſand leaves. Now the long ſcrolls or books of the ancients were ſeldom written but on one ſide, here ſaid to be εσωθεν, *within*, becauſe that ſide was turned inwards in rolling. When any of theſe ſcrolls was written on both ſides, it contained twice as much as if written in the uſual way *. The chief intention of the prophet in mentioning this circumſtance, muſt have been to ſignify that this volume was replete with information, and that its contents were not to be meaſured by its ſize. But notwithſtanding the exceptions in a few particular caſes, the names of the common productions of the moſt neceſſary arts, may be conſidered as ſo far at leaſt correſponding to each other in moſt languages, as not to throw any difficulty worth mentioning in the way of a tranſlator.

§ 4. The ſecond claſs above mentioned, is of thoſe words which in one language do but imperfectly correſpond to any of the words of another language compared with it. Of this kind will be found, if properly attended to, moſt of the terms relating to morals, to the paſſions and matters of ſentiment, or to the objects of the reflex and internal ſenſes, in regard to which it is often impoſſible to find words in one language that are exactly equivalent to thoſe of another. This holds in all languages leſs or more, according as there is more or leſs uniformity in the conſtitution, religion, and laws, of the nations whoſe languages are compared; on which conſtitution, religion, and laws, as was obſerved, the ſentiments, manners, and cuſtoms of the people in a great meaſure depend. Herein conſiſts one principal difficulty, which tranſlators, if perſons of penetration, have to encounter. Finding it ſometimes impoſſible to render fully the ſenſe of their

* A book executed in this manner the Greeks called οπισθογραφον, which is thus expreſſed by Juvenal, "*Scriptus et in tergo*," Sat. 1.

author, they are conſtrained (if I may borrow a term from the mathematicians) to do the beſt they can by approximation.

To come to examples: To the Greek words ἀρετη, σωφροσυνη, εγκρατεια, φρονησις, ελεος, the Latin words *virtus*, *temperantia*, *continentia*, *prudentia*, *miſericordia*, are not entirely equivalent; ſtill leſs the Engliſh words *virtue*, *temperance*, *continence*, *prudence*, *mercy*: for though theſe laſt are manifeſtly formed from the Latin words, one would think, that by being adopted into another country, they had all more or leſs changed their nature with the climate. Thoſe perſons whoſe knowledge in ſuch matters is but ſuperficial, will not enter readily into theſe ſentiments. They are accuſtomed to conſider certain words in the different languages as reſpectively correſpondent. The grammars, lexicons, and common tranſlations, lead them to conclude ſo, and they enquire no further. But thoſe who are converſant with authors of reputation in theſe different tongues, will need no arguments to convince them of the truth of what has been advanced.

Who knows not that the Latin word *virtus* would, in many inſtances, be but weakly, not to ſay improperly, rendered by the Engliſh word *virtue*; as that word in Roman authors comes often nearer the import of what we call *valour* or fortitude, ſometimes even *brute force*? We ſhould not readily aſcribe *virtue* to wild beaſts; yet Tacitus ſo applies the term *virtus*: "Fera animalia, ſi clauſa teneas, virtutis obliviſcuntur." And if ſome of our words have too great latitude of ſignification to anſwer always to their Latin etymons, ſome have, on the contrary, too little. For example, the Engliſh word *temperance* is too confined in meaning to anſwer to the Latin *temperantia*, which implies moderation in every deſire, and is defined by Cicero in one place, "moderatio cupiditatum rationi obediens*;" and in another, "temperantia eſt quæ in rebus aut expetendis aut fugiendis, rationem ut ſequamur, monet†." Now all that is implied in the Engliſh word is almoſt only that ſpecies which he denominates "temperantia in victu." And though the differences may not be ſo conſiderable in all the other related words above mentioned, it were eaſy to ſhew that they cannot in every inſtance be made to tally.

It requires indeed but a very ſmall ſkill in languages to enable us to diſcover that etymology is often a very unſafe guide to the proper acceptation of a term. It will not be doubted that the Latin word *ſobrius* is the root of the Engliſh word *ſober*, and their term *honeſtum* of our term *honeſty*; but every body knows that the related words in the two languages will not always anſwer to each other. Nay, to ſhew in the ſtrongeſt manner how much more difficult it is than is commonly imagined, to apprehend

* De Fin. l. ii. † De Fin. l. i.

hend the preciſe import and proper application of words of this order in dead languages, I ſhall tranſcribe a ſhort paſſage from the fourth book of the Tuſculan Queſtions, where the author explains the generic word *ægritudo*, with the various names of ſpecies comprehended under it. Amongſt other obſervations are the following: "Ægritudo eſt opinio recens mali preſentis, in "quo demitti contrahique animo rectum eſſe videatur. Ægri- "tudini ſubjiciuntur angor, mœror, dolor, luctus, ærumna, afflic- "tatio: angor eſt ægritudo premens, mœror ægritudo flebilis, "ærumna ægritudo laborioſa, dolor ægritudo crucians, afflictatio "ægritudo cum vexatione corporis, luctus ægritudo ex ejus qui "carus fuerat, interitu acerbo." "Let any one," ſays D'Alembert *, "examine this paſſage with attention, and ſay honeſtly, "whether, if he had not known of it, he would have had any "idea of theſe nice ſhades of ſignification here marked; and "whether he would not have been much embarraſſed, had he "been writing a dictionary, to diſtinguiſh with accuracy the "words *ægritudo*, *mœror*, *dolor*, *angor*, *luctus*, *ærumna*, *afflicta-* "*tio*. If Cicero, the greateſt philoſopher as well as orator that "ever Rome produced, had compoſed a book of Latin ſynony- "mas, ſuch as that which Abbé Girard did of French; and if "this work had but now for the firſt time been produced in a "circle of modern Latiniſts, I imagine it would have greatly "confounded them, in ſhewing them how defective their know- "ledge is of a ſubject of which they thought themſelves maſ- "ters."

I have brought this quotation, not to ſupport D'Alembert's opinion, who maintains that it is impoſſible for any modern to write Latin with purity; but only to ſhew how much nicer a matter it is than is commonly ſuppoſed, to enter critically into the peculiarities of a dead language. It might be eaſily ſhewn, were it neceſſary, that diſtinctions like thoſe now illuſtrated in the nouns, obtain alſo in the verbs of different languages. Under this claſs thoſe words alſo may be comprehended which are not barely the names of certain things, or ſigns of particular ideas, but which expreſs alſo the affection or diſpoſition of the ſpeaker towards the thing ſignified. In every language we ſhall find inſtances wherein the ſame thing has different names, which are not perfectly ſynonymous; for though there be an identity of ſubject, there is a difference of manner, wherein the ſpeaker appears affected towards it. One term will convey the idea with contempt, another with abhorrence, a third with ſome reliſh, a fourth with affection, and a fifth with indifference. Of this kind are the diminutives and amplificatives which abound ſo much in the Greek and Italian languages.

It is this principally which juſtifies Girard's obſervation, that there

* Sur l'Harmonie des Langues, et ſur la Latinité des Modernes.

there are much fewer words in any language which are in al reſpects ſynonymous than is commonly imagined. And it is this which makes the ſelection of appoſite words ſo much and ſo juſtly the ſtudy of an orator: for when he would operate on the paſſions of his hearers, it is of the laſt conſequence, that the terms he employs not only convey the idea of the thing ſignified, which may be called the primary uſe; but that along with it, they inſinuate into the minds of the hearers the paſſion of the ſpeaker, whatever it be, love or hatred, admiration or contempt, averſion or deſire. This, though the ſecondary uſe of the word, is not the leſs eſſential to his deſign. It is chiefly from the aſſociated affection that theſe different qualities of ſynonymous words taken notice of by Quintilian muſt be conſidered as originating: "Sed cum idem frequentiſſime plura ſignificent, quod "συνωνυμια vocatur, jam ſunt alia aliis honeſtiora, ſublimiora, ni- "tidiora, jucundiora, vocaliora." The laſt is the only epithet which regards merely the ſound. The following will ſerve for an example of ſuch Engliſh ſynonymas, *public ſpeaker*, *orator*, *declaimer*, *haranguer*, *holder-forth*. The ſubject of them all is the ſame, being what the firſt expreſſion, *public ſpeaker*, ſimply denotes; the ſecond expreſſes alſo admiration in the perſon who uſes it: the third conveys diſapprobation, by hinting that it is the ſpeaker's object rather to excite the paſſions, than to convince the judgment; the fourth is diſreſpectful, and the fifth contemptuous.

But there is a difference in words called ſynonymous, ariſing from the cuſtomary application, even when they imply little or nothing of either ſentiment or affection. The three words, *death*, *deceaſe*, *demiſe*, all denote the ſame thing. The firſt is the ſimple and familiar term; the ſecond is formal, being much employed in proceedings at law; the third is ceremonious, and ſcarcely uſed of any but princes and grandees. There are alſo ſome words peculiar to poetry, ſome to burleſque, which it is needleſs here to ſpecify. From theſe obſervations we learn, that in writings where words of this ſecond claſs frequently occur, it is impoſſible, in a conſiſtency with either perſpicuity or propriety, to tranſlate them uniformly by the ſame terms, like thoſe of the firſt. For, as has been obſerved, they are ſuch as do not perfectly correſpond with the terms of a different tongue. You may find a word that anſwers exactly to the word in queſtion in one acceptation, that will not ſuit it in another; though for this purpoſe ſome other term may be found equally well adapted.

It was too ſervile an attempt in the firſt tranſlators of the Old Teſtament (at leaſt of the Pentateuch, for the whole does not appear to have been tranſlated at one time, or by the ſame perſons) at this rigid uniformity in rendering the ſame Hebrew words by the

the ſame Greek words, which has given ſuch a peculiarity of idiom to the ſtyle of the Septuagint, and which, iſſuing thence as from its fountain, has infected more or leſs all the writings of the New Teſtament. I might obſerve further, that there are ſome words in the original by no means ſynonymous, which have been almoſt uniformly rendered by the ſame term, partly perhaps through not adverting ſufficiently to ſome of the nicer differences of ſignification, partly through a deſire of avoiding, as much as poſſible, in the tranſlation, whatever might look like comment or paraphraſe. Of this I ſhall have occaſion to take notice afterwards.

§ 5. The third claſs above mentioned is of thoſe words in the language of every nation which are not capable of being tranſlated into that of any people, who have not a perfect conformity with them in thoſe cuſtoms which have given riſe to thoſe words. Such are the names of weights, meaſures, and coins, which are for the moſt part different in different countries. There is no way that a tranſlator can properly take in ſuch caſes, but to retain the original term, and give the explanation in the margin. This is the way which has actually been taken, perhaps in all the tranſlations of the Old Teſtament. To ſubſtitute for the original term a definition or circumlocution, if the word frequently occur, would encumber the ſtyle with an offenſive multiplicity of words, and awkward repetitions, and thereby deſtroy at once its ſimplicity, vivacity, and even perſpicuity. In this claſs we muſt alſo rank the names of the particular rites, garments, modes, exerciſes, or diverſions, to which there is nothing ſimilar among thoſe into whoſe language the verſion is to be made. Of this claſs there are ſeveral words retained in the common Engliſh tranſlation; ſome of which, by reaſon of their frequency, have been long ſince naturalized amongſt us; as *ſynagogue*, *ſabbath*, *jubilee*, *purim*, *ephod*, *homer*, *ephah*, *ſhekel*, *gerah*, *teraphim*, *urim* and *thummim*, *phylacteries*, *cherubim*, *ſeraphim*, and a few others.

Beſide theſe, often the names of offices, judicatories, ſects, parties, and the like, ſcarcely admit of being transferred into a verſion in any other manner. It muſt be owned, however, that in regard to ſome of theſe, eſpecially offices, it is a matter of greater nicety than is commonly imagined, to determine when the name ought to be rendered in the tranſlation by a term imperfectly correſponding, and when it ought to be retained. What makes the chief difficulty here is, that there are offices in every ſtate and in every conſtitution, which are analogous to thoſe of other ſtates and conſtitutions in many material circumſtances, though they differ in many others. It is not always eaſy to ſay whether the reſemblances or the peculiarities preponderate. If the former, the word ought to be tranſlated, if the latter, it ought to be retained. The inconveniency of an exceſs in the firſt way is,

is, that it may lead the reader into miſtakes; that of an exceſs in the ſecond is, that it occaſions obſcurity, and by the too frequent interſperſion of uncouth and foreign words, gives the appearance of barbariſm to a verſion.

It may be ſaid however, in general, that the latter is the ſafer error of the two. Not only does the ſpeciality of the caſe afford a ſufficient apology for the uſe of ſuch words; but if either the dignity of the nation, which is the ſubject, or our connection with the people, or intereſt in their hiſtory, ſhall familiarize us to their inſtitutions and cuſtoms, the barbariſm of the terms will vaniſh of courſe. Who conſiders now theſe names of Roman magiſtracies, *conſul*, *pretor*, *edile*, *cenſor*, *queſtor*, *dictator*, *tribune*, as barbarous? Yet they are not the names of offices amongſt us correſpondent or ſimilar to thoſe among the Romans. To have employed inſtead of them, *mayor*, *alderman*, *ſheriff*, &c. we ſhould have juſtly thought much more exceptionable. I have heard of a Dutch tranſlator of Ceſar's Commentaries, who always rendered *conſul*, *burgomaſter*, and in the ſame taſte the names of all the other officers and magiſtrates of Rome. A verſion of this kind would appear to us ridiculous.

§ 6. It is almoſt unneceſſary to obſerve, that the two laſt are the only claſſes of words wherein the ſtudent will find any thing that can greatly puzzle him. A mere ſchool-boy, with the help of his grammar and lexicon, may acquire all that is requiſite for the juſt interpretation of the words of the firſt claſs. Thoſe of the third, it is manifeſt, are not to be underſtood by us without a previous knowledge of the religious and political conſtitutions of the country, together with their ceremonies and uſages; and thoſe of the ſecond, which is the matter of the greateſt delicacy of all, cannot be thoroughly apprehended without an acquaintance with the national character, that is, the prevalent caſt of mind, manners, and ſentiments of the people. So much is neceſſary in order to be maſter of the language of any country; hen of ſo much importance it is, in order clearly to comprehend the ſtyle of Scripture, to be well acquainted with whatever oncerns the Jewiſh nation.

PART II.

The Origin of the Changes in the Idiom of the Jews.

It is true that, as the New Teſtament is written in Greek, it muſt be of conſequence that we be able to enter critically into the ordinary import of the words of that tongue, by being familiarized to the genius and character of thoſe who ſpoke it. But

But from what has been obſerved, it is evident that, though in ſeveral caſes this knowledge may be eminently uſeful, it will not ſuffice; nay, in many caſes, it will be of little or no ſignificancy. Thoſe words, in particular, which have been in moſt familiar uſe with the old interpreters, and have been current in the explanations given in the Helleniſtical ſynagogues and ſchools, have, with their naturalization among the Iſraelites, acquired in the Jewiſh uſe, if I may be allowed the expreſſion, an infuſion of the national ſpirit. Though the words therefore are Greek, Jewiſh erudition is of more ſervice than Grecian, for bringing us to the true acceptation of them in the ſacred writings. Would you know the full import of the words ἁγιασμος, for example, and δικαιοσυνη in the New Teſtament? It will be in vain to rummage the claſſics. Turn to the pages of the Old Teſtament. It will avail little to recur to the Greek roots ἁγιος and δικη. Examine the extent given to the ſignification of the Hebrew roots קדש *kadaſh*, and צדק *tſadak*, which have given occaſion to the introduction of thoſe Greek terms into the tranſlation of the Seventy.

§ 2. Claſſical uſe, both in Greek and in Latin, is not only in this ſtudy ſometimes unavailable, but may even miſlead. The ſacred uſe and the claſſical are often very different. We know the import of the word *ſanctitas* in the Vulgate and in eccleſiaſtical writers, and that it anſwers exactly enough to our own word *ſanctity* derived from it. Yet from Cicero's account, it is plain that, in modern European tongues, we have no word correſponding to it in its primitive and claſſical uſe. "ÆQUITAS," ſays he, "tripartita dicitur eſſe. Una ad ſuperos deos, altera ad manes, tertia ad homines pertinere; prima *pietas*, ſecunda *ſanctitas*, tertia *juſtitia* nominatur *." According to him, therefore, the Latin word *ſanctitas* imports equity or ſuitable regards towards the infernal gods.

But in no inſtance does the claſſical ſenſe of a word differ more from that which it has invariably in the ſacred pages, than in the term ταπεινος, which with the former is always expreſſive of a bad quality, with the latter of a good. With us it is a virtue, with them it was a vice. Nor can it be juſtly affirmed that the word expreſſed the ſame diſpoſition of mind with Pagans, as with Jews and Chriſtians, and that the only difference was in the opinion or judgment formed concerning this diſpoſition; that the former looked upon it with a favourable eye, the latter with an unfavourable. For this is far from being the caſe. The quality of which it is expreſſive in claſſical uſe is totally different from that which it expreſſes in the ſacred writings. In the firſt it correſponded exactly to, and was commonly tranſlated by, the Latin *humilis*, which in profane authors always conveys a bad meaning, and

* Topica.

and denotes such a feeble, mean and abject temper, as is the very reverse of that fortitude, that superiority to death, shame, and pain, which the law of Christ so peremptorily exacts, and with which the faith of Christ so powerfully inspires the genuine disciple. Ταπεινοτης, the abstract, is comprised by Aristotle* under μικροψυχια, pusillanimity; or, as explained by lexicographers, "animus demissus et abjectus;" and contrasted to μεγαλοψυχια, magnanimity, "*animi celsitudo.*" And to evince that the Latin term, in heathen authors, has the same meaning with the Greek, I need no better authority than that of Cicero, who says†, "Succumbere doloribus, eosque *humili* animo imbecilloque ferre "miserum est, ob eamque debilitatem animi, multi parentes, "multi amicos, nonnulli patriam, plerique autem seipsos penitus "perdiderunt." To this he opposes, "Robustus animus et ex-"celsus, qui omni est liber cura et angore, cum et mortem con-"temnit," &c. The temper of mind here condemned by Cicero every Christian will condemn as much as he; and the application of the term *humilis* to this temper is a demonstration, that with him the word was the sign of an idea very different from that of which it has since, in conformity to the style of the Italic translation, been made the sign by ecclesiastical authors.

We may observe, by the way, that the English word *humility*, though borrowed directly from the Latin, conveys not the classical, but the scriptural sense of the word ταπεινοτης or ταπεινοφροσυνη, which Castalio, over zealous for the Latinity of his style, never renders *humilitas*, but always *modestia*. This word *modestia*, however, does not express adequately the sense of the original. *Modesty* relates only to the opinion of men, *humility* relates also and principally, to the unerring judgment of God; and includes such a combination of qualities as no species of polytheism could give a foundation for. It implies, along with a modest self-diffidence, a sense of unworthiness in the sight of God, accompanied with a profound veneration of his perfections. Accordingly piety, meekness, and modesty, make, if I may so express myself, the principal figures in the groupe. So far from involving any thing of that weak timidity and irresolution expressed in the passage quoted from the philosopher, as comprehended in the classical sense of the term *humilis*; it on the contrary implies, in every situation, a submission to the will of Heaven without repining or reserve, founded in a consciousness of one's own ignorance of what is best upon the whole, and an unshaken confidence in the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, by whose providence all events are over-ruled.

This is one of those terms which, in the mouth of a Jew or a Christian, an idolater could not comprehend, till he had previously acquired some notion of the Biblical theology. To some people

* Περι αρετων και κακιων. † De Finibus, l. 1.

people it may appear ſtrange, that ſo much knowledge ſhould be thought neceſſary for qualifying one to underſtand the words in current uſe in any language. But to thoſe more deeply verſed in theſe matters, there will be nothing ſurpriſing in the remark. They will be ſenſible that the modern names, *pedantry*, *gallantry*, *foppery*, *coquetry*, *prudery*, and many others, could not be tranſlated into any ancient language, otherwiſe than by circumlocutions. Monteſquieu * obſerves of what is called *honour* in the monarchies of Europe, that it is unknown, and conſequently unnamed in the deſpotiſms of Aſia, and that it would even be a matter of ſome difficulty to render the term, as underſtood by Europeans, intelligible to a Perſian.

§ 3. I ſhould not have been ſo particular on the different acceptations of ſome words as uſed by Jews and by Pagans, but in order to illuſtrate more effectually that important propoſition, that Scripture will ever be found its own beſt interpreter; and to evince what was remarked before, that the manners and ſentiments of a people being cloſely connected with their conſtitution and cuſtoms, ſacred and civil, have a powerful influence on the language, eſpecially on thoſe combinations of ideas, which ſerve to denote the various *phaſes* (pardon the unuſual application of the term) both of virtue and of vice, as diſplayed in the characters of individuals. For though ſome traces of all the virtuous and all the vicious qualities of which human nature is ſuſceptible, will perhaps be found in every country, theſe qualities are greatly diverſified in their appearance, inaſmuch as they invariably receive a kind of ſignature or peculiar modification from the national character. One plain conſequence of this doctrine has been already conſidered, namely, that there will be a diverſity in the aſſociated ideas claſſed under the appellatives, and conſequently in the genius of the languages, wherever there is a diverſity of character in the nations which uſe them.

§ 4. I am now going to exemplify another conſequence of this doctrine, which is, that the language of the ſame people will vary from itſelf, or, to ſpeak more properly, from what it was in a former period, when the people themſelves undergo a material alteration from what they were, in any of the reſpects above mentioned. Indeed it is manifeſt, that if a nation ſhould continue at the ſame preciſe degree of advancement in the ſciences and arts both elegant and uſeful, ſhould undergo no variation in their form of government, religion, and laws, and ſhould have little or no intercourſe with foreigners, their language and idiom would in all eſſential characters remain the ſame. Theſe two, language and idiom, though often confounded, I have had occaſion to diſcriminate before. The diſtinction deſerves our attention the more, as ſome of the cauſes mentioned operate more

* L'Eſprit des Loix, liv. iii. ch. 8. Lett. Perſ. 86.

upon the one, and others more upon the other: and as one of them may be even totally altered, whilſt the other is retained. This was accordingly the caſe with the Jewiſh nation.

§ 5. During the Babyloniſh captivity, the Jews ſcattered through the Aſſyrian provinces loſt irrecoverably, in conſequence of the mixture with ſtrangers ſo much ſuperior to them in number and conſideration, their vernacular dialect. But in conſequence of their attachment to their religion (which included their polity and law); in conſequence of their inviolable regard to their own cuſtoms, and of their deteſtation both of the cuſtoms and of the arts of the heathen; in conſequence of their veneration for the ſacred books, and their never hearing any other than a literal verſion of them in the public offices of religion, they ſtill in a great meaſure preſerved the idiom; inſomuch that if the Chaldee of Jeruſalem was not as different from the Chaldee of Babylon as the Greek of the ſynagogue was from the Greek of the claſſics, the only aſſignable reaſon perhaps is, that the idiom of the Hebrew and that of the Chaldee were originally more akin to each other, than the idiom of the Greek was to either. Now the idiom keeps a much firmer hold of the mind than the words, which are mere ſounds, do, and which, compared with the other, may be conſidered as but the body, the material part of a language, whereof the idiom is the ſoul.

Though the Jewiſh tongue therefore became different, their idiom was nearly the ſame I ſay nearly ſo; hence we infer, that the knowledge of the ſtyle and idiom of the Old Teſtament muſt throw light upon the New; but it was not entirely the ſame. Hence we conclude the utility of knowing the ſtate of the rabbinical and traditionary learning of that people in the days of our Saviour, this being the moſt effectual means of illuſtrating thoſe particulars wherein the idiom of the New Teſtament differs from that of the Old. It was indeed impoſſible that ſuch an intercourſe with ſtrangers as extirpated their language, ſhould not be productive of ſome effect on their notions of things, ſentiments, and manners. And changes produced in the ſentiments and manners of a people never fail to ſhew themſelves in their writings.

§ 6. But if what happened during their captivity had ſome effect on theſe, what followed after their return to Judea had a much greater. The perſecutions they endured under the Grecian empire, on account of their religion, did, as is often the caſe, greatly endear it to them, and make them conſider it in a light, in which (whatever may be ſaid of individuals) they ſeem never as a nation to have conſidered it in before. It became more an object and a ſtudy to them. Senſible how little their perſeverance ſecured to them the temporal advantages held forth in the letter of the law, they became fond of attending to thoſe

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ſpiritual and ſublime interpretations, both of the law and of the prophets, which ſerved to fortify the mind againſt all ſecular loſſes and misfortunes, and inſpire it with hope in the immediate views of torture and of death. Beſides, the intercourſe which, from the time of the Macedonian conqueſts, they unavoidably had with the Greeks, introduced inſenſibly into their manner of treating religion, an infuſion of the philoſophic ſpirit, with which they had before been utterly unacquainted.

The Greeks were perhaps the moſt inquiſitive, the moſt ingenious, and the moſt diſputatious people that ever appeared upon the earth. The uncommon importance which the Jews attributed to their religious peculiarities, both in doctrine and in ceremonies, and their abhorrence of the ceremonies of other nations, with whom they would have no intercommunity in worſhip, could not fail to provoke the ſcrutiny and contradiction of a people at once ſo acute and ſo conceited as the Greeks. The Jews alſo in ſelf-defence began to ſcrutinize and argue. On examining and comparing, they perceived in a ſtronger light than ever, the inexpreſſible futility and abſurdity of the mythology of the Greeks, and the noble ſimplicity, purity, and ſublimity of their own theology. The ſpirit of inquiry begot among them, as might have been expected, the ſpirit of dogmatizing, a ſpirit quite unknown to their anceſtors, though many centuries had elapſed from their eſtabliſhment in Canaan to the period of which I am ſpeaking. One of the firſt conſequences of the dogmatical ſpirit was a diviſion into factions and ſects.

In this ſtate we find them in the days of our Lord; the whole nation being ſplit into Phariſees, Sadducees, and Eſſenes. Now of ſuch party diſtinctions there is not a ſingle veſtige in the Old Teſtament. The dogmatiſts on the different ſides would have recourſe to different theories, the theories would give riſe to particular phraſes, by which the peculiar opinions of the partizans would be expreſſed, and even to particular applications of the words and phraſes to which they had been accuſtomed before. Hence the uſefulneſs of underſtanding their differences, and tenets, and manner of expounding ſacred writ.

§ 7. But though the differences in opinions and modes of expoſition which prevailed in the different ſects, do not much affect the ſtyle of the Hiſtorical part of the New Teſtament, which in its nature gives leſs occaſion for introducing ſubtleties in ſpeculation, and was written by men who, from their education, cannot be ſuppoſed to have entered much into the polemical diſcuſſions of thoſe days, they may reaſonably be ſuppoſed to affect the ſtyle of the epiſtolary writings, eſpecially of Paul, who was an adept in all the Jewiſh learning of the age. Indeed we learn from Philo, Joſephus, and the talmudical writers, that their literati at that period were become fond of aſſigning a moral ſignificance

nificance and purpoſe to all the ritual obſervances of the law, and of applying the words and phraſes relating to theſe in a certain figurative and myſtical manner. That in their mode of application they would often be whimſical, I do not deny; but that the New Teſtament itſelf gives ground to think that their ceremonies and carnal ordinances, as the apoſtle calls them, Heb. ix. 10. were intended to adumbrate ſome ſpiritual and more important inſtructions, appears to me uncontrovertible.

But whatever be in this, it muſt be allowed to be a matter of ſome moment, that we form a right notion of the different dogmas and prevailing taſte of the time. The reaſon is evident. The ſacred writers, in addreſſing thoſe of their own nation, would doubtleſs, in order to be underſtood, adapt themſelves, as their great Maſter had done before them, to the prevailing idiom and phraſeology. Now this is to be learned only from the common uſages, and from the reigning modes of thinking and reaſoning which diſtinguiſhed the people in that age and nation.

PART III.

The Difficulties found in tranſlating the Scriptures.

It can ſcarcely admit a doubt, that as every language has in it ſomething peculiar, and as the people of every nation have cuſtoms, rites, and manners wherein they are ſingular; each tongue will have its ſpecial difficulties, which will always be the greater to ſtrangers, the more remote the cuſtoms, rites, and manners of the nation are from the cuſtoms, rites, and manners of other nations: for in the ſame proportion the genius of the tongue will differ from that of other tongues. If ſo, it is no wonder that the diſtinguiſhing particularity of the Jews in conſtitution, ſentiments, ceremonies, and laws, ſhould render it more difficult to tranſlate with juſtneſs from their language, than to tranſlate from the language of any people who, in all the reſpects aforementioned, do not ſo remarkably differ from others.

It may be proper here to point out more particularly where difficulties of this kind will be found principally to lie. It is evident that they will not at all affect the conſtruction of the ſentences, or the inflexions of the words. The analogy of the language, and its whole grammatical ſtructure, may be very ſimple and eaſily acquired, whatever be the cuſtoms of the people, or how extraordinary ſoever they may appear to us. Further, ſimple narration is not that kind of writing which will be much affected by thoſe difficulties. The nouns which occur in

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it are generally of the firſt claſs, mentioned in the preceding part of this Diſſertation. And in theſe, from the principles formerly explained, the interpreter will not often meet with any thing to retard his progreſs. If the narrative be of matters which concern the community at large, as in civil hiſtory, there will no doubt be frequent recourſe to the words of the third claſs. But in regard to theſe, the method of adopting the original term, eſtabliſhed by univerſal practice, and founded in neceſſity, whereby tranſlators extricate themſelves when correſpondent terms cannot be found, does in effect remove the difficulty. And even when words of the ſecond claſs occur, as will ſometimes happen, there is a greater probability that the context will aſcertain their meaning in an hiſtorical work, than there is where they occur in any other kind of writing, ſuch as the didactic, the declamatory, the proverbial or aphoriſtic, and the argumentative.

This is the firſt difficulty proper to be mentioned, ariſing from difference of manners, a difficulty which cannot be ſaid to affect the ſacred writings peculiarly, otherwiſe than in degree. It is always the harder to reach in a verſion the preciſe ſignification of the words of the original, the wider the diſtance is in ſentiments and manners, between the nation in whoſe language the book is written, and the nation into whoſe language it is to be tranſlated.

§ 2. The ſecond difficulty I ſhall take notice of ariſes from the penury of words in the ancient oriental languages, at leaſt in the Hebrew, a natural conſequence of the ſimplicity of the people, the little proficiency made by them in ſciences and arts, and their early withdrawing themſelves, on account of religion, from the people of other nations. The fewer the words are in any language, the more extenſive commonly is the ſignification given to every word; and the more extenſive the ſignification of a word is, there is the greater riſk of its being miſunderſtood in any particular application; beſides, the fewneſs of words always obliges writers of enlarged minds, for the ſake of ſupplying the deficiency, frequently to recur to metaphor, ſynecdoche, metonomy, catachreſis, and other rhetorical tropes. Theſe accordingly are always found to abound moſt in the ſcantieſt tongues. Now the frequent uſe of tropes occaſions an unavoidable obſcurity and ſometimes ambiguity in the expreſſion.

§ 3. A third difficulty ariſes from the penury of books extant in the genuine ancient Hebrew, there being no more than the books of the Old Teſtament, and not even all theſe. When we conſider the manner in which the knowledge of any language, even of our native tongue, is acquired, we find it is ſolely by attending to the ſeveral ways in which words are uſed in a vaſt variety of occurrences and applications, that the preciſe meaning is aſcertained. As it is principally from converſation in our mother

mother-tongue, or in any living language which we learn from thoſe who ſpeak it, that we have occaſion to obſerve this variety, ſo it is only in books that we have occaſion to obſerve it, when employed in the acquiſition of a dead language. Conſequently, the fewer the books are, there is the greater riſk of miſtaking the ſenſe, eſpecially of thoſe words that do not frequently occur. This has given riſe to doubts about the meaning of ſome words, even of the firſt claſs, to wit, the names of a few natural objects, as plants, animals, and precious ſtones, which occur but very rarely in Scripture, and in paſſages where ſufficient light cannot be had from the context.

§ 4. It may indeed be ſaid that, as the writers of the New Teſtament employed not the Hebrew but the Greek language in their compoſitions, neither of the two remarks laſt mentioned can affect them, however they may affect the penmen of the Old. The Greek is indeed a moſt copious language, and the books written in it are very numerous. But whoever would argue in this manner muſt have forgotten, what has been fully evinced in the former Diſſertation, that though the words, the inflection, and the conſtruction in the books of the New Teſtament are Greek, the idiom is ſtrictly Hebraical; or at leaſt he muſt not have reflected on the inevitable conſequences of this doctrine, one of which is, that the Hebraiſtic Greek, or Greek of the ſynagogue, as it has been called, will, in a great meaſure, labour under the ſame inconveniencies and defects with the tongue on which its idiom is formed. Another conſequence is, that the ſcarcity of books in the language which is the parent of the idiom, is in effect a ſcarcity of the lights that are neceſſary, or at leaſt convenient for the eaſier diſcovery of the peculiarities of the idiomatic tongue formed upon it. The reaſon of both is obvious; it is from that language we muſt learn the import of the phraſes, and even ſometimes of particular words, which otherwiſe would often prove unintelligible.

§ 5. The fourth difficulty which the interpreter of the Bible has to encounter, ariſes from the nature of the prophetic ſtyle, a ſtyle highly figurative, or, as ſome critics have thought proper to denominate it, ſymbolical. The ſymbolical or typical is, in my apprehenſion, very much akin to what may be called the allegoric ſtyle. There is, however, this difference: the ſymbols employed in prophecy have, like the Egyptian hieroglyphs, acquired a cuſtomary interpretation from the eſtabliſhed uſe in that mode of writing, and are ſeldom or never varied; whereas the allegory is more at the diſcretion of the writer. One conſequence of this is, that in the former there is not required the ſame exactneſs of reſemblance between the ſymbols, or the types and their antitypes, as is required in allegory. The reaſon is obvious. The uſual application ſupplies the defects in the firſt; whereas,

whereas, in the ſecond, it is ſolely by an accuracy of reſemblance that an allegory can be diſtinguiſhed from a riddle.

This difficulty however in the prophetic ſtyle, may be ſaid more ſtrictly to affect the expounder of the ſacred oracles than the tranſlator. For in this mode of writing there are two ſenſes exhibited to the intelligent reader; firſt, the literal, and then the figurative; for, as the words are intended to be the vehicle of the literal ſenſe to the man who underſtands the language, ſo the literal ſenſe is intended to be the vehicle of the figurative to the man whoſe underſtanding is exerciſed "to diſcern the things of the Spirit." It is to ſuch therefore in a particular manner, that whatever is written in the ſymbolic ſtyle in the New Teſtament is addreſſed.. Our Lord, to diſtinguiſh ſuch from the unthinking multitude, calls them thoſe who have ears to hear. *Whoſo hath ears to hear*, ſays he, *let him hear*, Matt. xi. 15. xiii. 9. Mark iv. 9. Luke viii. 8. The ſame expreſſion is alſo uſed in the Apocalypſe, (Rev. ii. 7. 11. 17. 29.) a book of prophecies. And it deſerves to be attended to, that Jeſus Chriſt never employs theſe words in the introduction or the concluſion of any plain moral inſtructions, but always after ſome parable or prophetic declarations figuratively expreſſed. Now it is with the literal ſenſe only that the tranſlator, as ſuch, is concerned. For the literal ſenſe ought invariably to be conveyed into the verſion, where, if you diſcover the antitype or myſtical ſenſe, it muſt be, though not through the ſame words, through the ſame emblems, as you do in the original.

This alſo holds in tranſlating allegory, apologue, and parable. A man may render them exactly into another tongue, who has no apprehenſion of the figurative ſenſe. Who can doubt that any fable of Eſop or Phedrus, for example, may be tranſlated with as much juſtneſs by one who has not been told, and does not ſo much as gueſs the moral, as by one who knows it perfectly? Whereas the principal concern of the expounder is to diſcover the figurative import. In the New Teſtament indeed there is only one book, the Apocalypſe, written entirely in the prophetic ſtyle: and it muſt be allowed that that book may be accurately tranſlated by one who has no apprehenſion of the ſpiritual meaning. However, in the greater part both of the hiſtorical and of the epiſtolary writings, there are prophecies interſperſed. Beſides, ſome knowledge in the diction and manner of the prophets is neceſſary for the better apprehenſion of the application made in the New Teſtament, of the prophecies of the Old, and the reaſonings of the apoſtles in regard to thoſe prophecies.—Indeed it may be affirmed in general, that for tranſlating juſtly what is of a mixed character, where the emblematic is blended with the hiſtorical, ſome knowledge of the myſtic applications

plications is more eſſential, than for tranſlating unmixed prophecy, allegory, or parable.

§ 6. I ſhall mention as the cauſe of a fifth difficulty in the examination, and conſequently in the right interpretation of the Scriptures, that before we begin to ſtudy them critically, we have been accuſtomed to read them in a tranſlation, whence we have acquired a habit of conſidering many ancient and oriental terms, as perfectly equivalent to certain words in modern uſe in our own language, by which the other have been commonly rendered. And this habit, without a conſiderable ſhare of knowledge, attention, and diſcernment, is almoſt never perfectly to be ſurmounted. What makes the difficulty ſtill the greater is, that when we begin to become acquainted with other verſions beſide that into our mother-tongue—ſuppoſe Latin, French, Italian; theſe, in many inſtances, inſtead of correcting, ſerve but to confirm the effect. For in theſe tranſlations we find the ſame words in the original, uniformly rendered by words, which we know to correſpond exactly, in the preſent uſe of thoſe tongues, to the terms employed in our own tranſlation.

I hope I ſhall not be ſo far miſunderſtood by any as to be ſuppoſed to inſinuate, by this remark, that people ought to delay reading the Scriptures in a tranſlation, till they be capable of conſulting the original. This would be to debar the greater part of mankind from the uſe of them altogether, and to give up the many immenſe advantages derived from the inſtructions contained in the very worſt verſions of that book, for the ſake of avoiding a few miſtakes, comparatively ſmall, into which one may be drawn even by the beſt. A child muſt not be hindered from uſing his legs in walking, on pretence that if he be allowed to walk, it will be impoſſible always to ſecure him from falling. My intention in remarking this difficulty, is to ſhow firſt that thoſe early ſtudies, however proper and even neceſſary in Chriſtians, are nevertheleſs attended with this inconveniency, that at a time when we are incompetent judges, prepoſſeſſions are inſenſibly formed on mere habit or aſſociation, which afterwards, when the judgment is more mature, cannot eaſily be ſurmounted; 2dly, to account in part, without recurring to obſcurity in the original, for the greater difficulty ſaid to be found in explaining holy writ, than in expounding other works of equal antiquity; and, 3dly, to awake a proper circumſpection and caution in every one who would examine the Scriptures with that attention which the ineffable importance of the ſubject merits.

But, in order to ſet the obſervation itſelf in relation to this fifth difficulty in the ſtrongeſt light, it would be neceſſary to trace the origin, and give as it were the hiſtory of ſome terms, which have become technical amongſt eccleſiaſtical writers, pointing out the changes which in a courſe of ages they have inſenſibly undergone.

undergone. When alterations are produced by slow degrees, they always escape the notice of the generality of people, and sometimes even of the more discerning. For a term once universally understood to be equivalent to an original term whose place it occupies in the translation, will naturally be supposed to be still equivalent, by those who do not sufficiently attend to the variations in the meanings of words, which the tract of time and the alterations in notions and customs thence arising, have imperceptibly introduced. Sometimes etymology too contributes to favour the deception. Is there one of a thousand, even among the readers of the original, who entertains the smallest suspicion that the words, *blasphemy*, *heresy*, *mystery*, *schism*, do not convey to moderns precisely the same ideas which the Greek words βλασφημια, αιρεσις, μυστηριον, σχισμα, in the New Testament, conveyed to Christians in the times of the apostles? Yet that these Greek and English words are far from corresponding perfectly, I shall take an occasion of evincing afterwards *. The same thing may be affirmed of several other words, and even phrases, which retain their currency on religious subjects, though very much altered in their signification.

§ 7. The sixth and last difficulty, and perhaps the greatest of all, arises from this, that our opinions on religious subjects are commonly formed, not indeed before we read the Scriptures, but before we have examined them. The ordinary consequence is, that men afterwards do not search the sacred oracles in order to find out the truth, but in order to find what may authorise their own opinions. Nor is it indeed otherwise to be accounted for, that the several partizans of such an endless variety of adverse sects (although men who on other subjects appear neither weak nor unfair in their researches) should all, with so much confidence, maintain that the dictates of holy writ are perfectly decisive in support of their favourite dogmas, and in opposition to those of every antagonist. Nor is there in the whole history of mankind a clearer demonstration than this, of the amazing power of prejudice and prepossession

It may be said, that interest often warps men's judgment, and gives them a bias towards that side of a question in which they find their account; nay, it may even be urged further, that in cases in which it has no influence on the head, it may seduce the heart, and excite strenuous combatants in defence of a system which they themselves do not believe I acknowledge that these suppositions are not of things impossible. Actual instances may be found of both. But for the honour of human nature, I would wish to think that those of the second class now mentioned, are far from being numerous. But whatever be in this, we certainly have, in cases wherein interest is entirely out of the ques-

* Dissertation ix.

tion, nay, wherein it appears evidently on the oppoſite ſide, irrefragable proofs of the power of prepoſſeſſion, inſomuch that one would almoſt imagine that, in matters of opinion, as in matters of property, a right were conſtituted merely by pre-occupancy. This ſerves alſo to account in part for the great diverſity of ſentiments in regard to the ſenſe of Scripture, without recurring to the common plea of the Romaniſts, its obſcurity and ambiguity.

§ 8. Thus the principal difficulties to be encountered in the ſtudy of Biblical criticiſm are ſix, ariſing, 1ſt, from the ſingularity of Jewiſh cuſtoms; 2dly, from the poverty (as appears) of their native language; 3dly, from the fewneſs of the books extant in it; 4thly, from the ſymbolical ſtyle of the prophets; 5thly, from the exceſſive influence which a previous acquaintance with tranſlations may have occaſioned; and, 6thly, from prepoſſeſſions, in what way ſoever acquired, in regard to religious tenets.

DISSERTATION THE THIRD.

OF THE STYLE OF THE SCRIPTURE HISTORY, PARTICULARLY THE GOSPELS.—ITS PERSPICUITY DEFENDED AGAINST THE OBJECTIONS OF FATHER SIMON.

FROM what has been evinced in the preceding diſcourſe, it will not improbably be concluded that the ſtyle of holy writ, both of the New Teſtament and of the Old, of the hiſtorical books as well as of the prophetical and the argumentative, muſt be generally obſcure and often ambiguous. So much, and with ſo great plauſibility and acuteneſs, has been written by ſome learned men, in proving this point, that were a perſon, before he ever read the Scriptures, either in the original or in a tranſlation, to conſider every topic they have employed, and to obſerve how much, in regard to the truth of ſuch topics, is admitted by thoſe who cannot entirely acquieſce in the concluſion, he would infallibly deſpair of reaping any inſtruction that could be depended on from the ſtudy of the Bible, and would be almoſt tempted to pronounce it altogether unprofitable.

What can exceed the declarations to this purpoſe of the celebrated Father Simon, a very eminent critic, and probably the greateſt oriental ſcholar of his age? "We ought," ſays he *, "to regard it as unqueſtionable, that the greater part of the Hebrew words are equivocal, and that their ſignification is *entirely* uncertain. For this reaſon, when a tranſlator employs in his verſion the interpretation which he thinks the beſt, he cannot ſay abſolutely that that interpretation expreſſes truly what is contained in the original. There is *always* ground to doubt whether the ſenſe which he gives to the Hebrew words be the true

* Hiſt. Crit. du V. T. liv iii. ch. ii. On doit ſuppoſer comme une choſe conſtante, que la plus part des mots Hebreux ſont equivoques, et que leur ſignification eſt *entierement* incertaine. C'eſt pourquoi lors qu'un traducteur employe dans ſa verſion l'interpretation qu'il juge la meilleure, on ne peut pas dire abſolument, que cette interpretation exprime au vrai ce qui eſt contenu dans l'original. Il y a *toujours* lieu de douter, ſi le ſens qu'on donne aux mots Hebreux eſt le veritable, puis qu'il y en a d'autres qui ont *autant* de probabilité.

" true ſenſe, becauſe there are other meanings which are *equally* " probable." Again *, " They (the Proteſtants) do not conſider " that even the moſt learned Jews doubt almoſt every where " concerning the proper ſignification of the Hebrew words, and " that the Hebrew lexicons compoſed by them, commonly con- " tain nothing but uncertain conjectures." Now, if matters were really as here repreſented, there could be no queſtion that the ſtudy of Scripture would be mere loſs of time, and that, whatever might be affirmed of the ages of the ancient prophets, it could not be ſaid at preſent, that there is any revelation extant of what preceded the times of the apoſtles. For a revelation which contains nothing but matter of doubt and conjecture, and from which I cannot raiſe even a probable opinion that is not counterbalanced by opinions equally probable, is no revelation at all. How defective, on this hypotheſis, the New Teſtament would be, which every where preſuppoſes the knowledge and belief of the Old; and in many places, how inexplicable without that knowledge, it is needleſs to mention.

§ 2. It would not be eaſy to account for exaggerations ſo extravagant in an author ſo judicious, and commonly ſo moderate, but by obſerving that his immediate aim, whereof he never loſes ſight, throughout his whole elaborate performance, is to eſtabliſh TRADITION as the foundation of all the knowledge neceſſary for the faith and practice of a Chriſtian. *Scripture* doubtleſs has its difficulties; but we know at leaſt what and where it is. As for *tradition*, what it is, how it is to be ſought, and where it is to be found, it has never yet been in the power of any man to explain to the ſatisfaction of a reaſonable inquirer. We are already in poſſeſſion of the former, if we can but expound it. We cannot ſay ſo much of the latter, which, like Nebuchadnezzar's dream, we have firſt to find, and then to interpret.

I am not ignorant that Simon's principal aim has been repreſented by ſome of his own communion, particularly Boſſuet, biſhop of Meaux, as ſtill more hoſtile to religion, than from the account above given we ſhould conclude it to be. That celebrated and ſubtle diſputant did not heſitate to maintain that, under the ſpecious pretext of ſupporting the authority of the church, this prieſt of the Oratory undermined Chriſtianity itſelf, a proceeding which in the end muſt prove fatal to an authority that has no other foundation to reſt upon. The Biſhop accordingly inſiſts that the general tendency of his argument, as appears in every part of the work, is to inſinuate a refined Socinianiſm, if not an univerſal

* Hiſt. Crit. du V. T. liv. iii. ch. iv. Ils n'ont pas pris garde, que même les plus ſcavans Juifs doutent preſque par tout de la ſignification propre des mots Hebreux, et que les dictionaires qu'ils ont compoſés de la langue Hebraique ne contiennent le plus ſouvent que de conjectures incertaines.

univerſal ſcepticiſm. Certain it is, that the ambiguous manner often adopted by our critical hiſtorian, and the addreſs with which he ſometimes eludes the expectation of his readers, add not a little probability to the reaſoning of this acute antagoniſt. When to any flagrant miſinterpretation of a portion of Scripture mentioned in his work, we expect his anſwer from a critical examination of the paſſage, we are ſilenced with the tradition and authority of the church, urged in ſuch a way as evidently ſuggeſts that without recurring to her deciſion, there is no poſſibility of refuting the objections of adverſaries, or diſcovering the truth; and that our own reaſonings unchecked by her, if they did not ſubvert our faith altogether, would infallibly plunge us into all the errors of Socinus. Thus moſt of his diſcuſſions concerning the import of the ſacred text conclude in an alternative which, whilſt it conceals his own ſentiments, bewilders his readers. The purport is, 'If ye will be rational, ye muſt ſoon ceaſe to 'be Chriſtians; and if ye will be Chriſtians, ye muſt (where-'ever religion is concerned) ceaſe to be rational.' This alternative of faith or reaſon, though not expreſſed in ſo many words, is but too plainly implied in thoſe he uſes. If for *Chriſtian* he had ſubſtituted *Roman Catholic*, or even any one denomination of Chriſtians, the ſentiment would not have been ſo generally controverted. As it is, he offers no other choice, but to believe every thing, how abſurd ſoever, on an authority into the foundations of which we are not permitted to enquire, or to believe nothing at all. The Critical Hiſtory has accordingly been obſerved to produce two contrary effects on readers of oppoſite characters. Of the weak and timid, it often makes *implicit believers*: of the intelligent and daring, it makes *free-thinkers*. To which ſide the author himſelf leaned moſt, it would perhaps be preſumptuous to ſay. But as his perſonal character and known abilities were much more congenial to thoſe of the latter claſs than to thoſe of the former, it was no wonder that he fell under ſuſpicion with ſome ſhrewd but zealous Catholics, who looked on his zeal for tradition as no better than a diſguiſe. But this only by the way. I mean not to conſider here what was his real and ultimate ſcope in the treatiſe above mentioned; it is enough for my purpoſe to examine his profeſſed intention, which is to ſupport tradition by repreſenting Scripture as, in conſequence of its obſcurity, inſufficient evidence of any doctrine.

That Simon's aſſertions above quoted are without bounds hyperbolical, can ſcarcely be doubted by any perſon who reflects. Of the prophetical writings I am not now to ſpeak, though even, with regard to them, it were eaſy to ſhew that ſuch things could not be affirmed in an entire conſiſtency with truth. As to the hiſtorical books, I hope to prove, notwithſtanding all that has been evinced on one ſide and admitted on the other, that they are

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in general remarkable for perſpicuity. It is true that our knowledge of the tongue, for the reaſons above mentioned, is defective; but it is alſo true, that this defect is ſeldom ſo great as materially to darken the hiſtory, eſpecially the more early part of it.

§ 3. The firſt quality for which the ſacred hiſtory is remarkable, is ſimplicity. The Hebrew is a ſimple language. Their verbs have not, like Greek and Latin, a variety of moods and tenſes, nor do they, like the modern languages, abound in auxiliaries and conjunctions. The conſequence is, that in narrative they expreſs by ſeveral ſimple ſentences, much in the way of the relations uſual in converſation, what in moſt other languages would be comprehended in one complex ſentence of three or four members. Though the latter method has many advantages in reſpect of elegance, harmony and variety, and is eſſential to what is ſtrictly called ſtyle, the former is incomparably more perſpicuous. Accordingly we may often obſerve, that unlettered people who are very attentive to a familiar ſtory told in their own homely manner, and perfectly underſtand it, quickly loſe attention to almoſt any written hiſtory, even the moſt intereſting, the hiſtory contained in the Scriptures alone excepted. Nor is the ſole reaſon of this exception becauſe they are more accuſtomed to that hiſtory than to any other, though no doubt this circumſtance contributes to the effect; but it is chiefly becauſe the ſimplicity of the diction brings it to the level of ordinary talk, and conſequently does not put the minds of people who are no readers ſo much to the ſtretch as what is written, even in the leaſt laboured ſtyle of compoſition, in any modern tongue, does in regard to thoſe acquainted with the tongue.

§ 4. Take for an example of the ſimplicity here meant, the firſt paragraph of Geneſis, conſiſting of five not long verſes, and containing not fewer than eleven ſentences. The common punctuation does not indeed make them ſo many. But that is of no moment. When ſentences are very ſhort, we uſually ſeparate them by ſemicolons, ſometimes by commas; but that is a complete ſentence, in whatever way pointed, which conveys a meaning fully enunciated, and intelligible independently of what precedes or what follows; when what precedes, and what follows, is alſo intelligible, independently of it. 1. *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.* 2. *And the earth was without form and void.* 3. *And darkneſs was upon the face of the deep.* 4. *And the ſpirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.* 5. *And God ſaid, Let there be light.* 6. *And there was light.* 7. *And God ſaw the light, that it was good.* 8. *And God divided the light from the darkneſs.* 9. *And God called the light day.* 10. *And the darkneſs he called night.* 11. *And the evening and the morning were the firſt day.* This is a juſt repreſentation

ſentation of the ſtrain of the original. A more perfect example of ſimplicity of ſtructure we can nowhere find. The ſentences are ſimple; the ſubſtantives are not attended by adjectives, nor the verbs by adverbs, no ſynonymas, no ſuperlatives, no effort at expreſſing things in a bold, emphatical, or uncommon manner.

In order to judge of the difference of this manner from that of ordinary compoſitions, we need only compare with it Caſtalio's verſion of the paſſage into Latin, wherein all, except the firſt ſentence and the laſt, and conſequently nine of thoſe above recited, are compriſed in one complicated period. "1. Principio creavit "Deus cœlum et terram. 2. Quum autem eſſet terra iners at- "que rudis, tenebriſque effuſum profundum, et divinus ſpiritus "ſeſe ſuper aquas libraret, juſſit Deus ut exiſteret lux, et extitit "lux; quam quum videret Deus eſſe bonam, lucem ſecrevit a "tenebris, et lucem diem, et tenebras noctem appellavit. 3. Ita "extitit ex veſpere et mane dies primus." Compare with this the verſion of the ſame paſſage in the Vulgate, which is literal like the Engliſh. "In principio creavit Deus cœlum et terram. "Terra autem erat inanis et vacua, et tenebræ erant ſuper faciem "abyſſi: Et ſpiritus Dei ferebatur ſuper aquas. Dixitque "Deus, Fiat lux. Et facta eſt lux. Et vidit Deus lucem quod "eſſet bona. Et diviſit lucem a tenebris. Appellavitque lucem "diem, et tenebras noctem. Factumque eſt veſpere et mane "dies unus." The difference between theſe in point of perſpicuity, is to an ordinary hearer extremely great. So much depends on the ſimplicity of ſtructure, neceſſarily ariſing in ſome degree from the form of the language. Nothing is more characteriſtic of the ſimple manner than the introduction of what was ſpoken, directly in the words of the ſpeaker; whereas in the periodic ſtyle we are informed obliquely of its purport. Thus what is in the Vulgate, "*Dixit Deus*, Fiat lux," is in Caſtalio, "*Juſſit Deus* ut exiſteret lux."

§ 5. But beſide this, there is a ſimplicity of ſentiment, particularly in the Pentateuch, ariſing from the very nature of the early and uncultivated ſtate of ſociety about which that book is converſant. This renders the narrative in general extremely clear and engaging. Simple manners are more eaſily deſcribed than manners highly poliſhed and refined. Being alſo adapted to the ordinary ranks of people and to all capacities, they much more generally excite attention, and intereſt the heart. It has been remarked, not unjuſtly, that though no two authors wrote in languages more widely different, both in genius and in form, than Moſes and Homer, or treated of people who in their religious opinions and ceremonies were more oppoſite than were the Hebrews and the Greeks, we ſhall hardly find any who reſemble one another more than theſe writers, in an affecting and perſpicuous

cuous ſimplicity, which ſuits almoſt every taſte, and is level to every underſtanding. Let it be obſerved, that in this compariſon I have no alluſion to imagery, or to any quality of diction, except that above mentioned. Now nothing contributes more to this reſemblance than this circumſtance which they have in common, that both preſent to our view a rude, becauſe little cultivated, ſtate of human beings and politics. The paſſions and the motives of the men recorded by them, diſplay themſelves without diſguiſe. There is ſomething wonderfully ſimple and artleſs even in the artifices related in their writings. If nature be not always exhibited by them naked, ſhe is dreſſed in a plain decent garb, which, far from diſguiſing, accommodates her, and ſhews her to advantage. Natural beauties pleaſe always and univerſally; artificial ornaments depend for their effect on mode and caprice. They pleaſe particular perſons only or nations, and at particular times. Now, as the writers above mentioned, though in many reſpects very diſſimilar, reſemble each other in this ſpecies of ſimplicity, they alſo reſemble in a certain native perſpicuity invariably reſulting therefrom.

§ 6. Homer is thought by many the moſt perſpicuous writer in Greek; yet in reſpect of idiom and dialect he is ſo peculiar, that one is leſs aſſiſted to underſtand him by the other compoſitions in the language, than to underſtand any other Greek writer in proſe or verſe. One would almoſt think that the only uſage in the tongue which can enable us to read him is his own. Were we therefore to judge from general topics which might plauſibly be declaimed upon, we ſhould conclude that the Iliad and the Odyſſey are among the darkeſt books in the language; yet they are in fact the cleareſt. In matters of criticiſm it is likewiſe unſafe to form general concluſions from a few examples, which may be pompouſly diſplayed, and, when brought into view together, made appear conſiderable, but are as nothing in number, compared with thoſe with which it is poſſible to contraſt them.

§ 7. Indeed moſt of Simon's inſtances, in ſupport of his doctrine of the impenetrable darkneſs of Scripture, appear to me rather as evidences of the ſtrait he was in to find appoſite examples, than as tolerable proofs of his opinion. For my part, I frankly own that, from the conviction I had of the profound erudition and great abilities of the man, I was much more inclined to his opinion before, than after the peruſal of his proofs. At firſt I could not avoid ſuſpecting that a man of his character muſt have had ſomething extraordinary, to which I had not attended, to advance, in ſupport of ſo extraordinary a poſition. I was at the ſame time certain that, as it was a point he had much at heart to enforce, the proofs he would bring from examples in ſupport of it, would be the ſtrongeſt he could find.

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Let us then conſider ſome of the principal of theſe examples. What pains has he not taken to ſhew that ברא, *bara*, does not neceſſarily imply, *to make out of nothing?* But if it do not, can any man conſider this as an evidence of either the ambiguity or the obſcurity of Hebrew? The doctrine that God made the world out of nothing, does not reſt upon the import of that verb, but on the whole narration, particularly on the firſt verſe of Geneſis, compared with thoſe which follow; whence we learn that God firſt made the chaotic matter, out of which he afterwards formed the material beings whereof the world is compoſed. But paſſing this; for I mean not here to inquire into the grounds of that article, but into the obſcurity of Scripture; who ſees not that the original term is not more ambiguous or more obſcure than thoſe by which it is rendered into other languages? Is ποιεω, or even κτιζω, in Greek, *creo* in Latin, or *create* in Engliſh, more definite? Not in the leaſt, as we may learn from the common dictionaries of theſe languages. In regard even to the ſcriptural uſe of the Engliſh word, God, in the two firſt chapters of Geneſis, is ſaid, in the common verſion, to have *created* thoſe very things, of which we are alſo told, that he formed them out of the ground and out of the water. Are theſe languages then (and as much may be ſaid of all the languages I know) perfectly ambiguous and obſcure? "It is," ſays Simon*, "the "tradition of the ſynagogue and of the church, which limits the "vague meaning of theſe firſt words of Geneſis." But if words be accounted *vague*, becauſe they are general expreſſions, under which ſeveral terms more ſpecial are included, the much greater part of the nouns as well as the verbs, not of the oriental tongues only, but of every tongue, ancient and modern, muſt be denominated vague. Every name muſt be ſo that is not a proper name; the name of a ſpecies, becauſe applicable to many individuals; more ſo the name of a genus, becauſe applicable to many ſpecies; and ſtill more ſo, the name of a claſs or order, becauſe applicable to many genera.

Would it not be an abuſe of words to ſay that a man ſpoke vaguely, equivocally, or darkly, who told me that he had built a *houſe* for himſelf, becauſe the verb *to build* does not ſuggeſt what the materials of the building were, whether ſtone, or brick, or wood, to any of which it may be equally applied; and becauſe the noun *houſe* may equally denote a houſe of one ſtory, or of ſeven ſtories, forty feet long, or four hundred? As far as the information went, the expreſſion was clear and unequivocal. But it did not preclude the poſſibility of farther information on the ſubject. And what ſingle affirmation ever does preclude this? Are we informed of nothing when we are told that God *made all things?* And if it ſhould be added *out of nothing*, would not

* Reponſe aux Sentimens de quelques Theol. de Hollande, ch. 16.

this be accounted additional information, and not the removal of any obſcurity in the foregoing? Would we not judge in the ſame manner, ſhould a man, after acquainting us that he had built his houſe, add, that it was of marble, ſeventy feet long, and three ſtories high? yet there would be ſtill ſcope for further enquiry, and further information. Is a man told nothing who is not told every thing? And is every word obſcure or ambiguous, that does not convey all the information that can be given upon the ſubject? This way of proving, adopted by our learned critic, is indeed a novelty of its kind.

§ 8. Another of his examples is the word צבא *tſaba* *, rendered by the Seventy κοσμος, in the Vulgate *ornatus*, and by our tranſlators *hoſt*. Though this word be admitted to be equivocal taken by itſelf, as moſt nouns in every language are, its import in this paſſage is clearly aſcertained by the context to be metaphorical. Whether therefore it be rendered *hoſt* with the Engliſh interpreters, κοσμος with the Greek, or *ornatus* with the Latin, it makes no conceivable variation in the ſenſe. Nobody, in reading our tranſlation, ever thinks of an army of men, in the literal acceptation, muſtered in the ſky. Nor is the diverſity at all material, when the purport of the whole ſentence is conſidered, between the different verſions which have been given of the two Hebrew words תהו *thohu*, and בהו *bohu*†. All concur in making them expreſſive of a chaos.

§ 9. As to the verſion, which, according to him, may be given to the three firſt verſes of Geneſis ‡, making of five or ſix ſimple ſentences one complex period, little more is neceſſary than to remark, that its very want of ſimplicity in ſuch a book, written in ſo early an age, is a very ſtrong preſumption againſt it, being not leſs unſuited to the time of the hiſtorian, than it is to the genius of the language. In what reſpect he could call it literal, or agreeable to the grammatical ſenſe, I do not know; ſince it evidently departs from the ordinary import, as well as the uſual conſtruction of the words, and that not for giving light to a paſſage otherwiſe obſcure (which may reaſonably excuſe a ſmall deviation from the letter), but for involving in darkneſs what is expreſſed

* Gen. ii. 1. The whole verſe is in the common verſion: *Thus the heavens and the earth were finiſhed, and all the* hoſt *of them.*

† Rendered in the Engliſh tranſlation, *without form and void* Gen. i. 2.

‡ The verſion is, "Avant que Dieu crea le ciel et la terre, que la terre "etoit ſans forme, &c. que les tenebres etoient, &c. et que l'eſprit de "Dieu. &c. Dieu dit que la lumiere ſoit," &c. Literally in Engliſh, *Before that God created the heavens and the earth, that the earth was without form and void, that darkneſs was upon the face of the deep, and that the ſpirit of God moved upon the face of the waters; God ſaid, Let there be light, and there was light.* Hiſt. Crit. de V. T. liv. iii. ch. iii. He mentions alſo another rendering: "Au commencement que," &c. But this ſeems only a more awkward way of expreſſing the ſame thing.

expreſſed perſpicuouſly. It is, beſides, quite arbitrary. The copulative is thrice rendered "*Que*," *that*; the fourth time it is omitted; and what follows is in the perfect of the indicative, the preceding clauſes being in the potential or ſubjunctive mood. Now I may venture to affirm, that no conceivable reaſon can be aſſigned, why this clauſe ſhould be made choice of for the direct affirmation, and not any of thoſe preceding or following in the paragraph.

Add to all this, that to make בראשית *bereſhith*, a conjunction, and render it "*priuſquam*," *avant que*, is not only without, but againſt Biblical authority. ראשית *beginning*, is a very common noun, and joined with the prepoſitive ב ſignifying *in*, occurs in four places beſide this. In theſe it is uniformly rendered as here, ἐν ἀρχῇ in the Septuagint, and *in principio* in the Vulgate, and cannot, in a conſiſtency with the words connected, be rendered otherwiſe. In the Targum or Chaldee paraphraſe of Onkelos on the books of Moſes, which in point of antiquity comes next to the Septuagint, it is rendered בקדמין, *in principiis*, in conformity to every other known tranſlation.

The opinion of Grotius and ſome learned Rabbis, unſupported by either argument or example, nay, in manifeſt contradiction to both, is here of no weight. Scriptural uſage alone muſt decide the queſtion. Theſe commentators (with all deference to their erudition and abilities be it ſpoken) being comparatively modern, cannot be conſidered as ultimate judges in a queſtion depending entirely on an ancient uſe, whereof all the evidences that were remaining in their time, remain ſtill, and are as open to our examination, as they were to theirs. In other points where there may happen to be in Scripture an alluſion to cuſtoms or ceremonies retained by the Jews, but unknown to us, the caſe is different. But nothing of this kind is pretended here. It is therefore needleſs to enter further into particulars. What has been produced above will ſerve for a ſpecimen of the evidence brought by Father Simon, of the obſcurity of the Hebrew Scriptures. And I imagine that, by the like arguments, I might undertake to prove any writing, ancient or modern, to be vague, ambiguous, and obſcure.

§ 10. That ſome things, however, in the ſacred hiſtory, not of great conſequence, are ambiguous, and ſome things obſcure, it was never my intention to queſtion. But ſuch things are to be found in every compoſition, in every language. Indeed, as the word *perſpicuous* is a relative term (for that may be perſpicuous to one which is obſcure to another), it muſt be allowed alſo that the dead languages have, in this reſpect, a diſadvantage, which is always the greater, the leſs the language is known. As to the multiplicity of meanings ſometimes affixed to ſingle words, one would be at a loſs to ſay what tongue, ancient or modern, is moſt

moſt chargeable with this blemiſh. Any perſon accuſtomed to conſult lexicons will readily aſſent to what I ſay. In regard to Engliſh (in which we know that it is not impoſſible to write both unambiguouſly and perſpicuouſly), if we recur to Johnſon's valuable Dictionary for the ſignification of the moſt common terms, both nouns and verbs, and overlook, for a moment, our acquaintance with the tongue, confirmed by long and uninterrupted habit, we ſhall be ſurpriſed that people can write intelligibly in it, and be apt to imagine that, in every period, nay, in every line, a reader will be perplexed in ſelecting the proper, out of ſuch an immenſe variety of meanings as are given to the different words *. In this view of things, the explanation of a ſimple ſentence will appear like the ſolution of a riddle.

§ 11. But no ſooner do we return to practice, than theſe imaginations, founded merely on a theoretical and partial view of the ſubject, totally diſappear. Nothing can be more pertinent, or better founded, than the remark of Mr le Clerc, "That a word which is equivocal by itſelf, is often ſo clearly limited to a particular ſignification by the ſtrain of the diſcourſe, as to leave no room for doubt." Nor has Simon paid a due regard to this moſt evident truth, though he pretends, in anſwering that writer, to have been aware of it †. He could not otherwiſe have run into ſuch exaggerations as theſe: "The ſignification of the "greater part of the Hebrew words is *entirely* uncertain;" and "a tranſlator cannot ſay abſolutely that his interpretation ex- "preſſes truly what is contained in the original, there being *al-* "*ways* ground to doubt, becauſe there are other meanings which "are *equally* probable;" abſurdities which it were eaſy to confute from his own work, were this the proper place.

§ 12. It may be aſked in reply, But is not the poverty of the Hebrew tongue, of which the obſcurity and the ambiguity ſeem to be the natural conſequences, acknowledged by all impartial critics? In ſome ſenſe it is, and I have acknowledged it very amply; but it deſerves our notice, that much more has been inferred from this than there is foundation for. The language of a people little advanced in civilization, amongſt whom knowledge of any kind has made but inconſiderable progreſs, and the arts of life are yet rude and imperfect, can hardly be ſuppoſed copious. But it is not ſufficiently weighed, on the other hand, that if their words be few, their ideas are few in proportion. Words multiply with the occaſions for employing them. And if, in modern languages, we have thouſands of names to which we can find

* Thus to the noun *word* Johnſon aſſigns 12 ſignifications—to *power* 13. and to *foot* 16. The verb, *to make*, has, according to him, 66 meanings, *to put*, 80, and *to take*, which is both neuter and active, has 134. This is but a ſmall ſpecimen in nouns and verbs; the obſervation may be as amply illuſtrated in other parts of ſpeech.

† Reponſe aux Sentimens de quelques Theol. de Holl. ch. xvi.

find none in Hebrew corresponding, we shall discover, upon inquiry, that the Hebrews were ignorant of the things to which those names are affixed by us as the signs.

Knowledge precedes, language follows. No people have names for things unknown and unimagined, about which they can have no conversation. If they be well supplied in signs for expressing those things with which they are, either in reality or in imagination, acquainted, their language, considered relatively to the needs of the people who use it, may be termed copious; though, compared with the languages of more intelligent and civilized nations, it be accounted scanty. This is a scantiness, which might occasion difficulty to a stranger attempting to translate into it the writings of a more polished and improved people, who have more ideas, as well as words, but would never be felt by the natives; nor would it hurt in the least the clearness of their narratives, concerning those matters which fall within the sphere of their knowledge. There is no defect of signs for all the things which they can speak or write about, and it can never affect the perspicuity of what they do say, that they have no signs for those things whereof they have nothing to say, because they know nothing about them.

Nay, it may be reasonably inferred, that in what is called a scanty language, where the signs are few, because the things to be signified are few, there is a greater probability of precision than in a copious language, where the requisite signs are much more numerous, by reason of the multiplicity of things to be represented by them. The least deviation from order will be observed in a small company, which would be overlooked in a crowd. The source of much false reasoning on this head, is the tendency people have to imagine that, with the same extent of subject which might have employed the pen of an ancient Greek, the Hebrews had perhaps not one fourth part of their number of words. Had this been the case, the words must indeed have been used very indefinitely; but as the case really stood, it is not so easy to decide, whether the terms (those especially for which there is most occasion in narrative) be more vague in their signification in Hebrew, than in other languages.

§ 13. But to descend from abstract reasoning to matters of fact, which in subjects of this kind are more convincing, "It is "false," says Le Clerc, "that there is always ground to doubt "whether the sense which one gives to the Hebrew words be the "true sense; for, in spite of all the ambiguities of the Hebrew "tongue, all the interpreters of Scripture, ancient and modern, "agree with regard to the greater part of the history, and of the "Jewish religion." Le Clerc is rather modest in his assertions; but in fact he was too much of Simon's opinion on this article,

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as appears particularly from his Prolegomena to the Pentateuch*. Otherwiſe he might have juſtly aſſerted that the points rendered doubtful by the obſcurity or the ambiguity of the text, bear not to thoſe which are evident, the proportion of one to an hundred in number, and not of one to a thouſand in importance. Let it be obſerved, that I ſpeak only of the doubts ariſing from the obſcurity of Scripture; for, as to thoſe which may be ſtarted by curioſity concerning circumſtances not mentioned, ſuch doubts are, on every ſubject, ſacred and profane, innumerable. But, in queſtions of this ſort, it is a maxim with every true and conſiſtent Proteſtant, that the faith of a Chriſtian is not concerned.

Simon's reply is affectedly evaſive. At the ſame time that it in fact includes a conceſſion ſubverſive of the principles he had advanced, it is far ſhort of what every perſon of reflection muſt ſee to be the truth. He tells us that "he never doubted that "one might underſtand Hebrew well enough to know *in groſs* "and *in general*, the Biblical hiſtories; but this *general* and *con-* "*fuſed* knowledge does not ſuffice for fixing the mind in what "regards the articles of our belief†." Now what this author meant by *knowing in groſs* and *in general*, which is a more vague expreſſion than any I remember in the Pentateuch, I will not attempt to explain; but it is not in my power to conceive any kind of knowledge, groſs or pure, general or ſpecial, deducible from a writing wherein "there is *always* ground to doubt whe- "ther the ſenſe aſſigned be the true ſenſe, becauſe there are other "meanings which are *equally* probable." There is in theſe poſitions a manifeſt contradiction. When the probabilities in the oppoſite ſcales balance each other, there can reſult no knowledge, no, nor even a reaſonable opinion. The mind is in total ſuſpenſe between the contrary but equal evidences.

§ 14. But, to be more particular, what hiſtorical point of moment recorded in Geneſis, is interpreted differently by Jews of any denomination, Phariſees, Sadducees, Karaites, or even Samaritans? Let it be obſerved, that I ſpeak only of their literal or grammatical interpretations of the acknowledged text, and neither of their interpolations, nor of their myſtical expoſitions and allegories, which are as various as men's imaginations; for with theſe it is evident that the perſpicuity of the tongue is no way concerned. Or is there one material difference, in what concerns the hiſtory, among Chriſtians of adverſe ſects, Greeks, Romaniſts and Proteſtants, or even between Jews and Chriſtians? This book

* Diſſ. I. ch. vi.

† "Mr Simon n'a jamais douté qu'on n'eut aſſez de connoiſſance de la "langue Hebraique pour ſavoir *en groſs* et *en general* les hiſtoires de la "Bible. Mais cette connoiſſance *general* et *confuſe* ne ſuffit pas pour ar- "rêter l'eſprit dans ce qui regarde les points de notre creance." Reponſe aux Sentimens de quelq. Theol. de Holl. ch. xvi.

book has been tranſlated into a great many languages, ancient and modern, into thoſe of Aſia, Africa and Europe. Is not every thing that can be denominated an event of conſequence ſimilarly exhibited in them all? In all we find one God, and only one, the Maker of heaven and earth, and of every thing that they contain. From all we learn, that the world was made in ſix days, that God reſted the ſeventh. All agree in the work of each day, in giving man dominion over the brute creation, in the formation of the woman out of the body of the man, in the prohibition of the tree of knowledge, in man's tranſgreſſion and its conſequences, in the murder of Abel by his brother Cain, in the deluge, in the preſervation of Noah's family, and of the animal world, by the ark, in the confuſion of tongues, in the hiſtories given of the patriarchs.

It were tedious, I had almoſt ſaid endleſs, to enumerate every thing. Take the ſtory of Joſeph for an example, the only one I ſhall ſpecify. In what verſion of that moſt intereſting narrative, oriental or occidental, ancient or modern, Jewiſh or Chriſtian, Popiſh or Proteſtant, is any thing which can be juſtly called material, repreſented differently from what it is in the reſt? Do we not clearly perceive in every one of them the partiality of the parent, the innocent ſimplicity of the child, the malignant envy of the brothers, their barbarous purpoſe ſo cruelly executed, their artifice for deceiving their father, the young man's ſlavery in Egypt, his prudence, fidelity, piety, chaſtity, the infamous attempt of his miſtreſs, and the terrible revenge ſhe took of his virtuous refuſal, his impriſonment, his behaviour in priſon, the occaſion of his releaſe, Pharaoh's dreams, and Joſeph's interpretation, the exaltation of the latter in Egypt, the years of plenty and the years of famine, the interviews he had with his brothers, and the affecting manner in which he at laſt diſcovered himſelf to them? Is there any one moral leſſon that may be deduced from any part of this hiſtory, (and none ſurely can be more inſtructive), which is not ſufficiently ſupported by every tranſlation with which we are acquainted? Or is this coincidence of tranſlations, in every material circumſtance, conſiſtent with the repreſentations which have been given of the total obſcurity and ambiguity of the original? The reverſe certainly.

§ 4. Nor is it neceſſary, in this inquiry, to confine one's ſelf to the points merely hiſtorical, though, for brevity's ſake, I have done it. Permit me only to add in a ſentence, that the religious inſtitutions, the laws and the ceremonies of the Jews, as far as they are founded on the expreſs words of Scripture, and neither on tradition, nor on traditionary gloſſes, are, in every thing material, underſtood in the very ſame way by both Jews and Chriſtians. The principal points on which the Jewiſh ſects differ ſo widely from one another, are ſupported, if not by the oral tradi-

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tive law, at leaſt by myſtical ſenſes, attributed by one party, and not acquieſced in by others, to thoſe paſſages of Scripture, about the literal meaning whereof all parties are agreed.

§ 16. Yet our critic will have it, that our knowledge of theſe things is *confuſed* and *general*. He had granted more, as we have ſeen, than was compatible with his bold aſſertions above quoted; and therefore to diſguiſe a little the inconſiſtency of thoſe aſſertions with the conceſſion now made, he encumbers it with the epithets *confuſed* and *general*. But let the fact ſpeak for itſelf. Had there been any ſource of confuſion in the original, was it poſſible that there ſhould have been ſuch harmony in tranſlations made into languages ſo different, and by men who, in many things that concern religion, were of ſentiments ſo contrary? But if this knowledge be *confuſed* and *general*, I ſhould like to be informed what this author, and thoſe who think as he does, would denominate *diſtinct* and *particular*. For my part, I have not a more diſtinct and particular notion of any hiſtory, I ever read in any language, than of that written by Moſes. And if there has not been ſuch a profuſion of criticiſm on the obſcurities and ambiguities which occur in other authors, it is to be aſcribed ſolely to this circumſtance, that what claims to be matter of revelation, awakens a cloſer attention, and excites a more ſcrupulous examination, than any other performance which, how valuable ſoever, is infinitely leſs intereſting to mankind. Nor is there a ſingle principle by which our knowledge of the import of ſacred writ, eſpecially in what relates to Jewiſh and Chriſtian antiquities, could be overturned, that would not equally involve all ancient literature in univerſal ſcepticiſm.

§ 17. Some perhaps will be ready to conclude from what has been advanced, that all new tranſlations of Scripture muſt be ſuperfluous, ſince the language is ſo clear, that no preceding tranſlator has miſſed the ſenſe in points of conſequence. It is indeed true that no tranſlator, that I know, has miſſed the ſenſe in points of principal conſequence, whether hiſtorical events, articles of faith, or rules of practice; inſomuch that we may with Brown ſafely deſire the ſceptic *, "to chuſe which he ſhould like beſt "or worſt among all the controverted copies, various readings, "manuſcripts, and catalogues, adopted by whatever church, ſect, "or party; or even any of the almoſt infinite number of tranſ- "lations made of theſe books in diſtant countries and ages, re- "lying on it as amply ſufficient for all the great purpoſes of re- "ligion and Chriſtianity."

Yet it is not to be argued that, becauſe the worſt copy or tranſlation contains all the eſſentials of religion, it is not of real conſequence, by being acquainted with the beſt, to guard againſt errors which, though comparatively of ſmaller moment, and not ſubverſive

* Eſſays on the Characteriſtics, Eſſ. iii. Sect. iii.

ſubverſive of the foundation, impair the integrity, and often injure the conſiſtency, as well as weaken the evidence of our religious knowledge. Although the moſt eſſential truths are the moſt obvious and acceſſible to the unlearned, as well as to the learned, we ought not to think lightly of any advances attainable in the divine ſcience. There is a ſatisfaction which the well-diſpoſed mind receives from an increaſe of knowledge, that of itſelf does more than repay all the labour employed in the acquiſition. If this hold even in ordinary ſubjects, how much more in the moſt ſublime? There is, beſides, ſuch a ſymmetry of parts in the divine inſtitution we have by Jeſus Chriſt, that a more thorough acquaintance with each part ſerves to illuſtrate the other parts, and confirm our faith in the whole. And whatever in any degree corroborates our faith, contributes in the ſame degree to ſtrengthen our hope, to enhance our love, and to give additional weight to all the motives with which our religion ſupplies us, to a pious and virtuous life.

Theſe are reaſons which ought to weigh with every Chriſtian, and the more eſpecially, as the moſt minute examination will never be found an unprofitable ſtudy, even to the moſt learned. It is with the good things of the Spirit, as with what are called the good things of life; the moſt neceſſary are the moſt common, and the moſt eaſily acquired. But as, in regard to the animal life, it would be a reproach on thoſe poſſeſſed of natural abilities, through torpid indolence, to look no further than mere neceſſaries, not exerting their powers for the attainment of thoſe conveniencies whereby their lives might be rendered both more comfortable to themſelves, and more beneficial to others; it is beyond compare more blame-worthy to betray the ſame lazy diſpoſition, and the ſame indifference, in what concerns the ſpiritual life. Barely to have faith, does not ſatisfy the mind of the pious Chriſtian, whoſe ambition it is to be rich in faith. To have received of the celeſtial grace is not enough, in point either of acquirement or of evidence, to him whoſe ardent and daily deſire it is to grow in grace, and in the comforts of God's Spirit. Now, to make progreſs in divine knowledge, is (if I may be allowed the ſimilitude) to improve the ſoil in which faith, and hope, and charity, and all the graces of the Spirit, muſt be ſown and cultivated.

§ 18. But to return to the ſtyle of the ſacred hiſtory, from which I fear this controverſy, though exceedingly important, and intimately connected with the ſubject, has made me digreſs too far; there is another ſpecies of ſimplicity, beſide the ſimplicity of ſtructure, and the ſimplicity of ſentiment above mentioned, for which, beyond all the compoſitions I know in any language, Scripture hiſtory is remarkable. This may be called ſimplicity of deſign. The ſubject of the narrative ſo engroſſes the attention

of the writer, that he is himſelf as nobody, and is quite forgotten by the reader, who is never led by the tenor of the narration ſo much as to think of him. He introduces nothing as from himſelf. We have no opinions of his, no remarks, conjectures, doubts, inferences; no reaſonings about the cauſes or the effects of what is related. He never interrupts his reader with the diſplay of either his talents or his paſſions. He makes no digreſſions; he draws no characters; he gives us only the naked facts, from which we are left to collect the character. The utmoſt he does in characteriſing, and that but ſeldom, is compriſed in a very few words. And what is thus ſaid is not produced as his opinion, either of the perſon or of the thing, but as the known verdict of the time, or perhaps, as the deciſion of the Spirit. No attempt to ſhine by means of the expreſſion, compoſition, or ſentiments. Plainneſs of language is always preferred, becauſe the moſt natural, the moſt obvious, and the beſt adapted to all capacities. Though in ſtyle by no means ſlovenly, yet in little points, as about thoſe grammatical accuracies which do not affect the ſenſe and perſpicuity of the ſentence, rather careleſs than curious.

§ 19. Now in the laſt of the three ſorts of ſimplicity enumerated, our Lord's biographers particularly excel. This quality, or ſomething akin to it, has been much and juſtly celebrated in ſome pagan writers, in Xenophon, for inſtance, among the Greeks, and Ceſar among the Latins. It were eaſy however to ſhow, were it a proper ſubject of diſcuſſion here, that the difference between theſe and the ſacred penmen, eſpecially the evangeliſts, is very conſiderable. In reſpect of the firſt ſpecies of ſimplicity mentioned, ſimplicity of ſtructure, the difference of the genius of the Greek language from that of the Hebrew, muſt no doubt occaſion ſome difference in the manner of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, from that of Moſes; but the identity of idiom explained in a former diſcourſe, (Diſſ. I. Part i.) occaſions ſtill a ſtrong reſemblance between them. If Geneſis, therefore, may be juſtly ſaid to poſſeſs the firſt rank for ſimplicity of compoſition in the ſentences, the goſpels are certainly entitled to the ſecond. But even theſe are not, in this kind, entirely equal among themſelves. John and Matthew have it in a higher degree than Mark and Luke.

As to the ſecond ſpecies, ſimplicity of ſentiment, ariſing chiefly from the uncultivated ſtate of ſociety in the period and country about which the hiſtory is converſant; the change of times, which was doubtleſs very great, as well as the difference of ſubject, would neceſſarily confer the firſt degree here alſo upon the former. But in what was denominated ſimplicity of object or deſign, the evangeliſts, of all writers, ſacred and profane, appear the foremoſt. Their manner is indeed in ſome reſpects peculiar and

and unrivalled. It may not be amiſs to conſider a little the circumſtances which gave occaſion to this diverſity and peculiarity.

§ 20. For this purpoſe I beg leave to lay before the reader the few following obſervations. 1ſt, I obſerve, that the ſtate and circumſtances of things were, before the times of the apoſtles, totally changed in Paleſtine from what they had been in the times of the patriarchs. The political alterations gradually brought upon the country, by a ſucceſſion of revolutions in government, which made their condition ſo very unlike the paſtoral life of their wandering forefathers, are too obvious to need illuſtration. 2dly, Their intercourſe with ſtrangers of different nations, to ſome of which they had been ſucceſſively in ſubjection, had, notwithſtanding their peculiarities in religion, introduced great changes in manners, ſentiments, and cuſtoms. In our Saviour's days we find the nation divided into religious ſects and political parties; the former of which had their reſpective ſyſtems, ſchools, and patrons among the learned. Each ſect had its axioms or leading principles, and its particular mode of reaſoning from thoſe principles. Now there is not a ſingle trace of any thing ſimilar to this in all the Old Teſtament hiſtory. 3dly, As the *great* object of our Lord's miniſtry, which is the *great* ſubject of the Goſpels, was to inculcate a doctrine and morality with which none of their ſyſtems perfectly coincided; and as, by conſequence, he was oppoſed by all the principal men of the different factions then in the nation, the greater part of his hiſtory muſt be employed in relating the inſtructions which he delivered to the people and to his diſciples, the diſputes which he had with his antagoniſts, and the methods by which he recommended and ſupported his doctrine, expoſed their ſophiſtry, and eluded their malice.

This muſt give a colour to the hiſtory of the Meſſiah, very different from that of any of the ancient worthies recorded in the Old Teſtament; in which, though very inſtructive, there is comparatively little delivered in the didactic ſtyle, and hardly any thing in the argumentative. A great deal of both we have in the Goſpels. It ought not here to paſs unnoticed, that it is more in compliance with popular language, than in ſtrict propriety, that I denominate his manner of enforcing moral inſtruction, *arguing*. Our Lord, addreſſing himſelf much more to the heart than to the head, and, by his admirable parables, without the form of argument, convincing his hearers, that the moral truths he recommended are conformable to the genuine principles of our nature, in other words, to the dictates of conſcience and the common ſenſe of mankind, commands from the impartial and the conſiderate an unlimited aſſent. Accordingly, when a ſimilitude or an example is made to ſupply the place of argument, in ſupport of a particular ſentiment, he does not formally deduce

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the concluſion, but either leaves it to the reflections of his hearers, or draws it from their own mouths by a ſimple queſtion. This, without the parade of reaſoning, is, in practical ſubjects, the ſtrongeſt of all reaſoning. After candidly ſtating an appoſite caſe, it is appealing for the deciſion, not to the prejudices or the paſſions, but to the natural ſenſe of good and evil, even of his adverſaries. 4thly, As our Lord's hiſtory is occupied, partly with what he ſaid, and partly with what he did, this occaſions in the Goſpels a twofold diſtinction of ſtyle and manner: firſt that of our Saviour, as it appears in what he ſaid; ſecondly, that of his hiſtorians, as it appears in their relation of what he did. I ſhall conſider briefly how the different ſorts of ſimplicity above mentioned, may be applied to each of theſe.

§ 21. As to the ſimplicity of ſtructure, it may be ſaid in a very eminent degree to belong to both. It is in itſelf regarded more as a quality of narration, but is by no means excluded from the other kinds of compoſition. Beſides, in our Lord's diſcourſes, particularly his parables, there is a great deal of narrative. Simplicity of ſentiment appears more in the dialogue part, and in the teaching, than in the narration, which is almoſt confined to what is neceſſary for information and connection. It may be objected, that our Lord's figurative manner of teaching is not perfectly compatible with ſimplicity. But let it be obſerved, that there is a ſimplicity of manner in the enunciation of the ſentiments directly ſignified, which a piece of writing that admits a figurative or allegorical meaning, is as ſuſceptible of, as one that admits only a literal interpretation. Greece has not produced a more genuine ſpecimen of this than we have in the Apologues of Eſop, which are all nevertheleſs to be underſtood figuratively. In Cebes's Table, which is an allegory, there is great ſimplicity of diction. It is only with the expreſſion of the literal or immediate ſentiment, that this quality is concerned. And nothing ſurely can in this particular exceed the parables of our Lord. As theſe are commonly in the ſtyle of narration, they are ſuſceptible of the ſame ſimplicity of ſtructure, as well as of ſentiment, with the hiſtorian's narrative, and are, in this reſpect, hardly diſtinguiſhable from it.

But the third ſort mentioned belongs peculiarly to the hiſtorian. In our Lord's diſcourſes, though the general and ultimate object is the ſame throughout, namely the honour of God by the recovery of men, the particular and immediate object varies with the ſubject and occaſion. At one time it is to inſtruct his hearers in one important doctrine or duty, at another time in another; ſometimes to refute one error, at other times another; now to rebuke what is wrong, then again to encourage in the practice of what is right. We have all the variety of threats and promiſes, prohibitions and precepts, rebukes and conſolations, explanation and

and refutation, praiſe and blame. Theſe undoubtedly require a conſiderable variety in the ſtyle and manner. Now there is occaſion for nothing of this kind in the narrative. The hiſtorians with whom we are here concerned, do, in their own character, neither explain nor command, promiſe nor threaten, commend nor blame, but preſerve one even tenor in exhibiting the facts entirely unembelliſhed, reporting, in ſingleneſs of heart, both what was ſaid, and what was done, by their Maſter, likewiſe what was ſaid, and what was done, to him, by either friends or enemies. Not a ſyllable of encomium on the former, or of invective againſt the latter. As to their Lord himſelf, they appear to regard his character as infinitely ſuperior to any praiſe which they could beſtow: and as to his perſecutors, they mingle no gall in what they write concerning them; they do not deſire to aggravate their guilt, in the judgment of any man, either by giving expreſsly, or by ſo much as inſinuating, through the ſeverity of their language, their opinion concerning it.

§ 22. Nay, which is more remarkable, the names of the high-prieſt and his coadjutor, of the Roman procurator, of the tetrarch of Galilee, and of the treacherous diſciple, are all that are mentioned of the many who had a hand in his proſecution and death. In regard to the four firſt, it is manifeſt that the ſuppreſſion of the names, had the facts been related, would have made no difference to contemporaries; for in offices of ſo great eminence poſſeſſed by ſingle perſons, as all thoſe offices were, the official is equivalent to the proper name, which it never fails to ſuggeſt; but ſuch a ſuppreſſion would have made to poſterity a material defect in the hiſtory, and greatly impaired its evidence. In regard to the fifth it is ſufficient to obſerve, that without naming the traitor, juſtice could not have been done to the eleven. Whereas of thoſe Scribes and Phariſees who bargained with Judas, of the men who apprehended Jeſus, of the officer who ſtruck him on the face at his trial, of the falſe witneſſes who depoſed againſt him, of thoſe who afterwards ſpat upon him, buffeted and mocked him, of thoſe who were loudeſt in crying, *Away with him; crucify him; not this man but Barrabbas;* of thoſe who ſupplied the multitude with the implements of their mockery, the crown of thorns, the reed, and the ſcarlet robe; of thoſe who upbraided him on the croſs with his inability to ſave himſelf; or of the ſoldier who pierced his ſide with a ſpear; no name is given by any of the hiſtorians.

It may be ſaid, 'The names have not been known to them.' This may have been true of ſome of their names, but cannot be ſuppoſed to have been true of them all, and that, with regard not to one, two, or three, but to all the four evangeliſts. The witneſſes muſt have been perſons of the country, and at leaſt occaſional hearers of our Lord. It was no doubt chiefly the people of

of Jeruſalem who tumultuouſly demanded his execution, who derided him with the title of Meſſiah, and who inſulted him even on the croſs. Curioſity on ſuch occaſions leads men to enquire about perſons who act a principal part in a ſcene ſo tragical; and that the diſciples were not beyond the influence of this motive, is evident from the whole of the ſtory. The names of the Roman ſoldiers concerned in this tranſaction might have been unknown to them, and probably little minded by them; but the actions of their countrymen muſt have excited another kind of emotion, as it more nearly affected all his followers.

Now this reſerve in regard to the names of thoſe who were the chief inſtruments of his ſufferings, is the more obſervable, as the names of others to whom no ſpecial part is attributed, are mentioned without heſitation. Thus Malchus, whoſe ear Peter cut off, and who was immediately after miraculouſly cured by Jeſus, is named by John; but nothing further is told of him than that he was preſent when our Lord was ſeized, and that he was a ſervant of the high-prieſt. Simon, the Cyrenian, who carried the croſs, is named by no fewer than three of the evangeliſts; but we are alſo informed that in this ſervice he did not act voluntarily, but by compulſion. Joſeph, of Arimathea, and Nicodemus, are the only members of the Sanhedrim, except the high prieſt, who are mentioned by name; but they were the only perſons of that body who did not concur in condemning the Son of God, and who, though once fearful and ſecret diſciples, aſſumed the reſolution to diſplay their affection at a time when no one elſe ventured openly to acknowledge him. Our Lord's biographers, whilſt they are thus far ready to do juſtice to merit, avoid naming any man, without neceſſity, of whom they have nothing to ſay that is not to his diſhonour. To the virtuous and good they conciliate our eſteem and love, an effectual method of raiſing our admiration of virtue and goodneſs, and exciting in us a noble emulation; but our contempt and hatred they direct againſt the crimes, not againſt the perſons of men; againſt vices, not againſt the vicious: aware that this laſt direction is often of the moſt dangerous tendency to Chriſtian charity, and conſequently to genuine virtue. They ſhewed no diſpoſition to hold up any man to the Chriſtians of their own time, as an object of either their fear or their abhorrence, or to tranſmit his name with infamy to poſterity.

Though this holds principally in what concerns the laſt great cataſtrophe, it appears in ſome degree in every part of the hiſtory. Except in the caſe of Herodias, which, from the rank of the perſonages concerned, muſt have been a matter of notoriety and public ſcandal, and therefore required a more public reprehenſion, the names are never mentioned, when what is related reflects diſgrace on the perſons. Of the Scribes and Phariſees who

who watched our Lord, and, on different occasions, dissembling esteem, assailed him with captious and ensnaring questions, of those who openly ascribed his miracles to Beelzebub, called him a madman, a demoniac, and what they accounted worse than either, a Samaritan, who accused him of associating with the profligate, of Sabbath-breaking, of intemperance and blasphemy, of those Sadducees who by their sophistry vainly attempted to refute the doctrine of the resurrection, of those enraged Nazarenes, his fellow-citizens who would have carried him by force to a precipice, that they might throw him down headlong, no names are ever mentioned; nor is the young but opulent magistrate named, who came to consult him as to what he must do to obtain eternal life; for though there were some favourable symptoms in his case, yet as, by going away sorrowful, he betrayed a heart wedded to the world, the application did not terminate to his honour But of Simon the Pharisee, who invited our Lord to his house, and who, though doubtful, seemed inclinable to learn, of Jairus, and Bartimeus, and Zaccheus, and Lazarus, and his sisters Mary and Martha, and some others, of whose faith, repentance, gratitude, love and piety, the most honourable testimony is given, a very different account is made.

Some may object, that this conduct in the first disciples is imputable to a weak and timid policy. They were afraid to raise against themselves powerful enemies, whose vengeance might prove fatal to their persons, and ruinous to their cause. It happens luckily for silencing this pretext, that, in other things, they gave the most unequivocal proofs of their fortitude; besides, that the exceptions above mentioned include almost all the persons possessed of such authority, civil or sacred, united with such a disposition as could render their resentment an object of terror to those who were obnoxious to it. That the difference thus marked between the evil and the good is, on the contrary, in the true spirit of their Master, might be inferred, as from several other passages, so in particular, from that similitude wherein the rewards and punishments of another state are so well exemplified. A name is given to the poor man who was conveyed by angels to Abraham's bosom; the other, who was consigned to torments, is distinguished solely by the epithet *rich*. A particularity from which we may learn an instructive lesson of modesty and caution in regard to names, when what truth compels us to say is to the disadvantage of the persons, and that it sufficeth that we consider particular punishments as suited to particular actions, without referring them to known individuals, or leading the thoughts of others to refer them.

But as to the penmen themselves, and their fellow-disciples, in recording their own faults, no secret is made of the names. Of this the intemperate zeal of the sons of Zebedee on one occasion,

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and their ambition and ſecular views on another, the incredulity of Thomas, the preſumption of Peter, and his lamentable defection in the denial of his Maſter, not to mention the prejudices and dulneſs of them all, are eminent examples. Theſe particulars are all related by the ſacred hiſtorians with the ſame undiſguiſed plainneſs which they uſe in relating the crimes of adverſaries; and with as little endeavour to extenuate the former, as to aggravate the latter. Nor have they, on the other hand, the remoteſt appearance of making a merit of their confeſſion. In one uniform ſtrain, they record the moſt ſignal miracles and the moſt ordinary events. In regard to the one, like perſons familiarized to ſuch exertions of power, they no more expreſs themſelves either with heſitancy or with ſtrong aſſeverations, than they do in regard to the other. Equally certain of the facts advanced, they recite both in the ſame unvaried tone, as faithful witneſſes, whoſe buſineſs it was to teſtify, and not to argue.

§ 23. Hence it happens, that that quality of ſtyle which is called *animation*, is in a manner excluded from the narrative. The hiſtorians ſpeak of nothing, not even the moſt atrocious actions of our Lord's perſecutors, with ſymptoms of emotion; no angry epithet, or pathetic exclamation, ever eſcapes them; not a word that betrays paſſion in the writer, or is calculated to excite the paſſions of the reader. In diſplaying the moſt gracious, as well as marvellous, diſpenſation of Providence towards man, all is directed to mend his heart, nothing to move his pity, or kindle his reſentment. If theſe effects be alſo produced, they are manifeſtly the conſequences of the naked expoſition of the facts, and not of any adventitious art in the writers, nay not of any one term, not otherwiſe neceſſary, employed for the purpoſe.

I am ſenſible that to thoſe who are both able and willing to give theſe writings a critical examination, hardly in any tranſlation does this peculiarity appear ſo much as it does in the original. Moſt readers conſider *animation* as an excellency in writing; and in ordinary performances it no doubt is ſo. By intereſting them ſtrongly in the events related, it rouſes and quickens their attention. Unanimated ſimplicity, on the contrary, they call flatneſs, if not inſipidity of manner. In conſequence of this general ſentiment, when two words occur to a tranſlator either of which expreſſes the fact, but one of them does it ſimply, without any note of either praiſe or blame, the other with ſome warmth expreſſive of cenſure or approbation; he very naturally prefers the latter as the more emphatical and affecting. Nor will he be apt to ſuſpect that he is not ſufficiently cloſe to the original, if the action or thing alluded to be truly ſignified, though not entirely in the ſame manner. Such differences, even good tranſlators, though not inſenſible of them, are apt to overlook, excuſing themſelves with the conſideration, that words in all reſpects corre-

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reſponding in two tongues which differ widely from each other, are not always to be found.

But to explain myſelf by examples, without which a writer is often but indiſtinctly underſtood, in rendering ὁ παραδους αυτον, Matt. x. 4. into Latin; of the two verbs, *tradere* to deliver up, and *prodere* to betray, moſt tranſlators would prefer the latter as the more animated. Yet in reality, the former is more conformable to the ſimplicity of the ſacred author, who ſatisfies himſelf with acquainting us with the external fact, without characteriſing it, or inſinuating his own opinion; otherwiſe the term would have been προδους not παραδους. Again, the demonſtrative ουτος, Matt. xii. 24. may be rendered into Engliſh either *this man*, or *this fellow*. But in the laſt expreſſion, a degree of contempt is ſuggeſted, which is not in the firſt, nor in the original. See the notes on both paſſages.

§ 24. Let it be obſerved, that in excluding animation, I in a great meaſure confine myſelf to the narrative, or what proceeds immediately from the hiſtorians. In the diſcourſes and dialogues wherein their Maſter bears the only, or the principal part; the expreſſion, without loſing aught of its proper ſimplicity, is often remarkable for ſpirit and energy. There is in theſe an animation, but ſo chaſtiſed by candour and ſtrict propriety, as to be eaſily diſtinguiſhed from what is often ſo termed in other compoſitions.

Yet here too the language has ſometimes ſuffered in the very beſt tranſlations, and that not ſo much through the fault of tranſlators, as in conſequence of the difference of genius found in different tongues. Some of the epithets employed by our Lord againſt his antagoniſts, have not that aſperity which all modern verſions appear to give them. The Greek word υποκριτης, for example, as metaphorically uſed in Scripture, has more latitude of ſignification than the word *hypocrite* formed from it, as uſed in modern tongues. The former is alike applicable to all who diſſemble on any ſubject or occaſion; the latter is in ſtrictneſs applied only to thoſe who, in what concerns religion, lead a life of diſſimulation. It muſt be owned that it is to perſons of this character that it is oftenеſt applied in the Goſpel; but the judicious philologiſt hardly needs to be informed, that the more the ſignification of a word is extended, the more vague and general it becomes, and conſequently, if a reproachful epithet, the ſofter. The word ψευστης, in like manner, has not that harſhneſs in Greek that *liar* has in Engliſh. The reaſon is the ſame as in the former inſtance; for though often properly rendered *liar*, it is not limited to what we mean by that term. Every man who tells or teaches what is falſe, whether he know the falſehood of what he ſays or not, is what the ſacred authors juſtly denominate ψευστης, *a falſe ſpeaker*; but he is not what we call a *liar*, unleſs

he knows it to be falſe, and deceives intentionally. For this reaſon I have, in ſome inſtances, Matt. xxii. 18. John viii. 55. conſidered it as no more than doing juſtice to the ſpirit of the original, to ſoften the expreſſion in the common verſion, though otherwiſe unexceptionable.

On the other hand, the evangeliſts, in their own characters, are rarely other than mere narrators, without paſſions or opinions. In this, as I have ſaid, they differ from Moſes and the other hiſtorians of the Old Teſtament, who, though juſtly celebrated for native ſimplicity of manner, have not heſitated briefly to characterize the moſt remarkable perſons and actions whereof they have occaſion to ſpeak. Without pretending to account entirely for this difference of manner in writers who ſpoke by the ſame Spirit, I ſhall only ſubmit to the judicious reader the following conſiderations, which appear to indicate a ſingular propriety in the modeſt reſerve of our Lord's biographers.

Moſes, and the other writers of the Old Teſtament Scriptures, were all prophets, a character with which, conſidered in a religious light, no merely human character can be compared. None therefore could be better authorized than they, to pronounce directly on the quality both of the agents and of the actions mentioned in their hiſtories. In this view of the matter, they had no ſuperior, even in the moſt eminent perſonages whoſe lives they recorded. An unreſerved plainneſs of cenſure or approbation was in them therefore becoming, as it entirely ſuited the authority with which they were veſted. But was not the ſituation of the evangeliſts, it may be aſked, the ſame in this reſpect, as they alſo wrote by inſpiration? It is true they were inſpired, and at leaſt equally entitled to the prophetical character with any who preceded them; but they were not entirely in the ſame ſituation. In the Old Teſtament, the ſacred penmen were the mouth of God to the people. In the goſpels, the writers appear ſolely as Chriſt's humble attendants, ſelected for introducing to the knowledge of others this infinitely higher character, who is himſelf in a ſuper-eminent ſenſe the mouth, the oracle of God. It is this ſubordinate part of uſhers which they profeſſedly act. Like people ſtruck with the ineffable dignity of the Meſſiah whom they ſerve, they loſe no opportunity of exhibiting him to the world, appearing to conſider the introduction of their own opinion, unleſs where it makes a part of the narration, as an impertinence. As modeſt pupils in the preſence of ſo venerable a teacher, they lay their hand upon their mouth, and, by a reſpectful ſilence, ſhew how profound their reverence is, and how ſtrong their deſire to fix all the attention of mankind upon him. They ſink themſelves, in order to place him in the moſt conſpicuous point of view: they do more; they, as it were, annihilate themſelves, that Jeſus may be all in all. Never could it be ſaid of

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any preachers with more truth than of them, that they preached not themſelves, but Chriſt Jeſus the Lord. Deeply impreſſed with their Maſter's inſtructions, and far from affecting to be called Rabbi, or to be honoured of men as fathers and teachers in things divine, they never allowed themſelves to forget that they had only one Father who is in heaven, and only one teacher, the Meſſiah. The unimpaſſioned, yet not unfeeling manner, wherein they relate his cruel ſufferings, without letting one harſh or ſevere epithet eſcape them, reflecting on the conduct of his enemies, is as unexampled as it is inimitable, and forms an eſſential diſtinction between them and all who have either gone before or followed them, literate or illiterate, artful or artleſs, ſceptical or fanatical. For if, in the latter claſſes, the illiterate, the artleſs, and the fanatical, fury and hatred flame forth, wherever oppoſition or contradiction preſents them with an occaſion; the former, the literate, the artful, and the ſceptical, are not leſs diſtinguiſhable for the ſupercilious and contemptuous manner in which they treat the opinions of religioniſts of all denominations. The manner of the evangeliſts was equally removed from both. Add to this, that without making the leaſt pretences to learning, they no where affect to depreciate it; but, on the contrary, ſhew a readineſs to pay all due regard to every uſeful talent or acquiſition.

§ 25. From all that has been ſaid I cannot help concluding that, if theſe men were impoſtors, agreeably to the infidel hypotheſis, they were the moſt extraordinary the world ever produced. That they were not philoſophers and men of ſcience, we have irrefragable, I had almoſt ſaid, intuitive evidence; and of what has hitherto been found invariably to mark the character of fanatics and enthuſiaſts of all religions, we do not diſcover in them a ſingle trace. Their narratives demonſtrate them to have been men of ſound minds and cool reflection. To ſuppoſe them deceived in matters which were the objects of their ſenſes; or, if not deceived, to ſuppoſe ſuch men to have planned the deception of the world, and to have taken the method which they took to execute their plan, are alike attended with difficulties inſurmountable. The Chriſtian's hypotheſis, that they ſpoke the truth, and were under the influence of the Divine Spirit, removes at once all difficulties, and in my judgment (for I have long and often revolved the ſubject), is the only hypotheſis which ever will, or ever can, remove them. But this only by the way.

§ 26. Concerning the other qualities of ſtyle to be found in theſe writings, I acknowledge I have not much to add. Simplicity, gravity, and perſpicuity, as neceſſarily reſulting from ſimplicity, are certainly their predominant characters. But as in writings it is not always eaſy to diſtinguiſh the qualities ariſing from the thought, from thoſe ariſing merely from the expreſſion,

I ſhall conſider, in a few ſentences, how far the other properties of good writing, commonly attributed to the ſtyle, are applicable to the evangeliſts. In what concerns harmony, and qualities which may be called merely ſuperficial, as adding only an external poliſh to their language; about ſuch, if we may judge from their writings, they do not appear, as was hinted before, to have had any the ſmalleſt ſolicitude. To convey the ſenſe (the only thing of importance enough to be an object to them) in the moſt familiar, and conſequently in the moſt intelligible terms to their readers, ſeems to have been their higheſt aim in point of ſtyle. What concerned the ſound alone, and not the ſenſe, was unworthy of their attention.

In regard to elegance, there is an elegance which reſults from the uſe of ſuch words as are moſt in favour with thoſe who are accounted fine writers, and from ſuch an arrangement in the words and clauſes, as has generally obtained their approbation. This is ſtill of the nature of *varniſh*, and is diſclaimed, not ſtudied, by the ſacred authors. But there is alſo an elegance of a ſuperior order, more nearly connected with the ſentiment; and in this ſort of elegance they are not deficient. In all the oriental languages great uſe is made of tropes, eſpecially metaphor. The Scriptures abound with them. When the metaphors employed bear a ſtrong reſemblance, and the other tropes are happily adapted to the ſubjects they are intended to repreſent, they confer *vivacity* on the writing. If they be borrowed from objects which are naturally agreeable, beautiful, or attractive, they add alſo *elegance*. Now of this kind, both of *vivacity* and of *elegance*, the evangeliſts furniſh us with a variety of examples. Our Lord illuſtrates every thing (agreeably to the uſe of the age and country) by figures and ſimilies. His tropes are always appoſite, and often borrowed from objects naturally engaging. The former quality renders them *lively*, the latter *elegant*. The ideas introduced are frequently thoſe of corn-fields, vineyards, and gardens. The parables are ſometimes indeed taken from the cuſtoms of princes and grandees, but oftener from the life of ſhepherds and huſbandmen. If thoſe of the firſt kind confer dignity on the examples, thoſe of the ſecond add an attraction, from the pleaſantneſs of images which recal to the fancy, the thoughts of rural happineſs and tranquillity. And even in caſes where propriety required that things diſagreeable ſhould be introduced, as in the ſtory of the rich man and Lazarus, the whole is conducted with that ſerioufneſs and chaſte ſimplicity of manner, which totally exclude diſguſt. We may juſtly ſay, therefore, that the eſſential attributes of good writing are not wanting in theſe hiſtories, though whatever can be conſidered as calculated for glitter and oſtentation, is rather avoided than ſought.

§ 27. Upon the whole, therefore, the qualities of the ſtyle could

could not, to thoſe who were not Jews, nor accuſtomed to their idiom, ſerve at firſt to recommend theſe writings. The phraſeology could hardly fail to appear to ſuch, awkward, idiomatical, and even vulgar. In this manner it generally did appear to Gentile Greeks, upon the firſt peruſal. But if they were, by any means, induced to give them a ſecond reading, though ſtill not inſenſible of the peculiarity, their prejudices and diſlike of the idiom rarely failed to ſubſide. A third commonly produced an attachment. The more they became acquainted with theſe books, the more they diſcovered of a charm in them, to which they found nothing comparable or ſimilar in all that they had learnt before, inſomuch that they were not aſhamed, nay, they were proud, to be taught by writers for whoſe perſons and performances they had formerly entertained a ſovereign contempt. The perſecutors of the church, both Jews and Pagans, perceived, at laſt, the conſequences of conniving at the ſtudy of the Scriptures, and were therefore determined to make it their principal object to effect the ſuppreſſion of them, particularly of the Goſpels. But the more this was attempted, the more were the copies multiplied, the more was the curioſity of mankind excited, and the more was the ineſtimable treaſure of divine knowledge they contained, circulated. Early, and with avidity, were tranſlations demanded, in almoſt every known tongue. Thoſe Chriſtians who had as much learning as to be capable, were ambitious of contributing their ſhare in diffuſing amongſt all nations, the delight, as well as the inſtruction, which the ſtudy of theſe books conveyed into the ſoul. Nor was this admiration of the divine writings to be found only among the vulgar and the ignorant. It is true, it originated among them; but it did not terminate with them. Contrary to the common courſe of faſhion, which deſcends from the higher ranks to the lower, it aroſe among the loweſt claſſes, and aſcended to the higheſt. Not only nobles and ſenators, but even philoſophers and men of letters, the pupils of ſophiſts and rhetoricians, who by the prejudices of their education would be moſt ſhocked with the inelegancies, the vulgariſms, and even the barbariſms (as they would account them) of the ſacred writers, found a ſecret and irreſiſtible attraction, which overcame all their prepoſſeſſions, and compelled them to acknowledge, that no writers could ſo effectually convey conviction to the underſtanding, and reformation to the heart, as theſe poor, homely, artleſs, and unlettered Galileans.

DISSER-

DISSERTATION THE FOURTH.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE RIGHT METHOD OF PROCEEDING IN THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE BOOKS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

It was remarked in a foregoing Diſſertation, (Diſſ. I. Part ii. § 1.) that, notwithſtanding the ſameneſs both of the language and of the idiom employed by the penmen of the New Teſtament, there is a ſenſible diverſity in their ſtyles. The firſt general rule, therefore, which demands the attention of him who would employ himſelf in ſearching the Scriptures, is to endeavour to get acquainted with each writer's ſtyle, and, as he proceeds in the examination, to obſerve his manner of compoſition, both in ſentences and in paragraphs, to remark the words and phraſes peculiar to him, and the peculiar application which he may ſometimes make of ordinary words; for there are few of thoſe writers who have not their peculiarities in all the reſpects now mentioned. This acquaintance with each can be attained only by the frequent and attentive reading of his works in his own language.

§ 2. The ſecond general direction is to enquire carefully, as far as is compatible with the diſtance of time and the other diſadvantages we labour under, into the character, the ſituation, and the office of the writer, the time, the place, and the occaſion of his writing, and the people for whoſe immediate uſe he originally intended his work. Every one of theſe particulars will ſometimes ſerve to elucidate expreſſions otherwiſe obſcure or doubtful. This knowledge may in part be learnt from a diligent and reiterated peruſal of the book itſelf, and in part be gathered from what authentic, or at leaſt probable, accounts have been tranſmitted to us concerning the compilement of the canon.

§ 3. The third and only other general direction I ſhall mention, is, to conſider the principal ſcope of the book, and the particulars chiefly obſervable in the method by which the writer has purpoſed to execute his deſign. This direction, I acknowledge, can hardly be conſidered as applicable to the hiſtorical books, whoſe purpoſe is obvious, and whoſe method is determined

mined by the order of time, or at leaſt by the order in which the ſeveral occurrences recorded have preſented themſelves to the memory of the compiler. But in the epiſtolary writings, eſpecially thoſe of the apoſtle Paul, this conſideration would deſerve particular attention.

§ 4. Now to come to rules of a more ſpecial nature. If, in reading a particular book, a word or phraſe occur which appears obſcure, perhaps unintelligible, how ought we to proceed? The firſt thing undoubtedly we have to do, if ſatisfied that the reading is genuine, is to conſult the context, to attend to the manner wherein the term is introduced, whether in a chain of reaſoning, or as belonging to a hiſtorical narration, as conſtituting ſome circumſtance in a deſcription, or included in an exhortation or command. As the concluſion is inferred from the premiſes; or as from two or more known truths, a third unknown or unobſerved before may fairly be deduced; ſo from ſuch attention to the ſentences in connection, the import of an expreſſion, in itſelf obſcure or ambiguous, will ſometimes with moral certainty be diſcovered. This, however, will not always anſwer.

§ 5. If it do not, let the ſecond conſideration be, whether the term or phraſe be any of the writer's peculiarities. If ſo, it comes naturally to be enquired, what is the acceptation in which he employs it in other places? If the ſenſe cannot be preciſely the ſame in the paſſage under review, perhaps, by an eaſy and natural metaphor or other trope, the common acceptation may give riſe to one which perfectly ſuits the paſſage in queſtion. Recourſe to the other places wherein the word or phraſe occurs in the ſame author, is of conſiderable uſe, though the term ſhould not be peculiar to him.

§ 6. But thirdly, if there ſhould be nothing in the ſame writer that can enlighten the place, let recourſe be had to the parallel paſſages, if there be any ſuch, in the other ſacred writers. By parallel paſſages I mean thoſe places, if the difficulty occur in hiſtory, wherein the ſame or a ſimilar ſtory, miracle, or event, is related; if in teaching or reaſoning, thoſe parts wherein the ſame doctrine or argument is treated, or the ſame parable propounded; and if in moral leſſons, thoſe wherein the ſame claſs of duties is recommended. Or, if the difficulty be found in a quotation from the Old Teſtament, let the parallel paſſage in the book referred to, both in the original Hebrew and in the Greek verſion, be conſulted.

§ 7. But if in theſe there be found nothing that can throw light on the expreſſion, of which we are in doubt, the fourth recourſe is to all the places wherein the word or phraſe occurs in the New Teſtament, and in the Septuagint verſion of the Old, adding to theſe the conſideration of the import of the Hebrew or Chaldaic word whoſe place it occupies, and the extent of ſignification, of which

which in different occurrences ſuch Hebrew or Chaldaic term is ſuſceptible.

§ 8. Perhaps the term in queſtion is one of thoſe which very rarely occur in the New Teſtament, or thoſe called ἅπαξ λεγομενα, only once read in Scripture, and not found at all in the tranſlation of the Seventy. Several ſuch words there are. There is then a neceſſity, in the fifth place, for recurring to the ordinary acceptation of the term in claſſical authors. This is one of thoſe caſes wherein the interpretation given by the earlieſt Greek fathers deſerves particular notice. In this verdict, however, I limit myſelf to thoſe comments wherein they give a literal expoſition of the ſacred text, and do not run, as is but too cuſtomary with them, into viſion and allegory. There are ſo many advantages which people have for diſcovering the import of a term or phraſe in their mother-tongue, unuſual perhaps in writing, but current in converſation, above thoſe who ſtudy a dead language, ſolely by means of the books extant in it, that no reaſonable perſon can queſtion that ſome deference is in ſuch caſes due to their authority.

Ye will obſerve, that in regard to the words or phraſes, whereof an illuſtration may be had from other parts of ſacred writ, whether of the Old or of the New Teſtament, I ſhould not think it neceſſary to recur directly to thoſe primitive, any more than to our modern expounders. My reaſon is, as the word or phraſe may not improbably be affected by the idiom of the ſynagogue, the Jewiſh literature will be of more importance than the Grecian, for throwing light upon the paſſage. Now this is a kind of learning with which the Greek fathers were very little acquainted. Whereas, on the other hand, if the term in queſtion rarely, or but once, occur in the New Teſtament, and never in the verſion of the Old, there is little ground to imagine that it is affected by the idiom of the ſynagogue, but the greateſt reaſon to ſuppoſe that it is adopted by the ſacred penmen in the common acceptation.

I think it neceſſary to add here another limitation to the reference intended to the ancient Greek expoſitors. If the doubtful paſſage have been produced in ſupport of a ſide, in any of the famous controverſies by which the Chriſtian church has been divided, no regard is due to the authority, whatever may be due to the arguments, of any writer, who lived at, or ſoon after, the time when the controverſy was agitated. If you know the ſide he took in the diſpute, you are ſure beforehand of the explanation he will give of the words in queſtion. Nothing blinds the underſtanding more effectually than the ſpirit of party, and no kind of party-ſpirit more than bigotry under the aſſumed character of religious zeal.

§ 9. In regard to the uſe to be made of the Fathers for aſſiſting

ing us to understand the Scriptures, there are two extremes, to one or other of which the much greater part of Christians show a propensity. One is an implicit deference to their judgment in every point on which they have given an opinion, the other is no regard at all to any thing advanced by them. To the first extreme the more moderate Romanists, and those Protestants who favour pompous ceremonies and an aristocratical hierarchy, are most inclined; and to the second, those Protestants, on the contrary, who prefer simplicity of worship and the democratical form in church government. But these observations admit many exceptions. As to the Papists, in the worst sense of the word, those who are for supporting even the most exorbitant of the papal claims, the manifest tendency whereof is to establish an ecclesiastical despotism, the aim of their doctrine, in spite of the canons, has long been to lessen, as much as possible, our reverence of the Fathers. What was said by Friar Theatin, an Italian, in a public disputation at Paris with some French divines, in presence of the Pope's nuncio and many prelates, may be justly considered as spoken in the spirit, and expressive of the sentiments of the whole party. When his antagonist Baron, a Dominican, urged the testimonies of several Fathers, in direct opposition to the doctrine maintained by the Italian, the latter did not recur to the chimerical distinctions of the Sorbonists, but making light of that long train of authorities, replied contemptuously, "As to "what concerns the authority of the Fathers, I have only to say "with the church, *Omnes sancti patres orate pro nobis;*" an answer which, at the same time that it greatly scandalized the Galican doctors, was highly approved by the nuncio, well knowing that it would be very much relished at Rome. So similar on this head are the sentiments of the most opposite sects. Nor is this the only instance wherein the extremes approach nearer to each other, than the middle does to either. I may add, that an unbounded respect for the Fathers was, till the commencement of the sixteenth century, the prevalent sentiment in Christendom. Since that time their authority has declined apace, and is at present, in many places, totally annihilated.

I own that, in my opinion, they of former generations were in one extreme, and we of the present are in another. The Fathers are not entitled to our adoration, neither do they merit our contempt. If some of them were weak and credulous, others of them were both learned and judicious. In what depends purely on reason and argument, we ought to treat them with the same impartiality we do the moderns, carefully weighing what is said, not who says it. In what depends on testimony, they are, in every case wherein no particular passion can be suspected to have swayed them, to be preferred before modern interpreters or annotators. I say not this to insinuate that we can rely more on

their integrity, but to ſignify that many points were with them a ſubject of teſtimony, which, with modern critics, are matter merely of conjecture, or at moſt of abſtruſe and critical diſcuſſion. It is only from ancient authors, that thoſe ancient uſages, in other things as well as in language, can be diſcovered by us, which to them ſtood on the footing of matters of fact, whereof they could not be ignorant. Language, as has been often obſerved, is founded in uſe; and ancient uſe, like all other ancient facts, can be conveyed to us only by written teſtimony. Beſides, the facts regarding the import of words (when controverſy is out of the queſtion) do not, like other facts, give ſcope to the paſſions to operate; and if miſrepreſented, they expoſe either the ignorance or the bad faith of the author to his contemporaries. I do not ſay, therefore, that we ought to confide in the verdict of the Fathers as judges, but that we ought to give them an impartial hearing as, in many caſes, the only competent witneſſes. And every body muſt be ſenſible that the direct teſtimony of a plain man, in a matter which comes within the ſphere of his knowledge, is more to be regarded than the ſubtile conjectures of an able ſcholar who does not ſpeak from knowledge, but gives the concluſions he has drawn from his own precarious reaſonings, or from thoſe of others.

§ 10. And even as to what is advanced not on knowledge but on opinion, I do not think that the moderns are in general entitled to the preference. On controverted articles of faith, both ought to be conſulted with caution, as perſons who may reaſonably be thought prejudiced in favour of the tenets of their party. If, in this reſpect, there be a difference, it is entirely in favour of the ancients. An increaſe of years has brought to the church an increaſe of controverſies. Diſputes have multiplied, and been dogmatically decided. The conſequence whereof is, that religion was not near ſo much moulded into the ſyſtematic form for many centuries, as it is in theſe latter ages. Every point was not in ancient times ſo minutely diſcuſſed, and every thing, even to the phraſeology, ſettled in the ſeveral ſects, with ſo much hypercritical and metaphyſical, not to ſay ſophiſtical, ſubtlety, as at preſent. They were, therefore, if not entirely free, much leſs entangled with deciſions merely human, than more recent commentators; too many of whom ſeem to have had it for their principal object, to bring the language of Scripture to as cloſe a conformity, as poſſible, to their own ſtandard, and make it ſpeak the dialect of their ſect. So much for the preference I give to the ancient, particularly to the Greek, expounders of Scripture, when they confine themſelves to the grammatical ſenſe; and ſo much for the regard to which I think the early Chriſtian writers juſtly entitled.

§ 11. To the aid we may have from them, I add that of the ancient

ancient verſions, and laſt of all that of modern ſcholiaſts, annotators, and tranſlators. In the choice of theſe we ought to be more influenced by the acknowledged learning, diſcernment, and candour of the perſon, than by the religious denomination to which he belonged, or the ſide which, on conteſted articles, he moſt favoured. So far from limiting ourſelves to thoſe of one ſect, or of one ſet of tenets, it is only by the free uſe of the criticiſms and arguments of oppoſite ſides, as urged by themſelves, that undue prepoſſeſſions are beſt cured, or even prevented. We have heard of poiſons which ſerve as antidotes againſt other poiſons of oppoſite quality. It will be no inconvenient conſequence of the uſe of interpreters addicted to adverſe parties, if their exceſſes ſerve mutually to correct one another.

§ 12. But I am aware that ſome will be aſtoniſhed that, among the aſſiſtances enumerated for interpreting the Scriptures, I have made no mention of two helps much celebrated by writers of almoſt all denominations. Theſe are *the analogy of the faith*, and *the etymology of the words*. It will no doubt be proper now to enquire impartially, what aid, in the interpretation of dark and doubtful paſſages, may reaſonably be ſought for and expected from theſe.

§ 13. Firſt, of the analogy of the faith. As far as I can collect from the import of the terms, what is meant by propoſing this as a rule of interpretation in every dubious caſe, it ſhould be, that when a paſſage appears ambiguous, or is ſuſceptible of different interpretations, that interpretation is always to be adopted which is moſt conformable to the whole ſcheme of religion, in reſpect both of doctrines and of precepts, delivered in the ſacred oracles. Now, there can be no queſtion that, if the enquirer be previouſly in the certain knowledge of that whole ſcheme, this rule is excellent, and, in a great meaſure, ſuperſedes the neceſſity of any other. But let me aſk him, or rather let him aſk himſelf, ere he proceed, this ſimple queſtion, What is the reaſon, the principal reaſon at leaſt, for which the ſtudy of Scripture is ſo indiſpenſable a duty? It is preciſely, all conſiſtent Proteſtants will anſwer, that thence we may diſcover what the whole ſcheme of religion is. Are we then to begin our examination with taking it for granted that, without any enquiry, we are perfectly acquainted with this ſcheme already? Is not this going to Scripture, not in order to learn the truths it contains, but in order to find ſomething that may be made to ratify our own opinions?

If no more were meant by making the analogy of the faith the rule of interpreting, than that, where an expreſſion is either dark or equivocal, an interpretation were not to be adopted, which would contradict the ſentiments of the writer, manifeſtly declared in other paſſages perfectly clear and unequivocal; this is no more than what candour would allow in interpreting any profane

profane author, who seems to have enjoyed the exercise of his reason; nay, though the rule were extended to what should be found clearly contained in any other sacred writer, it would be but of little significance as an help in the explanation of the holy oracles. For it is only the uncontroverted truths, about which there has never arisen any doubt in the church, that ought to be comprehended in the phrase, *the analogy of the faith*, when proposed in this manner as a canon to direct us in the interpretation of Scripture.

'But why,' say you, 'should we confine the meaning to the 'uncontroverted truths?' Attend a little, and you must perceive that what I have now advanced, is almost self evident. When I recur to holy writ, my view is, or ought to be, that I may know what it teaches; more especially that, as its doctrine is so variously represented by different sects, I may thence discover, amid such a multiplicity of jarring sentiments, where the truth lies. My purpose manifestly is, by the Scripture, to judge concerning all such controverted sentiments, and not, by a particular set of controverted sentiments, previously and therefore inconsiderately adopted, to determine concerning the sense of Scripture. This would not be judging the parties by the law, but resolving to judge of the import of the law by the interpretation that shall be given by one of the parties, whom we have contracted a strong inclination to favour. Surely such a conduct in a civil judge would be universally pronounced incompatible with every principle of reason and justice. And is not at least as great a deference due from the devout Christian to the divine oracles, as is due from the secular judge to the law of his country?

§ 14. In vain do we search the Scriptures for their testimony concerning Christ, if, independently of these Scriptures, we have received a testimony from another quarter, and are determined to admit nothing as the testimony of Scripture, which will not perfectly quadrate with that formerly received. This was the very source of the blindness of the Jews in our Saviour's time. They searched the Scriptures as much as we do; but, in the disposition they were in, they would never have discovered what that sacred volume testifies of Christ; (see John v. 39, 40. in this Translation, with the note upon it.) Why? because their great rule of interpretation was *the analogy of the faith*; or, in other words, the system of the Pharisean scribes, the doctrine then in vogue, and in the profound veneration of which they had been educated. This is that veil by which the understandings of that people were darkened, even in reading the law, and of which the apostle observed that it remained unremoved in his day, and of which we ourselves have occasion to observe, that it remains unremoved in ours.

And is it not precisely in the same way that the phrase is used by

by every ſect of Chriſtians, for the particular ſyſtem or digeſt of tenets for which they themſelves have the greateſt reverence? The Latin church, and even the Greek, are explicit in their declarations on this article. With each, *the analogy of the faith* is their own ſyſtem alone. And that different parties of Proteſtants, though more reſerved in their manner of ſpeaking, aim at the ſame thing, is undeniable; the ſame, I mean, conſidered relatively to the ſpeakers, for abſolutely conſidered, every party means a different thing. When a Lutheran tells you, "You are "to put no interpretation on any portion of Scripture, but what "perfectly coincides with *the analogy of the faith*," liſt him ever ſo little on the import of this phraſe, and you ſhall find, that if he mean any thing, it is, that you are to admit no expoſition that will not exactly tally with the ſyſtem of his great founder, Luther. Nor is he ſingular in this. A Calviniſt has the ſame prepoſſeſſion in favour of the ſcheme of Calvin, and an Arminian of that of Arminius. Yet they will all tell you with one voice, that their reſpective doctrines are to be tried by Scripture, and by Scripture alone. *To the law and to the teſtimony*, is the common cry; only every one of them, the better to ſecure the deciſion on the ſide he has eſpouſed, would have you previouſly reſolve, to put no ſenſe whatever on the law and the teſtimony, but what his favourite doctor will admit. Thus they run on in a ſhuffling circular ſort of argument, which, though they ſtudiouſly avoid expoſing it, is, when dragged into the open light, neither more nor leſs than this: "You are to try our doctrine by the "Scripture only. But then you are to be very careful that you "explain the Scripture ſolely by our doctrine." A wonderful plan of trial, which begins with giving judgment, and ends with examining the proof, wherein the whole ſkill and ingenuity of the judges are to be exerted in wreſting the evidence ſo as to give it the appearance of ſupporting the ſentence pronounced beforehand.

'But,' ſay ſome, 'is not this mode of interpretation warranted 'by apoſtolical authority? Does not Paul, Rom. xii. 6. in ſpeak-'ing of the exerciſe of the ſpiritual gifts, enjoin the prophets to 'propheſy, κατα την αναλογιαν της πιστεως, *according to the proportion* 'of faith, as our tranſlators render it, but as ſome critics explain 'it, *according to the analogy of the faith?*' Though this expoſition has been admitted into ſome verſions *, and adopted by Hammond and other commentators, and may be called literal, it is ſuited neither to the ordinary meaning of the words, nor to the tenor of the context. The word αναλογια ſtrictly denotes proportion, meaſure, rate, but by no means that complex notion conveyed

* Port Royal and Saci, though tranſlating from the Vulgate, which ſays, *ſecundum rationem fidei*, have rendered the clauſe, *ſelon l'analogie et la regle de la foi*.

conveyed in the aforeſaid phraſe by the term *analogy*, which has been well obſerved by Whitby to be particularly unſuitable in this place, where the apoſtle treats of thoſe who ſpeak by inſpiration, not of thoſe who explain what has been thus ſpoken by others. The context manifeſtly leads us to underſtand αναλογια πιστεως, v. 6. as equivalent to μετρον πιστεως, v. 3. And for the better underſtanding of this phraſe, *the meaſure of faith*, it may be proper to obſerve, 1. That a ſtrong conviction of any tenet, from whatever cauſe it ariſes, is in Scripture ſometimes termed *faith*. Thus in the ſame Epiſtle, Rom. xiv. 22. the apoſtle ſays, *Haſt thou faith? have it to thyſelf before God.* The ſcope of his reaſoning ſhews that nothing is there meant by *faith*, but a conviction of the truth in regard to the article of which he had been treating, namely, the equality of days and meats, in point of ſanctity, under the goſpel diſpenſation. The ſame is evidently the meaning of the word, v. 23 *Whatſoever is not of faith, is ſin*; where, without regard to the morality of an action abſtractly conſidered, that is concluded to be ſin which is done by one who doubts of its lawfulneſs; 2dly, As to ſpiritual gifts, prophecy and inſpiration in particular, they appear to have been accompanied with ſuch a faith or conviction that they came from the Spirit, as left no room for heſitation. And indeed it is eaſy to perceive that ſomething of this kind was abſolutely neceſſary to enable the inſpired perſon to diſtinguiſh what proceeded from the Spirit of God, from what was the creature of his own imagination. It was obſerved before, (Diſſ. I. Part ii. § 3.) that the prophets of God were not acted upon like machines, in delivering their predictions, as the diviners were ſuppoſed to be among the heathen, but had then, as at other times, the free uſe of their faculties, both of body and mind. This caution is therefore with great propriety given them by the apoſtle, to induce them to be attentive in propheſying not to exceed the preciſe meaſure allowed them, (for different meaſures of the ſame gift were committed to different perſons), and not to mingle aught of their own with the things of God's Spirit. This diſtinction, he tells them, they have it in their power to make, by means of that lively faith with which the divine illumination is accompanied. Though a ſenſe ſomewhat different has been given to the words by ſome ancient Greek expoſitors, none of them, as far as I remember, ſeems to have formed a conception of that ſenſe, which, as was obſerved above, has been given by ſome moderns.

So much for what is commonly underſtood by *the analogy of the faith*, ſo unanimouſly recommended as a rule of interpretation, but ſo diſcordantly applied; and ſo much for the regard that is due to it.

§ 15. Another ordinary method of explaining is, by entering, on every occaſion, into a minute and nice examination of the etymology

mology of the principal words employed in the ſentence. This, though generally carried to exceſs, neither proceeds from the like partial prepoſſeſſions as the former, nor is ſo hazardous in its conſequences. There are caſes wherein no reaſonable perſon can doubt, that the ſignification of a word may be fully aſcertained from the knowledge we have of the meaning of the etymon; for inſtance, in verbal nouns expreſſing the action ſignified by the verb, as κριμα, *judgment*, from κρινειν, *to judge*, or the actor, as κριτης, *a judge*, from the ſame root; in concretes from abſtracts, as αληθινος, *true*, from αληθεια, *truth*; or converſely, abſtracts from concretes, as δικαιοσυνη, *juſtice*, from δικαιος, *juſt*. In compoſitions alſo analogically formed, the ſenſe of the compound term may often be certainly known, by the import of the ſimple terms of which it is compoſed. Thus, no man will heſitate a moment to pronounce from etymology, that φιληδονος muſt mean, *a lover of pleaſure*, and φιλοθεος, *a lover of God*; though theſe words occur but once in the New Teſtament, and never in the Greek verſion of the Old. In matters ſo obvious, the bare knowledge of the rudiments of the language renders the mention of any rules, ſave thoſe of grammar, unneceſſary, almoſt as much as for determining the import of the future tenſe of a verb from that of the preſent, or the ſignification of the paſſive voice from that of the active. There are inſtances, however, wherein the verb in the paſſive form undergoes an additional change of meaning, beſide what the analogy of the language requires.

§ 16. But there are a great many caſes wherein, if I may be allowed the expreſſion, the pedigree of the derivative or of the compound, cannot be deduced with equal clearneſs; and there are many caſes wherein, though its deſcent may be clearly traced, we ſhould err egregiouſly, if we were to fix its meaning from that of the primitive or root. As to the firſt, that we ſhould not haſtily decide concerning the import of an obſcure or unuſual term, from that of another better known, but of whoſe relation to the former we are uncertain, is indeed manifeſt. But even often, where the connection is unqueſtionable, the ſenſe of the one does not aſcertain the ſignification of the other. It will not be improper to give a few illuſtrations of this doctrine, as I know nothing in which modern critics are more frequently miſled, than in their reaſonings from etymology. I ſhall exemplify this remark firſt in ſimple words, and afterwards in compound.

§ 17. The Greek word τραγικος, from τραγος, *a goat*, if it occurred very ſeldom in Greek authors, and if in the few places where it occurred, the words in connection did not ſuffice for aſcertaining the ſenſe, and if the cuſtom which gave riſe to the common acceptation of that term had never been related by any ancient writer, nobody, by the aid of etymology, could have imagined

imagined the meaning to be that which we know certainly that it is. As much may be ſaid of the word κωμικος, from κωμη, *a village*. By neither ſhould we have been led to think of poetry or any of its ſpecies. To the Greek word κωμικος, the Latin *paganus* anſwers exactly in being ſimilarly derived from a primitive of the ſame ſignification. But it is very far from correſponding in ſenſe. Nor does it, in the uſe which ſoon became univerſal among Chriſtians, correſpond better with its etymon *pagus*. When Chriſtianity became very general throughout the empire, as all the churches were in the cities and great towns, where the biſhops had their reſidence, the Chriſtians found a convenience in living near their place of worſhip, which made them moſtly reſort to the cities or their ſuburbs. Thoſe who were attached to the ancient idolatry, not having the ſame motive for preferring the towns, and probably liking better, when Chriſtianity came to have the aſcendant, to aſſociate with one another, lived generally in the villages. Hence *villager* and *idolater* became ſynonymous. This ſenſe of the Latin *paganus* has paſſed into modern tongues. The Italians ſay *pagano*, the French *payen*, and the Engliſh *pagan*, to denote the ſame character. The Engliſh word *villain*, in low Latin *villanus*, a farmer, a villager, though nearly coinciding in etymology, has come gradually by uſe to ſignify a worthleſs unprincipled man. Thus the three words κωμικος in Greek, *paganus* in Latin, and *villain* in Engliſh, though evidently ſo conformable in etymology, that they ought all to denote the ſame thing, namely *villager*, have, for many ages, both loſt that ſignification, and acquired others in which they do not in the leaſt reſemble one another. If the uſe, in theſe languages, ſhould ever come to be very little known, and the hiſtory of the nations nearly loſt, we may form a gueſs at the abſurdities in explaining theſe terms into which men would be miſled by etymology. קדשה *kedeſhah*, in Hebrew, ſignifies *a harlot*, a word manifeſtly ſprung, according to the invariable rules of that language, from קדש *kadaſh*, *to ſanctify*. What could give riſe to ſo ſtrange a deviation from the primitive meaning, it is perhaps now impoſſible to diſcover.

In proceſs of time, words in every tongue vary from their original import, in conſequence of the gradual influence of incidental cauſes, and the changes in manners and ſentiments which they occaſion. Hence the word זרה among the Hebrews, which denoted no more at firſt than a female ſtranger, came at laſt to ſignify a common proſtitute; and is almoſt always uſed in this ſenſe by Solomon in the Book of Proverbs. The origin of this application may indeed be eaſily traced from their laws. The women of that occupation among them were all foreigners, no daughter of Iſrael being permitted to follow ſo infamous a profeſſion. It is an obſervation of Cicero, if I remember right, that

that the word *hoſtis* with them anciently meant *foreigner*, which, having been given at firſt, through delicacy, as a milder name for people with whom they were at war, became, through long continued uſe, the proper appellation for *enemy*. By the like gradation doubtleſs amongſt us, the word *knave*, from denoting ſervant, has degenerated into the ſign of a character diſtinguiſhed more for turpitude of manners, than for meanneſs of condition. It would not be ſo eaſy to divine how the word *beholden*, the paſſive participle of the verb *to behold*, came, from ſignifying *ſeen* or *perceived*, to denote *indebted*. Innumerable examples of this kind might be mentioned.

§ 18. But from ſimple words to proceed, as I propoſed, to compounds; were we to lay it down as a principle, that the combined meanings of the component parts will always give us the ſenſe of the compound, we ſhould conclude that the Greek word παναγγος is equivalent to the Engliſh poetic word *omnific*, to which it exactly correſponds in etymology; yet nothing can be more different in ſignification. The former is always adopted in a bad, the latter in a good ſenſe. Hardly any rule in the compoſition of Greek words holds more uniformly than that the adverb ευ gives the addition of a good quality to the word with which it is joined; yet the term ευηθης which, if any faith were due to etymology, ſhould mean a virtuous and worthy man, denotes generally a *ſimpleton* or *fool*. The Greek word αυταρκεια exactly correſponds, in reſpect of the ſignification of its component parts, to the Engliſh word *ſelf ſufficiency*: yet the former has a good meaning, and denotes *contentment*; the latter, except when applied to the Deity, has invariably a bad meaning, and ſignifies *arrogance*. Sometimes the ſenſe of one of the words in compoſition is totally loſt, the compound term being applied in a manner which excludes it. Thus the word οικοδομεω ought to ſignify, *to build a houſe*, but it is not only conſtrued with ταφος, *a ſepulchre*, (which by metaphor may indeed be called a houſe, being the receptacle of the dead), but with θυσιαστηριον, *altar*, χαρακωσις, *bulwark*, and ſeveral other terms which, in no ſenſe, proper or figurative, can be denominated *houſes*. Such anomalies, both in derivation and in compoſition, are to be found in all tongues, inſomuch that often etymology points to one meaning, and uſe to another. Were we to mind the indication of the former, the Engliſh word *always* ought to be rendered into Latin *omnimodo* and not *ſemper*; our verb, *to vouchſafe*, ſhould denote, *to give one a protection*, or *to inſure one's ſafety*, and not *to deign* or *condeſcend*. The inſeparable prepoſition *re* in Engliſh commonly denotes *again*, but to *reprove* is not *to prove again*, *to recommend* is not *to commend again*; nor does *to remark* mean, *to mark again*. As little can theſe be explained by the aid of the adverb *back*, like the verbs *to recal* and *to return*.

§ 19. In the above examples I have confined myself to terms whose meaning, though an exception from the rules of analogy, is incontrovertible; my principal object being to evince, to the satisfaction of every intelligent reader, that the sense of words is often totally different from that to which the etymology points, and that consequently in all the cases wherein use cannot be discovered, and wherein the context does not necessarily fix the meaning, the conviction which arises from etymology alone is considerably inferior to that which arises either from known use, or from the words immediately connected. But, before I dismiss this topic, I shall offer some criticisms on a few passages of the New Testament, which may appear, on a superficial view, more controvertible, in order to shew with how much caution we ought to proceed in rendering a compound word in one language, by one in another similarly compounded; and that even though the original term be not, like those above specified, an exception, in respect of meaning, from the common rules of analogy.

The word διψυχος, used by the apostle James, compounded of δις, signifying in composition *double* or *twice*, and ψυχη, *soul, mind, spirit*, could not, one would at first imagine, be more properly or literally rendered, than by the similar English compound *double-minded*. But this, though in some sense it may be called a literal version, is a mis-translation of the word, inasmuch as it conveys a sense entirely different. Yet the meaning of the original term is analogical; only there are different ways wherein the mind or soul may be charged with duplicity. One is, when it sometimes leans to one opinion, sometimes to the contrary; another is, when it secretly harbours passions and opinions the reverse of those which it openly professes. No two meanings can be more different; the first is certainly the import of the Greek word, the second of the English, which is justly explained by Johnson, *deceitful, insidious*. To recur to the passage itself, James i. 8. Ανηρ διψυχος ακαταστατος εν πασαις ταις οδοις αυτου, in the common translation, *A double minded man is unstable in all his ways*; first, the sentiment itself may suggest a doubt of the justness of the version. There appears no immediate connection between deceitfulness and inconstancy. The deceitful are often but too stable in a bad course. The doubleness expressed in the English word does not imply sudden changes of any kind; but solely that the real motives of conduct and the outward professions disagree, or that the person intends one thing, whilst he professes another. Now who sees not that, in respect of both the intention and the profession, he may be very steady? Fickleness is not remarkably an attendant on hypocrisy. When I examine the context, I find nothing there that relates to sincerity or the conformity that ought to subsist between a man's words and his thoughts; but I am led directly by it to think of constancy in right

right principles, as the apoſtle had been, in the preceding words, urging the neceſſity of unſhaken faith. This verſe, if δίψυχος be underſtood to mean unſteady in the belief of the truth, perfectly coincides with, and ſupports the apoſtle's argument, implying that inconſtancy in principles produces inconſtancy in the whole conduct, than which no ſentiment can be clearer.

To recur, however, to ſome of the other rules of criticiſing above mentioned (not as neceſſary in the preſent inſtance, but for the ſake of illuſtration), and firſt to Scriptural uſage: I find, on enquiry, that there is only one other paſſage in the New Teſtament wherein the word occurs. It is in the ſame epiſtle, but the expreſſion there is too general to aſcertain the import of the term in queſtion. As the word is not to be found in the Septuagint, nor even in the Apocrypha, there is reaſon to believe that it is not affected by the idiom of the ſynagogue. I therefore apply to common uſe, and find that the word uniformly denotes *doubtful, fluctuating* in reſpect of one's judgment. All its conjugates in like manner ſupport this meaning; δίψυχια is *doubt* or *heſitancy*, δίψυχεω, *to doubt, to heſitate*. If we apply to the ancient Greek expoſitors, they all interpret it in the ſame way. And as this is none of the paſſages whereon any of their theological controverſies were founded, we can give them the greater credit. I ſhall only tranſcribe the explanation given by Ecumenius *, which is to this effect: "Δίψυχος ανηρ is a man of unſet-"tled and fluctuating ſentiments, too ſolicitous about the preſent "to attain the future, too anxious about the future to ſecure the "preſent, who driven hither and thither in his judgment of "things, is perpetually ſhifting the object, who this moment "would ſacrifice all for eternity, and the next would renounce "any thing for this tranſient life." The ſenſe of the apoſtle's expreſſion may be therefore juſtly given in theſe words: *A man unſteady in his opinions, is in all his actions inconſtant.*

§ 20. To the above example I ſhall add a few of the moſt common of all kinds of compoſition, a prepoſition and a verb in familiar uſe. My intention is chiefly to ſhow, that a deviation in interpreting, ſmall to appearance, even ſuch as is apt to be overlooked by a reader deceived by the correſpondence of the themes, is often ſufficient to pervert the ſenſe, either by rendering the expreſſion totally unmeaning, or by giving it a wrong meaning. The verb ὁραω, *to ſee*, is common; προ in compoſition generally anſwers to the Engliſh inſeparable prepoſition *fore*. The verb, therefore, προοραω, or, in the middle voice, προοραομαι, ſhould mean analogically, one would imagine, *to foreſee*. It is accordingly

* Δίψυχον ανδρα, τον ανεπερειστον, τον ασηριχτον λεγει, τον μητε προς τα μελλοντα παγιως, μητε προς τα παροντα ασφαλως ηδρασμενον, αλλα τηδε κακεισε αγομενον και περιφερομενον, και ποτε μεν των μελλοντων, ποτε δε των παροντων αντεχομενον.

ingly in one place, Acts ii. 25. so rendered, *I foresaw the Lord always before my face*, in Greek, προωρωμην τον Κυριον ενωπιον μου διαπαντος. The words are a quotation from the Psalms, xvi. 8. and are literally copied from the Septuagint.

It will naturally occur to an attentive English reader to enquire, What is the meaning of the word *foresaw* in this passage? Foresight has a reference to the future; whereas the Psalmist is speaking of things as present: for, though it is true that the words relate to the Messiah, who was many centuries posterior to David, they are not announced in the form of a prediction. David, in speaking, personates the Messiah, of whom he was an eminent type, and ascribes as to himself what, in the sublimest sense, was applicable only to that illustrious descendent It is, as it were, Christ who speaks. The Lord he represents as always before him, not as *to be* in some future period before him, adding *he is*, not *he will be*, on my right hand. In regard to the compound verb, it occurs only in one other passage of the New Testament, to be considered afterwards, and in no place of the Septuagint, except that above quoted. But, on examining more closely the import of the simple words, we discover that the Greek preposition may relate to place as well as to time, and that it is often merely what grammarians call *intensive*; that is, it does not alter the sense of the simple verb to which it is prefixed, it only renders the expression more emphatical. Thus the verb προοραω is as literally rendered *prospicio* as *prævideo*, and has been in this passage more fitly rendered so by Beza. It may be objected that this explanation produces a pleonasm in the sentence, as it is immediately added, ενωπιον μου, *before me*. But such pleonasms are not uncommon in Scripture. Thus, Rom. viii. 26. Το πνευμα υπεριντυγχανει υπερ ημων. Matt. vii. 24. 26. Ὁστις οικοδομησε την οικιαν αυτου. Rev. xiv. 2. Φωνην ηκουσα κιθαρωδων κιθαριζοντων εν ταις κιθαραις αυτων. The last four words in this verse are plainly implied in the participle. The phrase which occurs oftener than once, υποποδιον των ποδων αυτου, is chargeable with the like redundancy. Add to all this, that the Hebrew word here translated προοραω by the Seventy, never signifies *to foresee*, but *to place*, *to set*. In this passage, being applied to the mind, it denotes the Psalmist's, or rather the Messiah's fixed attention on God as always with him.

The other passage in which this verb occurs is also in the Acts, xxi. 29. Ησαν προεωρακοτες Τροφιμον τον Εφεσιον εν τη πολει συν αυτω. Here the connection, without other resource, shews sufficiently that the simple verb ὁραω means literally *to see*, and the preposition προ *before*, in respect of time, not of place, and yet that προοραω does not imply *to foresee*, but *to see before*. The difference lies here. The former is to see or perceive an event before it happen, the latter denotes only to see either person or thing before the

the preſent time, which alone can be the ſenſe of this paſſage, and which is therefore rightly rendered by our tranſlators, *They had ſeen before with him, in the city, Trophimus an Epheſian.* To have ſaid, "They had foreſeen with him," would have totally marred the ſenſe. But our tranſlators have not always been equally attentive.

§ 21. I ſhall add an example, not unlike the former, in the verb προγινωσκω, though the difficulty, with regard to it, ariſes as much from the ſignification of the ſimple verb, as from that of the prepoſition. Paul ſays, Rom. xi. 2. Ουκ απωσατο ὁ Θεος τον λαον αυτου ὁν προεγνω, which our tranſlators render, *God hath not caſt away his people which he foreknew.* The laſt clauſe in this verſion conveys to my mind no meaning whatever. To *foreknow* always ſignifies to know ſome event before it happen; but no event is here mentioned, ſo that we are at a loſs to diſcover the object of the foreknowledge mentioned. Is it only the exiſtence of the people? Even this is not explicitly ſaid; but if this were the writer's intention, we ſhould ſtill be at a loſs for the ſenſe. There is nothing in this circumſtance which diſtinguiſhes God's people from any other people, for the exiſtence of all were equally foreknown by him; whereas here ſomething peculiar is plainly intended, which is ſuggeſted as a reaſon to prevent our thinking that God would ever totally caſt them away. Though nothing, to appearance, can anſwer more exactly than the Engliſh *foreknew* does to the Greek προεγνω, it in reality labours under a double defect. The firſt is the ſame which was obſerved in the preceding paragraph, in rendering the prepoſition; for there is the ſame difference between *knowing before* and *foreknowing*, that there is between *ſeeing before* and *foreſeeing*. Our tranſlators have, on ſome occaſions, ſhown themſelves ſenſible of the difference. Accordingly they render προγινωσκοντες με ανωθεν, Acts xxvi. 5. *which knew me from the beginning*, not *foreknew me.* The example above quoted from the twenty-firſt chapter of the Acts, is a ſimilar inſtance.

The prepoſitions in the two languages, though nearly, are not perfectly correſpondent, eſpecially in compoſition. With us the inſeparable prepoſition *fore*, prefixed to *know, ſee, tell,* and *ſhow*, always relates to ſome event which is *known, ſeen, told,* and *ſhewn,* before it happen; whereas the Greek prepoſition προ does not neceſſarily relate to an event, and ſignifies no more than *before this time.* The difference in theſe idioms may be thus illuſtrated. A friend introducing a perſon with whom he ſuppoſes me unacquainted, ſays, *This is ſuch a man.* I make anſwer, *I knew him before.* I ſhould ſpeak nonſenſe if I ſaid, *I foreknew him.* Yet in Greek I might ſay properly προεγνων.

Another inſtance wherein our interpreters have ſhown an attention to this diſtinction, we have in the ſecond epiſtle to the Corinthians,

Corinthians, vii. 3. where they tranſlate the word προειρηκα very properly, *I have ſaid before.* Every reader of diſcernment muſt perceive that it would have been abſurd to render it in that place, *I have foretold.*

But to return to the paſſage under review in the epiſtle to the Romans: it was obſerved, that the common verſion of the word προεγνω, in that paſſage, labours under a double defect. It is not, in my judgment, barely in tranſlating the prepoſition that the error lies, but alſo in the ſenſe aſſigned to the verb compounded with it. That God knew Iſrael before, in the ordinary meaning of the word *knowing*, could never have been ſuggeſted as a reaſon to hinder us from thinking that he would ever caſt them off; for, from the beginning, all nations and all things are alike known to God. But the verb γινωσκω, in Helleniſtic uſe, has all the latitude of ſignification which the verb יָדַע *jadang* has, being that whereby the Seventy commonly render the Hebrew word. Now the Hebrew word means not only *to know*, in the common acceptation, but *to acknowledge* and *to approve.* Nothing is more common in Scripture than this uſe. "The Lord *knoweth*, γινωσκει, "the way of the righteous," Pſalm i. 6. that is, *approveth.* "Then I will profeſs unto them, I never *knew* you," εγνων, *acknowledged* you for mine, Matt. vii. 23. "If any man love "God, the ſame is *known* of him," 1 Cor. viii. 3. εγνωσται, *acknowledged.* If, therefore, in the paſſage under examination, we underſtand in this way the verb γινωσκω, adding the import of the prepoſition προ, *before*, *formerly*, *heretofore*, the meaning is both clear and pertinent: "God hath not caſt off his people whom heretofore he acknowledged.."

I ſhall juſt add a ſenſe of the verb προγινωσκω, as uſed by the apoſtle Peter, 1 Pet. i. 20. different from both the former. The verb γινωσκω in claſſical uſe often denotes *to decree*, *to ordain*, *to give ſentence* as a judge, and therefore προγινωσκω, *to foreordain*, &c. It is in this ſenſe only we can underſtand προεγνωσμενου προ καταβολης κοσμου, which our interpreters have rightly rendered "*foreordained*, before the foundation of the world." But they have not ſo well tranſlated the verbal noun προγνωσις in the ſecond verſe of the chapter, *foreknowledge*, which renders the expreſſion indefinite and obſcure, not to ſay, improper. It ought, for the ſame reaſon, to have been *predetermination.* The ſame word, in the ſame ſignification, occurs in the Acts, chap. ii. 23. where it is alſo improperly rendered *foreknowledge.*

§ 22. It may be thought that, in the compoſition of ſubſtantives, or of an adjective and a ſubſtantive in familiar uſe, there is hardly a poſſibility of error, the import of both the ſimple words being eſſential to the compound. But this is not without exception, as βωμολοχος, συκοφαντης, χειροτονια, and many others, evince. It is indeed very probable, that the import of ſuch terms originally

nally was what the etymology indicates. But in their application, ſuch variations are inſenſibly introduced by cuſtom, as ſometimes fix them at laſt in a meaning very different from the primary ſenſe, or that to which the component parts would lead us.

I ſhall bring for an example a term about which tranſlators have been very little divided. It is the word σκληροκαρδια, always rendered in the common verſion *hardneſs of heart*. Nothing can be more literal, or, to appearance, more juſt. Σκληροκαρδια is compounded of σκληρος *hard*, and καρδια *heart*. Nor can it be denied that theſe Engliſh words, taken ſeverally, are, in almoſt every caſe, expreſſive of the full ſenſe of the Greek words, alſo taken ſeverally. Yet there is reaſon to ſuſpect that the Greek compound does not anſwer to the meaning conſtantly affixed by us to *hardneſs of heart*, or, in one word, *hardheartedneſs*. Let us recur to examples. In Matt. xix. 8. we read thus, "Moſes, "becauſe of *the hardneſs of your hearts*, προς την σκληροκαρδιαν υμων, "ſuffered you to put away your wives." Now theſe terms, *hardneſs of heart*, with us always denote cruelty, inhumanity, barbarity. It does not appear that this is our Lord's meaning in this paſſage. And though the paſſage might be ſo paraphraſed, as would give a plauſibility to this interpretation, I do not recollect that this vice of cruelty, as a national vice, was ever imputed to them by Moſes; though he often charges them with incredulity, obſtinacy, and rebellion. As there is nothing, however, in the context, that can be called deciſive, I recur to the other paſſages in the New Teſtament wherein the word is found. Theſe are but two, and both of them in Mark's Goſpel. One of them is, x. 5. where the ſame occurrence is recorded as in the paſſage of Matthew above referred to. In theſe two parallel places, there is ſo little variation in the words, that the doubt as to the meaning of this term muſt equally affect them both. The other paſſage is, xvi. 14. in the account given of our Lord's appearances to his diſciples after his reſurrection. "Afterwards "he appeared unto the eleven, as they ſat at meat, and upbraided "them with *their unbelief and hardneſs of heart*, την απιστιαν "αυτων και σκληροκαρδιαν, becauſe they believed not them which "had ſeen him after he was riſen." Nothing can be clearer than that the word here has no relation to *inhumanity*, as this great event gave no handle for diſplaying either this vice or the contrary virtue. Some commentators, after Grotius, render it here *incredulity*, making our Saviour expreſs the ſame fault by both words απιστια and σκληροκαρδια. I do not ſay that the uſe of ſuch ſynonymas is without example in Scripture; though I would not recur to them where another interpretation were equally natural, and even more probable. I think, therefore, that by the firſt of theſe terms the effect is meant, and by the ſecond

ſecond the cauſe; that is, their ſtiff and untractable temper, their indocility or perverſeneſs. Now this is a fault with which the Jews are frequently upbraided by Moſes. Beſides, this interpretation perfectly ſuits the ſenſe of both paſſages. In that firſt quoted, as well as in this, the connection is evident. "Moſes, "becauſe of your untractable diſpoſition, permitted you to di-"vorce your wives;" leſt, by making the marriage tie indiſſoluble, ye had perverſely renounced marriage altogether, ſaying, as ſome of the diſciples did, "If the caſe of the man be ſo with "his wife, it is not good to marry." The ſenſe *unbelief*, which Grotius puts upon it, is rather more forced in that paſſage than the common acceptation. Caſtalio renders it very properly *pervicacia*.

If, for further ſatisfaction, I recur to the Septuagint, I find invariably a connection with *perverſeneſs*, never with *inhumanity*. Where we read in Engliſh, Deut. x. 16. "Circumciſe the fore-"ſkin of your heart, and be no more ſtiff necked," the Seventy have it, Περιτεμεσθε την σκληροκαρδιαν ὑμων, και τον τραχηλον ὑμων ου σκληυνατε ετι. Here the oppoſition of the members in the ſentence, which, in the Oriental taſte, gives the ſame command, firſt in the poſitive form, and then in the negative, renders the meaning indubitable. The adjective σκληροκαρδιος is uſed in the book of Proverbs, xvii. 20. for perverſe or untractable. Ὁ σκληροκαρδιος, in Hebrew, עקש לב *ghakeſh leb*, ου συναντα αγαθοις; rendered juſtly in the Vulgate, "Qui perverſi cordis eſt, non inveniet "bonum;" in Engliſh, "He that hath a froward heart, findeth "no good." There is another example of this adjective in Ezek. iii. 7. which appears to me deciſive. The verſe runs thus in our verſion: "The houſe of Iſrael will not hearken unto "thee; for they will not hearken unto me, for all the houſe of "Iſrael are impudent and *hardhearted*;" φιλονεικοι εισι και σκληροκαρδιοι. It is plain, from the context, that nothing is advanced which can fix on them the charge of inhumanity; but every thing points to their indocile and untractable temper. In like manner, when the verb σκληυνω is followed by την καρδιαν, the meaning is invariably either to *become*, or to *render refractory*, *rebellious*, not *cruel* or *inhumane*. This is evidently the ſenſe of it as applied to Pharaoh, whoſe obſtinacy the ſevereſt judgments hardly could ſurmount. And can any perſon doubt that the meaning of the Pſalmiſt, when he ſays, Pſal. xcv. 7, 8. *To day if ye ſhall hear his voice*, μη σκληυνητε τας καρδιας ὑμων, is, *be not contumacious* or *ſtiff-necked, as in the provocation?* It is impoſſible either to recur to the hiſtory referred to, Numb. xiv. or to the comment on the paſſage in the epiſtle to the Hebrews, Heb. iii. and iv. and not perceive this to be a full expreſſion of the ſenſe. *Hardhearted*, therefore, in our language, which ſtands always in oppoſition to *tenderhearted* or *compaſſionate*, is not a

juſt

juſt tranſlation, though, in ſome ſenſe, it may be called a literal tranſlation, of σκληροκαρδιος.

§ 23. If we enquire a little into the figurative ſignifications given to the ſimple word καρδια by the ſacred penmen, we ſhall find their application of the compound to *contumacy* or *indocility*, as natural as ours is to *cruelty* and *unfeelingneſs*. Let it be obſerved then that, though the Greek word καρδια, when uſed in the proper ſenſe for the part of the body ſo denominated, is equivalent to the Engliſh word *heart*, it is not always ſo when uſed metaphorically. With us it is made by figure to ſtand, ſometimes for *courage*, ſometimes for *affection*, of which it is conſidered as the ſeat; but hardly ever, that I remember, for *underſtanding*. To denote this faculty, we ſometimes ſpeak of a good or a bad *head*; we alſo uſe the term *brain*. This, and not the *heart*, we regard as the ſeat of intelligence and diſcernment. Yet this was a frequent uſe of the term *heart* among the ancients, not the Hebrews only, but even the Greeks and the Romans. Καρδια in Greek, even in the beſt uſe, as well as *cor* in Latin, are employed to denote diſcernment and underſtanding. Hence, the word *cordatus* in Latin, for *wiſe*, *judicious*, *prudent*.

For the preſent purpoſe it ſuffices to produce a few inſtances from Scripture, which will put the matter beyond a doubt. For the ſake of brevity, I ſhall but juſt name the things attributed to the heart, referring to the paſſages in the margin; that from them every perſon may judge of the figurative application. Firſt, then, intelligence is aſcribed to it, Matt. xiii. 15. alſo reaſoning, Mark ii. 6. likewiſe blindneſs, Mark. iii. 5. &c.* doubts, Mark xi. 23. faith, Rom. x. 10. thought, Acts viii. 22. compariſon, Luke ii. 19. reflection, ibid.; in ſhort, all that we commonly conſider as belonging to the intellectual faculty, are applied in Scripture to the heart, a term which, in figurative ſtyle, is uſed with very great latitude. In this view of the metonymy, σκληροκαρδιος comes naturally to ſignify *indocile*, *untractable*, of an underſtanding ſo hard, that inſtruction cannot penetrate it. Of ſimilar formation is the term *thick ſkulled* with us. But the ſenſe is not entirely the ſame. This implies mere incapacity, that an untoward diſpoſition.

§ 24. Here it may not be improper to ſuggeſt a caution, for preventing miſtakes, not only in the interpretation of Scripture, but in that of all ancient writers. Though a particular word in a modern language, may exactly correſpond with a certain word in a foreign or a dead language, when both are uſed literally and properly, theſe words may be very far from correſponding when uſed metaphorically, or when affected by any trope whatever.

* The term is πωρωσις, *calloufneſs*, rendered *hardneſs* in the common tranſlation, but which as often means *blindneſs*, and is ſo rendered Rom. xi. 25. Eph. iv. 18. A ſenſe here more ſuitable to the context.

Nor does this remark hold in any thing more frequently than in that ſort of metonymy ſo common amongſt every people, whereby ſome parts of the body, eſpecially of the entrails, have been ſubſtituted to denote certain powers or affections of the mind, with which they are ſuppoſed to be connected. The opinions of different nations and different ages, on this article, differ ſo widely from one another, that the figurative ſenſe in one tongue is a very unſafe guide to the figurative ſenſe in another. In ſome inſtances they ſeem even to ſtand in direct oppoſition to each other. The *ſpleen* was accounted by the ancient Greeks and Romans the ſeat of mirth and laughter; by us moderns it is held (I ſuppoſe with equal reaſon) the ſeat of ill-humour and melancholy. When, therefore, it is evident that the name is, in one of thoſe ancient languages, uſed not properly, but tropically, what ſome would call a literal tranſlation into a modern tongue, would, in fact, be a miſrepreſentation of the author, and a groſs perverſion of the ſenſe *.

§ 25. I ſhall add but one other example, of the miſinterpretation of a compound word, ariſing from the apparent, rather than the real, import of its etymology. The word ὁμοιοπαθης occurs twice in the New Teſtament. The firſt time is on occaſion of the miraculous cure of the lame man by Paul and Barnabas at Lyſtra. When the people would have offered ſacrifice to the apoſtles, ſuppoſing them to be two of their gods, Jupiter and Mercury, they no ſooner heard of their intention, than they rent their clothes, and ran in among the people, crying out and ſaying (as in the common tranſlation), "Sirs, why do ye theſe things? we alſo are men *of like paſſions with you*," Acts xiv. 15. ὁμοιοπαθεις ὑμιν. The other occaſion of the words occurring, is where the apoſtle James ſaid, as our tranſlators render it, "Elias "was a man *ſubject to like paſſions as we are*, ὁμοιοπαθης ἡμιν, "and he prayed earneſtly that it might not rain," James v. 17. From which paſſages I have heard it gravely inferred, that a ſuperiority over the paſſions is hardly to be expected from the influence

* I had occaſion to conſider a little this ſubject in another work, The Philoſophy of Rhetoric, Book III. Chap. I. Sect. II. Part I. I there took notice of a remark of Cornutus on theſe words of the firſt ſatire of Perſius: "Sum petulanti ſplene cachinno." Which, as it is much to my preſent purpoſe, and not long, I ſhall here repeat. "Phyſici dicunt homines ſplene "ridere, felle iraſci, jecore amare, corde ſapere, et pulmone jactari." To the ſame purpoſe, I find in a very ancient piece, called the Teſtaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, ſuppoſed to be the work of a Chriſtian of the firſt century, the following ſentiment in the Teſtament of Naphtali, introduced for the ſake of illuſtrating that God made all things good, adapting each to its proper uſe. καρδιαν εις φρονησιν, ἡπαρ προς θυμον, χολην προς πικριαν, εις γελωτα σπληνα, νεφρους εις παυεργιαν. Grab. Spicil. patrum I. Secul. T. 1. Ed. 2. p. 212. This, though differing a little from the remark made by the commentator on Perſius, perfectly coincides in what regards the *heart* and the *ſpleen*.

fluence even of the moſt divine religion, or the moſt diſtinguiſhing lights of the Spirit; ſince ſacred writ itſelf ſeems, in this reſpect, to put Jews, Chriſtians, and Pagans, nay prophets, apoſtles, and idolatrous prieſts, and people, all upon a level.

But this ariſes merely from the miſtranſlation of the word ὁμοιοπαθης, concerning which I beg leave to offer the following remarks: 1ſt, I remark that it is found only twice in the New Teſtament, does not occur in the verſion of the Seventy, and but once in the Apocryphal writings, where it is applied to the earth, Wiſd. vii. 3. in which there is nothing analogous to human paſſions, though there is ſome analogy to human ſufferings and diſſolution; and that therefore we have no reaſon, agreeably to an obſervation lately made, § 8. to conſider this term as affected by the idiom of the ſynagogue. 2dly, If we recur to claſſical uſe, we find that it implies no more than *fellow mortal*, and has no relation to what, in our language, is peculiarly called *paſſion*: and, 3dly, That with this, the etymology rightly underſtood, perfectly agrees. The primary ſignification of παθος in Greek, and of the unclaſſical term *paſſio* in Latin, is *ſuffering*; the firſt from πασχειν, the ſecond from *pati* to ſuffer. Thence they are adopted to denote calamity, diſeaſe, and death; thence alſo they are taken ſometimes to denote thoſe affections of the mind which are in their nature violent, and are conſidered as implying pain and ſuffering; nay, the Engliſh word *paſſion* is in this manner applied (but it is in a ſort of technical language) to the death and ſufferings of our Lord.

Now, as to the term ὁμοιοπαθης, in the manner in which it is rendered by our interpreters, the argument employed by the apoſtles to the Lycaonians loſes all its force and ſignificance. The Pagans never denied that the gods whom they adored were beings of like paſſions with themſelves; nay, they did not ſcruple to attribute the moſt diſgraceful, and the moſt turbulent paſſions to their deities. And as little as any were the two divinities exempted whom they ſuppoſed Paul and Barnabas to be; but then they always attributed to them a total exemption from mortality and diſeaſe. It would have been therefore impertinent to ſay to idolaters, who miſtook them for gods, "We are ſubject to the like paſſions with you;" for this their prieſts and poets had uniformly taught them both of Jupiter and of Mercury. But it was pertinent to ſay, "We are your fellow-mortals," as liable as you to diſeaſe and death. For, if that was the caſe with the two apoſtles, the people would readily admit, they were not the gods they took them for. Indeed this was not only the principal, but, I may almoſt ſay, the ſole diſtinction they made between gods and men. As to irregular luſts and paſſions, they ſeem even to have aſcribed them to the celeſtials in a higher degree, in proportion, as it were, to their ſuperior power. And, in

in regard to the application to Elijah, in the other paſſage quoted, let it not be thought any objection to the interpretation here given, that the prophet was tranſlated, and did not die; for all that is implied in the apoſtle's argument is, that his body was naturally mortal and diſſolvable as well as ours; a point which was never called in queſtion, notwithſtanding his miraculous deliverance from death. I ſhall only add, that the explanation here given is entirely conformable to the verſion of thoſe paſſages in the Vulgate, and to that of all the other tranſlations, ancient and modern, of any name.

§ 26. From all that has been ſaid on this topic, it is evident that, in doubtful caſes, etymology is but a dangerous guide; and, though always entitled to ſome attention, never, unleſs in the total failure of all other reſources, to be entirely reſted in. From her tribunal there lies always an appeal to *uſe*, in caſes wherein uſe can be diſcovered, whoſe deciſion is final, according to the obſervation of Horace,

Quem penes arbitrium eſt, et jus, et norma loquendi.

I have been the more particular on this head, becauſe etymology ſeems to be a favourite with many modern interpreters, and the ſource of a great proportion of their criticiſms. And indeed it muſt be owned that, of all the poſſible ways of becoming a critic in a dead or a foreign language, etymology is the eaſieſt. A ſcanty knowledge of the elements, with the aid of a good lexicon, and a plauſible fluency of expreſſion, will be fully ſufficient for the purpoſe. I ſhall add a few inſtances in this taſte from ſome modern tranſlations of the New Teſtament; though I am far from inſinuating that the above mentioned qualifications for criticiſing, were all that the authors were poſſeſſed of. Some of them, on the contrary, have, in other inſtances, diſplayed critical abilities very reſpectable. But where is the man who, on every occaſion, is equal to himſelf? The word εσπλαγχνισθη, Matt. ix. 36. is rendered, by the Gentlemen of Port Royal, *Ses entrailles furent emues de compaſſion*, on which Wynne ſeems to have improved in ſaying, *His bowels yearned with compaſſion.* Ευδοκησαν, Rom. xv. 26, 27. is rendered by the former, *ont reſolu avec beaucoup d'affection.* Δεησις ενεργεμενη, James v. 16. is tranſlated by Doddridge, *Prayer wrought by the energy of the Spirit.* Σκηνωσει. Rev. vii. 15. by Diodati, *Tendera un padiglione.* Χειροτονησαντες, Acts xiv. 23. by Beza, *cum ipſi per ſuffragia creaſſent*, and κληρονομησουσι, Matt. v. 5. *hæreditario jure obtinebunt.* The Vulgate too, ſometimes without neceſſity, but more rarely, adopts the ſame paraphraſtical method. For thoſe examples above referred to, which occur in the Goſpel, ſee the notes on the places.

DISSER-

DISSERTATION THE FIFTH.

OF THE PROPER VERSION OF SOME NAMES OF PRINCIPAL IMPORT IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

THE religious inſtitution of which the Lord Jeſus is the author, is diſtinguiſhed in the New Teſtament by particular names and phraſes, with the true import of which it is of great conſequence that we be acquainted, in order to form a diſtinct apprehenſion of the nature and end of the whole. A very ſmall deviation here may lead ſome into groſs miſtakes, and conceal from others, in a conſiderable degree, the ſpirit which this inſtitution breathes, and the diſcoveries which it brings. I think it neceſſary, therefore, to examine this ſubject a little, in order to lay before the critical, the judicious and the candid, my reaſons for leaving, in ſome particulars which at firſt may appear of little moment, the beaten track of interpreters, and giving, it may be ſaid, new names to known things, where there cannot be any material difference of meaning. The affectation of rejecting a word, becauſe old, if neither obſcure nor obſolete, and of preferring another, becauſe new, if it be not more appoſite or expreſſive, is juſtly held contemptible; but, without doubt, it would be an extreme on the other ſide, not leſs hurtful, to pay a greater veneration to names, (that is, to mere ſounds), than to the things ſignified by them. And ſurely a tranſlator is juſtly chargeable with this fault, who in any degree ſacrifices propriety and that perſpicuity which, in a great meaſure, flows from it, to a ſcrupulous (not to ſay ſuperſtitious) attachment to terms, which, as the phraſe is, have been conſecrated by long uſe. But of this I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more afterwards.

The moſt common appellation given to this inſtitution, or religious diſpenſation, in the New Teſtament, is, ἡ Βασιλεια τȣ θεȣ, or των ȣρανων; and the title given to the manifeſtation of this new ſtate, is moſt frequently το ευαγγελιον της Βασιλειας, &c. and ſometimes, when conſidered under an aſpect ſomewhat different, ἡ καινη διαθηκη. The great Perſonage himſelf, to whoſe adminiſtration

ſtration the whole is entruſted, is, in contra-diſtinction to all others, denominated ὁ χριστος. I ſhall, in this diſcourſe, make a few obſervations on each of the terms above mentioned.

PART I.

Of the Phraſe ἡ Βασιλεια τȣ Θεȣ, *or* των ȣρανων.

In the phraſe ἡ Βασιλεια τȣ Θεȣ, or των ȣρανων, there is a manifeſt alluſion to the predictions in which this economy was revealed by the prophets in the Old Teſtament, particularly by the prophet Daniel, who mentions it in one place, ch. ii. 44. as *a kingdom*, Βασιλεια, *which the God of heaven would ſet up, and which ſhould never be deſtroyed*; in another, ch. vii. 13, 14. as a kingdom to be given, with glory and dominion over all people, nations and languages, to one like a ſon of man. And the prophet Micah, ch. iv. 6, 7. ſpeaking of the ſame era, repreſents it as a time when Jehovah, having removed all the afflictions of his people, would reign over them in Mount Sion thenceforth even for ever. To the ſame purpoſe, though not ſo explicit, are the declarations of other prophets. To theſe predictions there is a manifeſt reference in the title, ἡ βασιλεια τȣ Θεȣ, or των ȣρανων, or ſimply, ἡ βασιλεια, given in the New Teſtament, to the religious conſtitution which would obtain under the Meſſiah. It occurs very often, and is, if I miſtake not, uniformly in the common tranſlation, rendered *kingdom*.

§ 2. That the import of the term is always either *kingdom*, or ſomething nearly related to kingdom, is beyond all queſtion; but it is no leſs ſo, that, if regard be had to the propriety of our own idiom, and conſequently to the perſpicuity of the verſion, the Engliſh word will not anſwer on every occaſion. In moſt caſes βασιλεια anſwers to the Latin *regnum*. But this word is of more extenſive meaning than the Engliſh, being equally adapted to expreſs both our terms *reign* and *kingdom*. The firſt relates to the time or duration of the ſovereignty; the ſecond, to the place or country over which it extends. Now, though it is manifeſt in the goſpels, that it is much oftener the time than the place that is alluded to; it is never, in the common verſion tranſlated *reign*, but always *kingdom*. Yet the expreſſion is often thereby rendered exceedingly awkward, not to ſay abſurd. Uſe indeed ſoftens every thing. Hence it is that, in reading our Bible, we are inſenſible of thoſe improprieties which, in any other book, would ſtrike us at firſt hearing. Such are thoſe expreſſions which apply motion to a kingdom, as when mention is made of its *coming*, *approaching*,

approaching, and the like; but I ſhould not think it worth while to contend for the obſervance of a ſcrupulous propriety, if the violation of it did not affect the ſenſe, and lead the reader into miſtakes. Now this is, in ſeveral inſtances, the certain conſequence of improperly rendering βασιλεια *kingdom*.

§ 3. When βασιλεια means *reign*, and is followed by των ουρανων, the tranſlation *kingdom of heaven* evidently tends to miſlead the reader. Heaven, thus conſtrued with kingdom, ought, in our language, by the rules of grammatical propriety, to denote the region under the kingly government ſpoken of. But finding, as we advance, that this called the *kingdom of heaven* is actually upon the earth, or, as it were, travelling to the earth, and almoſt arrived, there neceſſarily ariſes ſuch a confuſion of ideas as clouds the text, and by conſequence weakens the impreſſion it would otherwiſe make upon our minds. It may be ſaid indeed, that the import of ſuch expreſſions in Scripture is now ſo well known, that they can hardly be miſtaken. But I am far from thinking that this is the caſe. Were it ſaid only that they are become ſo familiar to us that, without ever reflecting on the matter, we take it for granted that we underſtand them; there is no ſentiment to the juſtneſs of which I can more readily ſubſcribe. But then the familiarity, inſtead of anſwering a good, anſwers a bad purpoſe, as it ſerves to conceal our ignorance, even from ourſelves. It is not therefore the being accuſtomed to hear ſuch phraſes, that will make them be univerſally, or even generally, apprehended by the people. And to thoſe who may have heard of the expoſition commonly given of them, the conception of the kingdom of heaven, as denoting a ſort of dominion upon the earth, a conception which the mind attains indirectly, by the help of a comment, is always feebler than that which is conveyed directly by the native energy of the expreſſion. Not but that the words βασιλεια των ουρανων are often rightly tranſlated *kingdom of heaven*, being often manifeſtly applied to the ſtate of perfect felicity to be enjoyed in the world to come. But it is equally evident that this is not always the meaning of the phraſe.

§ 4. There are two ſenſes wherein the word *heaven* in this expreſſion may be underſtood. Either it ſignifies the place ſo called, or it is a metonymy for God, who is in Scripture ſometimes by periphraſis denominated, *He that dwelleth in heaven*. When the former is the ſenſe of the term ουρανοι, the phraſe is properly rendered *the kingdom of heaven*; when the latter, *the reign of heaven*. Let it be remarked in paſſing, in regard to the ſenſe laſt given of the word ουρανοι as ſignifying *God*, that we are fully authorized to affirm it to be Scriptural. I ſhould have hardly thought it neceſſary to make this remaak, if I had not occaſionally obſerved ſuch phraſes as *the aſſiſtance of heaven*, and *addreſſes to heaven*, criticiſed and cenſured in ſome late

late performances, as favouring more of the Pagan or the Chineſe phraſeology, than of the Chriſtian. That they are perfectly conformable to the latter, muſt be clear to every one who reads his Bible with attention. Daniel, in the interpretation of Nebuchadnezzar's dream, ſays, chap. iv. 26. *Thy kingdom ſhall be ſure unto thee, after that thou ſhalt have known that the* Heavens *do rule.* The prophet had ſaid in the preceding verſe, *Seven times ſhall paſs over thee, till thou know that the* Moſt High *ruleth in the kingdom of men.* Thus he who is denominated the *Moſt High* in one verſe, is termed *the Heavens* in the following. The Pſalmiſt Aſaph ſays of profligates, Pſal. lxxiii. 9. *They ſet their mouth againſt the* Heavens ; that is, *they vent blaſphemies againſt God.* The phraſe in the New Teſtament ἡ βασιλεια των ϰϱανων, is almoſt as common as ἡ βασιλεια τϒ Θεϒ. And though it may be affirmed that the regimen in the one expreſſes the proprietor of the kingdom, in the other the place ; it is evident that this does not hold always. In parallel paſſages in the different Goſpels, where the ſame facts are recorded, one of theſe expreſſions is uſed by one Evangeliſt, and the other as equivalent by another. Nay, the phraſe ἡ βασιλεια των ϰϱανων, is adopted when it is manifeſt that the place of dominion ſuggeſted is earth, not heaven ; and that therefore the term can be underſtood only as a ſynonyma for Θεος. The prodigal ſays to his father, Luke, xv. 18. 21. *Father, I have ſinned againſt* Heaven *and before thee ;* that is, *againſt God and thee.* Otherwiſe, to ſpeak of ſinning againſt an inanimate object, would be exceedingly unſuitable both to the Chriſtian theology and to the Jewiſh. *The baptiſm of John,* ſays our Lord, Matt. xxi. 25. *whence was it ? from* Heaven, *or of men ? From Heaven,* that is, *from God.* Divine authority is here oppoſed to human. This difference, however, in the ſenſe of ϰϱανος, makes no difference to a tranſlator, inaſmuch as the vernacular term with us admits the ſame latitude with the Hebrew and the Greek.

§ 5. That βασιλεια ought ſometimes to be rendered *reign,* and not *kingdom,* I ſhall further evince when I illuſtrate the import of the words ϰηϱυσσω, ευαγγελιζω, and ſome others. Iſaiah, Daniel, Micah, and others of the Prophets, had encouraged the people to expect a time, when the Lord of hoſts ſhould reign in Mount Zion and in Jeruſalem, when the people of God ſhould be redeemed from their enemies, and made joyful in the Meſſiah their King. It was this happy epoch which was generally underſtood to be denominated by the phraſes βασιλεια τϒ Θεϒ, and βασιλεια των ϰϱανων, *the reign of God,* and *the reign of Heaven :* the approach of which was firſt announced by the Baptiſt, afterwards by our Lord himſelf and his Apoſtles. Βασιλεια is applicable in both acceptations, and it needs only be obſerved that, when it refers to the time, it ought to be rendered *reign,* when to the

the place, *kingdom*. For this reaſon, when it is conſtrued with the verb κηρυσσω, ευαγγελιζω, καταγγελλω, or the noun ευαγγελιον, it ought invariably to be *reign*, as alſo when it is ſpoken of as come, coming, or approaching.

§ 6. The French have two words correſponding to ours, *regne*, reign, and *royaume*, kingdom. Their interpreters have often fallen into the ſame fault with ours, ſubſtituting the latter word for the former; yet, in no French tranſlation that I have ſeen, is this done ſo uniformly as in ours. In the Lord's prayer, for example, they all ſay, *ton regne vienne*, not *ton royaume*, thy *reign* come, not thy *kingdom*. On the other hand, when mention is made of entrance or admiſſion into the βασιλεια, or excluſion from it, or where there is a manifeſt reference to the ſtate of the bleſſed hereafter; in all theſe caſes, and perhaps a few others, wherein the ſenſe may eaſily be collected from the context, it ought to be rendered *kingdom*, and not *reign*.

§ 7. There are a few paſſages, it muſt be acknowledged, in which neither of the Engliſh words can be conſidered as a tranſlation of βασιλεια ſtrictly proper. In ſome of the parables, (Mat. xviii. 23.) it evidently means adminiſtration, or method of governing; and in one of them, (Luke xix. 12. 15.) the word denotes royalty or royal authority, there being a manifeſt alluſion to what had been done by Herod the Great, and his immediate ſucceſſor, in recurring to the Roman ſenate, in order to be inveſted with the title and dignity of King of Judea, then dependent upon Rome. But where there is a proper attention to the ſcope of the place, one will be at no loſs to diſcover the import of the word.

PART II.

Of the Name το Ευαγγελιον.

I PROCEED to enquire into the meaning of the word το ευαγγελιον. This term, agreeably to its etymology, from ευ *bene* and αγγελια *nuncium*, always in claſſical uſe, where it occurs but rarely, denotes either good news, or the reward given to the bearer of good news. Let us ſee what ought to be accounted the Scriptural uſe of the term. Ευαγγελιον and ευαγγελια occur ſix times in the Septuagint in the Books of Samuel and Kings. I reckon them as one word, becauſe they are of the ſame origin, are uſed indiſcriminately, and always ſupply the place of the ſame Hebrew word בשרה *beſharah*. In five of theſe, the meaning is *good news*;

in the ſixth, the word denotes the reward given for bringing good news. In like manner, the verb ευαγγελιζειν, or ευαγγελιζεσθαι, which occurs much oftener in the Septuagint than the noun, is always the verſion of the Hebrew verb בשר *baſhar*, *læta annunciare*, to tell good news. It ought to be remarked alſo, that ευαγγελιζω is the only word by which the Hebrew verb is rendered into Greek; nor do I know any word in the Greek language that is more ſtrictly of one ſignification than this verb. In one inſtance, the verbal מבשר *mebaſher*, is indeed uſed for one who brings tidings, though not good, 1 Sam. iv. 17. but in that place the Seventy have not employed the verb ευαγγελιζω, or any of its derivatives. One paſſage, (2 Sam. i. 20.) wherein the Septuagint uſes the verb ευαγγελιζομαι, has alſo been alleged as an exception from the common acceptation. But that this is improperly called an exception, muſt be manifeſt to every one who reflects that the total defeat of the Iſraelitiſh army, with the ſlaughter of the king of Iſrael and his ſons, muſt have been the moſt joyful tidings that could have been related in Gath and Aſkelon, two Philiſtine cities. The word occurs ſeveral times in the prophets, particularly in Iſaiah, and is always rendered in the common verſion, either by the phraſe *to bring good tidings*, or by ſome terms nearly equivalent. It is ſometimes alſo ſo rendered in the New Teſtament, Luke i. 19. ii. 10. viii. 1. Acts xiii. 32. Rom. x. 15. 1 Theſſ. iii. 6.

§ 2. Now let it be obſerved that, when the word is introduced in the goſpels, it is generally either in a quotation from the prophets, or in evident alluſion to their words. Thus πτωχοι ευαγγελιζονται, which our tranſlators render, *To the poor the goſpel is preached*, Matt. xi. 5. Luke vii. 22. the whole context ſhews to be in alluſion to what is ſaid by the prophet Iſaiah, chap. lxi. 1. in whom the correſponding phraſe is rendered, *preach good tidings to the meek*. But nothing can be more to my purpoſe, than that noted paſſage where we are told, Luke iv. 18, 19. that the place in Iſaiah was read by our Lord in the ſynagogue of Nazareth. The words in the common tranſlation of the Goſpel are theſe, *The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, becauſe he hath anointed me to preach the goſpel*, ευαγγελιζεσθαι, *to the poor; he hath ſent me to heal the broken hearted, to preach deliverance to the captives, and recovering of ſight to the blind, to ſet at liberty them that are bruiſed, to preach the acceptable year of the Lord*. Now I cannot help obſerving of this paſſage, that the meaning would have been more perſpicuouſly conveyed, and its beauty and energy would have been better preſerved, if our tranſlators had kept cloſer to the manner in which they had rendered it in the Old Teſtament. There the term ευαγγελιζεσθαι is rendered, *to preach good tidings*. And though it is certain, agreeably to our Lord's declaration, that the goſpel, with its ſpiritual bleſſings, are here held

held forth to us, it is ſtill under the figure of temporal bleſſings, and therefore it is very improperly introduced by its diſtinguiſhing appellation into the verſion, which ought to convey the literal, not the figurative ſenſe of the original.

Ευαγγελιζεσθαι πτωχοις, *to bring good tidings to the poor* or afflicted, agreeably to the extenſive ſignification of the Hebrew word, is the general title of the meſſage, and comprehends the whole. It is explained by being branched out into the particulars which immediately follow. For, if it be aſked, What is the good tidings brought to the afflicted? the anſwer is, a cure to the broken-hearted, deliverance to the captives, ſight to the blind. It is the Lord's jubilee which brings freedom to the ſlave, acquittance to the debtor, and relief to the oppreſſed. Now that the goſpel is herein admirably delineated, is manifeſt. But ſtill it is preſented to us under figures, and therefore to mention it by its peculiar title in the midſt of the figurative deſcription, is to efface, in a great meaſure, that deſcription; it is to jumble injudiciouſly the ſign and the thing ſignified. It is, as if one ſhould confound in an apologue or parable, the literal ſenſe with the moral, and aſſert of the one what is ſtrictly true only of the other; by which means no diſtinct image would be preſented to the mind. Or it is, as when a painter ſupplies the defects in his work by labels, and, inſtead of a picture, preſents us with a confuſed jumble, wherein ſome things are painted, and ſome things deſcribed in words. But it is not in our verſion only, but in moſt modern tranſlations, that this confuſion in rendering this beautiful paſſage has appeared.

§ 3. I ſhall add but one other inſtance of a quotation from the prophets: Ὡς ὡραιοι οἱ ποδες των ευαγγελιζομενων ειρηνην, των ευαγγελιζομενων τα αγαθα, Rom. x. 15. In the common verſion, as quoted in the New Teſtament, *How beautiful are the feet of them that preach the goſpel of peace, and bring glad tidings of good things.* It would have been better here alſo, on many accounts, to keep cloſer to the original in Iſaiah, ch. lii. 7. whence the paſſage was taken, and to tranſlate it thus: "How beautiful are the feet of "them who bring the joyful meſſage of peace, the joyful news "of good things;" at the ſame time, we acknowledge it is with a particular alluſion to that ſpiritual peace, and thoſe eternal good things, procured to us by Jeſus Chriſt. But the beauty and energy of the alluſion and implied ſimilitude are deſtroyed, or rather, there is no more alluſion or ſimilitude in the words, when the characteriſtic deſcription intended by the prophet is in a manner thrown aſide, and in its ſtead is inſerted the name appropriated to the diſpenſation. This at leaſt is in part done; for the prophet's figures are neither totally laid aſide, nor totally retained. Inſtead of imitating his ſimplicity of manner, they have made a jumble of the ſenſe implied, and the ſenſe expreſſed.

For

For this purpoſe they have rendered the ſame word (which is repeated in the two clauſes) in one clauſe, *preach the goſpel*, according to the ſenſe juſtly ſuppoſed to be figured by it; in the other clauſe, *bring glad tidings*, according to the letter. I can ſee no reaſon for this want of uniformity, unleſs perhaps the notion that *the goſpel of good things* founded more awkwardly than *the goſpel of peace*.

§ 4. The prophet's deſign undoubtedly was, to deliver it as an univerſal truth amply confirmed by experience, that the meſſage of peace and proſperity to thoſe who had been oppreſſed and afflicted by the ravages of war, and its various unhappy conſequences, was ſo charming, that it could transform a moſt diſagreeable into a pleaſing object. The feet of thoſe who had travelled far in a hot country, through rough and duſty roads, preſent a ſpectacle naturally offenſive to the beholder; nevertheleſs, the conſideration that the perſons themſelves are to us the meſſengers of peace and felicity; and that it is in bringing this welcome tidings they have contracted that ſordid appearance, can in an inſtant convert deformity into beauty, and make us behold with delight this indication of their embaſſy, their dirty feet, as being the natural conſequence of the long journey they have made. A thought ſomewhat ſimilar occurs in Horace, (Lib. ii. Ode i.) who, ſpeaking of victors returning with glory from a well-fought field, exhibits them as—*Non indecoro pulvere ſordidos*. The poet perceives a charm, ſomething decorous, in the very duſt and ſweat, with which the warriors are ſmeared, and which ſerve to recal to the mind of the ſpectator, the glorious toils of the day; thus, things in themſelves ugly and diſguſting, ſhare, when aſſociated in the mind with things delightful, in the beauty and attractions of thoſe things with which they are connected. But this ſentiment is loſt in the common verſion; for it might puzzle the moſt ſagacious reader to deviſe a reaſon why the feet in particular of the Chriſtian preacher ſhould be declared to excel in beauty.

§ 5. Now, in all the paſſages quoted from the prophets, it appears ſo natural, and ſo proper every way, to give them in the words which had been uſed in tranſlating the prophecies, when the words in the New Teſtament will bear the ſame verſion, that one is at a loſs to conceive what could move the tranſlators to depart from this rule. Ought they, where no ground is given for it in the original, either to make the ſacred penmen appear to have miſquoted the prophets, or to make the unlearned reader imagine, that the Scriptures uſed by them differed from thoſe uſed by us, where there is not in fact any difference? Let it be obſerved that I ſay, when the words in the New Teſtament will bear the ſame verſion with thoſe in the Old; for I am not for carrying this point ſo far as ſome tranſlators have done, who, when

when there is a real difference in the import of the expreſſions, are for correcting one of the ſacred writers by the other. This is not the part of a faithful tranſlator, who ought candidly to repreſent what his author ſays, and leave it to the judicious critic to account for ſuch differences as he beſt can. But it is ſurely a more inexcuſeable error to make differences where there are none, than to attempt to cover them where there are. Now, as it was never pretended that, in the paſſages above quoted, the Hebrew word was not juſtly tranſlated by the Seventy, and that the ſenſe of both was not juſtly expreſſed by the phraſe which our tranſlators had employed in the verſion of the prophets, they had no reaſon for adopting a different, though it were a ſynonymous phraſe, in rendering the paſſage when quoted in the New. What ſhall we ſay then of their employing an expreſſion which conveys a very different meaning?

§ 6. I ſhall produce one example, which, though no quotation, yet, having a direct reference to a promiſe often mentioned in the Old Teſtament, and made originally to the patriarchs, ought to have been interpreted in the moſt comprehenſive way. Our tranſlators, by not attending to this, have rendered a paſſage otherwiſe perſpicuous perfectly unintelligible. Και γαρ εσμεν ευηγγελισμενοι, καθαπερ κακεινοι; in the common verſion, *For unto us was the goſpel preached as well as unto them*, Heb. iv. 2. He had been ſpeaking of the Iſraelites under Moſes in the wilderneſs. This ſounds ſtrangely in Chriſtian ears. That the goſpel has been preached to us, needs no affirmation to convince us: our only difficulty is, to underſtand in what ſenſe the goſpel, or religious inſtitution of Jeſus Chriſt, was preached to thoſe who lived and died before his incarnation. Yet it ſeems here to be ſuppoſed that we all know that the goſpel was preached to them, but need to be informed that it has ever been preached to ourſelves. Had it been ſaid, *For unto them was the goſpel preached as well as unto us*, we ſhould have diſcovered a meaning in the ſentence, though we might have been at a loſs to conceive in what reſpect it is defenſible. But as it ſtands, we are no leſs puzzled about the meaning, than about the truth of the obſervation. Now, the literal and proper tranſlation of the word ευηγελιζομαι, in an inſtant removes every difficulty. *For unto us the good tidings are publiſhed which were publiſhed to them.* What theſe good tidings are, is evident from the context. It is the promiſe of reſt to God's people. It had been ſhewn by the apoſtle, in the preceding chapter, that the promiſe firſt made to the patriarchs was not, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, exhauſted by the admiſſion of the Iſraelites into the land of Canaan; that, on the contrary, we learn, from a threat in the Pſalms againſt the rebellious, that there was ſtill a nobler country and ſuperior happineſs men had to look for, of which the earthly Canaan was

but

but a figure; that therefore we ought to take warning, from the example of thoſe whoſe carcaſes fell in the wilderneſs, to beware leſt we alſo forfeit, through unbelief, that glorious inheritance, the reſt that yet remains for the people of God. Now, as the promiſes conveying the good news of reſt, were originally made to the fathers, and to Iſrael, according to the fleſh, it was pertinent to take notice that we are equally intereſted in them, and that this good news of reſt in a happy country afterwards to be enjoyed, is declared to us as fully as ever it was to them. This ſenſe, though clearly the apoſtle's, is totally effaced by the miſinterpretation of the word ευηγελισμενοι. The Vulgate has, in this place, kept clear of the glaring impropriety in the Engliſh verſion. It has ſimply, "Etenim et nobis nuntiatum eſt quemadmodum et illis." Their common way, however, is different.

§ 7. In other places, moſt modern tranſlators have been miſled, in this article, by implicitly following the Vulgate, which firſt ſet the bad example of tranſlating thoſe paſſages differently in the Old Teſtament and in the New. In the paſſage quoted from Paul, and by him from Iſaiah, Eraſmus has very well preſerved both the import of the word, and the conformity to the way in which it had been always juſtly rendered in the prophet. "Quam ſpecioſi pedes annuntiantium pacem, annuntiantium "bona!" To the ſame purpoſe Caſtalio, who has taken this way, which Eraſmus had not done, of rendering alſo the words read by our Lord in the ſynagogue, "Me ad læta pauperibus "nuntianda miſit." In the other places above referred to, Caſtalio follows the common method. "Pauperes evangelium do-"centur." Eraſmus, in rendering the paſſage quoted from Matthew, has endeavoured to comprehend both ways. "Pau-"peres lætum accipiunt evangelii nuntium." He has in this been copied by the tranſlation of Zuric. This method is quite paraphraſtical. It does not favour of the ſimplicity of the evangelical ſtyle. If ευαγγελιον mean *lætum nuntium*, why did he add *evangelii?* And if it do not mean *lætum nuntium*, what had theſe words to do in the verſion? And if the Latin *evangelium* is of the ſame import with the Greek ευαγγελιον, the ſentence is a mere tautology; as if he ſhould ſay, *The poor receive the good news of glad tidings.* And if the import of the adoptive Latin word *evangelium*, which is in fact the caſe, be different from that of the Greek, which is fully interpreted by the two words *lætum nuntium*, *evangelii* is a mere interpolation. The words of the original are general, and have equal latitude of ſignification with the Latin *lætum nuntium*, or the Engliſh *good news*. The addition of the word *evangelii* limits the ſenſe, in a way which the Prophet's expreſſion does not warrant. Nor does an interpreter's opinion concerning the completion of the prophecy (however true, nay, however certain, that opinion be) entitle him to expreſs

preſs the prediction with greater ſpeciality of meaning than has been done by his author. Eraſmus does not ſeem himſelf to have been entirely ſatisfied with this circumlocution, as he has rendered the ſame words in Luke in the common way, and in this alſo has been followed by the Tigurine tranſlator. Beza has in all the paſſages above referred to, (except that in which the Vulgate was right) followed the Vulgate, and has been followed by moſt of the early Proteſtant tranſlators.

§ 8. Some may imagine, that I am here pleading for what, on other occaſions, I have ſhown no partiality to, a tranſlation of the words ſervilely literal or etymological. But, let it be obſerved, that I am never for tracing, in the tranſlation, the etymology of the words of the original, when the etymology does not give the juſt import of the words, according to the received uſe at the time when the ſpeeches or dialogues related were ſpoken, or when the book was compoſed. The Greek verb *ευαγγελιζω*, when firſt uſed by the evangeliſts, or the Hebrew בִּשַּׂר *baſhar*, when uſed by the prophets, or the Syriac ܒܫܰܪ *ſabar*, as moſt probably uſed by our Lord and his apoſtles, conveyed to their countrymen only one and the ſame idea, which is preciſely what the phraſe *to bring good tidings* conveys to us. The appropriation of the word to the religious inſtitution called the Goſpel, is of a later date, and has gradually ariſen out of the former uſage. When etymology and uſe perfectly coincide, as they often do, we cannot be too literal in our interpretations; when they differ, which does not ſeldom happen, the latter is to be followed, and not the former.

In ſome reſpects ſimilar, though apparently contrary, to the above objection, is that of thoſe who urge that our term *goſpel*, in its Saxon etymology is an exact counterpart to the Greek *ευαγγελιον*, being compounded of two words, which conjoined denote *good news*. But the only pertinent queſtion is, in this caſe, Is this the preſent meaning of the Engliſh word *goſpel*? The firſt objectors would aſſign to the Greek word *ευαγγελιον*, a ſenſe which it had not during our Lord's miniſtry, but which it acquired ſoon after; the ſecond would put upon the Engliſh word *goſpel*, a ſenſe which it once had, but now has not. That this is the caſe is evident.

Should one, for example, bring us word * that an end is put to hoſtilities, and that the powers at war have at laſt agreed upon a peace, ought we, in reporting this intelligence, to ſay, that one had come preaching to us the goſpel of peace? Whoever ſhould expreſs himſelf thus, would, I am afraid, be thought to talk both abſurdly and profanely. At leaſt he would be ſaid to employ a very bold and far-fetched metaphor. Yet not the metaphorical, but the proper expreſſion, in the language of the apoſtles,

* This was written towards the end of the American war.

tles, would be, ευηγγελισατο ἡμιν ειρηνην, or even εκηρυξεν ἡμιν το ευαγγελιον της ειρηνης. Joſephus, in his Hiſtory of the Jewiſh War, lib. iii. ch. 34. acquainting us that Titus ſent to his father the good news of his taking Tarichea, ſays, Τιτος δε εκπεμψας τινα των ἱππεων ευαγγελιζεται τω πατρι το εργον. How would it ſound in our ears to render it, *preached to his father the goſpel of the action?* Nothing can be a ſtronger evidence that the Greek phraſes above mentioned, and the Engliſh *preached the goſpel*, are not equivalent. All, therefore, that can be concluded from the primitive import of the word *goſpel*, in a different, though related, language, is that, in the Anglo-Saxon, not the Engliſh, verſion of the New Teſtament, the word ευαγγελιον was rightly ſo tranſlated. Certain it is, however, that the error remarked in the Engliſh verſion, runs through all the modern tranſlations, as well as the Vulgate which gave it birth, and is a remarkable inſtance of the truth of an obſervation formerly made, (Diſſ. iii. § 6.) that ſometimes, by conſulting other verſions, we may be confirmed in an error, inſtead of having it corrected. Indeed the old Latin tranſlation has ſerved in many things, as will appear more fully afterwards, as a model to the tranſlators in the Weſt.

§ 9. But, though the noun ευαγγελιον was equally unequivocal with the verb ευαγγελιζω, in its acceptation in the Old Teſtament, and commonly in the Evangeliſts, it muſt be owned that, from its original ſignification, it came inſenſibly afterwards to vary and receive other meanings, in the way I ſhall now attempt to explain. The word occurs very often in the New Teſtament, where, as it is a term of principal importance, its different ſignifications deſerve to be inveſtigated with the greateſt accuracy. That the radical ſignification, *good news*, is not only the moſt common, but, in ſome reſpect, a concomitant of every other meaning affixed to the word, muſt be evident to every one who is converſant with the original. Yet this alluſive concomitance, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, is an advantage which cannot be obtained in a tranſlation. As uſe, which governs language, will not bend to our inclinations, we muſt change the word in the verſion, when the import of the original name is ſo far different, that the ſame term, in another language, will not anſwer; yet, by changing it, we may loſe the emphaſis, which reſults from the alluſion to the primitive and predominant application of the word. It will ſometimes happen, in a train of reaſoning, where the ſame word is uſed in the original in different, but related ſenſes, that the change of the correſponding term in the verſion will hurt perſpicuity, and yet may be neceſſary, becauſe the ſame word in another language, whoſe idiom does not admit the ſame extent of ſignification, would hurt it more.

§ 10. The firſt meaning of the word then in the New Teſtament, eſpecially in the Goſpels, is, as has been obſerved, *good news*,

news, a signification which, though always implied, is not always what is chiefly intended; and therefore the word cannot, without a sacrifice of propriety, be uniformly rendered so. The name, from being expressive of an eminent quality in the dispensation introduced by the Messiah, and from being most frequently applied to it, came gradually to serve as a name for the dispensation itself. When it is thus employed, it is in our tongue properly rendered *gospel*. This is the second meaning of the word. Of the other senses which it has in Scripture, I shall take notice afterwards. The two above mentioned are the chief. And, first, I shall consider the cases wherein that which I call the literal and primitive signification ought to be retained.

§ 11. First, then, this sense ought to be retained in the version, when the word ευαγγελιον is construed with a noun serving to limit or explain its nature, as το ευαγγελιον της ειρηνης, *the good news of peace*, το ευαγγελιον της βασιλειας, *the good news of the reign*. It was observed, on the explanation of the word βασιλεια, that the Christian economy was foretold under the denomination of *the reign of God*, and *the reign of Heaven*; and I may add, in the typical language of the Psalms, *the reign of David*. Now there were, about the time of our Saviour's appearance, many who, from the predictions of the prophets and signs of the times, waited, with pious confidence, for the consolation of Israel, that is, for the coming of the Lord's Messiah, and the commencement of his glorious reign. This was the great subject of comfort to them, amidst all the distresses and oppressions, personal or political, under which they groaned. For how erroneous soever the prevalent notions concerning the person of the Messiah, and the nature of his reign were, they agreed in this, that they exhibited him as a deliverer, in whose time the principal grievances of the nation were to be redressed; and, in consequence of this, the people looked forwards with faith and hope, but not without a mixture of impatience, to that long-deferred, as they then thought, but happy era, the mission and consequent reign of the Messiah. Freedom to the slave, release to the prisoner, pardon to the convict, could not be more welcome, or afford matter of greater joy, than the tidings, well authenticated, that that blessed period, spoken of in raptures by their prophets, and described in the most glowing colours of eastern poetry, was at length arrived. Hence it is not improbable that, even some time before the birth of Jesus, this much wished event came to be denominated, by those who expected it, perhaps the majority of the nation, *the good news* (being such in an eminent manner), and more explicitly *the good news of the reign of God*, that is, of the new dispensation that would obtain under the promised Messiah.

§ 12. A number of such like phrases, borrowed from the Prophets, and from the Psalms, relating to this event, had become

current among the people, and were adopted both by our Lord and by John his harbinger. Thus the Meſſiah himſelf is ſtyled, ὁ ἐρχομενος, *he that cometh*, not *he that ſhould come*, as it is leſs properly rendered in the common verſion, it being an abbreviation of that expreſſion of the Pſalmiſt, cxviii. 26. *He that cometh in the name of the Lord.* Now it is manifeſt that, when firſt the Baptiſt, then our Lord himſelf, and laſtly his apoſtles, in his life-time, announced publicly the approach of this reign, they announced what the generality of the people would immediately, and without difficulty, apprehend. I do not mean that they would underſtand the nature of the reign or ſpiritual dominion to be eſtabliſhed, for this is what few or none did; but that they would immediately underſtand it to relate to the acceſſion of the Meſſiah, their great deliverer, to that ſovereignty with which they had learnt from the prophets, and from the ſcribes, that he was to be inveſted. The diſpenſation, therefore, is properly uſhered in with an authoritative call to all men to amend their lives, and prepare for the reign of the Meſſiah, the expectation and joy of God's people, juſt about to commence. Nothing, therefore, could be more ſuitable, and, though alarming to the wicked, nothing could be more conſolatory to the pious, at the time the nation was in ſubjection to a foreign and oppreſſive yoke, than ſuch ſeaſonable information. Nothing conſequently can be better accommodated to what muſt have been the ſentiments and proſpects of the people at that time, or can more accurately expreſs the full import of the original, κηρυσσων το ευαγγελιον της βασιλειας του Θεου, than this literal and plain verſion, *Proclaiming the glad tidings of the reign of God.* This conveys to us, at this moment, the ſame ideas which, in thoſe circumſtances, muſt have been conveyed by the words of the ſacred hiſtorian, into the mind of every Jewiſh reader at the time.

§ 13. On the contrary, the expreſſion in the vulgar tranſlation, *preaching the goſpel of the kingdom of God*, muſt have been to ſuch a reader unintelligible; as even to us, when we abſtract from the familiarity occaſioned by cuſtom, which is apt to impoſe upon us, it appears both obſcure and improper. Caſtalio, in one place, (Matt. iv. 23.) departs, if poſſible, ſtill farther from the ſenſe, rendering it *regium publicans evangelium*, "publiſhing the "royal goſpel." Not to mention the futility of the term *royal*, applied in a way which renders it a mere expletive, the very ſubject publiſhed, ἡ βασιλεια, *the reign*, is juſtled out to make room for a ſplendid but unmeaning epithet. Our Lord, we find from the Evangeliſts, ſpoke to his countrymen in the dialect of their own Scriptures, and uſed thoſe names to which the reading of the Law and the Prophets, either in the original, or in the verſions then uſed, had familiarized them. Our tranſlators, and indeed moſt European tranſlators, repreſent him as uſing words which,

which, even in their own tranſlations of the Old Teſtament, never occur, and to which, in fact, there is nothing there that correſponds in meaning. The people had all heard of the reign of the Meſſiah, to be eſtabliſhed in the latter times, and conſidered the arrival of that period as the happieſt tidings with which they could be made acquainted. But of the *Goſpel* they had never heard before. "What is this you call the Goſpel?" they would naturally aſk; "and what does *the Goſpel of a kingdom mean?*" Theſe are words to which our ears are ſtrangers. No mention is made of ſuch things in the Law, in the Prophets, or in the Pſalms.

§ 14. Now, if the terms muſt have been altogether unintelligible to Jews, they are, even to us Chriſtians, both obſcure and improper. Firſt, obſcure, becauſe indefinite. It does not appear eaſy in ſuch circumſtances, as thoſe under conſideration, to aſſign a preciſe meaning to the word *Goſpel*. We commonly underſtand by it the whole religious inſtitution of Jeſus, including both doctrines and precepts. Nothing can be plainer than that this is not the meaning of the term here. The very words which were preached or promulgated, are expreſsly mentioned, and compriſed in a ſingle ſentence; Μετανοειτε, ηγγικε γαρ ἡ βασιλεια των ουρανων. Beſides, the apoſtles, who, in our Lord's life-time, received this commiſſion, were not yet qualified for teaching the ſyſtem of doctrine implied under the name *goſpel*, becauſe, in fact, they did not know it themſelves. They had then no notion of a Meſſiah but as a temporal prince and mighty conqueror, or of his kingdom but as a ſecular monarchy, more extenſive than, but of the ſame nature with thoſe which had preceded, to wit, the Aſſyrian, the Perſian, the Macedonian empires, or that which was in being at the time, the Roman. Not one of their hearers could have been more prejudiced than the apoſtles themſelves were at that time, againſt a ſuffering Saviour, who was to expire in agonies and infamy on the croſs.

Now, let people but coolly reflect, and then put the queſtion to themſelves; If we ſet aſide theſe important truths, the death, and conſequently the reſurrection of Jeſus Chriſt, his victory over the enemies of our ſalvation, and his purchaſe of ſpiritual and eternal bleſſings by his blood; of all which the apoſtles were then ignorant, and againſt moſt of which, when firſt informed of them, they were as much prejudiced as any Phariſee, what will remain of that which we denominate the Goſpel, in contradiſtinction to Judaiſm? The doctrine of the Goſpel is manifeſtly what the apoſtles were not qualified to teach, till they were enlightened by the deſcent of the Holy Ghoſt on the day of Pentecoſt, after our Lord's aſcenſion. Nay, they were, after his reſurrection, when they knew more than formerly, expreſsly commanded, before they ſhould attempt to teach that doctrine, to wait the promiſed

promiſed illumination from above, Acts i. 4. 8. But they had been, long before, ſufficiently qualified to announce the approach of this diſpenſation, and to warn men to forſake their ſins, and to prepare for the appearance of their Lord and King. Further, if the term *goſpel* here be rather indefinite, how does this addition, *of the kingdom*, ſerve either to illuſtrate or to limit the import of that term? And an addition, which anſwers neither of theſe purpoſes, cannot fail ſtill farther to darken it.

§ 15. But, ſecondly, that expreſſion in our language is, in theſe inſtances, alſo improper; becauſe there is no meaning which uſe has affixed to the Engliſh word *goſpel*, that expreſſes the ſenſe of the original. And, as it has been ſhewn that our term does not there ſuit the word ευαγγελιον, I mean afterwards to ſhew that the word *preaching* does not exactly convey the ſenſe of κηρυσσων. At the ſame time it is acknowledged, on the other hand, that the word ευαγγελιον is, in many places in the epiſtles of Paul, rightly rendered *goſpel*. But this is manifeſtly, as has been ſhewn, a ſecondary ſenſe of later date.

§ 16. I obſerved, that when the word ευαγγελιον is conſtrued with a noun ſerving to limit or explain its nature, it ought to be rendered *good news*. But every regimen is not to be underſtood as ſerving this purpoſe. Thus, when it is followed with Ιησυ Χριστυ, with τυ Κυριυ, or τυ Θευ, which denote the author, it is juſtly regarded as a name for the diſpenſation, and properly rendered *Goſpel*. In the phraſe το ευαγγελιον τυ Χριστυ, not preceded by Ιησυ, the regimen may denote either the author or the ſubject. In the firſt view, it is *the goſpel of Chriſt*, that is, inſtituted by him; in the ſecond, *the good news of the Meſſiah*, that is, concerning him. There are, perhaps, a few other caſes in which the choice may be a matter of indifference. But, in moſt caſes, the regimen aſcertains the ſenſe. Thus, το ευαγγελιον της ειρηνης, Eph. vi. 15. can be no other than *the good news of peace*. The addition plainly indicates the ſubject. For the ſame reaſon, το ευαγγελιον της χαριτος τυ Θευ, Acts xx. 24. is *the good news of the favour of God*; το ευαγγελιον της σωτηριας ὑμων, Eph. i. 13. *the good news of your ſalvation*. The words in the common verſion, *the goſpel of your ſalvation*, are mere words, and convey no meaning to Engliſh ears.—The ſecond caſe wherein the word always may, and commonly ſhould, be rendered *good news*, and not *goſpel*, is when it is conſtrued with κηρυσσω, I *proclaim* or *publiſh*. The juſtneſs of this obſervation will be manifeſt, from what I ſhall afterwards obſerve on the import of that verb in the Goſpels and Acts.

§ 17. The third caſe is, when it clearly refers to a different ſubject from what is commonly with us denominated the goſpel. Under this, perhaps, may be ranked ſome of the examples which alſo come under the firſt caſe mentioned. For inſtance, το ευαγγε-

λιον

λιον της σωτηριας ὑμων, *the good news of your salvation.* For here the tidings to which the apoſtle refers, was not the embaſſy itſelf of peace by Jeſus Chriſt, but it was the cordial reception which the Epheſians had given to that embaſſy, and which was to him who loved them, good news, becauſe a pledge of their ſalvation. Under the ſame caſe alſo, in my opinion, we ought to claſs that famous paſſage in the Apocalypſe, xiv. 6, 7. *I ſaw another angel fly in the midſt of heaven, having the everlaſting goſpel* (ſo are the words εχοντα ευαγγελιον αιωνιον rendered in the common verſion) *to preach to them that dwell on the earth; and to every nation, and kindred, and tongue, and people, ſaying with a loud voice, Fear God and give glory to him, for the hour of his judgment is come, and worſhip him,* &c. My reaſons are, firſt, we are expreſsly informed what the angel had to proclaim, κηρυσσειν, which is all contained in the 7th verſe, and relates to a particular event long poſterior to the firſt propagation of the goſpel, namely, the vengeance God would take on the perſecutors of his church, expreſſed in theſe words, *The hour of his judgment is come.* The reſt of the verſe is to be underſtood merely as a warning naturally ſuggeſted by the occaſion. Nor let it be urged, that the approach of the hour of judgment looks rather like bad news than good. It frequently holds, that the tidings which to one are the moſt doleful, are to another the moſt joyous. The viſions and prophecies of that Book are all directed to the churches of Chriſt, and intended for their uſe. To cruſh their enemies was to relieve the churches; the defeat of the one was the victory of the other. Secondly, what the angel had to promulgate, is not called το ευαγγελιον, as the word is almoſt uniformly uſed, when referring to the Chriſtian diſpenſation, but ſimply ευαγγελιον, not *the goſpel*, the inſtitution of Chriſt—not that which is emphatically ſtyled *the good news*, but barely *good news.* It is ſtyled αιωνιον, everlaſting, with the ſame propriety, and in the ſame latitude, as things of long duration, or of permanent conſequences, are often in Scripture ſo denominated.

§ 18. Again, let it be obſerved, that by the Engliſh word *goſpel*, we do not always mean preciſely the ſame thing. The predominant ſenſe is doubtleſs the religious inſtitution of Jeſus Chriſt. But this is not invariably its meaning. Early in the church the word ευαγγελιον was employed to denote, and, in one paſſage of the New Teſtament, actually denotes, the hiſtory of the life, teaching, death, and reſurrection of the Son of God. It is in this ſenſe that the four hiſtories or narratives, written by Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, containing memoirs of that extraordinary Perſonage, have, from the earlieſt antiquity, been titled, ευαγγελια, *Goſpels.* The word is thus uſed by Mark, i. 1. Αρχη τε ευαγγελιε Ιησε Χριστε, *The beginning of the Goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt.* I confeſs, however, that it would not be eaſy to decide, whether

whether this ought to be accounted part of the ſacred text, or a title afterwards preſixed (as were the names of the penmen by ſome of the firſt tranſcribers) which may have been inadvertently admitted into the text. But whether this application be ſcriptural or not, it is very ancient, and has obtained univerſally in the church. The Engliſh word has preciſely the ſame application. It may be proper here to remark, that though the Greek word ευαγγελιον has been adopted by the Syriac interpreters, yet, in the hiſtorical part, they admit it only into the titles of the four Goſpels, in the ſenſe laſt mentioned, and into the firſt verſe of Mark's Goſpel, where the ſenſe is the ſame. Their uſe of the Greek word in theſe places, is exactly ſimilar to the uſe which our tranſlators have made of the words of the Septuagint, *Geneſis* and *Exodus*, which ſerve for names to the two firſt books of the Pentateuch, but which they have never employed in the body of the work, where the words γενεσις and εξοδος occur in that verſion. Thus, in every other paſſage of the Goſpels and Acts, ευαγγελιον is rendered ܒܫܪܬܐ *ſabartha*, a plain Syriac word of the ſame ſignification and ſimilar origin. In this the Syriac interpreters appear to have acted more judiciouſly than the Latin, as they have been ſenſible of the impropriety of darkening ſome of the plaineſt, but moſt important declarations, by the unneceſſary introduction of an exotic term which had no meaning, or at leaſt not the proper meaning in their language. In Paul's Epiſtles, I acknowledge, they have ſeveral times adopted the Greek word; but let it be obſerved that, in theſe, the term ευαγγελιον is frequently employed in a different ſenſe. This has in part appeared already, but will be ſtill more evident from what immediately follows.

§ 19. The fourth ſenſe of ευαγγελιον in the New Teſtament is the miniſtry of the goſpel. In this acceptation I find the word uſed oftener than once by the apoſtle Paul. Thus, *God is my witneſs, whom I ſerve with my ſpirit, in the goſpel of his Son*, Rom. i. 9. εν τω ευαγγελιω, that is, in the miniſtry of the goſpel, or in diſpenſing the goſpel of his Son. This is one of the paſſages in which the Syriac interpreter has retained the original word. In another place, 1 Cor. ix. 18. *What is my reward then? Verily that when I preach the goſpel, I may make the goſpel of Chriſt*, το ευαγγελιον, *without charge*; that is, that the miniſtry of the goſpel of Chriſt may not by me be rendered chargeable. This the context plainly ſhews; for this is the only expence he is ere ſpeaking of. I think, for perſpicuity's ſake, the word *miniſtry* ſhould have been uſed in the tranſlation, as the Engliſh name *goſpel* hardly admits this meaning. Nor are theſe the only places wherein the word has this ſignification; ſee 2 Cor. viii. 18. and Phil. iv. 15.

§ 20. I obſerve alſo, in the epiſtles of this apoſtle, a fifth meaning,

meaning, or at leaſt a particular application of the firſt general meaning, *good news*. It ſometimes denotes, not the whole Chriſtian diſpenſation, but ſome particular doctrine or promiſe, ſpecially meriting that denomination. In this ſenſe Paul uſes the word, writing to the Galatians, ch. ii. 2. The particular doctrine to which he gives the pertinent appellation, ευαγγελιον, *good news*, is the free admiſſion of the Gentiles into the church of Chriſt, without ſubjecting them to circumciſion and the other ceremonies of the law. This, conſidering the Jewiſh prejudices at that time, accounts for the reſerve which he uſed at Jeruſalem, where, by his own repreſentation, he imparted privately to the diſciples of chief diſtinction, and conſequently of moſt enlarged knowledge and ſentiments, that doctrine which he publicly proclaimed in Gentile countries. I think it is this which the apoſtle ſometimes, by way of diſtinction, denominates *his Goſpel*. For though there was no diſcordancy in the doctrine taught by the different apoſtles, yet to him and Barnabas, the apoſtles of the uncircumciſion, it was ſpecially committed to announce every where among the heathen, God's gracious purpoſe of receiving them, uncircumciſed as they were, into the church of Chriſt. Accordingly, as he proceeds in his argument, Gal. ii. 7. the goſpel, or good news, ευαγγελιον, ſent to the Gentiles, is expreſsly contraſted with that ſent to the Jews.

This ſeems alſo to be the ſenſe of the word in another paſſage, Rom. xvi. 25. where what he calls το ευαγγελιον μου, he deſcribes as μυστηριον χρονοις αιωνιοις σεσιγημενον, *kept ſecret for ages*, but now made known to all nations for the obedience of the faith. For, in this manner, he oftener than once ſpeaks of the call of the Gentiles. In all ſuch paſſages, it is better to retain the general term *good news* in the verſion. This appellation is, in ſome reſpect, evidently applicable to them all, whereas the term *goſpel* is never thus underſtood in our language.

PART III.

Of the Phraſe η καινη διαθηκη.

ANOTHER title by which the religious inſtitution of Jeſus Chriſt is ſometimes denominated, is η καινη διαθηκη, which is almoſt always, in the writings of the apoſtles and evangeliſts, rendered by our tranſlators *the New Teſtament*. Yet the word διαθηκη by itſelf is, except in a very few places, always there rendered not *teſtament*, but *covenant*. It is the Greek word whereby the Seventy have uniformly tranſlated the Hebrew ברית *berith*, which

which our translators in the Old Testament have invariably rendered *covenant*. That the Hebrew term corresponds much better to the English word *covenant*, though not in every case perfectly equivalent, than to *testament*, there can be no question; at the same time it must be owned that the word διαθηκη, in classical use, is more frequently rendered *testament*. The proper Greek word for covenant is συνθηκη, which is not found in the New Testament, and occurs only thrice in the Septuagint. It is never there employed for rendering the Hebrew *berith*, though, in one place, it is substituted for a term nearly synonymous. That the scriptural sense of the word διαθηκη is more fitly expressed by our term *covenant*, will not be doubted by any body who considers the constant application of the Hebrew word so rendered in the Old Testament, and of the Greek word, in most places at least, where it is used in the New. What has led translators, ancient and modern, to render it *testament*, is, I imagine, the manner wherein the author of the epistle to the Hebrews argues, ch. ix. 16, 17. in allusion to the classical acceptation of the term. But however much it was necessary to give a different turn to the expression in that passage, in order to make the author's argument as intelligible to the English, as it is in the original to the Greek reader, this was not a sufficient reason for giving a version to the word in other places that neither suits the context, nor is conformable to the established use of the term, in the sacred writings.

§ 2. The term *new* is added to distinguish it from the *old covenant*, that is, the dispensation of Moses. I cannot help observing here by the way, that often the language of theological systems, so far from assisting us to understand the language of holy writ, tends rather to mislead us. The two covenants are always in Scripture the two dispensations, or religious institutions; that under Moses is the *old*, that under the Messiah is the *new*. I do not deny that in the latitude wherein the term is used in holy writ, the command under the sanction of death which God gave to Adam in paradise, may, like the ordinance of circumcision, with sufficient propriety be termed a *covenant*; but it is pertinent to observe that it is never so denominated in Scripture; and that, when mention is made in the Epistles of the two covenants, the *old* and the *new*, or the first and the second, (for there are two so called by way of eminence), there appears no reference to any thing that related to Adam. In all such places, Moses and Jesus are contrasted, the Jewish economy and the Christian, Mount Sinai in Arabia, whence the law was promulged, and Mount Sion in Jerusalem, where the gospel was first published.

§ 3. It is proper to observe further that, from signifying the two religious dispensations, they came soon to denote the books, wherein

wherein what related to theſe diſpenſations was contained; the ſacred writings of the Jews being called ἡ παλαια διαθηκη, and the writings ſuperadded by the apoſtles and evangeliſts, ἡ καινη διαθηκη. We have one example in Scripture of this uſe of the former appellation. The apoſtle ſays, 2 Cor. iii. 14. ſpeaking of his countrymen, *Until this day remaineth the veil untaken away in the reading of the Old Teſtament,* επι τη αναγνωσει της παλαιας διαθηκης. The word in this application is always rendered in our language *Teſtament.* We have in this followed the Vulgate, as moſt modern tranſlators alſo have done. In the Geneva French, the word is rendered both ways in the title, that the one may ſerve for explaining the other, *Le nouveau Teſtament,* c'eſt a dire *La nouvelle alliance,* &c. in which they copied Beza, who ſays, *Teſtamentum novum,* ſive *Fœdus novum.* That the ſecond rendering of the word is the better verſion is unqueſtionable; but the title appropriated by cuſtom to a particular book, is on the ſame footing with a proper name, which is hardly conſidered as a ſubject of criticiſm. Thus we call Ceſar's Diary, *Ceſar's Commentaries,* from their Latin name, though very different in meaning from the Engliſh word.

PART IV.

Of the Name ὁ Χριστος.

THE only other term neceſſary to be examined here, is ὁ χριστος, the Meſſiah, or *the Chriſt,* in Engliſh rendered, according to the etymology of the word, *the anointed;* for ſo both the Hebrew משיח, *Meſhiach,* and the Greek χριστος ſignify; and from the ſound of theſe are formed our names *Meſſiah* and *Chriſt.* What firſt gave riſe to the term was the ceremony of anointing, by which the kings and the high prieſts of God's people, and ſometimes the prophets, 1 Kings xix. 16. were conſecrated and admitted to the exerciſe of their holy functions; for all theſe functions were accounted holy among the Iſraelites. As this conſecration was conſidered as adding a ſacredneſs to their perſons, it ſerved as a guard againſt violence from the reſpect had to religion. Its efficacy this way was remarkably exemplified in David. By this conſideration principally, as he acknowledges, he was reſtrained from avenging himſelf on Saul his enemy, who ſought his life, when he had it in his power to kill him. *The Lord forbid,* ſaid he, 1 Sam. xxiv. 6. *that I ſhould do this thing unto my maſter, the Lord's anointed, to ſtretch forth mine hand againſt him, ſeeing he is the anointed of the Lord.* The word

here tranſlated *anointed* is, as in other places, in Hebrew *Meſſiah*, and in the Greek of the Seventy, *Chriſt*. It was a term, therefore, in its original uſe, applicable to all the ſucceſſion of kings and high prieſts, good and bad, of the people of Iſrael.

§ 2. But as the king and the high prieſt were the heads of the whole nation, the one in civil, the other in religious matters, the term *anointed*, that is, *Meſſiah* or *Chriſt*, might, not improbably, ſerve, by a figure, to denote the chief, head, or principal of any claſs or people. So thinks the learned Grotius. Thus the high-prieſt is ſometimes diſtinguiſhed from ordinary prieſts by the title *the anointed prieſt*, in the Septuagint ὁ ἱερευς ὁ χριστος; though this, I own, is not a proof of the point, ſince he was literally ſo diſtinguiſhed from the reſt *. But that the word is ſometimes applied, when, in the literal ſenſe, no anointing had been uſed, cannot be queſtioned. In this way it is applied to Cyrus, the Perſian monarch by the prophet Iſaiah, ch. xlv. 1. *Thus ſaith the Lord to his anointed, to Cyrus;* yet Houbigant, differing from his uſual manner, renders the words, *de unctio ſuo Cyro* But whether the import of this expreſſion be, that Cyrus was a chief among kings, a moſt eminent ſovereign, as Grotius ſeems to imagine, or that he was ſelected of God for the reſtoration of Judah, and the rebuilding of the temple of Jeruſalem, the only temple dedicated to the true God, may be made a queſtion. For my part, I am inclinable to think that it is rather this latter interpretation which conveys the prophet's idea, and the meaning intended by the Spirit of God. And to this interpretation the context entirely agrees. The word was alſo employed to denote thoſe ſpecially favoured of God, as were the patriarchs Abraham, Iſaac, and Jacob, concerning whom he is repreſented by the Pſalmiſt as having ſaid, *Touch not mine anointed*, Pſal cv. 15 1 Chron. xvi. 22. The word is in the plural number, των χριστων μου, in the Vulgate *Chriſtos meos*, which, in our idiom, is not diſtinguiſhed from the ſingular. Now there is no ground from Scripture to believe that any of them was in the literal ſenſe anointed.

§ 3. But the moſt eminent uſe and application of the word is when it is employed as the title of that ſublime Perſonage typified and predicted from the beginning, who was to prove, in the moſt exalted ſenſe, the Redeemer and Lord of God's people. He is ſpoken of by the prophets under ſeveral characters, and, amongſt others, under this *of God's anointed*, the Meſſiah or the Chriſt. Thoſe of the prophets, who ſeem more eſpecially to have appropriated this title, formerly more common, to the Mediator of the new covenant, were, the royal prophet David, (Pſal. ii. 2.) Iſaiah, (ch. lxi. 1. &c.) and Daniel, (ch. ix. 25, 26.) The firſt repreſents

* The ſons of Aaron were indeed all anointed, in their father's lifetime, by the expreſs command of God; but it does not appear that this practice deſcended to other ordinary prieſts.

ſents him as anointed of God king of God's heritage, the ſecond as ſet apart and conſecrated to be the meſſenger of good tidings to the inhabitants of the earth, the third as appointed to make expiation for the ſins of the people.

§ 4. It deſerves to be remarked, that in the Engliſh tranſlation of the Old Teſtament, the word is always rendered *anointed*, to whomſoever applied, except in the two verſes of Daniel quoted in the margin, where it is tranſlated *Meſſiah*. In the New Teſtament, the correſponding Greek word is always rendered *Chriſt*, and commonly without the article. In this our interpreters have been ſo uniform, that they have even employed the word *Chriſt*, where the paſſage is a quotation and literal tranſlation from the Old Teſtament, in which the Hebrew word, though perfectly equivalent, had been by themſelves rendered *anointed*. Thus, Acts iv. 26, 27. *the rulers were gathered together againſt the Lord, and againſt his Chriſt*, κατα τυ Χριςυ αυτυ. The words are quoted from the ſecond Pſalm, where they had ſaid, *againſt his anointed*. The change here is the more remarkable, as there is a plain reference to the meaning of the word in the very next ſentence: *For of a truth againſt thy holy child Jeſus whom thou haſt anointed*, ον εχρισας, *both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Iſrael, were gathered together.*

§ 5. In the Vulgate, in all the places of the Old Teſtament above referred to, it is tranſlated *Chriſtus*. So it is alſo in Houbigant, except where it is applied to Cyrus, as mentioned § 2. Whereas, in regard to Cyrus, it is in the Vulgate, *Hæc dicit Dominus Coriſto meo Cyro*. The ſame appellation is alſo given to King Saul, *Dixitque David ad viros ſuos, Propitius ſit mihi Dominus, ne faciam hanc rem domino meo, Chriſto Domini, ut mittam manum meam in eum, quia Chriſtus Domini eſt*. In the Pſalms, *Nolite tangere Chriſtos meos*, and *adverſus Dominum et adverſus Chriſtum ejus*. In Daniel alſo the word is in the ſame way rendered. Here indeed, and in the laſt mentioned paſſage from the Pſalms, as no Chriſtian can well doubt the reference to the Meſſiah, there is not ſo great an appearance of impropriety; yet, when applied to the high-prieſt, they have not ſaid *chriſtus*, but *unctus*, giving the import of the word as it was literally applicable to him. Otherwiſe the term *Chriſtus* might have been uſed at leaſt as properly of the high-prieſt, who was, in one reſpect, a figure of our Lord, as either of a heathen prince, or even of a bad king of Iſrael. All the other Latin tranſlators, except *Leo de Juda*, if I remember right, uſe *unctus*, not only in ſpeaking of the prieſt, but alſo in relation to Cyrus and Saul; and wherever they have not obſerved a direct reference to the Lord Jeſus. *Leo*, in the paſſage above quoted from Samuel, uſes both words, *meſſias* and *unctus*, in relation to Saul, where he probably introduces the latter word for explaining the former. *Servet*

vet me Dominus, ne rem iſtam deſignem contra dominum meum meſſiam Domini, ut ſcilicet inferam ei manum; eſt enim unctus Domini. To Cyrus alſo he applies the word *meſſias*. In Daniel, Leo, Caſtalio and Houbigant, all uſe the word *meſſias:* Junius uſes *chriſtus* with the Vulgate, both there and in the ſecond Pſalm, in which laſt mentioned place Leo alſo uſes *chriſtus*. About other modern tranſlations it is not neceſſary here to enquire. It is ſufficient to obſerve that at, and for many years before, the time of our Lord's appearing, the term was underſtood to denote the great Deliverer and Prince whom God had promiſed, by his prophets, to ſend for the comfort and redemption of his people.

§ 6. Let us now conſider a little the uſe of the term in the New Teſtament. If we were to judge by the common verſion, or even by moſt verſions into modern tongues, we ſhould conſider the word as rather a proper name than an appellative, or name of office, and ſhould think of it only as a ſurname given to our Lord. Our tranſlators have contributed greatly to this miſtake, by very ſeldom prefixing the article before *Chriſt*, though it is rarely wanting in the original. The word *chriſt* was at firſt as much an appellative as the word *baptiſt* was, and the one was as regularly accompanied with the article as the other. Yet our tranſlators, who always ſay *the baptiſt*, have, one would think, ſtudiouſly avoided ſaying *the chriſt*. This may appear to ſuperficial readers an inconſiderable difference; but the addition of the article will be found, when attended to, of real conſequence for conveying the meaning in Engliſh, with the ſame perſpicuity and propriety with which it is conveyed in Greek. So much virtue there is in the article, which, in our idiom, is never prefixed to the name of a man, though it is invariably prefixed to a name of office, (unleſs where ſome pronoun, or other appropriating expreſſion renders it unneceſſary), that without it the ſenſe is always darkened, and ſometimes marred. Thus, in ſuch expreſſions as theſe, *This Jeſus whom I preach unto you is Chriſt*, Acts xvii. 3. *Paul teſtified to the Jews that Jeſus was Chriſt*, ch. xviii. 5. *Shewing by the Scriptures that Jeſus was Chriſt*, ver. 28. the unlearned reader forms no diſtinct apprehenſion, as the common application of the words leads him uniformly to conſider Jeſus and Chriſt, as no other than the name and the ſurname of the ſame perſon. It would have conveyed to ſuch a reader preciſely the ſame meaning to have ſaid, *Paul teſtified to the Jews that Chriſt was Jeſus;* and ſo of the reſt. The article alone, therefore, in ſuch caſes, adds conſiderable light to the expreſſion; yet no more than what the words of the hiſtorian manifeſtly convey to every reader who underſtands his language. It ſhould be, therefore, *Paul teſtified to the Jews that Jeſus was the chriſt*, or the

the meſſiah, &c. Many other examples might be brought to the ſame purpoſe; but theſe are ſufficient.

§ 7. But it may be aſked, Is the word *Chriſt* then never to be underſtood in the New Teſtament as a proper name, but always as having a direct reference to the office or dignity? I anſwer that, without queſtion, this word, though originally an appellative, came at length, from the frequency of application to one individual, and only to one, to ſupply the place of a proper name. What would contribute to haſten this effect, was the commonneſs of the name *Jeſus* among the Jews at that time, which rendered an addition neceſſary for diſtinguiſhing the perſon. The remark of Grotius is not without foundation, that, in proceſs of time, the name *Jeſus* was very much dropped, and *Chriſt*, which had never been uſed before as the proper name of any perſon, and was, for that very reaſon, a better diſtinction, was ſubſtituted for it; inſomuch that, among the heathen, our Lord came to be more known by the latter than by the former. This uſe ſeems to have begun ſoon after his aſcenſion. In his life-time, it does not appear that the word was ever uſed in this manner; nay, the contrary is evident from ſeveral paſſages of the Goſpels. But the Evangeliſts wrote ſome years after the period above mentioned, and therefore, the more perfectly to notify the ſubject of their hiſtory, they adopted the practice common among Chriſtians at that time, which was to employ the word as a ſurname for the ſake of diſtinction. This was eſpecially proper in the beginning of their narrative, for aſcertaining the perſon whoſe hiſtory they were to write. Thus Matthew begins, *The lineage of Jeſus Chriſt*, i. 1.; and a little after, ver. 18. *Now the birth of Jeſus Chriſt happened thus.* Mark, in like manner, i. 1. *The beginning of the goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt.* In all the three places it is Ιησυ Χριστε, Jeſus *Chriſt*, not Ιησυ τε Χριστε, Jeſus the Chriſt, or the Meſſiah.

Matthew and Mark, as was juſt now obſerved, name him ſo, in introducing their Goſpels; but it deſerves to be remarked, that they do not afterwards, in their hiſtory, either name him ſo themſelves, or mention this name as given him by any of his contemporaries: nay, the very profeſſion of Peter, and the doubts raiſed by his enemies in regard to his being ὁ χριστος, *the Meſſiah*, or *the Chriſt*, and his never being named familiarly, either by them or by others, during that period, Ιησους Χριστος, but ſimply Ιησους or ὁ Ιησους, which occurs in the four Goſpels upwards of five hundred times, put it beyond doubt, that the word was never applied to him as a proper name, whilſt he remained on this earth. It was at that time always underſtood as the denomination of the dignity or office to which ſome believed him entitled, others diſbelieved, and many doubted. The names uſed both by Matthew and by Mark, in the beginning of their Goſpels, and by

by John in the introductory part of his, i. 17. for Luke does not adopt this manner in his Gospel, shew only the usage which obtained at the time when they wrote, but not when their Lord was living upon the earth. In the last of the four Gospels, he is in one place, John xvii. 3. represented as calling himself Jesus Christ in an address to God; but this is so singular, that I cannot help suspecting an accidental omission of the article; and that the clause must have stood originally, ὁν απεστειλας Ιησυν τον χριστον, *Jesus the messiah whom thou hast sent.* But whatever be in this, we are warranted to conclude, from the uniform tenor of all the Gospels, that χριστος, in this passage, must be understood as the name of his office. Now, for the very same reason for which our translators have rendered ὁ βαπτιστης, uniformly *the baptist*, with the article, they ought to have rendered ὁ χριστος, *the christ*, or *the messiah*, with the article. By not doing it, they have thrown much obscurity on some passages, and weakened others.

§ 8. Though in the epistles it may be sometimes difficult, but is seldom of consequence, to determine whether χριστος be an appellative or a proper name, there is rarely in the Gospels, with which I am here more immediately concerned, any difficulty that can retard an attentive and judicious critic. Such will be sensible, that whatever was the case afterwards, the word Christ, during the period comprehended in the Gospel history, was employed solely to express the office or dignity wherewith he was invested, as the apostle of God, for the redemption of the world. Accordingly, when it is used in the Gospels, the stress of the sentence lies commonly on the signification of that word. Peter, in his solemn confession, says, John vi. 69. *We believe and are sure that thou art* ὁ χριστος, *the christ, the messiah, the Son of the living God.* Here the substance of his declared belief lies much in the import of this term. Our translators have considered this as so evident that, in the parallel passages in other Gospels, they have departed from their ordinary practice, and rendered it *the christ*, and in this passage, less properly, *that christ.* In other places where propriety equally required the article, they have not given it.

Of several which might be quoted, I shall mention only one example in the question put by Jesus to the Pharisees, Matt. xxii. 42 Τι υμιν δοκει περι τυ χριστυ, which our translators render, *What think ye of Christ?* The word used in this manner, without any article definite or indefinite, or any other term to ascertain the meaning, must, in our idiom, be a proper name; and, as here proposed by Jesus, can be understood no otherwise by an unlearned reader than as intended for drawing forth their sentiments concerning himself. To such the question must appear identical with *What think ye of Jesus?* A name of office is never used in so indistinct a manner. For example, we may say indefinitely,

What

What think ye of a king? or definitely, *What think ye of the king?* but never, *What think ye of king?* unless we speak of one whose name is *King*. Yet an appellative may be used without an article when the name is subjoined, because this serves equally with the article to ascertain the meaning, as thus, *What think ye of king Solomon?* In the place above quoted, there was therefore the strongest reason for following more closely the original, as it was evidently our Lord's purpose to draw forth their sentiments, not concerning himself, the individual who put the question to them, and whom he knew they considered as an impostor, but, in general, concerning the quality of that Personage whom, under the title of Messiah, they themselves expected.

§ 9. One mark of distinction, therefore, whereby the title χριστος may be discriminated from the name, is its being attended with the article. I do not mention this, however, as holding invariably, but very generally. When the word is in the vocative, by the idiom of the language, there can be no article; in that case, therefore, we must be directed solely by the sense. Thus, in προφητευσον ημιν χριστε, Matt. xxvi. 68. this term must mean *messiah*, as the intended ridicule is entirely founded on their ascribing that character to one in his wretched circumstances. Another exception is, when it is joined to some other title, as Χριστος Κυριος, Luke ii. 11. Χριστος βασιλευς, xxiii. 2.; and sometimes, but more rarely, when construed with a pronoun, as εαν τις αυτον ομολογηση χριστον, John ix. 22. where the sense renders the meaning indubitable. In a few places in regard to this, as well as to other terms, there is an ellipsis of the article, where the most common usage would require it. Of this ὁτι χριστος εστι, Mark ix. 41. is an instance.

I know it may be objected to the article as a criterion, that in Greek it is not unusual to prefix it to the proper names of persons. Accordingly, in naming our Lord, Ιησους and ὁ Ιησους are used indifferently. For this reason, I do not lay much stress on this distinction, unless it be confirmed by the connection. In the Epistles, it is plain, that the term is used familiarly as a proper name, and consequently when alone, and not appearing from the context to be emphatical, may be properly rendered as a name, whether it have the article or not. But when it immediately follows Ιησους, the article not intervening, it can hardly be interpreted otherwise. Let it be observed that, in scriptural use, when a person has two names, the article, if used at all, is prefixed to the first name, and never inserted between them, unless when some other word, as λεγομενος, is added by way of explanation. Thus it is Πορκιος Φηστος, Σεργιος Παυλος, Ιουδας Ισκαριωτης, Ποντιος Πιλατος, and Σιμων Πετρος. Indeed, where a person is distinguished by adding an epithet rather than a surname, denoting the place of his birth, or of his residence, the article is constantly prefixed

prefixed to the adjective. Thus it is always Μαρια ἡ Μαγδαληνη, literally *Mary the Magdalene*, that is, *of Magdala*, a city on the lake of Genneſaret; and Ιησους ὁ Ναζωραιος, Jeſus *the Nazarene*, or *of Nazareth*.

When the article, therefore, is inſerted between the words Ιησους and Χριστος, there is reaſon to conſider the latter as uſed emphatically, and pointing directly to his office. In many places in the Epiſtles, perhaps in a very few in the Goſpels, it may be regarded as a matter of indifference, in which of the two ways the term is tranſlated. Thus, in the firſt chapter of Matthew, ver. 16. Ιησους ὁ λεγομενος Χριστος, may be either Jeſus *who is called Chriſt*, that being a ſurname which, when Matthew wrote, was frequently given him, or *Jeſus who is called* (that is *accounted*) *Meſſiah*. I have, in my verſion, preferred the ſecond interpretation; as, in the verſe immediately following, we cannot underſtand otherwiſe, the words ἑως του Χριστου, with the article, and without the name Ιησου prefixed. If ſo, ὁ λεγομενος Χριστος is mentioned to prepare us for this application of the title. Beſides, the ſame phraſe occurs again in this Goſpel, xxvii. 17. 22. as uſed by Pilate at a time when it was never applied to our Lord but by his followers, and that ſolely as the denomination of his office. So much for the method whereby we may diſcover when this word is emphatical, and when it is merely a ſurname.

§ 10. It is proper now to enquire, in the laſt place, which of the three terms, *Meſſiah*, *Chriſt*, or *Anointed*, is the moſt proper to be applied in an Engliſh verſion. The word *Anointed* is indeed an Engliſh word, and is, beſides, in reſpect of the idea it conveys, expreſſive of the etymological import of the Hebrew and Greek terms. But, notwithſtanding theſe advantages, it is not ſo proper in this caſe for being uſed in a verſion. For firſt, the original term had early been employed, as we have ſeen, without any regard to the literal ſignification; and in the ordinary application of it, in our Lord's time, little or no attention ſeems to have been given to the circumſtance of unction, which gave riſe to the name. Though the word *Anointed*, therefore, expreſſes the primitive import of the Hebrew name, it does not convey the meaning in which it was then univerſally underſtood. It was conſidered ſolely as the well-known title of an extraordinary office, to which there was nothing ſimilar amongſt any other people. The original name, therefore, agreeably to what was concluded in a former diſcourſe, (Diſſ. II. § 5.) ought to be retained. Secondly, it deſerves ſome notice that the word, both in Hebrew and in Greek, is a ſubſtantive, and therefore, in point of form, well adapted for a name of office, being ſuſceptible of the ſame variety, in number and mode of conſtruction, with other ſubſtantives; the Engliſh word *Anointed* is a participle and indeclinable, and ſo far from being adapted for the name of an office,

office, that it is grammatically no more than the attributive of some name, either expressed or understood.

§ 11. As to the other two words, *Messiah* and *Christ*, it may be thought a matter of indifference which of them should be preferred. The following are the reasons which have determined me to give the preference to the former. First, our Lord's own ministry was only amongst his countrymen the Jews, to whom the title of *messiah* was familiar. With them, wheresoever dispersed, it is considered as the title of that dignity to this day, and is accordingly naturalized in every language that they speak. We never hear of the *Jewish christ*, it is always the *Jewish messiah*. When the English translators found it convenient, in translating Daniel, to adopt a term more appropriated than the general word *anointed*, they chose the Hebrew term *messiah*, in preference to the Greek; and it is surely proper, when the meaning of a word in the New Testament is manifestly the same, to conform, as much as possible, to the language of the Old. That the word *messiah* was constantly used in Palestine, in our Lord's time, is evident from the two passages in the Gospel of John, i. 42. iv. 25. where, after mentioning it as the title in current use both with Jews and with Samaritans, he adds the explanation in Greek. Secondly, *messiah* is, even in English use, much more familiar, as the name of the office, than the term *christ*, which is now universally understood as a proper name of our Saviour. The word *messiah*, on the contrary, is never employed, and consequently never understood, as a proper name. It is invariably a name of office; and even this circumstance, however slight it may appear, has a considerable influence on perspicuity.

§ 12. I shall only add here, before I conclude this subject, that the word χριστος is frequently used by Paul as a trope, denoting sometimes the Christian spirit and temper, as when he says, *My little children, of whom I travail in birth again, until Christ be formed in you*, Gal. iv. 19.; sometimes the Christian doctrine, *But ye have not so learned Christ*, Eph. iv. 28.; and in one place at least, the Christian church, *For as the body is one, and hath many members; and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body: so also is Christ*, 1 Cor. xii. 12. In these cases it is better to retain the name *Christ*, as used hitherto in the version.

§ 13. Some have thought that the expression ὁ υἱος του ανθρωπου, *the son of man*, which our Lord always uses when he speaks of himself in the third person, is also a title which was then understood to denote the messiah. But of this there does not appear sufficient evidence. The only passage of moment that is pleaded in support of it, is from the prophet Daniel, who says, that he saw in the night visions, *one like the son of man come, with the*

clouds of heaven, to the ancient of days, and that there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, Dan. vii. 13, 14. There can be no reasonable doubt, from the description given, that the messiah is meant. But this is not notified by any of the terms or phrases taken separately; it is the result of the whole. Nothing appears to be pointed out by this single circumstance, *one like the son of man*, or *like a son of man* (as it ought to have been rendered, neither term being in *statu emphatico*, which in Chaldee supplies the article), but that he would be a human, not an angelical, or any other kind of being: for, in the oriental idiom, *son of man* and *man* are terms equivalent.

The four monarchies which were to precede that of the messiah, the prophet had, in the foregoing part of the chapter, described under the figure of certain beasts, as emblems severally of the predominant character of each; the first under the figure of a lion, the second under that of a bear, the third of a leopard, and the fourth of a monster more terrible than any of these. This kingdom, which God himself was to erect, is contradistinguished to all the rest, by the figure of a man, in order to denote that whereas violence, in some shape or other, would be the principal means by which those merely secular kingdoms would be established, and terror the principal motive by which submission would be enforced, it would be quite otherwise in that spiritual kingdom to be erected by the ancient of days, wherein every thing would be suited to man's rational and moral nature; affection would be the prevailing motive to obedience, and persuasion the means of producing it; or, to use the Scripture expression, we should be drawn *with cords of a man, with bands of love*.

Had the prophet used *man* instead of *son of man*, could one have concluded, that the word *man* was intended as a distinguishing title of the messiah? It will hardly be pretended. Yet the argument would have been the same, for the terms are synonymous.

There are two phrases by which this may be expressed in Hebrew, בן אדם *ben adam*, and בן איש *ben ish*. When these two are contrasted to each other, the former denotes one of low degree, the latter one of superior rank. Thus *bene adam ubene ish*, are in the Psalms, xlix. 2. rightly rendered in the common version *low and high*. The first *bene adam* is, in the Septuagint, translated γηγενεις, in the Vulgate, *terrigenæ*, earth-born, or sons of earth, in allusion to the derivation of the word *adam*, man, from a word signifying ground or *earth*. The same *ben adam*, is the common appellation by which God addresses the prophet Ezekiel, which is rendered by the Seventy υιε ανθρωπε, and frequently occurs in that book. *The son of man*, therefore, was an humble title, in which nothing was claimed, but what was enjoyed in common with all mankind. In the Syriac version of the

the New Teſtament it often occurs, where the term in the Greek is ſimply ανθρωπος, *man*.

That it was never underſtood by the people in our Lord's time, as a title of the meſſiah, or even a title of dignity, is manifeſt from ſeveral conſiderations. In the firſt place, though Jeſus commonly takes it to himſelf, it is never given him by the Evangeliſts, in ſpeaking of him. He is never addreſſed with this title by others, whether diſciples or ſtrangers. Several honourable compellations were given him, by thoſe who applied for relief, as, κυριε, διδασκαλε, rabbi; ſometimes he is addreſſed *ſon of David*, ſometimes *ſon of God*, and on one occaſion he is called *he who cometh in the name of the Lord*. The two laſt titles may reaſonably be ſuppoſed to imply an acknowledgment of him as meſſiah. Now, if the title *ſon of man* had been thought, even in any degree, reſpectful from others, we ſhould certainly have had ſome examples of it in his life-time. Further, our Lord was in the practice of denominating himſelf in this manner, at the very time that he prohibited his diſciples from acquainting any man that he was the meſſiah. What purpoſe could this prohibition have anſwered, if the title he commonly aſſumed in the hearing of every body, was underſtood to be of the ſame import? It is urged further, that this phraſe is uſed in the Apocalypſe, i. 13. in deſcribing the viſion which the apoſtle John had of his Maſter. The anſwer is the ſame with that given to the argument founded on Daniel's viſion. Firſt, the phraſe is not entirely the ſame with that by which Jeſus diſtinguiſhes himſelf in the Goſpel. Our Lord calls himſelf ὁ υιος τυ ανθρωπυ, *the ſon of man*; John ſays, ὁμοιον υιω ανθρωπυ, without any article, *one like a ſon of man*, that is, *in the human form*. It is indeed evident that he is ſpeaking of Jeſus Chriſt; but this is what we gather from the whole deſcription and context, and not from this circumſtance alone.

§ 14. But, whatever be in this, there are ſeveral titles which, in the writings of the apoſtles and evangeliſts, are peculiarly applied to our Lord, though they do not often occur. I have already mentioned ὁ ερχομενος εν ονοματι κυριυ, and ὁ υιος Δαβιδ. Add to theſe ὁ αγιος τυ Θευ, *the ſaint*, or *the holy one of God*, ὁ εκλεκτος τυ Θευ, *the elect*, or *the choſen one of God*, both expreſſions borrowed from the prophets. Now, though theſe terms are in the plural number ſuſceptible of an application to others, both angels and men, they are, in the New Teſtament, when in the ſingular number, and accompanied with the article, evidently appropriated to the meſſiah.

DISSER-

DISSERTATION THE SIXTH.

INQUIRY INTO THE DIFFERENCES IN THE IMPORT OF SOME WORDS COMMONLY THOUGHT SYNONYMOUS.

SEVERAL words in the New Teſtament conſidered by our tranſlators as ſynonymous, and commonly rendered by the ſame Engliſh word, are not really ſynonymous, though their ſignifications may have an affinity, and though ſometimes they may be uſed indiſcriminately. I ſhall exemplify this remark in a few inſtances of words which occur in the Goſpels.

PART I.

Διαβολος, Δαιμων, and Δαιμονιον.

THE firſt of this kind, on which I intend to make ſome obſervations, are διαβολος, δαιμων, and δαιμονιον, all rendered in the common tranſlation almoſt invariably *devil*. The word διαβολος, in its ordinary acceptation, ſignifies *calumniator*, *traducer*, *falſe accuſer*, from the verb διαβαλλειν, to calumniate, &c. Though the word is ſometimes, both in the Old Teſtament and in the New, applied to men and women of this character, it is, by way of eminence, employed to denote that apoſtate angel, who is exhibited to us, particularly in the New Teſtament, as the great enemy of God and man. In the two firſt chapters of Job, it is the word in the Septuagint by which the Hebrew שָׂטָן *Satan* or *adverſary*, is tranſlated. Indeed the Hebrew word in this application, as well as the Greek, has been naturalized in moſt modern languages. Thus we ſay indifferently *the devil* or *Satan*; only the latter has more the appearance of a proper name, as it is not attended with the article. There is this difference between the import of ſuch terms, as occurring in their native tongues, and as modernized in tranſlations. In the former they always retain ſomewhat of their primitive meaning, and, beſide indicating a particular being,

or clafs of beings, they are of the nature of appellatives, and mark a ſpecial character or note of diſtinction in ſuch beings. Whereas, when thus Latinized or Engliſhed, they anſwer ſolely the firſt of theſe uſes, as they come nearer the nature of proper names. This remark extends to all ſuch words as *cherub, ſeraph, angel, apoſtle, evangeliſt, meſſiah.*

§ 2. Διαβολος, I obſerved, is ſometimes applied to human beings. But nothing is eaſier than to diſtinguiſh this application from the more frequent application to the arch-apoſtate. One mark of diſtinction is that, in this laſt uſe of the term, it is never found in the plural. When the plural is uſed, the context always ſhews that it is human beings, and not fallen angels, that are ſpoken of. It occurs in the plural only thrice, and only in Paul's Epiſtles. Γυναικας, ſays he, 1 Tim. iii. 11. ὡσαυτως σεμνας, μη διαβολους. *Even ſo muſt their wives be grave, not ſlanderers.* In ſcriptural uſe the word may be either maſculine or feminine. Again, ſpeaking of the bad men who would appear in the laſt times, he ſays, 2 Tim. iii. 3. amongſt other things, that they will be ασοργοι, ασπονδοι, διαβολοι, in the common tranſlation, *without natural affection, truce-breakers, falſe accuſers* Once more, Tit. ii. 3. Πρεσβυτιδας ὡσαυτως εν καταστηματι ἱεροπρεπεις, μη διαβολους. *The aged women likewiſe, that they be in behaviour as becometh holineſs, not falſe accuſers.* Another criterion, whereby the application of this word to the prince of darkneſs may be diſcovered, is its being attended with the article. The term almoſt invariably is ὁ διαβολος. I ſay *almoſt*, becauſe there are a few exceptions.

§ 3. It may not be amiſs, ere we proceed, to ſpecify the exceptions, that we may diſcover whether there be any thing in the conſtruction that ſupplies the place of the article, or at leaſt makes that it may be more eaſily diſpenſed with. Paul, addreſſing himſelf to Elymas, the ſorcerer, who endeavoured to turn away the proconſul Sergius Paulus from the faith, ſays, Acts xiii. 10. *O full of all ſubtilty, thou child of the devil,* υἱε διαβολε. There can be no doubt that the apoſtle here means the evil ſpirit, agreeably to the idiom of Scripture, where a good man is called a child of God, and a bad man a child of the devil. *Ye are of your father the devil,* ſaid our Lord to the Phariſees, John viii. 44. As to the example from the Acts, all I can ſay is, that in an addreſs of this form, where a vocative is immediately followed by the genitive of the word conſtrued with it, the connection is conceived to be ſo cloſe as to render the omiſſion of the article more natural than in other caſes. This holds eſpecially when, as in the preſent inſtance, the addreſs muſt have been accompanied with ſome emotion and vehemence in the ſpeaker. I know not whether ὁ αντιδικος ὑμων διαβολος, 1 Pet. v. 8. *your adverſary the devil,* ought to be conſidered as an example. There being here

here two appellatives, the article prefixed to the first may be regarded as common, though I own it is more usual in such cases for the greater emphasis to repeat it. In the word ὁς ἐστι διαβολος και σατανας, Rev. xx. 2. *who is the devil and Satan;* as the sole view is to mention the names whereby the malignant spirit is distinguished, we can hardly call this instance an exception. Now these are all the examples I can find, in which the word, though used indefinitely or without the article, evidently denotes our spiritual and ancient enemy. The examples in which it occurs in this sense with the article, it were tedious to enumerate.

§ 4. There is only one place, beside those above mentioned, where the word is found without the article, and, as it is intended to express a human character, though a very bad one, ought not, I think, to have been rendered *devil*. The words are, *Jesus answered, Have I not chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?* εξ ὑμων εις διαβολος εστι, John vi. 70. My reasons for not translating it *devil* in this place are; first, the word is strictly and originally an appellative, denoting a certain bad quality, and though commonly applied to one particular being, yet naturally applicable to any kind of being susceptible of moral character; secondly, as the term in its appropriation to the arch rebel, always denotes one individual, the term *a devil* is not agreeable to Scripture style. insomuch, that I am inclined to think, that if our Lord's intention had been to use, by an antonomasia, the distinguishing name of the evil spirit, in order to express more strongly the sameness of character in both, he would have said ὁ διαβολος, one of you is *the devil*, this being the only way whereby that evil spirit is discriminated. The words αντιδικος adversary, πειραζων tempter with the article, are also used by way of eminence, though not so frequently, to express the same malignant being; yet, when either of these occurs without the article, applied to a man as an adversary or a tempter, we do not suppose any allusion to the devil. The case would be different, if one were denominated ὁ πειραζων, ὁ αντιδικος, *the tempter, the adversary*.

There is not any epithet (for διαβολος is no more than an epithet) by which the same spirit is oftener distinguished, than by that of ὁ πονηρος, *the evil one*. Now, when a man is called simply πονηρος without the article, no more is understood to be implied than that he is a bad man. But if the expression were ὁ πονηρος, unless used to distinguish a bad from a good man of the same name, we should consider it as equivalent to the devil, or *the evil one*. Even in metaphorical appellations, if a man were denominated *a dragon* or *a serpent*, we should go no farther for the import of the metaphor, than to the nature of the animal so called; but if he were termed *the dragon*, or *the old serpent*, this would immediately suggest to us, that it was the intention of the speaker to represent the character as the same with that of the seducer of

our

our first parents. The unlearned English reader will object, Where is the impropriety in speaking of *a devil?* Is any thing more common in the New Testament? How often is there mention of persons possessed with *a devil?* We hear too of numbers of them. Out of Mary Magdalene went seven; and out of the furious man who made the sepulchres his residence, a legion. The Greek student needs not be informed, that in none of those places is the term διαβολος, but δαιμων or δαιμονιον. Nor can any thing be clearer from Scripture, than that, though the *demons* are innumerable, there is but one *devil* in the universe. Besides, if we must suppose that this word, when applied to human creatures, bears at the same time an allusion to the evil spirit, there is the same reason for rendering it devils in the three passages lately quoted from Paul; for, wherever the indefinite use is proper in the singular, there can be no impropriety in the use of the plural. Both equally suppose that there may be many of the sort. Now, it is plain that those passages would lose greatly by such an alteration. Instead of pointing, according to the manifest scope of the place, to a particular bad quality to be avoided, or a vice whereby certain dangerous persons would be distinguished, it could only serve as a vague expression of what is bad in general, and so would convey little or no instruction.

§ 5. The only plea I know, in favour of the common translation of the passage is, that, by the help of the trope *antonomasia*, (for devil in our language has much the force of a proper name), the expression has more strength and animation than a mere appellative could give it. But that the expression is more animated, is so far from being an argument in its favour, that it is, in my judgment, the contrary. It savours more of the human spirit than of the divine, more of the translator than of the author. We are inclinable to put that expression into an author's mouth, which we should, on such an occasion, have chosen ourselves. When affected with anger or resentment, we always desert the proper terms, for those tropes which will convey our sentiment with most asperity. This is not the manner of our Lord, especially in cases wherein he himself is the direct object of either injury or insult. Apposite thoughts, clothed in the plainest expressions are much more characteristic of his manner. When there appears severity in what he says, it will be found to arise from the truth and pertinency of the thought, and not from a curious selection of cutting and reproachful words. This would be but ill adapted to the patience, the meekness, and the humility of his character; not to mention that it would be little of a piece with the account given of the rest of his sufferings.

I know it may be objected, that the rebuke given to Peter, Matt. xvi. 23. *Get thee behind me, Satan,* is conceived in terms as harsh, though the provocation was far from being equal. The answer

anſwer is much the ſame in regard to both. Satan, though conceived by us as a proper name, was an appellative in the language ſpoken by our Lord; for, from the Hebrew it paſſed into the Syriac, and ſignified no more than adverſary or opponent. It is naturally juſt as applicable to human as to ſpiritual agents, and is, in the Old Teſtament, often ſo applied.

§ 6. I acknowledge that the word διαβολος, in the caſe under examination, is to be underſtood as uſed in the ſame latitude with the Hebrew *Satan*, which, though commonly interpreted by the Seventy διαβολος, is ſometimes rendered επιβουλος, *inſidiator*, and may be here fitly tranſlated into Engliſh, either *ſpy* or *informer*. The Scribes and Phariſees, in conſequence of their knowledge of the oppoſition between our Lord's doctrine and theirs, had conceived an envy of him, which ſettled into malice and hatred, inſomuch that they needed no accuſer. But though Judas did not properly accuſe his Maſter to them as a criminal, the purpoſe which he engaged to the Scribes, the chief prieſts, and the elders, to execute, was to obſerve his motions, and inform them when and where he might be apprehended privately without tumult, and to conduct their ſervants to the place. The term uſed was therefore pertinent, but rather ſoft than ſevere. He calls him barely *ſpy* or *informer*, whom he might have called traitor and perfidious.

§ 7. It is now proper to enquire, ſecondly, into the uſe that has been made of the terms δαιμων and δαιμονιον. Firſt, as to the word δαιμων, it occurs only five times in the New Teſtament, once in each of the three Goſpels, Matthew, Mark, and Luke, and twice in the Apocalypſe. It is remarkable, that in the three Goſpels it refers to the ſame poſſeſſion, to wit, that of the furious man in the country of the Gadarenes, who haunted the ſepulchres. There does not, however, ſeem to be any material difference in this application from that of the diminutive δαιμονιον, which is alſo uſed by Luke in relation to the ſame demoniac.

§ 8. Δαιμονιον occurs frequently in the Goſpels, and always in reference to poſſeſſions real or ſuppoſed. But the word διαβολος is never ſo applied. The uſe of the term δαιμονιον is as conſtantly indefinite, as the term διαβολος is definite. Not but that it is ſometimes attended with the article; but that is only when the ordinary rules of compoſition require that the article be uſed even of a term that is ſtrictly indefinite. Thus, when a poſſeſſion is firſt named, it is called ſimply δαιμονιον, *a demon*, or πνευμα ακαθαρτον, *an unclean ſpirit*, never το δαιμονιον or το πνευμα ακαθαρτον. But when, in the progreſs of the ſtory, mention is again made of the ſame demon, he is ſtyled το δαιμονιον *the demon*, namely that already ſpoken of. And in Engliſh, as well as Greek, this is the uſage in regard to all indefinites. Further, the plural δαιμονια occurs frequently applied to the ſame order of beings with the ſingular,

guſar. But what ſets the difference of ſignification in the cleareſt light is that, though both words, διαβολος and δαιμονιον, occur often in the Septuagint, they are invariably uſed for tranſlating different Hebrew words. Διαβολος is always in Hebrew either שָׂטָן *tſar, enemy*, or הַשָּׂטָן *Satan, adverſary*, words never tranſlated δαιμονιον. This word, on the contrary, is made to expreſs ſome Hebrew term, ſignifying idol, pagan deity, apparition, or what ſome render *ſatyr*. What the preciſe idea of the *demons*, to whom poſſeſſions were aſcribed, then was, it would perhaps be impoſſible for us with any certainty to affirm; but as it is evident that the two words, διαβολος and δαιμονιον, are not once confounded, though the firſt occurs in the New Teſtament upwards of thirty times, and the ſecond about ſixty, they can, by no juſt rule of interpretation, be rendered by the ſame term. Poſſeſſions are never attributed to the being termed ὁ διαβολος. Nor are his authority and dominion ever aſcribed to δαιμονια: nay, when the diſcriminating appellations of the devil are occaſionally mentioned, δαιμονιον is never given as one. Thus he is called not only ὁ διαβολος, but ὁ πονηρος, ὁ πειραζων, ὁ αντιδικος, ὁ σατανας, ὁ δρακων ὁ μεγας, ὁ οφις ὁ παλαιος, ὁ αρχων τυ κοσμυ τυτυ, ὁ αρχων της ἐξουσιας τυ αἐρος, and ὁ θεος τυ αἰωνος τυτυ, that is, *the devil, the evil one, the tempter, the adverſary*, (this laſt word anſwers both to ὁ αντιδικος, and ὁ σατανας, which cannot be tranſlated differently), *the great dragon, the old ſerpent, the prince of this world, the prince of the power of the air*, and *the god of this world*. But there is no ſuch being as το δαιμονιον, the appellation δαιμονιον being common to multitudes, whilſt the other is always repreſented as a ſingular being, the only one of his kind. Not that the Jewiſh notion of the devil had any reſemblance to what the Perſians firſt, and the Manicheans afterwards, called the evil principle, which they made in ſome ſort co-ordinate with God, and the firſt ſource of all evil, as the other is of good. For *the devil*, in the Jewiſh ſyſtem, was a creature as much as any other being in the univerſe, and as liable to be controlled by omnipotence, an attribute which they aſcribed to God alone. But ſtill the devil is ſpoken of as only one; and other beings, however bad, are never confounded with him.

§ 9. I know but two paſſages of the hiſtory that have the appearance of exceptions from this remark. One is, that wherein our Lord, when accuſed of caſting out demons by the prince of demons, ſays in return, *How can Satan caſt out Satan?* Mark iii. 23. There is no doubt that ὁ Σατανας and ὁ Διαβολος are the ſame. Here then, ſay the objectors, the former of theſe names is applied to δαιμονια, which ſeems to ſhew an intercommunity of names. Yet it muſt be obſerved, that this of Satan is introduced only in the way of illuſtration by ſimilitude, as the diviſions in kingdoms and families alſo are. The utmoſt that can be deduced from ſuch an example is, that they are malignant beings

as well as he, engaged in the ſame bad cauſe, and perhaps of the number of thoſe called his angels, and made to ſerve as his inſtruments. But this is no evidence that he and they are the ſame. The other paſſage is in Luke, chap. xiii. 11. where we have an account of the cure of a woman, who had been bowed down for eighteen years. She is ſaid to have had a ſpirit of infirmity; and our Lord himſelf ſays that Satan had bound her, ver. 16. But let it be obſerved, firſt, that nothing is ſaid that implies poſſeſſion. She is not called δαιμονιζομενη, *a demoniac*. Our Saviour is not ſaid to diſpoſſeſs the demon, but to looſe her from her infirmity; ſecondly, that it is a common idiom among the Jews, to put *ſpirit* before any quality aſcribed to a perſon, whether it be good or bad, mental or corporeal. Thus the ſpirit of fear, the ſpirit of meekneſs, the ſpirit of ſlumber, the ſpirit of jealouſy, are uſed to expreſs habitual fear, &c.: thirdly, that the aſcribing of her diſeaſe to Satan, does not imply poſſeſſion. The former is frequent, even where there is no inſinuation of the latter. All the diſeaſed whom our Lord healed, are ſaid to have been oppreſſed by the devil, υπο του διαβολου, Acts x. 38. All Job's afflictions are aſcribed to Satan as the cauſe, Job i. ii. yet Job is no where repreſented as a demoniac.

§ 10. A late learned and ingenious author *, has written an elaborate diſſertation to evince, that there was no real poſſeſſion in the demoniacs mentioned in the goſpel; but that the ſtyle there employed was adopted merely in conformity to popular prejudices, and uſed of a natural diſeaſe. His hypotheſis is by no means neceſſary for ſupporting the diſtinction which I have been illuſtrating, and which is founded purely on Scriptural uſage. Concerning his doctrine, I ſhall only ſay in paſſing that, if there had been no more to urge from ſacred writ in favour of the common opinion, than the name δαιμονιζομενος, or even the phraſes δαιμονιον εχειν, εκβαλλειν, &c. I ſhould have thought his explanation at leaſt not improbable. But when I find mention made of the number of demons in particular poſſeſſions, their actions ſo expreſsly diſtinguiſhed from thoſe of the man poſſeſſed, converſations held by the former in regard to the diſpoſal of them after their expulſion, and accounts given how they were actually diſpoſed of; when I find deſires and paſſions aſcribed peculiarly to them, and ſimilitudes taken from the conduct which they uſually obſerve; it is impoſſible for me to deny their exiſtence, without admitting that the ſacred hiſtorians were either deceived themſelves in regard to them, or intended to deceive their readers. Nay, if they were faithful hiſtorians, this reflection, I am afraid, will ſtrike ſtill deeper. But this only by the way. To enter farther into the queſtion here, would be foreign to my purpoſe.

* Dr Farmer.

poſe. The reader of that performance, which is written very plauſibly, will judge for himſelf.

§ 11. I obſerve further that, though we cannot diſcover, with certainty, from all that is ſaid in the goſpel concerning poſſeſſion, whether the demons were conceived to be the ghoſts of wicked men deceaſed, or lapſed angels, or (as was the opinion of ſome early Chriſtian writers *) the mongrel breed of certain angels (whom they underſtood by *the ſons of God* mentioned in Geneſis, ch. vi. 2) and of *the daughters of men*; it is plain they were conceived to be malignant ſpirits. They are exhibited as the cauſes of the moſt direful calamities to the unhappy perſons whom they poſſeſs, dumbneſs, deafneſs, madneſs, palſy, epilepſy, and the like. The deſcriptive titles given them, always denote ſome ill quality or other. Moſt frequently they are called πνευματα ακαθαρτα, *unclean ſpirits*, ſometimes πνευματα πονηρα, *malign ſpirits*. They are repreſented as conſcious that they are doomed to miſery and torments, though their puniſhment be for a while ſuſpended. Art thou come hither, βασανιζαι ἡμας, *to torment us before the time?* Matt. viii. 29.

§ 12. But, though this is the character of thoſe demons who were diſlodged by our Lord out of the bodies of men and women poſſeſſed by them, it does not follow that the word *demon* always conveys this bad ſenſe, even in the New Teſtament. This having been a word much in uſe among the heathen, from whom the Helleniſt Jews firſt borrowed it, it is reaſonable to expect that, when it is uſed in ſpeaking of Pagans, their cuſtoms, worſhip, and opinions, more eſpecially when Pagans are repreſented as employing the term, the ſenſe ſhould be that which is conformable, or nearly ſo, to claſſical uſe. Now, in claſſical uſe, the word ſignified a divine being, though not in the higheſt order of their divinities, and therefore ſuppoſed not equivalent to Θεος, but ſuperior to human, and conſequently, by the maxims of their theology, a proper object of adoration. Though they commonly uſed the term in a good ſenſe, they did not ſo always. They had evil demons as well as good. *Juxta uſurpatum*, ſays Calcidius, *penes Græcos loquendi conſuetudinem tam ſancti ſunt dæmones quam profeſti eſt infidi.* But when no bad quality is aſcribed to the demon or demons ſpoken of, and nothing affirmed that implies it, the acceptation of the term in Pagan writers is generally favourable. Who has not heard of the demon of Socrates?

§ 13. In this way the word is to be underſtood in the only paſſage of the Acts where it occurs, Acts xvii. 18. Οι δε, Ξενων δαιμονιων δοκει καταγγελευς ειναι. *Others ſaid, he ſeemeth to be a ſetter forth of ſtrange gods.* So our tranſlators render it. The reaſon of this verdict is added, *becauſe he preached to them Jeſus and the*

* Juſt. M. Apol. i.

the resurrection, τον Ιησουν και την Αναστασιν. They supposed the former to be a male, and the latter a female divinity; for it was customary with them to deify abstract qualities, making them either gods or goddesses, as suited the gender of the name. This, if I remember right, is the only passage in the New Testament, in which δαιμονια is not rendered devils, but *gods*. If our translators had adhered to their method of rendering this word in every other instance, and said, *He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange devils*, they would have grossly perverted the sense of the passage. Now, this may suggest a suspicion of the impropriety of this version of the word any where, but especially where it relates to the objects of worship among the Pagans, with whom the term, when unaccompanied with a bad epithet, or any thing in the context that fixed the application to evil spirits, was always employed in a good sense.

§ 14. There is a famous passage to this purpose in the writings of the Apostle Paul, 1 Cor. x. 20, 21. on which I shall lay before the reader a few observations. Α θυει τα εθνη, δαιμονιοις θυει, και ου Θεω· ου θελω δε υμας κοινωνους των δαιμονιων γινεσθαι. Ου δυνασθε ποτηριον Κυριου πινειν και ποτηριον δαιμονιων· ου δυνασθε τραπεζης Κυριου μετεχειν, και τραπεζης δαιμονιων. In the English Bible thus rendered, *The things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils and not to God; and I would not that ye should have fellowship with devils. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils: Ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table and the table of devils.* Passing the impropriety, so often observed above, of representing a name as common to many, which Scripture has invariably appropriated to one, the sentiment itself expressed by our translators, that the Gentiles sacrifice to devils, is not just, whether we consider the thing abstractly, or in relation to the intention of the worshippers.

Considered abstractly, the pagan worship and sacrifices were not offered to God, whom they knew not, and to whose character and attributes there was nothing in the popular creed (I speak not of philosophers) that bore the least affinity. But as little were they offered to that being, whom Christians and Jews call the devil or Satan, with whose character and history they were equally unacquainted. Nor is it enough to say, that the characters of their deities were often so bad, that they partook more of the diabolical nature than of the divine. That is indeed true, and therefore evil spirits are not understood as excluded from the import of the term δαιμονια; but as little, on the other hand, ought that term to be confined to such. The proper notion is, beings, in respect of power, (whatever be their other qualities) superior to human, but inferior to that which we Christians comprehend under the term *divine*. For this reason even the higher orders of the heathen divinities, those whom they styled *Dii majorum*

jorum gentium, are included in the Apoſtle's declaration. For, though they more rarely applied to ſuch the terms δαιμων and δαιμονιον, the power aſcribed to them by their votaries, was infinitely ſhort of omnipotence, as indeed all their other attributes were ſhort of the divine perfections. Paul acknowledged no God but one, of whom the gentiles were ignorant, and to whom, therefore, they could not offer ſacrifice. All beings of a ſubordinate nature, however much they might be accounted ſuperior to us, he claſſes under the ſame general name. 'But can Jupiter 'himſelf be included in this deſcription, Jupiter to whom al-'mighty power and ſupreme dominion are attributed, and who 'is ſtyled by the poets, *The father of gods and men, the great-'eſt and beſt of beings?*' The attributes ſometimes given to Jupiter, muſt be conſidered as words merely complimental and adulatory; they being utterly inconſiſtent with the accounts which the ſame perſons give of his origin and hiſtory. They are like the titles with which earthly potentates are ſaluted by their flatterers, when ſtyled fathers of their country, abſolute lords of earth and ocean. De la Motte's reply to Madam Dacier*, is here very appoſite: "What! Could Homer ſeriouſly believe Jupiter "to be the creator of gods and men? Could he think him the "father of his own father Saturn, whom he drove out of heaven, "or of Juno his ſiſter, and his wife; of Neptune and Pluto his "brothers, or of the nymphs, who had the charge of him in his "childhood; or of the giants who made war upon him, and "would have dethroned him, if they had been then arrived at "the age of manhood? How well his actions juſtify the Latin "epithets, *optimus*, *maximus*, ſo often given him, all the world "knows." Jupiter has, therefore, no right to be held an exception, but is, with ſtrict propriety, comprehended in the name δαιμονια attributed, by the Apoſtle, to all the heathen gods. But δαιμονιον, as we have ſeen, is one thing, and ὁ διαβολος is another. Now, if a ſuppoſed reſemblance, in diſpoſition, between the heathen gods and the devil, were a ſufficient foundation for what is affirmed in the common verſion; any vicious perſon of whom mention is made in hiſtory, ſuch as Cain, Ham, Jezebel, in whom one might fancy a likeneſs in character or actions to ſome divinities of the heathen, might, with equal propriety as the devil, be called the objects of their adoration.

§ 15. There are two paſſages in the Old Teſtament, one in the Pentateuch, Deut. xxxii. 17. the other in the Pſalms, xcvi. 5. to which, particularly the firſt, the Apoſtle had doubtleſs an alluſion. In both, the term uſed by the Septuagint is δαιμονια: the Hebrew term is not the ſame in both places, but in neither is it a word which is ever tranſlated διαβολος by the Seventy. In the Pſalm referred to, the term in the original, is that

* De la Critique; ſeconde partie. Des Dieux.

that which is commonly rendered *idols*. Now, in regard to idols, the Apoſtle had ſaid in the ſame epiſtle, 1 Cor. viii. 4. that *an idol is nothing in the world;* in other words, is the repreſentation of no real exiſtence in the univerſe, though it may be the repreſentation of an imaginary being. It is as much as to ſay, Jupiter, and Juno, and Saturn, and all the reſt of the heathen gods, as delineated by the poets and mythologiſts, are nonentities, the mere creatures of imagination. Now, if an idol repreſent no real being, it does not repreſent the devil, whoſe exiſtence is, on the Chriſtian hypotheſis, beyond a queſtion. But I am aware of the objection that, if idols repreſent no real beings, they either do not repreſent demons, or demons are not real beings. I anſwer, it is true, that no individual demons, actually exiſting, are properly repreſented by their idols; nevertheleſs, theſe may, with ſtrict juſtice, be ſaid to repreſent the genus or kind, that is, beings intermediate between God and man, leſs than the former, greater than the latter. For to all who come under this deſcription, real or imaginary, good or bad, the name *demons* is promiſcuouſly given. The reality of ſuch intermediate orders of beings, revelation every where ſuppoſes, and rational theiſm does not contradict. Now, it is to *the kind* expreſſed in the definition now given, that the pagan deities are repreſented as correſponding, and not individually to *particular demons* actually exiſting. To ſay, therefore, that the Gentiles ſacrifice to *demons*, is no more than to ſay, that they ſacrifice to beings which, whether real, or imaginary, we perceive, from their own accounts of them, to be below the ſupreme. "What are men?" ſays a dialogiſt in Lucian*, The anſwer is, "Mortal gods. What are gods? Immortal men." In fact, immortality was almoſt the only diſtinction between them.

§ 16. This leads directly to the examination of the juſtneſs of the ſentiment, that *the gentiles ſacrifice to devils*, in the ſecond view of it that was ſuggeſted, or conſidered in relation to the ideas and intentions of the worſhippers themſelves, to which alone, in my apprehenſion, the apoſtle here alludes. Firſt then, we may juſtly ſay, that their ſacrifices were not offered to God; for, however much they might uſe the name of God, the intention is to be judged, not by the name, but by the meaning affixed to it. Now, ſuch a being as the eternal, unoriginated, immutable, Creator and Ruler of the world, they had not in all their ſyſtem, and therefore did not adore. For this reaſon, they are not unjuſtly termed, by the ſame Apoſtle, *ἄθεοι, atheiſts*, Eph. ii. 2. without God, that is, without the knowledge, and, conſequently, the belief and worſhip, of him who alone is God. But their ſacrifices and devotions were preſented to beings, to whom they

* Vitarum auctio. Τι δαι ὶ ανθρωποι; θεοι θνητοι. τι δαι ὶ θεοι; ανθρωποι αθανατοι.

they themſelves aſcribed a character infinitely inferior to what we know to belong to the true God, of whom they were ignorant.

A late philoſopher, who will not be ſuſpected of partiality to the ſentiments of an Apoſtle, or of the weakneſs of a bias in favour of Chriſtianity, has, nevertheleſs, in this inſtance, adopted the ideas of the ſacred author, and has not heſitated to pronounce the pagans * *a kind of ſuperſtitious atheiſts, who acknowledged no being that correſponds to our idea of a deity.* Beſides, a great part of the heathen worſhip was confeſſedly paid to the ghoſts of departed heroes, of conquerors, and potentates, and of the inventors of arts, whom popular ſuperſtition, after diſguiſing their hiſtory with fables and abſurdities, had blindly deified. Now, to all ſuch beings, they themſelves, as well as the Jews, aſſigned the name δαιμονια. Further, it deſerves our notice, that the Apoſtle is not writing here to Hebrews, but to Greeks; and that he himſelf, being a native of a Grecian city, knew perfectly the ſenſe that was affixed by them to the word δαιμονια. If, therefore, he had intended to ſuggeſt, that they were all malignant beings to whom their devotions were addreſſed, he would never have uſed the general term, which he knew they commonly underſtood in a more favourable ſenſe. In that caſe, he would have ſaid κακοδαιμοσι θυει, or ſomething equivalent.

§ 17. However much, therefore, the gentiles might have diſputed the truth of the firſt part of the Apoſtle's aſſertion, that they did not offer ſacrifice to God, becauſe they were not ſenſible of their own ignorance on this article, the latter part of the aſſertion they would have readily admitted, that they ſacrificed to demons, ſuch as the ſpirits of heroes and heroines deceaſed, and other beings conceived ſuperior to mere mortals. This charge they themſelves would not have pretended to be either injurious or untrue. The very paſſage formerly quoted from the Acts, where they call Jeſus and the reſurrection *ſtrange demons*, ξενα δαιμονια, ſhews, that there were *known demons*, γνωριμα δαιμονια, to whoſe ſervice they were accuſtomed. We cannot worſhip whom we do not mean to worſhip. There is an inconſiſtency in the ideas. They could, therefore, no more be ſaid to have worſhiped the devil, as we Chriſtians underſtand the term, than they could be ſaid to have worſhipped the cannibals of New Zealand, becauſe they had no more conception of the one than of the other. However much it may be in the ſpirit of theological controverſiſts, to uſe amplifications irreconcileable with truth and juſtice, in order to render an adverſary odious; this manner is not in the ſpirit of the ſacred penmen. Some appearances of the polemic temper there are in moſt verſions of the New Teſtament, which will be found to ſpring entirely from tranſlators. The popular

* Natural Hiſtory of Religion. Sect. IV

popular doctrine has indeed been adopted by Milton, and greatly embellished in his incomparable poem. But it is not from the fictions of poets that we must draw the principles of religion.

§ 18. I must likewise own that when, in the passage to the Corinthians under examination, we render δαιμονια *demons*, we still express the sentiment more harshly than it is in the original, because the word was often then used in a good sense, or at least, not as we Christians use it at present, invariably in a bad sense. One way, however of reducing it to its proper import, is to preserve sacredly the distinction, which holy writ so plainly authorises, and never to confound terms as synonymous, which are there never confounded.

§ 19. The above observations may serve also to illustrate a noted passage in the Apocalypse, Rev. ix. 20.: *The rest of the men which were not killed by these plagues, yet repented not of the works of their hands, that they should not worship devils,* δαιμονια, *and idols of gold and silver, and brass, and stone, and of wood, which neither can see, nor hear, nor walk.* It is equally manifest here, as in the former example, that the word rendered *devils*, ought to have been *demons*; nor is it less manifest, that every being who is not the one true God, however much conceived to be superior to us, is, whether good or bad, hero or heroine, demigod or demigoddess, angel or departed spirit, saint or sinner, real or imaginary, in the class comprized under the name *demons*. And the worship of them is as much *demonolatry* (if ye will admit the word) as the worship of Jupiter, Mars and Minerva. This may serve to shew, of how much consequence it is to attend, with accuracy, to the differences to be found in the application of words. It is only thereby that we can learn their exact import, and be qualified to judge both of the subject, and of the completion of scriptural prophecies. As to the worship of the devil του διαβολου, nothing can be clearer than that, in Scripture, no pagans are charged with it; and as to the worship των δαιμονιων, beings subordinate to the supreme, it may be considered how far we can with justice say, that the pagans are peculiarly chargeable. It will deserve to be remarked, by the way, that the only difference between demonolatry and idolatry appears to be, that the first regards the object of worship, the second the mode. The former is a violation of the first commandment, the latter of the second. The connection, however, is so intimate between them, that they have rarely, if ever, been found separate.

§ 20. There are only two other passages wherein the word δαιμονια occurs in the New Testament, in both which there is some difficulty. One is, where Paul warns Timothy, 1 Ep. iv. 1. of those who would make a defection from the faith, *giving heed to seducing spirits, and doctrines of devils,* διδασκαλιαις δαιμονιων, doctrines

trines of demons. It is hard to say whether, by this phrase, we are to understand doctrines suggested by demons, or doctrines concerning demons. The form of expression will support either meaning. If the first, the word *demons* is taken in a bad sense, for ghosts, or other spirits of a malignant character, the common acceptation of the word in the Gospels, where an agency on human beings is ascribed to them. The connection of the words, *doctrines of demons*, with *seducing spirits*, immediately preceding, gives some plausibility to this interpretation. If the second, there is reason to think, that it is used more extensively, for all those beings, inferior to God, who are made objects of adoration. In this case, the words foretel either a total apostasy from the faith of the Gospel, to heathen demonology, commonly called mythology, or a defection from the purity of its doctrine, by admitting an unnatural mixture of heathenish absurdities. That this is his meaning, is rendered not improbable, by its being connected with other corruptions of the Christian doctrine, also introduced some ages after the times of the Apostles, and implied in the words, *forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats, &c.* But in regard to this question, I do not pretend to decide.

§ 21. The other passage is in the Epistle of James, ch. ii. 19. The whole verse in the common version runs thus: *Thou believest that there is one God; thou dost well: the devils also believe and tremble:* τα δαιμονια, the demons. That the Apostle here means the spirits of wicked men deceased, which (in Jewish use, as we learn from Josephus) were commonly styled demons, there is no reason to question. The only points of which their belief is asserted, are the being and the unity of the Godhead. The epithet δαιμονιωδης is accordingly used in a bad sense in this Epistle, ch. iii. 15. where that wisdom which produceth envy and contention, is styled earthly, sensual, *devilish*, δαιμονιωδης, demonian.

§ 22. The only other words in the New Testament, connected with δαιμων are δεισιδαιμων and δεισιδαιμονια. Each occurs only once. The former is rendered, by our translators, *superstitious*, the latter, *superstition*. Neither of them is found in the Septuagint, or the Apocrypha, or in any part of the New Testament, except the Acts of the Apostles. We may readily believe, that the Jews, in speaking of their own religion, would avoid the use of terms bearing so manifest an allusion to a species of worship which it condemns. The only place where the term δεισιδαιμων occurs, is Paul's speech in the Areopagus at Athens. It is applied by him to the Atheniens, who were pagans. Ανδρες Αθηναιοι, says he, κατα παντα ὡς δεισιδαιμονεστερους ὑμας θεωρω, Acts xvii. 22.; in the common version, *Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious.* The English expression is, in my

opinion, much harſher than the Greek. As the word no where elſe occurs in the ſacred writings, our only rule for aſcertaining its import is the claſſical application. Beſides, the Apoſtle, being a native of a Grecian city, well knew in what ſenſe his hearers would underſtand the term. If then he ſpoke to be underſtood, we muſt ſuppoſe that he employed his words according to their current value in the place. Now, it is plain that, in the claſſical uſe, δεισιδαιμων has not a bad meaning, unleſs there be ſomething in the context that leads us to an unfavourable interpretation. Αιει δε δεισιδαιμων ην; *He was always a religious man*, ſays Xenophon of Ageſilaus, when he is plainly commending him. Favorinus explains the word by ὁ ευσεβης *pious; and gives* ευλαβειαν as the common import of δεισιδαιμονια, which he reſolves into φοβος Θεου η δαιμονων, *the fear of God, or of demons.*

Now, it has been ſhown, that among pagans, in the common acceptation of δαιμων, the meaning was favourable. It is acknowledged that δεισιδαιμων was alſo ſuſceptible of a bad meaning, anſwering to our word *ſuperſtitious*. Further, I readily admit that the Apoſtle would not probably have uſed that term in ſpeaking of either Jews or Chriſtians, becauſe he did not conſider the δαιμονες as objects of their veneration. At the ſame time, he knew, that in addreſſing the Athenians, he employed a term which could not be offenſive to them. Indeed, his manner of introducing his ſubject, ſhews a deſire of ſoftening the diſapprobation which his words imply, and from which he took occaſion to expound the principles of a more ſublime theology. The Athenians gloried in the character of being more religious δεισιδαιμονεστεροι, than any other Grecian ſtate. Paul's conceſſion of this point in their favour, would rather gratify than offend them, and would ſerve to alleviate the cenſure of carrying their religion to exceſs. Every thing, in the turn of his expreſſion, ſhews that it was his intention to tell them, in the mildeſt terms, what he found cenſurable in their devotion, and thence to take occaſion of preaching to them the only true God. Accordingly, he employed a word which he knew no pagan could take amiſs; and to denote the exceſs with which he thought them chargeable, he choſe to uſe the comparative degree, which was the gentleſt manner of doing it. Nay, he even abates the import of the comparative, by the particle ὡς. Beza has properly rendered the expreſſion, *quaſi religioſiores*. The verſion, *too ſuperſtitious*, not only deviates from the intention of the ſpeaker, but includes a groſs impropriety, as it implies that it is right to be ſuperſtitious to a certain degree, and that the error lies in exceeding that degree; whereas, in the univerſal acceptation of the Engliſh term, all ſuperſtition is exceſs, and therefore faulty.

As to the noun δεισιδαιμονια, in the only place of Scripture where it occurs, it is mentioned as uſed by a heathen, in relation

to

to the Jewiſh religion. Feſtus, the preſident, when he acquainted king Agrippa concerning Paul, at that time his priſoner, ſays that he found the accuſation brought againſt him by his countrymen, not to be ſuch as he had expected, but to conſiſt in ζητηματα τινα περι της ιδιας δεισιδαιμονιας, in the Engliſh tranſlation, *certain queſtions of their own ſuperſtition*, Acts xxv. 19. It was not unlike a Roman magiſtrate to call the Jewiſh religion *ſuperſtition*. That the gentiles were accuſtomed to ſpeak of it contemptuouſly, is notorious. But it ſhould be conſidered, that Feſtus was then addreſſing his diſcourſe to king Agrippa, whom he knew to be a Jew, who had come to Ceſarea to congratulate him, and to whom it appears, from the whole of the ſtory, that Feſtus meant to ſhew the utmoſt civility. It cannot then be imagined, that he would intentionally affront a viſitant of his rank, the very purpoſe of whoſe viſit had been to do him honour on his promotion. That the ordinary import of the term was favourable, cannot be queſtioned. Diodorus Siculus, ſpeaking of the religious ſervice performed by the high prieſt, at which the kings of Egypt were obliged to be preſent, adds, Ταυτα δ'επραττεν, αμα μεν τις δεισιδαιμοσιν και θεοφιλη βιον τον βασιλεα προτρεπομενος *. "Theſe things he did to "excite the king to a devout and pious life." The word, therefore, ought to have been rendered *religion*, according to its primitive and moſt uſual acceptation among the Greeks.

Biſhop Pierce is, for aught I know, ſingular in thinking that της ιδιας δεισιδαιμονιας ought to be tranſlated *of a private ſuperſtition*, meaning the Chriſtian doctrine taught by Paul. But of this verſion the words are evidently not ſuſceptible; the only authority alleged is Peter, who ſays, (2 ep. i. 20.) πασα προφητικη γραφη ιδιας επιλυσεως ου γινεται, in the common tranſlation, *No prophecy of the Scripture is of any private interpretation*. Admitting that this is a juſt expreſſion of the ſenſe of that paſſage, the caſes are not parallel. Ιδιος has there no article. If the import of ιδιος in the other place were *private*, the meaning of the phraſe muſt not be *a* but *the* private ſuperſtition, or the private religion. Had we any evidence that this deſignation had been given to Chriſtianity in the times of the apoſtles, there might be ſome plauſibility in the conjecture. But there is no trace of ſuch a deſignation; and indeed it would have been exceedingly improper as applied to a doctrine, which was preached publicly every where, and of whoſe miniſters, both Jews and Pagans, complained that they turned the world upſide down. There are few words in the New Teſtament more common than ιδιος, but there is not a ſingle inſtance wherein it is accompanied with the article, that can be rendered otherwiſe than *his own*, *her own*, or *their own*.

§ 23. So much for the diſtinction uniformly obſerved in Scripture between the words διαβολος and δαιμονιον; to which I ſhall only

* Lib. i.

only add, that in the ancient Syriac verſion, theſe names are always duly diſtinguiſhed. The words employed in tranſlating one of them are never uſed in rendering the other; and in all the Latin tranſlations I have ſeen, ancient and modern, Popiſh and Proteſtant, this diſtinction is carefully obſerved. It is obſerved alſo in Diodati's Italian verſion, and moſt of the late French verſions. But in Luther's German tranſlation, the Geneva French, and the common Engliſh, the words are confounded in the manner above obſerved. Some of the later Engliſh tranſlations have corrected this error, and ſome have implicitly followed the common verſion.

PART II.

Ἅιδης *and* γεεννα.

THE next example I ſhall produce of words in which, though commonly tranſlated by the ſame Engliſh term, there is a real difference of ſignification, ſhall be ἅδης and γεεννα, in the common verſion rendered *hell*. That γεεννα is employed in the New Teſtament to denote the place of future puniſhment, prepared for the devil and his angels, is indiſputable. In the Old Teſtament, we do not find this place in the ſame manner mentioned. Accordingly the word γεεννα does not occur in the Septuagint. It is not a Greek word, and conſequently not to be found in the Grecian claſſics. It is originally a compound of the two Hebrew words גיא הנם *ge hinnom*, the valley of Hinnom, a place near Jeruſalem, of which we hear firſt in the Book of Joſhua, xv. 8. It was there that the cruel ſacrifices of children were made by fire to Moloch, the Ammoniti̇ſh idol, 2 Chron. xxxiii. 6. The place was alſo called *Tophet*, 2 Kings xxiii. 10. and that, as is ſuppoſed, from the noiſe of drums, Toph ſignifying a drum, a noiſe raiſed on purpoſe to drown the cries of the helpleſs infants. As this place was, in proceſs of time, conſidered as an emblem of hell, or the place of torment reſerved for the puniſhment of the wicked in a future ſtate, the name Tophet came gradually to be uſed in this ſenſe, and at length to be confined to it. This is the ſenſe, if I miſtake not, in which *gehenna*, a ſynonymous term, is always to be underſtood in the New Teſtament, where it occurs juſt twelve times. In ten of theſe there can be no doubt; in the other two, the expreſſion is figurative; but it ſcarcely will admit a queſtion, that the figure is taken from that ſtate of miſery which awaits the impenitent. Thus the Phariſees are ſaid to make the proſelyte, whom they compaſs ſea and land to gain, twofold

twofold more a child of hell, υιος γεεννης, than themſelves, Matt. xxiii. 15. an expreſſion both ſimilar in form, and equivalent in ſignification, to υιος διαβολου, *ſon of the devil*, and υιος της απωλειας, *ſon of perdition*. In the other paſſage an unruly tongue is ſaid to be *ſet on fire of hell*, James iii. 6. φλογιζομενη υπο της γεεννης. Theſe two cannot be conſidered as exceptions, it being the manifeſt intention of the writers in both to draw an illuſtration of the ſubject from that ſtate of perfect wretchedneſs.

§ 2. As to the word ἁδης, which occurs in eleven places of the New Teſtament, and is rendered *hell* in all, except one, where it is tranſlated *grave*, it is quite common in claſſical authors, and frequently uſed by the Seventy in the tranſlation of the Old Teſtament. In my judgment it ought never in Scripture to be rendered *hell*, at leaſt in the ſenſe wherein that word is now univerſally underſtood by Chriſtians. In the Old Teſtament, the correſponding word is שאול *ſheōl*, which ſignifies the ſtate of the dead in general, without regard to the goodneſs or badneſs of the perſons, their happineſs or miſery. In tranſlating that word, the Seventy have almoſt invariably uſed ἁδης. This word is alſo uſed ſometimes in rendering the nearly ſynonymous words or phraſes בור *bor*, and אבני בור *abne bor*, *the pit*, and *ſtones of the pit*, צל מות *tſal moth*, *the ſhades of death*, דומה *dumeh*, *ſilence*. The ſtate is always repreſented under thoſe figures which ſuggeſt ſomething dreadful, dark and ſilent, about which the moſt prying eye, and liſtening ear, can acquire no information. The term ἁδης, *hades*, is well adapted to expreſs this idea. It was written anciently, as we learn from the poets (for what is called the poetic, is nothing but the ancient dialect), αιδης, *ab α privativo et ειδω video*, and ſignifies obſcure, hidden, inviſible. To this the word *hell* in its primitive ſignification perfectly correſponded. For, at firſt, it denoted only what was ſecret or concealed. This word is found with little variation of form, and preciſely in the ſame meaning, in all the Teutonic dialects *.

But though our word *hell*, in its original ſignification, was more adapted to expreſs the ſenſe of ἁδης than of γεεννα, it is not ſo now. When we ſpeak as Chriſtians, we always expreſs by it, the place of the puniſhment of the wicked after the general judgment, as oppoſed to heaven, the place of the reward of the righteous. It is true, that in tranſlating heathen poets, we retain the old ſenſe of the word *hell*, which anſwers to the Latin *orcus*, or rather *infernus*, as when we ſpeak of the deſcent of Eneas, or of Orpheus, into *hell*. Now the word *infernus*, in Latin, comprehends the receptacle of all the dead, and contains both *elyſium*, the place of the bleſſed, and *tartarus* the abode of the miſerable. The term *inferi*, comprehends all the inhabitants good and bad, happy

* See Junius' Gothic Gloſſary, ſubjoined to the Codex Argenteus, on the word *hulyan*.

happy and wretched. The Latin words *infernus* and *inferni* bear evident traces of the notion that the repoſitory of the ſouls of the departed is under ground. This appears alſo to have been the opinion of both Greeks and Hebrews, and indeed of all antiquity. How far the ancient practice of burying the body may have contributed to produce this idea concerning the manſion of the ghoſts of the deceaſed, I ſhall not take upon me to ſay; but it is very plain, that neither in the Septuagint verſion of the Old Teſtament, nor in the New, does the word ᾅδης convey the meaning which the preſent Engliſh word *hell*, in the Chriſtian uſage, always conveys to our minds.

§ 3. It were endleſs to illuſtrate this remark by an enumeration and examination of all the paſſages in both Teſtaments wherein the word is found. The attempt would be unneceſſary, as it is hardly now pretended by any critic, that this is the acceptation of the term in the Old Teſtament. Who, for example, would render the words of the venerable patriarch Jacob, Gen. xxxvii. 35. when he was deceived by his ſons into the opinion that his favourite child Joſeph had been devoured by a wild beaſt, *I will go down to hell to my ſon mourning?* or the words which he uſed, ch. xlii. 38. when they expoſtulated with him about ſending his youngeſt ſon Benjamin into Egypt along with them, *Ye will bring down my grey hairs with ſorrow to hell?* Yet in both places the word, in the original, is *ſheol*, and in the verſion of the Seventy, *hades*. I ſhall only add, that in the famous paſſage from the Pſalms, xvi. 10. quoted in the Acts of the Apoſtles, Acts ii. 27. of which I ſhall have occaſion to take notice afterwards, though the word is the ſame both in Hebrew and in Greek, as in the two former quotations, and though it is in both places rendered *hell* in the common verſion, it would be abſurd to underſtand it as denoting the place of the damned, whether the expreſſion be interpreted literally of David the type, or of Jeſus Chriſt the antitype, agreeably to its principal and ultimate object.

§ 4. But it appears at preſent to be the prevailing opinion among critics, that the term, at leaſt in the Old Teſtament, means no more than קבר *keber*, *grave* or *ſepulchre*. Of the truth of this opinion, after the moſt attentive, and, I think, impartial examination, I am far from being convinced. At the ſame time I am not inſenſible of the weight which is given to that interpretation by ſome great names in the learned world, particularly that of Father Simon, a man deeply verſed in oriental literature, who has expreſsly ſaid *, that *ſheol* ſignifies, in the Hebrew of the Old Teſtament, *ſepulchre*, and who has ſtrenuouſly and repeatedly defended this ſentiment againſt Le Clerc, and others, who had attacked

* Hiſt. Crit. du N. T. ch. 12.

tacked it *. And since he seems even to challenge his opponents to produce examples from the Old Testament, wherein the word *sheol* has the signification which they ascribe to it; I shall here briefly, with all the deference due to names so respectable as those which appear on the opposite side, lay before the reader the result of my inquiries upon the question.

§ 5. I freely acknowledge that, by translating sheol *the grave*, the purport of the sentence is often expressed with sufficient clearness. The example last quoted from Genesis is an evidence. *Ye will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to the grave*, undoubtedly gives the meaning of the sentence in the original, notwithstanding that the English word *grave* does not give the meaning of the Hebrew word *sheol*. This may at first appear a paradox, but will not be found so when examined. Suppose one, in relating the circumstances of a friend's death, should say, "This unlucky accident brought him to his shroud," another should say, "It brought him to his coffin," a third, "It brought "him to his grave." The same sentiment is expressed by them all, and these plain words, "This accident proved the cause of his "death," are equivalent to what was said by every one of them. But is it just to infer thence that the English words, *shroud*, *coffin*, *grave*, and *death*, are synonymous terms? It will not be pretended. Yet I have not heard any argument stronger than this, for accounting the Hebrew words *sheol* and *keber* synonymous. The cases are entirely parallel. Used as tropes, they often no doubt are so. Who can question, that when there is any thing figurative in the expression, the sense may be conveyed without the figure, or by another figure? And if so, the figures or tropes, however different, may doubtless, in such application, be called synonymous to one another, and to the proper term.

Now, if this holds of the tropes of the same language, it holds also of those of different languages. You may adopt a trope in translating, which does not literally answer to that of the original, and which, nevertheless, conveys the sense of the original more justly than the literal version would have done. But in this case, though the whole sentence in the version corresponds to the whole sentence in the original, there is not the like correspondence in the words taken severally. Sometimes the reverse happens, to wit, that every word of a sentence in the original, has a word exactly corresponding in the version; and yet the whole sentence in the one does not correspond to the whole sentence in the other. The different geniuses of different languages, render it impossible to obtain always a correspondence in both respects. When it can be had only in one, the sentiment is always to be preferred to the words. For this reason, I do not know

* Reponse a la Defense des Sentimens de quelques Theologiens de Hollande, ch. xvi.

know how our tranſlators could have rendered *ſheol* in that paſſage better than they have done. Taken by itſelf, we have no word in our language that anſwers to it. The Latin is, in this inſtance, luckier; as it ſupplies a word perfectly equivalent to that of the ſacred penman, at the ſame time that it juſtly expreſſes the ſenſe of the whole. Such is the tranſlation of the verſe in the Vulgate, *Deducetis canos meos cum dolore ad inferos.* Now, though our word *the grave*, may anſwer ſufficiently in ſome caſes for expreſſing, not the import of the Hebrew word *ſheol*, but the purport of the ſentence, it gives, in other caſes, but a feeble, and ſometimes an improper, verſion of the original. But this will be more evident afterwards.

§ 6. Firſt, in regard to the ſituation of *hades*, it ſeems always to have been conceived by both Jews and Pagans, as in the lower parts of the earth, near its centre, as we ſhould term it, or its foundation (according to the notions of the Hebrews, who knew nothing of its ſpherical figure), and anſwering in depth to the viſible heavens in height, both which are, on this account, oftener than once, contraſted in ſacred writ. In general, to expreſs any thing inconceivably deep, this word is adopted, which ſhews ſufficiently that unfathomable depth was always a concomitant of the idea conveyed by *ſheol*. Thus God is repreſented by Moſes as ſaying, Deut. xxxii. 22. *A fire is kindled in mine anger, and ſhall burn to the loweſt hell*, as it is rendered in the common verſion. The word is *ſheol* or *hades*; and Simon himſelf admits *, that it is here an hyperbole, which ſignifies that the fire ſhould reach the bottom of the earth, and conſume the whole earth. I acknowledge that it is in this paſſage uſed hyperbolically. But will any perſon pretend that it could have anſwered the purpoſe of giving the moſt terrible view of divine judgments, if the literal meaning of the word had implied no more than a grave? This conceſſion of Simon's, is in effect giving up the cauſe. According to the explanation I have given of the proper ſenſe of the word, it was perfectly adapted to ſuch an uſe, and made a very ſtriking hyperbole; but if his account of the literal and ordinary import of the term be juſt, the expreſſion, ſo far from being hyperbolical, would have been the reverſe.

In further evidence of this doctrine, the inhabitants of ἀδης are, from their ſubterranean abode, denominated in the New Teſtament, Phil. ii. 10. καταχθονιοι, a word of the ſame import with the phraſe ὑποκατω της γης, *under the earth*, in the Apocalypſe, ch. v. 13. and which, with the επουρανιοι and επιγειοι, *celeſtial* and *terreſtrial* beings, include the whole rational creation. Of the coincidence of the Hebrew and the Pagan notions in regard to the ſituation of the place of departed ſpirits, if it were neceſſary to add any thing to what was obſerved above, from the import

* Reponſe a la Defenſe, &c. ch. xvi.

port of the names *infernus* and *inferi*, these beautiful lines of Virgil might suffice:

> Non secus, ac si qua penitus vi terra dehiscens
> Infernas reserat sedes, et regna recludat
> Pallida, diis invisa, superque immane barathrum
> Cernatur trepidentque immisso lumine manes *.

§ 7. Several proofs might be brought from the prophets, and even from the Gospels, of the opposition in which heaven for height, and hades for depth, were conceived to stand to each other. I shall produce but a few from the Old Testament, which convey the most precise notion of their sentiments on this subject. The first is from the Book of Job, ch. xi. 7, 8, 9. where we have an illustration of the unsearchableness of the divine perfections in these memorable words, as found in the common version, *Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?* It is *as high as heaven, what canst thou do? Deeper than hell,* βαθυτερα δε των εν ἁδου, *what canst thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea.* Now of the opinion that the word in the Old Testament always denotes *grave* or *sepulchre*, nothing can be a fuller confutation than this passage. Among such immense distances as the height of heaven, the extent of the earth and the ocean, which were not only in those days unknown to men, but conceived to be unknowable; to introduce, as one of the unmeasurables, a sepulchre whose depth could scarcely exceed ten or twelve cubits, and which, being the work of men, was perfectly known, would have been absurd indeed, not to say ridiculous. What man in his senses could have said, 'Ye can no more comprehend the Deity, than ye can discover the height of the firmament, or measure the depth of a grave.'

A passage very similar we have in the Psalms, cxxxix. 8. where heaven and ἁδης are in the same way contrasted. *If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell,* εαν καταβω εις τον ἁδην, *behold thou art there.* The only other place I shall mention is in the prophet Amos, ch. ix. 2, 3. where God is represented as saying, *Though they dig into hell,* εις ἁδου, *thence shall my hand take them; though they climb up to heaven, thence will I bring them down, and though they hide themselves on the top of Carmel, I will search and take them out thence; and though they be hid from my sight in the bottom of the sea, thence will I command the serpent, and he shall bite them.* Here for illustration we have a double contrast. To the top of Carmel, a very high mountain, is contrasted very properly the bottom of the sea; but to heaven, which is incomparably higher than the highest mountain, no suitable contrast is found, except *sheol* or *hades*,

* Æn. viii.

which was evidently conceived to be the lowest thing in the world. The ἐπιγειοι were supposed to possess the middle parts, the ἐπουρανιοι and καταχθονιοι occupied the extremes, the former in height, the latter in depth. A late writer, of profound erudition, of whose sentiments on this subject I shall have occasion soon to take notice, has quoted the above passage of Amos, to prove that *into sheol men penetrate by digging:* he might, with equal reason, have quoted it to prove that *into heaven men penetrate by climbing*, or that men, in order to hide themselves, have recourse to the bottom of the sea.

§ 8. Again, let it be observed, that *keber*, the Hebrew word for *grave* or *sepulchre*, is never rendered in the ancient translation ἀδης, but ταφος, μνημα, or some equivalent term. *Sheol*, on the contrary, is never rendered ταφος or μνημα, but always ἀδης; nor is it ever construed with θαπτω, or any verb which signifies to bury, a thing almost inevitable in words so frequently occurring, if it had ever properly signified a grave. This itself might suffice to shew that the ideas which the Jews had of these were never confounded. I observe further, that ἀδης, as well as the corresponding Hebrew word, is always singular in meaning, as well as in form. The word for grave is often plural. The former never admits the possessive pronouns, being the receptacle of all the dead, and therefore incapable of an appropriation to individuals, the latter often. Where the disposal of the body or corpse is spoken of, ταφος, or some equivalent term, is the name of its repository. When mention is made of the spirit after death, its abode is ἀδης. When notice is taken of one's making or visiting the grave of any person, touching it, mourning at it, or erecting a pillar or monument upon it, and the like, it is always *keber* that is employed. Add to all this that, in *hades*, all the dead are represented as present, without exception. The case is quite different with the graves or sepulchres. Thus, Isaiah represents, very beautifully and poetically, a great and sudden desolation that would be brought upon the earth, saying, Isa. v. 14. *Hades*, which is in the common version, *Hell hath enlarged herself, and opened her mouth without measure.* *Hades* alone is conceived to contain them all, though the graves, in which their bodies were deposited, might be innumerable. Again, in the song of triumph on the fall of the king of Babylon, ch. xiv. 9. *Hell* (the original word is the same as in the preceding passage) *from beneath is moved for thee to meet thee at thy coming: it stirreth up the dead for thee, even all the chief ones of the earth: it hath raised up from their thrones all the kings of the nations.* Thus in *hades*, all the monarchs and nobles, not of one family or race, but of the whole earth, are assembled. Yet their sepulchres are as distant from one another as the nations they governed. Those mighty dead are raised, not from their couches, which would have

have been the natural expreſſion, had the prophet's idea been a ſepulchral vault, how magnificent ſoever, but *from their thrones*, as ſuited the notion of all antiquity, concerning not the bodies, but the ſhades or ghoſts of the departed, to which was always aſſigned ſomething ſimilar in rank and occupation to what they had poſſeſſed upon the earth. Nay, as is well obſerved by Caſtalio *, thoſe are repreſented as in hades, whoſe carcaſes were denied the honours of ſepulture.

§ 9. To the preceding examples, I ſhall add but one other from the Old Teſtament. It is taken from that beautiful paſſage in Job, ch. xxviii. 17. wherein God himſelf is the ſpeaker, and whereof the great purpoſe is, to expoſe human ignorance, and check human preſumption. *Have the gates of death been opened unto thee? or haſt thou ſeen the doors of the ſhadow of death?* For this laſt deſignation the term is in Hebrew *tſalmoth*, and in the tranſlation of the Seventy, ἅδης: for, as was hinted before, *tſalmoth*, in its ordinary acceptation, is ſynonymous with *ſheol*, though ſometimes uſed metaphorically, for a very dark place, or a ſtate of great ignorance. It is almoſt too obvious to need being remarked, that this challenge to Job could have no relation to a ſepulchre, the door, or entry to which, is always known to the living. The caſe was very different with regard to the habitation of departed ſpirits. At the ſame time I entirely agree with the learned and ingenious biſhop Lowth †, that the cuſtom of depoſiting under ground the bodies of the deceaſed, and the form of their ſepulchres, have, probably, firſt ſuggeſted ſome of the gloomy notions entertained on this ſubject. But popular opinions have a growth and progreſs, and come often, eſpecially in queſtions at once ſo intereſting and ſo inſcrutable, to differ widely from what they were originally. May we not then, upon the whole, fairly conclude, that we have all the evidence which the nature of the thing will admit, and more than in moſt philological inquiries is thought ſufficient, that the word *grave* or *ſepulchre* never conveys the full import of the Hebrew *ſheol*, or the Greek *hades*, though, in ſome inſtances, it may have all the preciſion neceſſary for giving the import of the ſentiment?

§ 10. Even in ſome inſtances, where the language is ſo figurative, as to allow great latitude to a tranſlator, the original term is but weakly rendered *grave*. Thus it is ſaid, *Love is ſtrong as death, jealouſy is cruel as the grave*, Cant. viii. 6. The *grave*, when perſonified, or uſed metaphorically, is more commonly, if I miſtake not, exhibited as a gentle power, which brings relief from cruelty, oppreſſion, and trouble of every kind: whereas *hades*, which regards more the ſtate of departed ſouls, than the manſions

* Defenſio adv. Bezam. Adverſarii Errores.
† De ſacra Poeſi Hebræorum, Præl. vii.

manſions of their bodies, exhibits, when perſonified, a ſevere and inflexible jailor, who is not to be gained by the moſt pathetic entreaties, or by any arts merely human. The clauſe would be appoſitely rendered in Latin, *inexorabilis ſicut orcus*: for it is this inflexibility of character, that is chiefly indicated by the original word rendered *cruel*. In this notion of that ſtate, as indeed in ſome other ſentiments on this ſubject, and even in the terms applied to it, there is a pretty cloſe coincidence with thoſe of the ancient pagans. When the Latin poet mentions the fatal conſequence of the venial treſpaſs of Orpheus (as it appeared to him) in turning about to take one look of his beloved Eurydice, before leaving the infernal regions, he ſays, *Ignoſcenda quidem*; but immediately correcting himſelf, adds, *ſcirent ſi ignoſcere manes*.

§ 11. I ſhall now proceed to examine ſome paſſages in the New Teſtament, wherein the word occurs, that we may diſcover whether we ought to affix the ſame idea to it as to the correſponding term in the Old.—The firſt I ſhall produce is one, which, being originally in the Old Teſtament, is quoted and commented on in the New, and is conſequently one of the fitteſt for aſſiſting us in the diſcovery. Peter, in ſupporting the miſſion of his Maſter, in a ſpeech made to the inhabitants of Judea and Jeruſalem, on the famous day of Pentecoſt, alleges, amongſt other things, the prediction of the royal Pſalmiſt, part of which runs thus in the common verſion, Act. ii. 27. *Becauſe thou wilt not leave my ſoul in hell, neither wilt thou ſuffer thine holy One to ſee corruption.* The paſſage is cited from the Pſalms, xvi. 10. in the very words of the Seventy, which are (as far as concerns the preſent queſtion) entirely conformable to the original Hebrew. As this prophecy might be underſtood by ſome to relate only to the Pſalmiſt himſelf, the Apoſtle ſhews how inapplicable it is to him, when literally explained. It plainly pointed to a reſurrection, and ſuch a reſurrection as would very ſoon follow death, that the ſoul ſhould not be left in hades, ſhould not remain in the manſion of departed ſpirits, but ſhould reanimate its body, before the latter had ſuffered corruption. *Brethren*, ſays he, Acts ii. 29. *let me ſpeak freely to you of the Patriarch David, that he is both dead and buried, and his ſepulchre is with us to this day.* He has had no reſurrection. It was never pretended that he had. His body, like other bodies, has undergone corruption; and this gives ſufficient reaſon to believe that his ſoul has ſhared the fate of other ſouls, and that the prophecy was never meant of him, unleſs in a ſecondary ſenſe. *But*, continues he, ver. 30, 31. *being a prophet, he ſpake of the reſurrection of Chriſt*, or the Meſſiah: and, to ſhew how exactly both what related to the ſoul, and what related to the body, had their completion in the Meſſiah, adds, that *his ſoul was not left in hades, neither did his*

fleſh

flesh see corruption. It has been argued that this is an example of the figure ἐν διὰ δυοῖν, where the same sentiment is expressed a second time by a different phrase. In some sense this may be admitted; for, no doubt, either of the expressions would have served for predicting the event. But it is enough for my purpose, that the writer, in using two, one regarding the soul, the other regarding the body, would undoubtedly adapt his language to the received opinions concerning each. And if so, *hades* was as truly, in their account, the soul's destiny after death, as corruption was the body's.

§ 12. I am surprised, that a man of Dr Taylor's critical abilities, as well as Oriental literature, should produce the passage quoted by the Apostle, as an example to prove that *sheol*, *the pit*, *death*, and *corruption*, are synonymous. The expression, as we read it in the Psalm, is (to say the least) no evidence of this; but if we admit Peter to have been a just interpreter of the Psalmist's meaning, which Simon seems very unwilling to admit, it contains a strong evidence of the contrary; for, in his comment, he clearly distinguishes the destiny of the *soul*, which is to be consigned to *sheol* or *hades*, from that of the *body* or flesh, which is to be consigned to *corruption*. Nor is there, in this, the slightest appearance of an unusual or mystical application of the words. The other examples brought by that author, in his very valuable Hebrew Concordance, are equally exceptionable.

He proceeds on the supposition, that no account can be given, why certain phrases are often found coupled together, but by saying that they are synonymous: whereas, in the present case, it is much more naturally accounted for, by saying, that the events to which they relate, are commonly concomitant. We ought never to recur to tautology for the solution of a difficulty, unless when the ordinary application of the words admits no other resource. This is far from being the case in the instances referred to. Of the like kind are the arguments founded on such figurative expressions, as digging into *hades*; Korah's descending alive into it; Jonah's being there, when in the belly of the great fish; the foundations of the mountains, or the roots of the trees, reaching to it; which are all evident hyperboles, and to which we find expressions entirely similar in ancient authors, both Greek and Latin. Thus, Virgil, describing the storm in which Æneas was involved at sea, says,

> Tollimur in cœlum, curvato gurgite, et iidem
> Subducta ad manes imos descendimus unda.

Again, speaking of an oak,

> Ipsa hæret scopulis; et quantum vertice ad auras
> Æthereas, tantum radice in Tartara tendit.

Yet,

Yet, these figures, as far as I have heard, have never created any doubt among critics, concerning the ordinary acceptation of the words *tartarus* and *imi manes*. No pretence has been made that the one ever meant, when used not tropically, but properly, the bottom of the sea, and the other a few yards under ground. Indeed, if a man were to employ the same mode of reasoning, in regard to the Latin terms that relate to this subject, which has been employed, in regard to the Hebrew; we should conclude, that *sepulchrum* and *infernus* are synonymous, *anima* and *corpus*, *manes* and *cinis*, upon evidence incomparably stronger than that we have for inferring, that *sheol* and *keber* are so. Of the first two the Latin poet says, *Animamque sepulchro condimus*. If *anima* be here used for *the soul*, agreeably to its ordinary and proper acceptation, he assigns it the same habitation as is given to the body after death, to wit, the *sepulchre*: and if it be used for *the body*, the words *corpus* and *anima* are strangely confounded, even by the best writers. As we have *anima* here for *corpus*, we have, in other places, *corpus* for *anima*. For, speaking of Charon's ferrying the souls of the deceased over Styx, he says,

Et ferruginea subvectat corpora cymba.

Now, what Virgil here calls *corpora*, and a few lines after, more explicitly, *defunctaque corpora vita*, he had a very little before expressed by a phrase of the contrary import, *tenues sine corpore vitas*, the one being *the body without the life*, the other *the life without the body*. That *cinis* and *manes* are in like manner confounded, we have an example from the same author:

Id cinerem, aut manes credis curare sepultos?

Here, if *sepultos* mean *buried*, *cinis* and *manes* are synonymous: if *manes* mean *ghosts*, then *sepultos* is equivalent to *deductos ad infernum*. Yet it would not be easy to say to what trope the author has, in these instances, had recourse, if it be not the catachresis. Nor is this promiscuous application of the words peculiar to the poets. Livy, the historian, uses the word *manes* in prose with equal latitude: *Sepulchra diruta, nudati manes*.

To these instances of confusion in the meanings of the words mentioned, nothing parallel has been alleged from the Hebrew Scriptures, except only that נפש sometimes, like *anima* in the example above quoted, means *a dead body*. Yet nobody considers the examples aforesaid as invalidating those distinctions in Latin, which an usage incomparably more extensive has established in the language. With much less reason then can a few expressions, confessedly hyperbolical and figurative, be pleaded for subverting the uniform acceptation of the Hebrew words in question, in their proper and natural application. Taylor's remark, that *keber* grave, is one particular cavity, &c. and that *sheol* is a collective

lective name for all the graves, &c. tends more to perplex the ſubject than to explain it. He would hardly be thought to apprehend diſtinctly the import of the Latin words, who ſhould define them by telling us, that *ſepulchrum* is one particular cavity digged for the interment of a dead perſon, and that *infernus* is a collective name for all the *ſepulchra*, &c. The definition would be both obſcure and unjuſt; yet, from what has been ſhown, more might be produced to juſtify it, than can be advanced in vindication of the other.

§ 13. Beſides, we have another clear proof from the New Teſtament, that *hades* denotes the intermediate ſtate of ſouls between death and the general reſurrection. In the Apocalypſe, ch. xx. 14. we learn that *death and hades*, by our tranſlators rendered *hell* as uſual, *ſhall*, immediately after the general judgment, *be caſt into the lake of fire. This is the ſecond death.* In other words, the death which conſiſts in the ſeparation of the ſoul from the body, and the ſtate of ſouls intervening between death and judgment, ſhall be no more. To the wicked theſe ſhall be ſucceeded by a more terrible death, the damnation of gehenna, *hell* properly ſo called. Indeed, in this ſacred Book, the commencement, as well as the deſtruction, of this intermediate ſtate, are ſo clearly marked, as to render it almoſt impoſſible to miſtake them. In a preceding chapter, vi. 8. we learn that *hades* follows cloſe at the heels of death; and, from the other paſſage quoted, that both are involved in one common ruin at the univerſal judgment. Whereas, if we interpret ἅδης *hell*, in the Chriſtian ſenſe of the word, the whole paſſage is rendered nonſenſe. *Hell* is repreſented as being caſt into *hell:* for ſo the lake of fire, which is in this place alſo denominated the ſecond death, is univerſally interpreted.

§ 14. The Apoſtle Paul, without naming *hades*, conveys to us the ſame idea of the ſtate of ſouls departed, Rom. x. 6. 7. *The righteouſneſs which is of faith, ſpeaketh on this wiſe, Say not in thine heart, who ſhall aſcend into heaven? (that is to bring Chriſt down from above;) or, who ſhall deſcend into the deep?* εις την αβυσσον into the abyſs, *(that is, to bring up Chriſt again from the dead)*—that is, faith doth not require, for our ſatisfaction, things impracticable, either to ſcale the heavens, or to explore the profound receſſes of departed ſpirits. The word here uſed ſhows this. It is αβυσσος, that is, a pit or gulph, if not bottomleſs, at leaſt of an indeterminable depth. The very antitheſis of deſcending into the deep, and aſcending into heaven, alſo ſhows it. There would be a moſt abſurd diſparity in the different members of this illuſtration, if no more were to be underſtood by the abyſs than the grave, ſince nothing is more practicable for the living than a deſcent thither. The women, who went to viſit our Lord's ſepulchre, did actually deſcend into it, Mark

xvi.

xvi. 5. Luke xxiv 3. Beſides, to call the grave the abyſs, is entirely unexampled. Let it be alſo obſerved, that it is not ſaid *to bring Chriſt up from the grave*, but *from the dead*; for which end to bring back the ſoul is in the firſt place neceſſary. I do not ſay that the Greek word αβυσσος, or the correſpondent Hebrew word תהום *thehom*, is confined to the ſignification here given it. I know that it often means the ocean, becauſe conceived to be of an unfathomable depth, and may indeed be applied to any thing of which the ſame quality can be affirmed.

§ 15. So much for the literal ſenſe of the word *hades*, which, as has been obſerved, implies properly neither *hell* nor the *grave*, but the place or ſtate of departed ſouls. I know that it has been ſaid, and ſpeciouſly ſupported, that in the Moſaical economy, there was no expreſs revelation of the exiſtence of ſouls after death. Admitting this to be in ſome ſenſe true, the Iſraelites were not without ſuch intimations of a future ſtate, as types, and figures, and emblematical predictions, could give them: yet certain it is, that life and immortality were, in an eminent manner, brought to light only by the Goſpel. But, from whatever ſource they derived their opinions, that they had opinions on this ſubject, though dark and confuſed, is manifeſt, as from many other circumſtances, ſo particularly from the practice of witchcraft and necromancy, which prevailed among them, and the power they aſcribed to ſorcerers, juſtly or unjuſtly it matters not, of evoking the ghoſts of the deceaſed.

The whole ſtory of the witch of Endor, 1 Sam. xxviii. 7, &c. is an irrefragable evidence of this. For, however much people may differ in their manner of explaining the phenomena which it preſents to us, judicious and impartial men, whoſe minds are not preoccupied with a ſyſtem, can hardly differ as to the evidence it affords, that the exiſtence of ſpirits in a ſeparate ſtate, was an article of the popular belief, and that it was thought poſſible, by certain ſecret arts, to maintain an intercourſe with them. Our queſtion here is, not what was expreſsly revealed to that people on this ſubject, but what appear to have been the notions commonly entertained concerning it? or what was it which the learned biſhop of London ſtyles*, the *infernum poeticum* of the Hebrews? Indeed, the artifices employed by their wizards and necromancers alluded to by Iſaiah, of returning anſwers in a feigned voice, which appeared to thoſe preſent, as proceeding from under the ground, Iſa. xxix. 4. is a demonſtration of the prevalence of the ſentiments I have been illuſtrating, in regard both to the exiſtence, and to the abode of ſouls departed. For that theſe were the oracles intended to be conſulted, is manifeſt from the Prophet's upbraiding them with it, as an abſurdity, that the living ſhould recur for counſel, not to their God, but to the dead.

In

* Notes on chap. xiii. and xiv. of Iſaiah.

It is well expreſſed in Houbigant's tranſlation, *Itane pro vivis mortui interrogantur*, Iſa. viii. 19. But what can be clearer to this purpoſe than the law itſelf, whereby ſuch practices are prohibited? *There ſhall not be found among you any one that maketh his ſon or his daughter to paſs through the fire, or that uſeth divination, or an obſerver of times, or an enchanter, or a witch, or a charmer, or a conſulter with familiar ſpirits, or a wizard, or a necromancer*, Deut. xviii. 10, 11. This laſt character is not expreſſed in the original as in the Engliſh tranſlation, by a ſingle word, but by a periphraſis, דרש אל חמתים *doreſh el hamathim*, which, rendered literally, is *one who conſulteth the dead*. It is accordingly tranſlated by the Seventy επιςρεφων προς νεκρους, and by Houbigant, *Qui mortuos interroget*.

§ 16. I ſhall add a few things in regard to the metaphorical uſe of the term. I have obſerved that *heaven* and *hades* are commonly ſet in oppoſition to each other; the one is conceived to be the higheſt object, the other the loweſt. From what is literally or locally ſo, the tranſition is very natural (inſomuch that we find traces of it in all languages) to what is figuratively ſo; that is, what expreſſes a glorious and happy ſtate on the one hand, or a humble and miſerable ſtate on the other. In this way it is uſed by our Lord, Matth. xi. 23. *And thou Capernaum, which art exalted to heaven, ſhalt be brought down to hades*, εως ἅδου. As the city of Capernaum was never literally raiſed to *heaven*, we have no reaſon to believe that it was to be literally brought down to *hades*. But as, by the former expreſſion, we are given to underſtand, that it was become a flouriſhing and ſplendid city, or, as ſome think, that it had obtained great ſpiritual advantages; ſo, by the latter, that it ſhould be brought to the loweſt degree of abaſement and wretchedneſs.

§ 17. Another paſſage, in which the application of the word is figurative, we have in that celebrated promiſe made to Peter, Matth. xvi. 18. *Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build my church, and the gates of hell*, πυλαι ἅδου, the gates of hades, *ſhall not prevail againſt it*. It is by death, and by it only, that the ſpirit enters into *hades*. The gate of *hades* is therefore a very natural periphraſis for death; inſomuch that, without any poſitive evidence, we ſhould naturally conclude this to be the meaning of the phraſe. But we have ſufficient evidence, both ſacred and profane, that this is the meaning. The phraſe occurs in the Septuagint in the thankſgiving of Hezekiah, after his miraculous recovery from the mortal diſeaſe he had been ſeized with, Iſa. xxxviii. 10. I ſaid, *I ſhall go to the gates of the grave*, εν πυλαις ἅδου. It follows, *I am deprived of the reſidue of my years*. Nothing can be plainer than that πυλαι ἅδου here means *death*, in other words, I ſhall die and be deprived of the reſidue of my years. But though the phraſe be the ſame (for πυλαι ἅδου

is a literal verſion of the Hebrew) with that uſed by our Lord, our tranſlators have not liked to make Hezekiah, who was a good man, ſpeak as if he thought himſelf going to hell, and have therefore rendered it *the grave*.

Another example we have in the Wiſdom of Solomon, which, though not canonical Scripture, is, in a queſtion of criticiſm, a good authority, xvi. 13. *Thou haſt power of life and death, thou leadeſt to the gates of hades,* εις πυλας ᾅδου, *and bringeſt up again.* This paſſage is as little ſuſceptible of doubt as the former. The claſſical uſe of this phraſe is the ſame with that of the inſpired writers. Homer, Iliad B, makes Achilles ſay, as rendered by our Engliſh poet:

> Who can think one thing, and another tell,
> My ſoul deteſts him as the gates of hell;
>
> εικος αϊδαο πυλησι·

that is, I hate him as death, or I hate him mortally. To ſay then that the gates of *hades* ſhall not prevail againſt the church, is, in other words, to ſay, It ſhall never die, it ſhall never be extinct. Le Clerc, though meaning the ſame thing (as appears by his note), has expreſſed it inaccurately: "Les portes de la "mort ne la ſurmonteront point;" *The gates of death ſhall not ſurmount it.* We ſee at once how appoſitely *death* is called *the gate of hades.* But what ſhould we call the gates of death? Not death itſelf, ſurely. They muſt be *diſeaſes;* for by theſe we are brought to death. But in this ſenſe we cannot apply the promiſe. For many direful diſeaſes has the church been afflicted with, if the introduction of the groſſeſt errors, the moſt ſuperſtitious practices and ſenſeleſs diſputes, are to be accounted ſuch; but they have not hitherto proved mortal, and, we have reaſon to believe, never ſhall.

§ 18. In the exclamation adopted by the Apoſtle, 1 Cor. xv. 55. *O death, where is thy ſting? O grave,* ᾅδη, *where is thy victory?* we cannot ſay ſo properly, that the words *death* and *hades* are uſed figuratively, as the words *ſting* and *victory*, with which they are accompanied. In regard to the ſenſe, there can be no doubt. It is manifeſtly the Apoſtle's view to ſignify that, whatever might have been formerly an object of terror in either *death* or *hades*, is removed by Jeſus Chriſt, inſomuch that in theſe very things the true diſciples find matter of joy and exultation.

§ 19. But is there not one paſſage, it may be ſaid, in which the word ᾅδης muſt be underſtood as ſynonymous with γεεννα, and conſequently muſt denote the place of final puniſhment prepared for the wicked, or *hell* in the Chriſtian acceptation of the term? Ye have it in the ſtory of the rich man and Lazarus, Luke xvi. 23. *In hell,* εν τω ᾅδη, *he lift up his eyes, being in torments, and ſeeth Abraham afar off and Lazarus in his boſom.* This is the only

only paſſage in holy writ which ſeems to give countenance to the opinion that ἅιδης ſometimes means the ſame thing as γεεννα. Here it is repreſented as a place of puniſhment. The rich man is ſaid to be tormented there in the midſt of flames. Theſe things will deſerve to be examined narrowly. It is plain, that in the Old Teſtament, the moſt profound ſilence is obſerved in regard to the ſtate of the deceaſed, their joys or ſorrows, happineſs or miſery. It is repreſented to us rather by negative qualities than by poſitive, by its ſilence, its darkneſs, its being inacceſſible, unleſs by preternatural means, to the living, and their ignorance about it. Thus much in general ſeems always to have been preſumed concerning it, that it is not a ſtate of activity adapted for exertion, or indeed for the accompliſhment of any important purpoſe, good or bad. In moſt reſpects, however, there was a reſemblance in their notions on this ſubject, to thoſe of the moſt ancient heathens.

But the opinions neither of Hebrews nor of heathens, remained invariably the ſame. And from the time of the captivity, more eſpecially from the time of the ſubjection of the Jews, firſt to the Macedonian empire, and afterwards to the Roman; as they had a cloſer intercourſe with pagans, they inſenſibly imbibed many of their ſentiments, particularly on thoſe ſubjects whereon their law was ſilent, and wherein, by conſequence, they conſidered themſelves as at greater freedom. On this ſubject of a future ſtate, we find a conſiderable difference in the popular opinions of the Jews in our Saviour's time, from thoſe which prevailed in the days of the ancient prophets. As both Greeks and Romans had adopted the notion, that the ghoſts of the departed were ſuſceptible both of enjoyment and of ſuffering, they were led to ſuppoſe a ſort of retribution in that ſtate, for their merit or demerit in the preſent. The Jews did not indeed adopt the pagan fables on this ſubject, nor did they expreſs themſelves entirely in the ſame manner; but the general train of thinking in both came pretty much to coincide. The Greek *hades* they found well adapted to expreſs the Hebrew *ſheol*. This they came to conceive as including different ſorts of habitations for ghoſts of different characters. And though they did not receive the terms *Elyſium* or *Elyſian fields*, as ſuitable appellations for the regions peopled by good ſpirits, they took inſtead of them, as better adapted to their own theology, *the garden of Eden*, or *Paradiſe*, a name originally Perſian, by which the word anſwering to *garden*, eſpecially when applied to Eden, had commonly been rendered by the Seventy. To denote the ſame ſtate, they ſometimes uſed the phraſe *Abraham's boſom*, a metaphor borrowed from the manner in which they reclined at meals. But, on the other hand, to expreſs the unhappy ſituation of the wicked in that intermediate ſtate, they do not ſeem to have declined the

the uſe of the word *tartarus*. The Apoſtle Peter, 2 Ep. ii. 4. ſays of evil angels that *God caſt them down to hell, and delivered them into chains of darkneſs, to be reſerved unto judgment.* So it ſtands in the common verſion, though neither γεεννα nor ἁδης are in the original, where the expreſſion is σειραις ζοφου ταρταρωσας παρεδωκεν εις κρισιν τετηρημενους. The word is not γεεννα; for that comes after judgment; but ταρταρος, which is, as it were, the priſon of hades, wherein criminals are kept till the general judgment. And as, in the ordinary uſe of the Greek word, it was comprehended under *hades*, as a part; it ought, unleſs we had ſome poſitive reaſon to the contrary, by the ordinary rules of interpretation, to be underſtood ſo here. There is then no inconſiſtency in maintaining that the rich man, though in torments, was not in *gehenna*, but in that part of *hades* called *tartarus*, where we have ſeen already that ſpirits reſerved for judgment are detained in darkneſs.

That there is, in a lower degree, a reward of the righteous, and a puniſhment of the wicked, in the ſtate intervening between death and the reſurrection, is no more repugnant to the divine perfections, than that there ſhould be (as, in the courſe of providence, there often are) manifeſt recompences of eminent virtues, and of enormous crimes, in this preſent world. Add to this, that Joſephus, in the account he gives of the opinions of the Phariſees, or thoſe Jews who believed a future ſtate, mentions expreſsly the rewards of the virtuous, and the puniſhments of the vicious, in *hades*, or under the earth, which is, as was obſerved before, another expreſſion for the ſame thing*. From his repreſentation we ſhould conclude, that, in his time, a reſurrection and future judgment, as underſtood by the Chriſtians, were not univerſally the doctrine, even of the Phariſees; but that

* Αθανατον τε ισχυν ταις ψυχαις πιστις αυτοις ειναι, και υπο χθονος δικαιωσεις τε και τιμας οις αρετης η κακιας επιτηδευσις εν τω βιω γεγονε, και ταις μεν εργμον αϊδιον προσιθεσθαι, ταις δε ραιωνην του αναβιουν. Antiq. lib. xviii. c. 2. Ψυχην δε πασαν μεν αφθαρτον· μεταβαινειν δε εις ἑτερον σωμα, την των αγαθων μονην· την δε των φαυλων, αϊδια τιμωρια κολαζεσθαι. Bell. Lib. ii. c. 12. Ἑτερον σωμα is an expreſſion by no means parallel, as Dr Jennings ſeems to have thought (Jewiſh Antiquities, B. i. c. 10.) to that uſed of our Lord's tranſfiguration (Luke ix. 29.). το ειδος του προσωπου αυτου ἑτερον. Ειδος is no more than the appearance. Now, to ſay that the body into which the ſoul paſſes is another body; and to ſay that it has another appearance, are two expreſſions which no perſon who reflects, will confound as equivalent. That there are ſome things, however, which would lead one to infer that the opinions of the Phariſees on this article were more conformable to the Chriſtian doctrine, than is implied in the words of Joſephus, is not to be diſſembled. But the difficulty reſulting hence is more eaſily removed by admitting, what is nowiſe improbable, that there was not then among them an exact uniformity of opinion, than by recurring on either ſide to a mode of criticiſm which the language will not bear.

that the prevalent and diſtinguiſhing opinion was, that the ſoul ſurvived the body, that vicious ſouls would ſuffer an everlaſting impriſonment in *hades*, and that the ſouls of the virtuous would both be happy there, and, in proceſs of time, obtain the privilege of tranſmigrating into other bodies. The immortality of human ſouls, and the tranſmigration of the good, ſeem to have been all that they comprehended in the phraſe αναστασις των νεκρων. Indeed, the words ſtrictly denote no more than renewal of life.

Their ſentiments on this topic naturally recal to our remembrance ſome of thoſe exhibited by Virgil, in the ſixth book of the Æneid. That this Pythagorean dogma was become pretty general among the Jews, appears even from ſome paſſages in the Goſpels. The queſtion put by the diſciples, John ix. 2. *Who ſinned; this man or his parents, that he was born blind?* and ſome popular opinions concerning Jeſus, whom they knew to have been born and brought up among themſelves, that he was Elijah, or Jeremiah, or one of the ancient prophets, Matt. xvi. 14. manifeſtly preſuppoſe the doctrine of the tranſmigration. It is alſo in alluſion to this, that the Jewiſh author of the book of Wiſdom, has, as it is rendered in the common tranſlation, thus expreſſed himſelf: *I was a witty child, and had a good ſpirit; yea rather, being good, I came into a body undefiled:* αγαθος ων ηλθον εις σωμα αμιαντον, Wiſd. viii. 19, 20. Yet we have reaſon, from the New Teſtament, to think that theſe tenets were not, at that time, univerſal among the Phariſees, but that ſome entertained juſter notions of a reſurrection, and that afterwards, the opinions of the Talmudiſts, on this article, had a much greater conformity to the doctrine of the Goſpel, than the opinions of ſome of their predeceſſors in and before our Saviour's time.

§ 20. According to this explication, the rich man and Lazarus were both in hades, though in very different ſituations, the latter in the manſions of the happy, and the former in thoſe of the wretched. Let us ſee how the circumſtances mentioned, and the expreſſions uſed in the parable will ſuit this hypotheſis. Firſt, though they are ſaid to be at a great diſtance from each other, they are ſtill within ſight and hearing. This would have been too groſs a violation of probability, if the one were conſidered as inhabiting the higheſt heavens, and the other as placed in the infernal regions. Again, the expreſſions uſed, are ſuch as entirely ſuit this explanation, and no other; for, firſt, the diſtance from each other is mentioned, but no hint that the one was higher in ſituation than the other; ſecondly, the terms whereby motion from the one to the other is expreſſed, are ſuch as are never employed in expreſſing motion to or from heaven, but always when the places are on a level, or nearly ſo. Thus Lazarus, when dead, is ſaid, Luke xvi. 22. απενεχθηναι, *to be caried away*, not ανενεχθηναι, *to be carried up*, by angels into Abraham's boſom; whereas,

whereas, it is the latter of these, or one similarly compounded, that is always used, where an assumption into heaven is spoken of. Thus, the same writer, in speaking of our Lord's ascension, says, ch. xxiv. 51. ανεφερετο εις τον ουρανον, and Mark, ch. xvi. 19. in relation to the same event, says, ανελημφθη εις τον ουρανον, *he was taken up into heaven.* These words are also used, wherever one is said to be conveyed from a lower to a higher situation. But, what is still more decisive in this way, where mention is made of passing from Abraham to the rich man, and inversely, the verbs employed are, διαβαινω and διαπεραω, words which always denote motion on the same ground or level; as, passing a river or lake, passing through the Red Sea, or passing from Asia into Macedonia. But, when heaven is spoken of as the termination to which, or from which, the passage is made, the word is invariably, either in the first case αναβαινω, and in the second καταβαινω, or some word similarly formed, and of the same import. Thus, both the circumstances of the story, and the expressions employed in it, confirm the explanation I have given. For if the sacred penmen wrote to be understood, they must have employed their words and phrases in conformity to the current usage of those for whom they wrote.

§ 21. When our Saviour, therefore, said to the penitent thief upon the cross, Luke xxiii. 43. *To day shalt thou be with me in paradise;* he said nothing that contradicts what is affirmed of his descent into *hades*, in the Psalms, in the Acts, or in the Apostles creed. *Paradise* is another name for what is, in the parable, called Abraham's bosom. But it may be urged on the other side, that Paul has given some reason to conclude that paradise and heaven, or the seat of the glorious hierarchy, are the same. *It is not*, says he, 2 Cor. xii. 1, 2, 3, 4. *expedient for me doubtless to glory: I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord. I knew a man in Christ above fourteen years ago (whether in the body I cannot tell, or whether out of the body, I cannot tell, God knoweth), such an one caught up to the third heaven. And I knew such a man (whether in the body, or out of the body, I cannot tell, God knoweth), how that he was caught up into paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter.* The Jews make mention of three heavens. The first is properly the atmosphere where the birds fly, and the clouds are suspended. The second is above the first, and is what we call the visible firmament, wherein the sun, moon, and stars appear. The third, to us invisible, is conceived to be above the second, and therefore sometimes styled the heaven of heavens. This they considered as the place of the throne of God, and the habitation of the holy angels. Now it is evident, that if, in the second and fourth verses, he speak of one vision or revelation only, paradise and heaven are the same; not so, if in these he speak

ſpeak of two different revelations. My opinion is, that they are two, and I ſhall aſſign my reaſons. Firſt, he ſpeaks of them as more than one, and that not only in introducing them, *I will come to viſions and revelations*, for ſometimes, it muſt be owned, the plural is uſed in expreſſing a ſubject indefinitely, but afterwards, in referring to what he had related he ſays, ver. 7. *leſt I ſhould be exalted above meaſure, through the abundance of the revelations*, των αποκαλυψεων. Secondly, they are related preciſely as two diſtinct events, and coupled together by the connexive particle. Thirdly, there is a repetition of his doubts, ver. 2, 3. in regard to the reality of his tranſlation, which, if the whole relate to a ſingle event, was not only ſuperfluous, but improper. This repetition, however, was neceſſary, if what is related in the third and fourth verſes, be a different fact from what is told in the ſecond, and if he was equally uncertain whether it paſſed in viſion or in reality. Fourthly, if all the three verſes regard only one revelation, there is a tautology in the manner of relating it unexampled in the apoſtle's writings. I might urge, as a fifth reaſon, the opinion of all Chriſtian antiquity, Origen alone excepted. And this, in a queſtion of philology, is not without its weight.

I ſhall only add, that though, in both verſes, the words in the Engliſh Bible are *caught up*, there is nothing in the original anſwering to the particle *up*. The apoſtle has very properly employed here the word ἁρπαζω, expreſſive more of the ſuddenneſs of the event, and of his own paſſiveneſs, than of the direction of the motion *. The only other place in which παραδεισος occurs is in the Apocalypſe, Rev. ii. 7. *To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midſt*, του παραδεισου, *of the paradiſe of God*. Here our Lord, no doubt, ſpeaks of heaven, but, as he plainly alludes to the ſtate of matters in the garden of Eden, where our firſt parents were placed, and where the tree of life grew, it can only be underſtood as a figurative expreſſion of the promiſe of eternal life, forfeited by Adam, but recovered by our Lord Jeſus Chriſt.

§ 22. To conclude this long diſcuſſion, I ſhall obſerve that, though

* The learned reader may peruſe the following paſſage from Epiphanius on this ſubject, in oppoſition to Origen. Ουδε ὁ αποστολος υποτιθεται τον παραδεισον ειναι εν τριτω ουρανω, τοις λεπτων ακροασθαι λογων επισαμενοις· οιδα γαρ ἁρπαγεντα ἑως τριτου λεγων ουρανου. και οιδα τον τοιουτον ανθρωπον, ειτε εν σωματι, ειτε χωρις σωματος, ὁ θεος οιδεν, ὁτε ἡρπαγη εις τον παραδεισον. δυο αποκαλυψεις μεγαλας ἑωρακεναι μηνυει, δις αναληφθεις εναργως, ἁπαξ μεν ἑως τριτου ουρανου, ἁπαξ δε εις τον παραδεισον. το γαρ οιδα ἁρπαγεντα τον τοιουτον ἑως τριτου ουρανου, ιδιως αποκαλυψιν αυτου κατα τον τριτον αναληφθεντι πεφηνεναι συνιησι. το δε, και οιδα παλιν επιφερομενον των τοιουτον ανθρωπον, ειτε εν σωματι, ειτε εκτος του σωματος, εις τον παραδεισον, ἑτεραν αυθις αυτου πεφανερωσθαι κατα τον παραδεισον αποκαλυψιν δεικνυσι. Epiph. Lib. ii. Hær. 44.

though we may discover hence, pretty exactly, the general sentiments entertained on these subjects at the time, and the style used concerning them, we are not to imagine that the expressions are to be rigorously interpreted, in order to come at the true doctrine upon those articles, but solely in order to discover the popular opinions of the age. In regard to these, the opinions of the age, there ought to be a close attention to the letter of what is spoken; but, in regard to the other, the doctrine of holy writ, our attention ought to be mostly to the spirit. Thus it appears to me the plain doctrine of Scripture, that there are such states as I have mentioned, and that the use and nature of them is such as has been said. But in respect of their situation, expressions implying that *hades* is under the earth, and that the seat of the blessed is above the stars, ought to be regarded merely as attempts to accommodate what is spoken to vulgar apprehension and language. Of the like kind is the practice, so frequent in holy writ, of ascribing human passions, nay, and human organs and members, to the Deity. The same may be said of what we hear of plants and trees in paradise, of eating and drinking, or of fire and brimstone in either *hades* or *gehenna*. We have no more reason to understand these literally, than we have to believe that the soul, when separated from the body, can feel torment in its tongue, or that a little cold water can relieve it.

§ 23. I am not ignorant, that the doctrine of an intermediate state between death and the resurrection, has been of late strenuously combated by some learned and ingenious men; amongst whom we must reckon that excellent divine, and firm friend to freedom of inquiry, Dr Law, the present bishop of Carlisle *. I honour his disposition, and have the greatest respect for his talents; but at the same time that I acknowledge he has, with much ability, supported the side he has espoused, I have never felt myself, on this head, convinced, though sometimes perplexed, by his reasoning. It is foreign to my purpose to enter into a minute discussion of controverted points in theology; and therefore I shall only, in passing, make a few remarks on this controversy, as it is closely connected with my subject.

First, I remark that the arguments on which the deniers of that state chiefly build, arise, in my opinion, from a misapprehension of the import of some Scriptural expressions. Καθευδειν, κοιμαν, *to sleep*, are words often applied to the *dead*, but this application is no more than a metaphorical euphemism derived from the resemblance which a dead body bears to the body of a person asleep. Traces of this idiom may be found in all languages, whatever be the popular belief about the state of the dead. They often occur in the Old Testement; yet it has been shown, that

* Dr Law was living when these Dissertations were in the hands of the Printer.

that the common doctrine of the Orientals favoured the ſeparate exiſtence of the ſouls of the deceaſed. But if it did not, and if, as ſome ſuppoſe, the ancient Jews were, on all articles relating to another life, no better than Sadducees; this ſhews the more ſtrongly, that ſuch metaphors, ſo frequent in their writings, could be derived ſolely from bodily likeneſs, and having no reference to a reſurrection, could be employed ſolely for the ſake of avoiding a diſagreeable or ominous word. I own, at the ſame time, that Chriſtians have been the more ready to adopt ſuch expreſſions, as their doctrine of the reſurrection of the body preſented to their minds an additional analogy between the bodies of the deceaſed and the bodies of thoſe aſleep, that of being one day awaked. But I ſee no reaſon to imagine that, in this uſe, they carried their thoughts further than to the corporeal and viſible reſemblance now mentioned. Another miſtake about the import of Scriptural terms, is in the ſenſe which has been given to the word ἀναστασις. They confine it by a uſe derived merely from modern European tongues, to that renovation which we call the reunion of the ſoul and the body, and which is to take place at the laſt day. I have ſhewn, in another place, (Notes on Matt. xxii. 23. and 32.) that this is not always the ſenſe of the term in the New Teſtament.

I remark, ſecondly, that many expreſſions of Scripture, in the natural and obvious ſenſe, imply that an intermediate and ſeparate ſtate of the ſoul is actually to ſucceed death. Such are the words of our Lord to the penitent thief upon the croſs, Luke xxiii. 43. Stephen's dying petition, Acts vii. 59. the compariſons which the apoſtle Paul makes in different places, (2 Cor. v. 6. &c. Philip. i. 21.) between the enjoyment which true Chriſtians can attain by their continuance in this world, and that which they enter on at their departure out of it, and ſeveral other paſſages. Let the words referred to be read by any judicious perſon, either in the original, or in the common tranſlation, which is ſufficiently exact for this purpoſe; and let him, ſetting aſide all theory or ſyſtem, ſay candidly whether they would not be underſtood, by the groſs of mankind, as preſuppoſing that the ſoul may, and will, exiſt ſeparately from the body, and be ſuſceptible of happineſs or miſery in that ſtate. If any thing could add to the native evidence of the expreſſions, it would be the unnatural meanings that are put upon them, in order to diſguiſe that evidence. What ſhall we ſay of the metaphyſical diſtinction introduced, for this purpoſe, between abſolute and relative time? The apoſtle Paul, they are ſenſible, ſpeaks of the ſaints as admitted to enjoyment in the preſence of God, immediately after death. Now, to palliate the direct contradiction there is in this to their doctrine, that the vital principle, which is all they mean by the ſoul, remains extinguiſhed between death and the reſurrection, they

remind us of the difference there is between abſolute or real, and relative or apparent, time. They admit that, if the apoſtle be underſtood as ſpeaking of real time, what is ſaid flatly contradicts their ſyſtem; but, ſay they, his words muſt be interpreted as ſpoken only of apparent time. He talks indeed of entering on a ſtate of enjoyment, immediately after death, though there may be many thouſands of years between the one and the other; for he means only, that when that ſtate ſhall commence, however diſtant in reality the time may be, the perſon entering on it will not be ſenſible of that diſtance, and conſequently there will be to him an apparent coincidence with the moment of his death. But does the apoſtle any where give a hint that this is his meaning? or is it what any man would naturally diſcover from his words? That it is exceedingly remote from the common uſe of language, I believe hardly any of thoſe who favour this ſcheme, will be partial enough to deny. Did the ſacred penmen then mean to put a cheat upon the world, and, by the help of an equivocal expreſſion, to flatter men with the hope of entering, the inſtant they expire, on a ſtate of felicity, when, in fact, they knew that it would be many ages before it would take place? But, were the hypotheſis about the extinction of the mind between death and the reſurrection well founded, the apparent coincidence they ſpeak of, is not ſo clear as they ſeem to think it. For my part, I cannot regard it as an axiom, and I never heard of any who attempted to demonſtrate it. To me it appears merely a corollary from Mr Locke's doctrine, which derives our conceptions of time from the ſucceſſion of our ideas, which, whether true or falſe, is a doctrine to be found only among certain philoſophers, and which, we may reaſonably believe, never came into the heads of thoſe to whom the goſpel in the apoſtolic age was announced.

I remark, thirdly, that even the curious equivocations (or, perhaps more properly, mental reſervation), that has been deviſed for them, will not, in every caſe, ſave the credit of apoſtolical veracity. The words of Paul to the Corinthians are, *Knowing, that whilſt we are at home in the body, we are abſent from the Lord:* again, *We are willing rather to be abſent from the body, and preſent with the Lord.* Could ſuch expreſſions have been uſed by him, if he had held it impoſſible to be with the Lord, or indeed any where, without the body; and that, whatever the change was which was made by death, he could not be in the preſence of the Lord, till he returned to the body? Abſence from the body, and preſence with the Lord, were never, therefore, more unfortunately combined, than in this illuſtration. Things are combined here as coincident, which, on the hypotheſis of thoſe gentlemen, are incompatible. If recourſe be had to the original, the expreſſions in Greek are, if poſſible, ſtill ſtronger. They are, *οι ενδημουντες εν τω σωματι, thoſe who dwell in the body*, who are *ενδη-*

μουντες

μεντες απο τυ Κυριυ, *at a diſtance from the Lord*; as, on the contrary, they are οι εκδημεντες εκ τυ σωματος, *thoſe who have travelled out of the body*, who are οι ενδημεντες προς τον Κυριον, *thoſe who reſide*, or *are preſent with the Lord*. In the paſſage to the Philippians alſo, the commencement of his preſence with the Lord is repreſented as coincident, not with his return to the body, but with his leaving it, with the diſſolution, not with the reſtoration, of the union.

The fourth, and only other remark I ſhall make, on this ſubject, is, that from the tenor of the New Teſtament, the ſacred writers appear to proceed on the ſuppoſition, that the ſoul and the body are naturally diſtinct and ſeparable, and that the ſoul is ſuſceptible of pain or pleaſure in a ſtate of ſeparation. It were endleſs to enumerate all the places which evince this. The ſtory of the rich man and Lazarus, Luke xvi. 22, 23.; the laſt words of our Lord upon the croſs, Luke xxiii. 46. and of Stephen when dying; Paul's doubts whether he was in the body or out of the body, when he was tranſlated to the third heaven, and paradiſe, 2 Cor. xii. 2, 3, 4.; our Lord's words to Thomas, to ſatisfy him that he was not a ſpirit, Luke xxiv. 39.; and, to conclude, the expreſs mention of the denial of ſpirits, as one of the errors of the Sadducees, Acts xxiii. 8.: *For the Sadducees ſay that there is no reſurrection, neither angel nor ſpirit*, μηδε αγγελον μηδε πνευμα. All theſe are irrefragable evidences of the general opinion on this ſubject of both Jews and Chriſtians. By *ſpirit*, as diſtinguiſhed from *angel*, is evidently meant the departed ſpirit of a human being; for, that man is here, before his natural death, poſſeſſed of a vital and intelligent principle, which is commonly called his ſoul or ſpirit, it was never pretended that they denied. It has been ſaid, that this manner of expreſſing themſelves has been adopted by the apoſtles and evangeliſts, merely in conformity to vulgar notions. To me it appears a conformity, which (if the ſacred writers entertained the ſentiments of our antagoniſts on this article) is hardly reconcilable to the known ſimplicity and integrity of their character. It favours much more of the pious frauds, which became common afterwards, to which I own myſelf unwilling to aſcribe ſo ancient and ſo reſpectable an origin. See Part I. of this Diſſertation, § 10.

§ 24. I ſhall ſubjoin a few words on the manner wherein the diſtinction has been preſerved between *hades* and *gehenna* by the tranſlators of the New Teſtament; for, as I obſerved before, *gehenna*, as a name for the place of future puniſhment, does not occur in the Old. All the Latin tranſlations I have ſeen, obſerve the diſtinction. All without exception adopt the word *gehenna*, though they do not all uniformly tranſlate *hades*. Both the Geneva French, and Diodati, have followed the ſame method. Luther, on the contrary, in his German verſion, has uniformly confounded

founded them, rendering both by the word *holle*. The Engliſh tranſlators have taken the ſame method, and rendered both the Greek names by the word *hell*, except in one ſingle place, 1 Cor. xv. 55. where ἅδης is tranſlated *grave*. Moſt foreign verſions obſerve the difference. So do ſome of the late Engliſh tranſlators, but not all. The common method of diſtinguiſhing, hitherto obſerved, has been to retain the word *gehenna*, and tranſlate *hades* either *hell* or *grave*, as appeared moſt to ſuit the context. I have choſen, in this verſion, to reverſe that method, to render γεεννα always *hell*, and to retain the word *hades*. My reaſons are, firſt, though Engliſh ears are not entirely familiarized to either term, they are much more ſo to the latter than to the former, in conſequence of the greater uſe made of the latter in theological writings. Secondly, the import of the Engliſh word *hell*, when we ſpeak as Chriſtians, anſwers exactly to γεεννα, not to ἅδης; whereas, to this laſt word we have no term in the language correſponding. Accordingly, though, in my judgment, it is not one of thoſe terms which admit different meanings, there has been very little uniformity preſerved by tranſlators in rendering it.

PART III.

Μετανοεω and Μεταμελομαι.

I SHALL now offer a few remarks on two words that are uniformly rendered by the ſame Engliſh word in the common verſion, between which there appears, notwithſtanding, to be a real difference in ſignification. The words are μετανοεω and μεταμελομαι, *I repent*. It has been obſerved by ſome, and, I think, with reaſon, that the former denotes properly a change to the better; the latter, barely a change, whether it be to the better or to the worſe; that the former marks a change of mind that is durable and productive of conſequences; the latter expreſſes only a preſent uneaſy feeling of regret or ſorrow for what is done, without regard either to duration or to effects; in fine, that the firſt may properly be tranſlated into Engliſh *to reform*; the ſecond, *to repent*, in the familiar acceptation of the word.

§ 2. The learned Grotius (whoſe judgment in critical queſtions is highly reſpectable) is not convinced that this diſtinction is well-founded. And I acknowledge that he advances ſome plauſible things in ſupport of his opinion. But as I have not found them ſatisfactory, I ſhall aſſign my reaſons for thinking differently. Let it, in the firſt place be obſerved, that the import of μεταμελομαι, in the explanation given, being more extenſive

or

or generical than that of μετανοεω, it may, in many cafes, be uſed, without impropriety, for μετανοεω; though the latter, being more limited and ſpecial in its acceptation, cannot ſo properly be employed for the former. The genus includes the ſpecies, not the ſpecies the genus.

§ 3. Admitting, therefore, that, in the expreſſion in the parable quoted by Grotius in ſupport of his opinion, ὑστερον δε μεταμεληθεις απηλθε, *afterwards he repented and went*, Matt. xxi. 29. the word μετανοησας would have been appoſite, becauſe the change ſpoken of is to the better, and had an effect on his conduct; ſtill the word μεταμεληθεις is not improper, no more than the Engliſh word *repented*, though the change, as far as it went, was a real reformation. Every one who reforms, repents; but every one who repents does not reform. I uſe the words entirely according to the popular idiom, and not according to the definitions of theologians; nay, I ſay further, that in this inſtance the Greek word μεταμελομαι is more proper than μετανοεω, and the Engliſh *repent* than *reform*. The reaſon is, becauſe the latter expreſſion in each language is not ſo well adapted to a ſingle action, as to a habit of acting, whereas the former may be equally applied to either. Now it is only one action that is mentioned in the parable.

§ 4. In regard to the other paſſage quoted by Grotius, to ſhew that μετανοια alſo is uſed where, according to the doctrine above explained, it ought to be μεταμελεια, I think he has not been more fortunate than in the former. The paſſage is, where it is ſaid of Eſau, Heb. xii. 17. *Ye know that afterward, when he would have inherited the bleſſing, he was rejected. For he found no place of repentance*, μετανοιας τοπον ουχ ευρε, *though he ſought it carefully with tears*. Grotius, in his comment on the place, acknowledges that the word μετανοια is not uſed here literally, but by a metonomy of the effect for the cauſe. 'He found no ſcope for 'effecting a change in what had been done, a revocation of the 'bleſſing given to Jacob, with a new grant of it to himſelf, or at 'leaſt of ſuch a bleſſing as might, in a great meaſure, ſuperſede 'or cancel the former.' This change was what he found no poſſibility of effecting, however earneſtly and movingly he ſought it. It is plain, that neither μετανοια, nor μεταμελεια, in their ordinary acceptation, expreſſes this change. For that it was not any repentance or reformation on himſelf, which he found no place for, is manifeſt both from the paſſage itſelf, and from the ſtory to which it refers. From the conſtruction of the words we learn, that what Eſau did not find, was what he ſought carefully with tears. Now, what he ſought carefully with tears, was, as is evident from the hiſtory, Gen. xxvii. 30. &c. ſuch a change in his father as I have mentioned. This was what he urged ſo affectingly, and this was what he, notwithſtanding, found it impoſſible

poſſible to obtain. Now, I acknowledge that it is only by a trope that this can be called either μετανοια or μεταμελεια. That it was not literally the regret or grief implied in μεταμελεια that he ſought, is as clear as day, ſince the manner in which he applied to his father, ſhewed him to be already poſſeſſed of the moſt pungent grief for what had happened. Nay, it appears from the hiſtory, that the good old Patriarch, when he diſcovered the deceit that had been practiſed on him, was very ſtrongly affected alſo; for it is ſaid, ver. 33. that Iſaac *trembled very exceedingly*. Now, as μετανοια implies a change of conduct, as well as ſorrow for what is paſt, it comes nearer the ſcope of the ſacred writer than μεταμελεια. If, therefore, there is ſome deviation from ſtrict propriety in the word μετανοια here uſed, it is unqueſtionable that to ſubſtitute in its place μεταμελεια, and repreſent Eſau as ſeeking, in the bitterneſs of grief, that he, or even his father, might be grieved, would include, not barely an impropriety, or deviation from the literal import, but an evident abſurdity.

§ 5. Paſſing theſe examples, which are all that have been produced on that ſide, are the words in general ſo promiſcuouſly uſed by ſacred writers (for it is only about words which ſeldom occur in Scripture, that we need recur to the uſage of profane authors), as that we cannot, with certainty, or at leaſt with probability, mark the difference? Though I do not believe this to be the caſe, yet as I do not think the matter ſo clear as in the ſuppoſed ſynonymas already diſcuſſed, I ſhall impartially and briefly ſtate what appears to me of weight on both ſides.

§ 6. Firſt, in regard to the uſage of the Seventy, it cannot be denied that they employ the two words indiſcriminately; and, if the preſent enquiry were about the uſe obſerved in their verſion, we could not, with juſtice, ſay, that they intended to mark any diſtinction between them. They are, beſides, uſed indifferently in tranſlating the ſame Hebrew words, ſo that there is every appearance that with them they were ſynonymous. But though the uſe of the Seventy adds conſiderable ſtrength to any argument drawn from the uſe of the New Teſtament writers, when the uſages of both are the ſame, or even doubtful; yet, when they differ, the former, however clear, cannot, in a queſtion which ſolely concerns the uſe that prevails in the New Teſtament, invalidate the evidence of the latter. We know, that in a much ſhorter period than that which intervened between the tranſlation of the Old Teſtament, and the compoſition of the New, ſome words may become obſolete, and others may conſiderably alter in ſignification. It is comparatively but a ſhort time (being leſs than two centuries) that has intervened between the making of our own verſion and the preſent hour; and yet, in regard to the language of that verſion, both have already happened,

pened, as ſhall be ſhewn afterwards *. Several of its words are antiquated, and others bear a different meaning now from what they did then.

§ 7. Let us therefore recur to the uſe of the New Teſtament. And here I obſerve, firſt, that where this change of mind is inculcated as a duty, or the neceſſity of it mentioned as a doctrine of Chriſtianity, the terms are invariably μετανοεω and μετανοια. Thus John the Baptiſt and our Lord, both began their preaching with this injunction, μετανοειτε, Math. iii. 2. iv. 17. The diſciples that were ſent out to warn and prepare men for the manifeſtation of the Meſſiah, are ſaid to have gone and preached ινα μετανοησωσι, Mark vi. 12. The call which the Apoſtles gave to all hearers was, μετανοησατε, και επιστρεψατε, και βαπτισθητω εκαστος υμων, Acts ii. 38. iii. 19. *to reform their lives, return to God, and be baptized.* Peter's command to Simon Magus, on diſcovering the corruption of his heart, is, μετανοησον απο της κακιας ταυτης, ch. viii. 22. When it is mentioned as an order from God, παραγγελλει τοις ανθρωποις πασι πανταχου μετανοειν, ch. xvii. 30. The duty to which Paul every where exhorted was, μετανοειν και επιστρεφειν επι τον Θεον, ch. xxvi. 20. The charge to reformation given to the Aſiatic churches in the Apocalypſe, is always expreſſed by the word μετανοησον, and their failure in this particular by ου μετενοησε, Rev. ii. and iii. paſſim. The neceſſity of this change for preventing final ruin, is thus repeatedly expreſſed by our Lord, Εαν μη μετανοητε, παντες απολεισθε, Luke xiii. 3, 5. And, in regard to the noun, wherever mention is made of this change as a duty, it is μετανοια, not μεταμελεια. It was εις μετανοιαν that our Lord came to call ſinners, Math. ix. 13.; the baptiſm which John preached was βαπτισμα μετανοιας, Mark i. 4. The fruits of a good life, which he enjoined them to produce, were αξιους μετανοιας, Math. iii. 8. What the Apoſtles preached to all nations, in their Maſter's name as inſeparably connected, were μετανοιαν και αφεσιν αμαρτιων, Luke xxiv. 47. Again, it is given as the ſum of their teaching, την εις τον Θεον μετανοιαν, και πιστιν εις τον Κυριον ημων Ιησουν Χριστον, Acts xx. 21. The ſame word is employed when the offer of ſuch terms is exhibited as the reſult of divine grace, Acts xi. 18. Now, in a queſtion of criticiſm, it is hardly poſſible to find ſtronger evidence of the diſtinction than that which has now been produced.

§ 8. There is a great difference between the mention of any thing as a duty, eſpecially of that conſequence, that the promiſes or threats of religion depend on the performance or neglect of it; and the bare recording of an event as fact. In the former, the words ought to be as ſpecial as poſſible, that there may be no miſtake in the application of the promiſe, no pretence for ſaying that more is exacted than was expreſſed in the condition. But, in relating facts, it is often a matter of indifference, whether the terms

* Diſſ. XI. Part II. § 5. &c.

terms be general or ſpecial. Provided nothing falſe be added, it is not expected that every thing true ſhould be included. This is the leſs neceſſary when, in the ſequel of a ſtory, circumſtances are mentioned, which ſupply any defect arifing from the generality of the terms. Under this deſcription may be included both the paſſage formerly conſidered, ὑστερον μεταμεληθεις απελθε; and that other connected with it, in the reproach pronounced againſt the Phariſees, for their impenitence and incredulity under the Baptiſt's miniſtry, ϑ μετεμεληθητε ὑστερον, τϑ πιστευσαι αυτω, Matth. xxi. 32. The laſt clauſe in each perfectly aſcertains the import of the ſentence, and ſupplies every defect.

§ 9. Let it further be obſerved, that when ſuch a ſorrow is alluded to, as either was not productive of reformation, or, in the nature of the thing, does not imply it, the words μετανοια and μετανοεω are never uſed. Thus the repentance of Judas, which drove him to deſpair, is expreſſed by μεταμεληθεις, Matth. xxvii. 3. When Paul, writing to the Corinthians, mentions the ſorrow his former letter had given them, he ſays, that conſidering the good effects of that ſorrow, he does not repent that he had written it, though he had formerly repented. Here no more can be underſtood by his own repentance ſpoken of, but that uneaſineſs which a good man feels, not from the conſciouſneſs of having done wrong, but from a tenderneſs for others, and a fear, leſt that which, prompted by duty, he had ſaid, ſhould have too ſtrong an effect upon them. This might have been the caſe, without any fault in him, as the conſequence of a reproof depends much on the temper with which it is received. His words are Ει ελυπησα ὑμας εν τη επιστολη ου μεταμελομαι ει και μετεμελομην, 2 Cor. vii. 8. As it would have made nonſenſe of the paſſage to have rendered the verb in Engliſh, *reformed* inſtead of *repented*, the verb μετανοεω inſtead of μεταμελομαι, would have been improper in Greek.

There is one paſſage in which this Apoſtle has in effect employed both words, and in ſuch a manner, as clearly ſhows the difference. Ἡ κατα Θεον λυπη μετανοιαν εις σωτηριαν αμεταμελητον κατεργαζεται, ver. 10.: in the common verſion, *Godly ſorrow worketh repentance to ſalvation not to be repented of.* There is a paronomaſia here, or play upon the word *repent*, which is not in the original. As both words μετανοεω and μεταμελομαι are uniformly tranſlated by the ſame Engliſh word, this figure of ſpeech could hardly have been avoided in the common verſion. Now, had the two words been alſo ſynonymous in Greek (as that trope, when it comes in the way, is often adopted by the ſacred writers), it had been more natural to ſay μετανοιαν αμετανοητον. Whereas the change of the word plainly ſhows, that in the Apoſtle's judgment, there would have been ſomething incongruous in that expreſſion. In the firſt word μετανοιαν, is expreſſed the effect of godly ſorrow, which is reformation, a duty required by our religion

religion as neceſſary to ſalvation. In the other αμεταμελητον, there is no alluſion to a further reformation, but to a further change, it being only meant to ſay, that the reformation effected is ſuch as ſhall never be regretted, never repented of. As into the import of this word there enters no conſideration of goodneſs or badneſs, but barely of change, from whatever motive or cauſe; the word αμεταμελητος comes to ſignify *ſteady*, *immutable*, *irrevocable*. This is evidently the meaning of it in that expreſſion, Αμεταμελητα τα χαρισματα και ἡ κλησις τȣ Θεȣ, Rom. xi. 29. which our tranſlators render, *the gifts and calling of God are without repentance*; more appoſitely and perſpicuouſly, are *irrevocable*. For this reaſon the word μεταμελομαι is uſed when the ſentence relates to the conſtancy or immutability of God. Thus Ωμοσε Κυριος και ȣ μεταμεληθησεται, Heb. vii. 21.: *The Lord hath ſworn and will not repent*, that is, *alter his purpoſe*.

The word αμετανοητον, on the contrary, including ſomewhat of the ſenſe of its primitive, expreſſes not, as the other, *unchanged* or *unchangeable*, but *unreformed*, *unreformable*, *impenitent*. The Apoſtle ſays, addreſſing himſelf to the obſtinate infidel, κατα την σκληροτητα σȣ και αμετανοητον καρδιαν, Rom. ii. 5: *After thy hardneſs and impenitent*, or irreclaimable *heart*. The word αμετανοητος, in the New Teſtament ſtyle, ought analogically to expreſs a wretched ſtate, as it ſignifies the want of that μετανοια, which the Goſpel every where repreſents as the indiſpenſable duty of the lapſed, and therefore as eſſential to their becoming Chriſtians; but the term αμεταμελητος is noway fitted to this end, as it expreſſes only the abſence of that μεταμελεια, which is nowhere repreſented as a virtue, or required as a duty, and which may be good, bad, or indifferent, according to its object. Thus I have ſhown, that on every pertinent occaſion, the diſtinction is ſacredly obſerved by the penmen of the New Teſtament, and that the very few inſtances in which it may appear otherwiſe at firſt glance, are found to be no exceptions when attentively examined.

§ 10. Having now aſcertained the diſtinction, it may be aſked, How the words ought to be diſcriminated in a tranſlation? In my opinion, μετανοεω, in moſt caſes, particularly where it is expreſſed as a command, or mentioned as a duty, ſhould be rendered by the Engliſh verb *reform*, μετανοια, by *reformation*; and that μεταμελομαι ought to be tranſlated *repent*. Μεταμελεια is defined by Phavorinus δυσαρεστησις επι πεπραγμενοις, *diſſatisfaction with one's ſelf, for what one has done*, which exactly hits the meaning of the word *repentance*; whereas μετανοια is defined γνησια απο πταισματων επι το εναντιον αγαθον επιστροφη, and ἡ προς το κρειττον επιστροφ ἡ *a genuine correction of faults*, and *a change from worſe to better*. We cannot more exactly define the word *reformation*. It may be ſaid that, in uſing the terms *repent* and *repentance*, as our tranſlators have done, for both the original terms, there is no

riſk of any dangerous error; becauſe, in the theological definitions of repentance, given by almoſt all parties, ſuch a reformation of the diſpoſition is included, as will infallibly produce a reformation of conduct. This, however, does not ſatisfy. Our Lord and his Apoſtles accommodated themſelves in their ſtyle to the people whom they addreſſed, by employing words according to the received and vulgar idiom, and not according to the technical uſe of any learned doctors. It was not to ſuch that his doctrine was revealed, but to thoſe who, in reſpect of acquired knowledge, were babes, Matth. xi. 25. The learned uſe is known comparatively but to a few: and it is certain that with us, according to the common acceptation of the words, a man may be ſaid juſt as properly to repent of a good, as of a bad, action. A covetous man will repent of the alms which a ſudden fit of pity may have induced him to beſtow. Beſides, it is but too evident, that a man may often juſtly be ſaid to repent, who never reforms. In neither of theſe ways do I find the word μετανοεω ever uſed.

I have another objection to the word *repent*. It unavoidably appears to lay the principal ſtreſs on the ſorrow or remorſe which it implies for former miſconduct. Now this appears a ſecondary matter at the moſt, and not to be the idea ſuggeſted by the Greek verb. The primary object is a real change of conduct. The Apoſtle expreſsly diſtinguiſhes it from ſorrow, in a paſſage lately quoted, repreſenting it as what the ſorrow, if of a godly ſort, terminates in, or produces. Ἡ κατα Θεον λυπη μετανοιαν κατεργαζεται, rendered in the common verſion, *Godly ſorrow worketh repentance*. Now, if he did not mean to ſay that the thing was cauſed by itſelf, or that repentance worketh repentance (and who will charge him with this abſurdity?) ἡ κατα Θεον λυπη is one thing, and μετανοια is another. But it is certain that our word repentance implies no more in common uſe, even in its beſt ſenſe, than ἡ κατα Θεον λυπη, and often not ſo much. It is conſequently not a juſt interpretation of the Greek word μετανοια, which is not ἡ κατα Θεον λυπη, but its certain conſequence. Grief or remorſe, compared with this, is but an accidental circumſtance. Who had more grief than Judas, whom it drove to deſpondency and ſelf-deſtruction? To him the Evangeliſt applies very properly the term μεταμεληθεις, which we as properly tranſlate *repented*. He was in the higheſt degree diſſatisfied with himſelf. But, to ſhow that a great deal more is neceſſary in the Chriſtian, neither our Lord himſelf, as we have ſeen, nor his forerunner John, nor his Apoſtles and miniſters who followed, ever expreſſed themſelves in this manner, when recommending to their hearers the great duties of Chriſtianity. They never called out to the people, μεταμελεσθε, but always μετανοειτε. If they were ſo attentive to this diſtinction, in order to prevent men, in ſo important an article, from placing their duty in a barren remorſe, however violent;

lent; we ought not surely to express this capital precept of our religion, by a term that is just as well adapted to the case of Judas, as to that of Peter. For the Greek word μεταμελομαι, though carefully avoided by the inspired writers, in expressing our duty, is fully equivalent to the English word *repent*.

§ 11. I shall now, ere I conclude this subject, consider briefly in what manner some of the principal translators have rendered the words in question into other languages. I shall begin with the Syriac, being the most respectable, on the score of antiquity, of all we are acquainted with. In this venerable version, which has served as a model to interpreters in the East, in like manner as the Vulgate has served to those in the West, the distinction is uniformly preserved. Μετανοειν is rendered תוב *thub, to reform*, to return to God, to amend one's life; μετανοια תבותא *thebutha, reformation*; μεταμελεσθαι is rendered תוא *thua, to repent*, to be sorry for what one has done. Nor are these Syriac words ever confounded as synonymous, except in the Apocalypse, which, though now added in the printed editions, is no part of that ancient translation, but was made many centuries after.

The second place in point of antiquity is, no doubt, due to the Vulgate, where, I acknowledge, there is no distinction made. The usual term for μετανοια is *pœnitentia*, for μετανοεω and μεταμελομαι indiscriminately, *pœnitentiam ago, pœnitentiam habeo, pœniteo* or *me pœnitet*. These can hardly be said to express more than the English words *repentance* and *repent*. Μετανοιαν αμεταμελητον is not improperly rendered *pœnitentiam stabilem*, agreebly to an acceptation of the term above taken notice of.

Beza, one of the most noted, and by Protestants most imitated, of all the Latin translators since the reformation, has carefully observed the distinction, wherever it was of consequence; for, as I remarked, there are a few cases in which either term might have been used in the original, and concerning which, a translator must be directed by the idiom of the tongue in which he writes. The same distinction had been made before, though not with perfect uniformity, by the translators of Züric. Beza's word for μετανοεω is *resipisco*, and for μετανοια, *resipiscentia*. To this last term he was led both by analogy, and (if not by classical authority) by the authority of early ecclesiastical writers, which, in the translation of holy writ, is authority sufficient. These words have this advantage of *pœnitere* and *pœnitentia*, that they always denote a change of some continuance, and a change to the better. For μεταμελομαι his word is *pœnitere*. Thus μεταμεληθεις, spoken of Judas, is *pœnitens*: Μετανοιαν αμεταμελητον, *resipiscentiam cujus nunquam pœniteat*, in which the force of both words is very well expressed. So is also αμεταννοητον καρδιαν, *cor quod resipiscere nescit*. Erasmus one of the earliest translators on the Romish side, uses both *resipisco* and *pœnitentiam ago*, but with

with no diſcrimination. They are not only both employed in rendering the ſame word μετανοεω, but even when the ſcope is the ſame. Thus μετανοειτε in the imperative, is at one time *reſipiſcite*, at another *pœnitentiam agite*: ſo that his only view ſeems to have been to diverſify his ſtyle.

Caſtalio, one of the moſt eminent Latin Proteſtant tranſlators, has been ſenſible of the diſtinction, and careful to preſerve it in his verſion. But, as his great aim was to give a claſſical air to the books of Scripture, in order to engage readers of taſte who affected an elegant and copious diction; he has diſfigured, with his adventitious ornaments, the native ſimplicity which ſo remarkably diſtinguiſhes the ſacred penmen, and is, in fact, one of their greateſt ornaments. We can more eaſily bear ruſticity than affectation, eſpecially on the moſt ſerious and important ſubjects. Amongſt other arts, by which Caſtalio has endeavoured to recommend his work, one is a ſtudied variety in the phraſes, that the ear may not be tired by too frequent recurrence to the ſame ſounds. The words under conſideration afford a ſtrong example. The verb μετανοεω is tranſlated by him I know not how many different ways. It is *ſe corrigere*, *vitam corrigere*, *redire ad frugem*, *redire ad ſanitatem*, *reverti ad ſanitatem*; when the vices which we are required to amend are mentioned, the phraſe is, *deſciſcere a ſua pravitate*, *deſiſtere a turpitudine*, *deſiſtere a ſuis operibus*, *impudicitia ſua recedere*, *ſua homicidia*, &c. *omittere*. Μετανοια partakes of the like variety. It is *emendata vita*, *vitæ emendatio*, *correcta vita*, *vitæ correctio*, *morum correctio*, *correcti mores*, *corrigenda vita*, *ſanitas*, *pœnitentia*; and in the oblique caſes, *frugem* and *bonam frugem*. For μεταμελομαι, I only find the two words *pœnitere* and *mutare ſententiam*. Μετανοιαν αμεταμελητον is not badly rendered *vitæ correctionem nunquam pœnitendam*, αμεταμελητα χαρισματα *munera irrevocabilia*, and αμετανοητος καρδια *ſepioratus animus*.

Diodati, the Italian tranſlator, in every caſe of moment, renders the verb μετανοεω *ravederſi*, which in the Vocabolario della Cruſca is explained *reſipiſcere*, *ad mentis ſanitatem redire*; but for the noun μετανοια, he always uſes *penitenza*, and for μεταμελομαι, very properly *pentirſi*. The Geneva French, tranſlates μετανοεω, *s'amender*, μεταμελομαι, *ſe repentir*, and μετανοια *repentance*. In both theſe verſions they uſe, in rendering μετανοιαν αμεταμελητον, the ſame paronomaſia which is in the common Engliſh verſion. Diodati has *penitenza della quale huom non ſi pente*. The Geneva French has *repentance dont on ne ſe repent*. The other paſſages alſo above quoted from the original, they tranſlate in nearly the ſame manner. Luther, in his German tranſlation, has generally diſtinguiſhed the two verbs, rendering μετανοειν *buſſe thun*, and μεταμελεισθαι *reuen* or *gereuen*.

PART

PART IV.

Ἅγιος and ὅσιος.

I SHALL give, as another example of words, ſuppoſed to be ſynonymous, the terms ἅγιος and ὅσιος. The former is, if I miſtake not, uniformly rendered in the New Teſtament, *holy*, or, when uſed ſubſtantively in the plural, *ſaints*. The latter, except in one inſtance, is always rendered by the ſame term, not only in the Engliſh Bible, but in moſt modern tranſlations. Yet that theſe two Greek words are altogether equivalent, there is, in my opinion, good reaſon to doubt. Both belong to the ſecond claſs of words, which I explained in a former Diſſertation *. They relate to manners, and are therefore not ſo eaſily defined. Nor are ſuch words in one language ever found exactly to tally with thoſe of another. There are, however, certain means, by which the true ſignification may, in moſt caſes, be, very nearly, if not entirely, reached. I ſhall, therefore, firſt mention my reaſons for thinking that the two words ἅγιος and ὅσιος in the New Teſtament are not ſynonymous, and then endeavour to aſcertain the preciſe meaning of each.

§ 2. That there is a real difference in ſignification between the two Greek words, notwithſtanding their affinity, my firſt reaſon for thinking is, becauſe in the Septuagint, which is the foundation of the Helleniſtic idiom, one of them is that by which one Hebrew word, and the other that by which another, not at all ſynonymous, is commonly tranſlated. Ἅγιος is the word uſed for קדוש *kadoſh*, *ſanctus*, *holy*, ὅσιος for חסיד *chaſid*, *benignus*, *gracious*.

§ 3. My ſecond reaſon is, becauſe theſe words have been underſtood by the ancient Greek tranſlators to be ſo diſtinct in ſignification, that not in one ſingle inſtance is the Hebrew word *kadoſh* rendered by the Greek ὅσιος, or *chaſid* by ἅγιος. What gives additional weight to this reaſon, is the conſideration, that both words frequently occur; and that the Greek tranſlators, though they have not been uniform in rendering either, but have adopted different words, on different occaſions, for tranſlating each; have, nevertheleſs, not in a ſingle inſtance, adopted any of thoſe terms, for rendering one of theſe Hebrew words, which they had adopted for rendering the other. Few words occur oftener than *kadoſh*. But, though it is, beyond compariſon, oftenеſt tranſlated ἅγιος, it is not ſo always. In one place it is rendered καθαρος, *mundus*, *clean*; the verb *kadaſh*, the ætymon is rendered δοξαζειν, *glorificare*, *to glorify*, αναβιβαζειν *aſcendere facere*, *to cauſe to aſcend*;

* Diſſ. II. § 4.

cend, καθαριζειν *purgare, to cleanſe*, ἁγιζειν *purificare, to purify*, as well as ἁγιαζειν and καθαγιαζειν *ſanctificare, to hallow, to ſanctify*; but not once by ὁσιος, or any of its conjugates. On the other hand, *chaſid* is rendered ελεημων and πολυελεος *miſericors, merciful*, ευλαβης *pius, devout*, and by ſome other words, but not once by ἁγιος, or by any of its conjugates, or by any of the terms employed in rendering *kadoſh*; a certain ſign, that to the old Greek tranſlators, ſeveral other words appeared to have more coincidence with either, than theſe had with each other.

§ 4. The third reaſon, which inclines me to think that the two words are not ſynonymous, is, becauſe I find, on examining and comparing, that there is a conſiderable difference in the application of them, not only in the Old Teſtament, but in the New. In regard to the word ἁγιος, it is applied not only to perſons, but to things inanimate, as the ſacred utenſils and veſtments; to times, as their jubilees and ſabbaths, their ſolemn feſtivals and faſts; and to places, as the land of Judea, the city of Jeruſalem, the mountain whereon ſtood the temple, the temple with its courts; but more eſpecially the houſe which the courts encloſed, the outer part whereof was called, by way of eminence, ἡ ἁγια, *ſcilicit* σκηνη, *the holy place*, and the inner ἡ ἁγια ἁγιων, *the holy of holies*, or *the moſt holy place*. Now I find nothing like this in the uſe made of the word ὁσιος, which, as far as I can diſcover, is applied only to perſons, or beings ſuſceptible of character. The τα ὁσια Δαβιδ, Iſa. lv. 3. Acts xiii. 34. cannot be accounted an exception. The word uſed by the Prophet is חסד *cheſed*, *benignitas*, not חסיד *chaſid*, *benignus*, and is not improperly rendered in our verſion *mercies*. Nor is the ὁσιας χειρας of the Apoſtle, 1 Tim. ii. 8. an exception, this being manifeſtly not a literal, but a tropical uſe of the epithet, wherein that is applied to the inſtrument, which, in ſtrictneſs, is applicable only to the agent; as when we ſay a *ſlanderous tongue* and *guilty hands*, we are always underſtood as applying the qualities of *ſlander* and *guilt*, to the perſon of whoſe tongue and hands we are ſpeaking.

§ 5. I obſerve, further, that even when ἁγιος is applied to perſons, it has not always a relation to the moral character, but often to ſomething, which, in regard to the perſon, is merely circumſtantial and external. It is, in this reſpect, that the children of Iſrael are called a *holy* nation, being conſecrated by their circumciſion, notwithſtanding that they were a rebellious and ſtiff-necked people, and rather worſe, inſtead of better, than other nations; as their great legiſlator Moſes often declares to them. In this ſenſe the tribe of Levi was *holier* than any other tribe, purely becauſe ſelected for the ſacred ſervice; the prieſthood had more *holineſs* than the other Levites, and the high-prieſt was the *holieſt* of all. There was the ſame gradation in theſe, as in the courts and houſe of the temple. It is in this ſenſe I underſtand the

the word ἅγιος, as applied to Aaron; *They envied Moſes, alſo, in the camp, and Aaron the ſaint of the Lord*, Pſal. cvi. 16.; τον ἅγιον Κυριε. Aaron's perſonal character does not ſeem to have entitled him to this diſtinction above Moſes, and the whole nation. Nor does the title ſeem to have been peculiarly applicable to him, in any other ſenſe than that now mentioned, namely, that he was the only one of the people who carried on his forehead the ſignature of his conſecration, *holineſs to the Lord*, ἁγιασμα Κυριε.

§ 6. On the other hand, it does not appear, from any clear paſſage, either in the Old Teſtament or in the New, that the Hebrew word *chaſid*, or the Greek *hoſios*, are ſuſceptible of this interpretation. I ſay, any clear paſſage; for I acknowledge there is one, the only one I can find in either, wherein the application of this term, as commonly underſtood, is ſimilar to that of the other lately quoted from the Pſalms. It is in Moſes' benediction of the tribes, immediately before his death: *Of Levi he ſaid, Let thy Thummim and thy Urim be with thy holy one, whom thou didſt prove at Maſſah, and with whom thou didſt ſtrive at the waters of Meribah*, Deut. xxxiii. 8. Not to mention, that in the Samaritan copy of the Pentateuch (which in ſome things is more correct than the Hebrew), there is a different reading of the word here rendered ὁσιος; the whole paſſage is exceedingly obſcure; inſomuch that it is impoſſible to ſay with certainty who is here called *chaſidecha*, which our tranſlators have rendered *thy holy one*. The words which follow ſerve rather to increaſe the darkneſs, than to remove it.

Houbigant, in his valuable edition of the Old Teſtament, with a new Latin tranſlation, and notes, will not admit that it can refer to Aaron or his ſucceſſors in the pontificate; and, in my judgment, ſupports his opinion with unanſwerable reaſons. One is, that the term *chaſid*, *hoſios*, is never applied to Aaron, nor to the prieſthood in general, nor to any prieſt as ſuch. Another is that, though we often hear of the people's proving God at Maſſah, and contending with him at the waters of Meribah, we nowhere hear that they proved or tempted Aaron, and ſtrove with him there. Indeed, if they had been ſaid to have tempted Moſes, the expreſſion, though unuſual, had been leſs improper, becauſe the immediate recourſe of the people, in their ſtrait, was to Moſes. They chid with him, we are told, and were almoſt ready to ſtone him, Exod. xvii. 1. &c. Numb. xx. 3 &c. Houbigant's opinion is, that by *thy holy one*, is here meant Jeſus Chriſt, who is diſtinguiſhed by this appellation in the Book of Pſalms. *Thou wilt not ſuffer thy holy one*, חסידך *chaſidecha*, τον ὁσιον σου, *to ſee corruption*, Pſal. xvi. 10. And to ſay that they ſtrove with, tempted or proved Chriſt in the wilderneſs, is conformable to the language of Scripture. *Neither let us tempt Chriſt*

Chriſt, ſays Paul, 1 Cor. x. 9. *as ſome of them alſo tempted*, referring to what happened in the deſert, *and were deſtroyed of ſerpents*. Houbigant's verſion (the words being underſtood as addreſſed to Levi, according to the original) is *Levi autem dixit, Thummim tuum, tuumque Urim viri ſancti tui eſt, quem tu tentationis in loco tentaſti, cui convitium feciſti, apud aquas contradictionis*. It muſt be owned, that he has added ſome plauſibility to his gloſs upon the paſſage, by the turn he has given to the following verſes. But it is ſufficient for my purpoſe to ſay, in regard to the negative part of his remark, that he is certainly right in maintaining that the expreſſion does not refer to Aaron and his ſucceſſors. But as to the poſitive part, that it refers to our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, will perhaps be thought more queſtionable. His being ſtyled *thy holy one*, τον ὁσιον σε, in words addreſſed to God, is not authority enough for underſtanding him to be meant by τω ὁσιω σε, *to thy holy one*, in words addreſſed to Levi.

§ 7. But to return: another difference in the application of the words ἁγιος and ὁσιος, is that the latter is ſometimes found coupled with other epithets expreſſive of different good qualities, and applied to character or moral conduct, each exhibiting, as it were, a feature diſtinct from thoſe exhibited by the reſt. The word ἁγιος is not commonly accompanied with other epithets; when it is, they are of ſuch a general nature, as rather to affect the whole character than ſeparate parts of it. The author of the Epiſtle to the Hebrews ſays of our Lord, Heb. vii. 26. that he was ὁσιος, ακακος, αμιαντος, in the common tranſlation, *holy, harmleſs, undefiled*. But the Engliſh word *holy*, being general in its ſignification, adds nothing to the import of the other epithets, eſpecially of αμιαντος, and conſequently does not hit the exact meaning of the word ὁσιος, which here probably denotes *pious*; the two other epithets, being employed to expreſs compendiouſly the regards due to others, and to himſelf. Paul has given us another example in his character of a biſhop, who, he ſays, Tit. i. 8. ought to be φιλοξενον, φιλαγαθον, σωφρονα, δικαιον, ὁσιον, εγκρατη. To render the word ὁσιος in this verſe *holy*, is chargeable with the ſame fault as in the former inſtance. The ſame thing holds alſo of the adverb ὁσιως. Now the word ἁγιος is not included in this manner, in an enumeration of good qualities. It is commonly found ſingle, or joined with other epithets equally general. The expreſſion uſed by the apoſtle, Rom. vii. 12. ὁ μεν νομος ἁγιος, και ἡ εντολη ἁγια, και δικαια, και αγαθη: *The law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and juſt, and good*—is no exception; for we have no enumeration here of the virtues of an individual, but of the general good qualities that may be aſcribed to God's law. And though the terms are equally general, they are not ſynonymous; they preſent us with the different aſpects of the ſame object. To ſay that the law of God is *holy*,

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is to represent it as awful to creatures such as we; to say it is *just*, is to remind us that it is obligatory; and to say it is *good*, is to tell us, in other words, that it is adapted to promote universal happiness, and therefore *lovely*.

§ 8. Having assigned my reasons for thinking that the two words ὅσιος and ἅγιος in the New Testament are not synonymous, I shall now, as I proposed, endeavour to ascertain the precise meaning of each. I believe it will appear, on examination, that the affinity between the two Greek words, in their ordinary and classical acceptation, is greater than between the Hebrew words, in lieu of which they have been so generally substituted by the Seventy. This, which may have originated from some peculiarity in the idiom of Alexandria, has, I suppose, led the translators of both Testaments to regard them often as equivalent, and to translate them by the same word. The authors of the Vulgate, in particular, have almost always employed *sanctus* in expounding both. This has misled most modern interpreters in the West. As to our own translators, the example has, doubtless, had some influence. Nevertheless they have in this not so implicitly followed the Vulgate in their version of the Old Testament, as in that of the New. Let it be premised, that the significations of words in any nation do not remain invariably the same. In a course of years, much fewer than two thousand, which are reckoned to have elapsed from the commencement to the finishing of the sacred canon, very considerable changes happen in the meanings of words in the same language, and among the same people. Now, to trace the gradations and nicer shades of meaning, which distinguish different periods, is one of the most difficult, but most important, tasks of criticism.

§ 9. In regard to the word *kadosh*, *hagios*, I acknowledge that it does not seem to me to have had originally any relation to character or morals. Its primitive signification appears to have been *clean*; first, in the literal sense, as denoting free from all filth, dirt, or nastiness; secondly, as expressing what, according to the religious ritual, was accounted *clean*. The first is natural, the second ceremonial, cleanness. Some traces of the first of these meanings we have in the Old Testament, but nothing is more common there than the second, particularly in the Pentateuch. Again, as things are made clean to prepare them for being used, (and the more important the use, the more carefully they are cleaned), the term has been adopted to denote, thirdly, *prepared, fitted, destined for* a particular purpose, of what kind soever the purpose be; fourthly, and more especially *consecrated*, or devoted to a religious use; fifthly, as things, so prepared and devoted, are treated with peculiar care and attention, *to hallow*, or *sanctify*, comes to signify to honour, to reverence, to stand in awe of, and *holy* to imply worthy of this treatment, that is, honourable,

venerable, awful; ſixthly, and laſtly, as outward and corporeal cleanneſs has, in all ages and languages, been conſidered as an apt metaphor for moral purity, it denotes guiltleſs, *irreproachable*, which is at preſent, among Chriſtians, the moſt common acceptation of the word.

§ 10. I ſhall give an example or two of each of the ſix uſes aforeſaid, not confining myſelf to the adjective *kadoſh*, but including its conjugates of the ſame root. Firſt, that it denotes *clean* in the vulgar acceptation, is manifeſt from the precept given to Iſrael in the deſert, to be careful to keep the camp free from all ordure *. The reaſon aſſigned is in theſe words: *For the Lord thy God walketh in the midſt of thy camp, therefore ſhall thy camp be holy,* וחיה קדוש και εσται ἁγια, *that he ſee no unclean thing in thee, and turn away from thee.*

Another remarkable example of this meaning we have in the hiſtory of king Hezekiah, who is ſaid to have given orders to the Levites, 2 Chron. xxix. 5. &c. to ſanctify the houſe of the Lord; the import of which order is explained by the words immediately following, and *carry forth the filthineſs out of the holy place.* The ſacred ſervice had, in the reign of the impious Ahaz, been for a long time totally neglected; the lamps were gone out, and the fire extinguiſhed on the altars, both of burnt-offerings and of incenſe; nay, and the temple itſelf had at length been abſolutely deſerted and ſhut up. The king, intending to reſtore the religious worſhip of Jehovah to its former ſplendour, ſaw that the firſt thing neceſſary was to make clean the houſe, with all its furniture, that they might be fit for the ſervice. Frequent mention is made of this cleanſing in the chapter above referred to, where it is ſometimes called *cleanſing*, ver. 15, 16. 18. ſometimes *ſanctifying*, ver. 5. 17. 19. the Hebrew verbs, טהר *tahar*, and קדש *kadaſh*, being manifeſtly, through the whole chapter, uſed indiſcriminately. Both words are, accordingly, in this paſſage, rendered by the Seventy indifferently ἁγνιζειν and καθαριζειν, not ἁγιαζειν; in the Vulgate, *mundare*, *expiare*, and once *ſanctificare*. In both the above examples, the word *holy* is evidently the oppoſite of *dirty*, *nasty*, *filthy*, in the current acceptation of the terms. This, as being the ſimpleſt and moſt obvious, is probably the primitive ſenſe. Things ſenſible firſt had names in every language. The names were afterwards extended to things conceivable and intellectual. This is according to the natural progreſs of knowledge.

§ 11. From this firſt ſignification, the tranſition is eaſy to that which, in the eye of the ceremonial law, is clean. One great purpoſe of that law, though neither the only nor the chief purpoſe, is to draw reſpect to the religious ſervice, by guarding againſt every thing that might ſavour of indecency or uncleanlineſs.

* See the whole paſſage, Deut. xxiii. 12, 13, 14.

neſs. The climate, as well as the nature of their ſervice, rendered this more neceſſary than we are apt to imagine. Any thing which could ſerve as a ſecurity againſt infectious diſorders in their public aſſemblies, whereof, as they lived in a hot climate, they were in much greater danger than we are, was a matter of the higheſt importance. Now, when once a fence is eſtabliſhed by ſtatute, it is neceſſary, in order to ſupport its authority, that the letter of the ſtatute ſhould be the rule in all caſes. Hence it will happen, that there may be a defilment in the eye of the law, where there is no natural foulneſs at all. This I call *ceremonial uncleanneſs*, to expreſs the reverſe of which, the term *holy* is frequently employed. Thus, by avoiding to eat what was accounted unclean food, they ſanctified themſelves, Lev. xi. 42. &c. xx. 25, 26.; they were likewiſe kept holy by avoiding the touch of dead bodies, to avoid which was particularly required of the prieſts, except in certain caſes, they being obliged, by their miniſtry, to be holier than others, Lev. xxi. 1,—6. Moſes is ſaid, Exod. xix. 10. 14. 22. to ſanctify the people, by making them waſh their clothes, and go through the legal ceremonies of purification. Nor is it poſſible to doubt that, when men were ordered to ſanctify themſelves directly for a particular occaſion, they were enjoined the immediate performance of ſomething which could be viſibly and quickly executed, and not the acquiſition of a character, which is certainly not the work of an hour or of a day. Thus the prieſts were to ſanctify themſelves, before they approached the Lord on Sinai; and thus the people were commanded by Joſhua to ſanctify themſelves in the evening, that they might be prepared for ſeeing the wonders which God was to perform among them next day, Joſh. iii. 5. In the ſame ſenſe alſo Joſhua is ſaid to ſanctify the people, Joſh. vii. 13. In this ſenſe we are alſo to underſtand what we are told of thoſe who ſanctified themſelves for the obſervance of that great paſſover which Hezekiah cauſed to be celebrated. What is termed *ſanctifying* in one verſe, is *cleanſing* in another, 2 Chron. xxx. 17, 18. To prevent being tedious, I do not repeat the whole paſſages, but refer to them in the margin; the reader may conſult them at his leiſure.

Even in the New Teſtament, where the word is not ſo frequently uſed in the ceremonial ſenſe, *holy* and *unclean*, ἁγιος and ακαθαρτος, are contraſted as natural oppoſites, 1 Cor. vii. 14. In one place in the Old Teſtament, Numb. v. 17. the Seventy have rendered the word *kadoſh* καθαρος, as entirely equivalent, calling that pure or *clean* water, which, in Hebrew, is *holy water*; and oftener than once in the Targums or Chaldee paraphraſes, the Hebrew *kadoſh* is rendered, by their common term, for *clean*. Thus, in that paſſage of the prophet, Iſa. lxv. 5. "Stand by thy-

"ſelf;

" ſelf; come not near me, for I am *holier* than thou," the laſt clauſe is in Chaldee, " I am *cleaner* than thou."

§ 12. In regard to the third ſenſe, ſeparated or *prepared* for a ſpecial purpoſe, there are ſeveral examples. The appointing of places for cities of refuge, is, both in the original and in the Septuagint, Joſh. xx. 7. called ſanctifying them. To make ready for war, is, in ſeveral places, to *ſanctify* war, Jer. vi. 4. Mic. iii. 5. In ſuch places, however, the Seventy have not imitated the Hebrew penmen, probably thinking it too great a ſtretch for the Greek language to employ ἁγιαζω in this manner. In one place, men are ſaid to be *ſanctified* for deſtruction, Jer. xii. 3. that is, devoted or prepared for it. To devote to a bad, even to an idolatrous uſe, is called to ſanctify. Thus, both in Hebrew and in Greek, Micah's mother is ſaid, Judges xvii. 3. to *ſanctify* the ſilver which ſhe had devoted for making an idol, for her and her family to worſhip. From this application, probably, has ſprung ſuch anomalous productions as קדשה *kedeſhah*, *a proſtitute*, and קדשים *kedeſhim*, *Sodomites*. Nor is this ſo ſtrange as it may at firſt appear. Similar examples may be found in moſt tongues. The Latin *ſacer*, which commonly ſignifies *ſacred*, *holy*, *venerable*, ſometimes denotes the contrary, and is equivalent to *ſceleſtus*. *Auri ſacra fames*, the execrable thirſt of gold.

§ 13. The fourth meaning mentioned, was devoted to a religious or pious uſe. Thus Jeremiah was *ſanctified*, Jer. i. 5. from the womb, in being ordained a prophet unto the nations; the prieſts and the Levites were ſanctified or conſecrated for their reſpective ſacred offices. It were loſing time to produce examples of an uſe, ſo frequently to be met with in Scripture, and almoſt in every page of the Books of Moſes. In this ſenſe (for it admits degrees) the Jewiſh nation was called *holy*, they being conſecrated to God by circumciſion, the ſeal of his covenant; in this ſenſe alſo, all who profeſs Chriſtianity are denominated *ſaints*, having been dedicated to God in their baptiſm.

§ 14. Of the fifth meaning, according to which, to *hallow* or *ſanctify* denotes to reſpect, to honour, to venerate; and *holy* denotes reſpectable, honourable, venerable; we have many examples. Thus, to *hallow* God, is oppoſed to profaning his name, Lev. xxii. 32. that is, to treating him with irreverence and diſreſpect. It is oppoſed alſo to the diſplay of a want of confidence in his power and in his promiſe, Num. xx. 12. It is in this meaning the word is uſed, when we are required to ſanctify the Sabbath, that is, to treat it with reſpect; and are commanded to pray that God's name may be hallowed, that is, honoured, revered. It is in this meaning chiefly that the word ſeems, in a lower degree applied to angels, and, in the higheſt, to the Lord of heaven and earth.

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There are ſome things which incline me to conclude, that this is more properly the import of the word, at leaſt in the application to God, than, as is commonly ſuppoſed, moral excellence in general. Doubtleſs, both the moral, and what are called the natural, attributes of God, may be conſidered as, in ſome reſpect, included, being the foundations of that profound reverence with which he ought ever to be mentioned, and more eſpecially addreſſed, by mortals. But it is worthy of our notice, that when the term *holy* is applied to God, and accompanied with other attributives, they are ſuch as infuſe fear rather than love, and ſuggeſt ideas of vengeance rather than of grace. When Joſhua found it neceſſary to alarm the fears of an inconſiderate nation, he told them, *Ye cannot ſerve the Lord, for he is a holy God, he is a jealous God; he will not forgive your tranſgreſſions and ſins*, Joſh. xxiv. 19. Again, this epithet *holy* is more frequently than any other applied to God's name. Now, if we conſider what other epithets are thus applied in Scripture, we ſhall find that they are not thoſe which expreſs any natural or moral qualities abſtractly conſidered; they are not the names of eſſential attributes, but ſuch only as ſuggeſt the ſentiments of awe and reverence with which he ought to be regarded by every reaſonable creature. No mention is made of God's wiſe name, powerful name, or true name, good name, or merciful name, faithful name, or righteous name; yet all theſe qualities, wiſdom, power, truth, goodneſs, mercy, faithfulneſs and righteouſneſs, are, in numberleſs inſtances, aſcribed to God, as the eternal and immutable perfections of his nature: but there is mention of his fearful name, his glorious name, his great name, his reverend name, and his excellent name, ſometimes even of his dreadful name, but oftenеſt of his holy name; for all theſe terms are comparative, and bear an immediate reference to the ſentiments of the humble worſhipper. Nay, as the epithet *holy* is often found in conjunction with ſome of the others above mentioned, which admit this application, they ſerve to explain it. Thus the Pſalmiſt, xcix. 3. *Let them praiſe thy great and terrible name; for it is holy.* Again, cxi. 9. *Holy and reverend is his name.*

What was the diſplay which Jehovah made to the Philiſtines, when his ark was in their poſſeſſion, a diſplay which extorted from them the acknowledgment that the God of Iſrael is a holy God, before whom they could not ſtand? It was ſolely of ſovereignty and uncontroulable power in the deſtruction of their idol god Dagon, and great numbers of the people. This filled them with ſuch terror at the bare ſight of the ark, the ſymbol of God's preſence, as was too much for them to bear. And indeed both the Greek ἁγιος, and the Latin *ſanctus*, admit the ſame meaning, and are often equivalent to *auguſtus*, *venerandus*. The former term *auguſtus*, Caſtalio has frequently, and not improperly, adopted

adopted in his verſion, when the Hebrew word *kadoſh* is applied to God. The change of the epithet *ſanctus* is not neceſſary; but if perſpicuity might be thought in a particular caſe to require it, I ſhould prefer the latter term *venerandus*, as more expreſſive of religious awe. Further, when the term *holy* is aſcribed by angels to God, we find it accompanied with ſuch words or geſtures as are expreſſive of the profoundeſt awe and veneration.

The deſcription, action, and exclamation of the ſeraphim in Iſaiah, ch. vi. 1. &c. lead our thoughts more to the ideas of majeſty and tranſcendent glory, than to thoſe of a moral nature. *I ſaw the Lord ſitting upon a throne, high and lofty, and his train filled the temple: above it ſtood the ſeraphim: each one had ſix wings: with twain he covered his face, and with twain he covered his feet, and with twain he did fly. And one cried to another, and ſaid, Holy, holy, holy is Jehovah the God of hoſts, the whole earth is full of his glory. And the pillars of the porch were ſhaken by the voice of him that cried; and the houſe was filled with ſmoke.* Every thing in this deſcription is awful and majeſtic. That he is the Lord of hoſts who dwelleth on high, in whoſe auguſt preſence even the ſeraphim muſt veil their faces, and that the whole earth is full of his glory, are introduced as the ground of aſcribing to him thrice, in the moſt ſolemn manner, the epithet *holy*.

There is a paſſage pretty ſimilar to this in the Apocalypſe, Rev. iv. 8. &c. *The four beaſts* (or, as the word ought to be rendered, *living creatures*) *had each of them ſix wings about him, and they were full of eyes within; and they reſt not day and night, ſaying, Holy holy holy, Lord God Almighty, who was, and is, and is to come. And when thoſe creatures give glory, and honour, and thanks, to him that ſitteth on the throne, who liveth for ever and ever; the four and twenty elders fall down before him that ſitteth on the throne, and worſhip him that liveth for ever and ever, and caſt their crowns before the throne, ſaying, Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power; for thou haſt created all things, and for thy pleaſure they are, and they were created.* Here every circumſtance points to the majeſty, power, and dominion, not to the moral perfections of God; the action and doxology of the elders make the beſt comment on the exclamation of the four living creatures, Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, &c.

It is univerſally admitted, that to hallow or ſanctify the name of God, is to venerate, to *honour* it. According to analogy, therefore, to affirm that the name of God is holy, is to affirm that it is *honourable*, that it is *venerable*. Nay, in the ſame ſenſe, we are ſaid to ſanctify God himſelf; that is, to make him the object of our veneration and awe. In this way, to ſanctify God,

God, is nearly the ſame as to fear him, differing chiefly in degree, and may be oppoſed to an undue fear of man. Thus it is employed by the prophet, Iſa. viii. 12, 13. *Say not, A confederacy to all them to whom this people ſhall ſay, a confederacy, neither fear ye their fear, nor be afraid. Sanctify the Lord of hoſts himſelf, and let him be your fear, and let him be your dread.* But nothing can give a more appoſite example of this uſe than the words of Moſes to Aaron, Lev. x. 1. &c. on occaſion of the terrible fate of Aaron's two ſons, Nadab and Abihu. *This is that the Lord ſpake, I will be ſanctified in them that come nigh me; and before all the people I will be glorified.* Their tranſgreſſion was, that they *offered before the Lord ſtrange fire*, or what was not the peculiar fire of the altar, lighted originally from heaven, but ordinary fire kindled from their own hearths, an action which, in the eye of that diſpenſation, muſt be deemed the groſſeſt indignity. Spencer * has well expreſſed the ſenſe of the paſſage in theſe words: "Deum ſanctum eſſe, id eſt, a qua-"vis perſona vel eminentia, incomparabili naturæ ſuæ excellentia, "ſeparatum, ideoque poſtulare, ut ſanctificetur, id eſt, auguſte, "decore, et ritu naturæ ſuæ ſeparatæ, imaginem quandam ſe-"rente, colatur."

§ 15. The ſixth and laſt ſenſe mentioned, was *moral purity* and innocence, a ſenſe which, by a very natural turn of thinking, ariſes out of the two firſt meanings aſſigned, namely, clean in the common import of the word, and clean in the eye of the ceremonial law. This meaning might, in reſpect of its connection with theſe, have been ranked in the third place. But, becauſe I conſider this as originally a metaphorical uſe of the word, and requiring a greater degree of refinement than the other meanings, I have reſerved it for the laſt. This acceptation is accordingly much more frequent in the New Teſtament than in the Old. In the latter, it oftener occurs in the prophetical and devotional writings, than in the Pentateuch, and the other hiſtorical books, where we never find *holy* mentioned in the deſcription of a good character. This, in my judgment, merits a more particular attention than ſeems to have been given it. In what is affirmed expreſsly in commendation of Noah, Abraham, or any of the patriarchs, of Moſes, Joſhua, Job, David, Hezekiah, or any of the good kings of Iſrael or Judah, or any of the prophets or ancient worthies, except where there is an alluſion to a ſacred office, the term *kadoſh*, holy, is not once employed. Now there is hardly another general term, as *juſt*, *good*, *perfect*, *upright*, whereof, in ſuch caſes, we do not find examples. Yet there is no epithet which occurs oftener on other occaſions than that whereof I am ſpeaking. But, in the time of the Evangeliſts, this moral application of the correſponding word *hagios*, was become

* Lib. I. cap. vii.

come more familiar; though the other meanings were not obſolete, as they are almoſt all at preſent. Herod is ſaid to have known that John the Baptiſt *was a juſt man and a holy*, Mark vi. 20. There is nothing like this in the Old Teſtament. When David pleads that he is holy, Pſal. lxxxvi. 2. it is not the word *kadoſh* that he uſes. The many injunctions to holineſs given in the law, as has been already hinted, have at leaſt a much greater reference to ceremonial purity, than to moral. The only immorality againſt which they ſometimes ſeem immediately pointed, is *idolatry*, it being always conſidered in the law as the greateſt degree of defilement in both ſenſes, ceremonial and moral.

But as every vicious action is a tranſgreſſion of the law, holineſs came gradually to be oppoſed to vice of every kind. The conſideration of this, as a ſtain on the character, as what ſullies the mind, and renders it ſimilarly diſagreeable to a virtuous man, as dirt renders the body to a cleanly man, has been common in moſt nations. Metaphors drawn hence are to be found perhaps in every language. As the ideas of a people become more ſpiritual and refined, and, which is a natural conſequence, as ceremonies ſink in their eſtimation, and virtue riſes, the ſecondary and metaphorical uſe of ſuch terms grows more habitual, and often in the end ſupplants the primitive and the proper. This has happened to the term *holineſs*, as now commonly underſtood by Chriſtians, or rather to the original terms ſo rendered. It had, in a good meaſure happened, but not entirely, in the language of the Jews, in the days of our Lord and his apoſtles. The exhortations to holineſs in the New Teſtament, are evidently to be underſtood of moral purity, and of that only. On other occaſions, the words *holy*, and *ſaints*, ἅγιοι, even in the New Teſtament, ought to be explained in conformity to the fourth meaning above aſſigned, devoted or conſecrated to the ſervice of God.

§ 16. Having illuſtrated theſe different ſenſes, I ſhall conſider an objection that may be offered againſt the interpretation here given of the word *holy*, when applied to God, as denoting *awful*, *venerable*. Is not, it may be ſaid, the imitation of God, in holineſs, enjoined as a duty? And does not this imply, that the thing itſelf muſt be the ſame in nature, how different ſoever in degree, when aſcribed to God, and when enjoined on us? As I did not entirely exclude this ſenſe, to wit, *moral purity*, from the term, when applied to the Deity, I readily admit that, in this injunction in the New Teſtament, there may be a particular reference to it. But it is not neceſſary that, in ſuch ſentences, there be ſo perfect a coincidence of ſignification, as ſeems in the objection to be contended for. The words are, *Be ye holy, for* (not *as*) *I am holy*. In the paſſage where this precept firſt occurs, it is manifeſt, from the context, that the ſcope of the charge given to the people, is to avoid ceremonial impurities; thoſe particularly

ticularly that may be contracted by eating unclean meats, and above all, by eating infects and reptiles, which are called an abomination. Now, certainly in this inferior acceptation, the term is utterly inapplicable to God. But what entirely removes the difficulty, is, that the people are faid, by a participation in fuch unclean food, to make themfelves abominable. To this the precept *Sanctify yourfelves, and be ye holy*, ftands in direct oppofition. There is here, therefore, a coincidence of the fecond and fifth meanings of the word *holy*, which are connected, in their application to men, as the means and the end, and therefore ought both to be underftood as comprehended; though the latter alone is applicable to God. Now, as the oppofite of abominable is, *eftimable, venerable*, the import of the precept, *Sanctify yourfelves*, manifeftly is, 'Be careful, by a ftrict atten-'tion to the ftatutes ye have received concerning purity, efpeci-'ally in what regards your food, to avoid the pollution of your 'body; maintain thus a proper refpect for your perfons, that 'your religious fervices may be eftemed by men, and accepted 'of God; for remember that the God whom ye ferve, as being 'pure and perfect, is entitled to the higheft eftem and venera-'tion. Whatever, therefore, may be called *flovenly*, or what 'his law has pronounced impure in his fervants, is an indig-'nity offered by them to their mafter, which he will certainly 'refent.'

But as an artful glofs or paraphrafe will fometimes miflead, I fhall fubjoin the plain words of Scripture, Lev. xi. 42. &c. which come in the conclufion of a long chapter, wherein the laws relating to cleanneff in animal food, in beafts, birds, fifhes, and reptiles, are laid down. *Whatfoever goeth upon the belly, and whatfoever goeth upon all four, or whatfoever hath more feet among all creeping things, that creep upon the earth; them ye fhall not eat, for they are an abomination. Ye fhall not make yourfelves abominable with any creeping thing that creepeth, neither fhall ye make yourfelves unclean with them, that ye fhould be defiled thereby. For I am the Lord your God; ye fhall therefore fanctify yourfelves, and ye fhall be holy; for I am holy: neither fhall ye defile yourfelves with any manner of creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. For I am the Lord that bringeth you up out of the land of Egypt, to be your God; ye fhall therefore be holy, for I am holy.* It is plain, that any other interpretation of the word *holy* than that now given, would render the whole paffage incoherent.

§ 17. Now, to come to the word חסיד *chafid*, ὁσιος, this is a term which properly and originally expreffes a mental quality, and that only in the fame manner as צדיק *tfaddik*, δικαιος *juft*, אמון *amon*, πιστος *faithful*, and feveral others. Nor is there any material variation of meaning that the word feems to have under-

gone at different periods. The moſt common acceptation is *gracious, merciful, beneficent, benign.* When there appears to be a particular reference to the way wherein the perſon ſtands affected to God and religion, it means *pious, devout.* In conformity to this ſenſe, our tranſlators have, in ſeveral places in the Old Teſtament, rendered it *godly.* The phraſe οἱ ὅσιοι τῦ Θεῦ is, therefore, not improperly rendered *the ſaints of God*, that is, his pious ſervants. It moſt probably, as was hinted before, means *pious* in what was ſaid of our Lord, that he was ὅσιος, ἄκακος, ἀμίαντος, as it ſeems to have been the intention of the ſacred writer to comprehend, in few words, his whole moral character reſpecting God, the reſt of mankind, and himſelf. In the enumeration which Paul gives to Titus, ch. i. 8. of the virtues whereof a biſhop ought to be poſſeſſed, it is ſurely improper to explain any of them by a general term equally adapted to them all; ſince nothing can be plainer than that his intention is to denote, by every epithet, ſome quality not expreſſed before. His words are φιλόξενον, φιλάγαθον, σώφρονα, δίκαιον, ὅσιον, ἐγκρατῆ. To render ὅσιον *holy* (though that were in other places a proper verſion) would be here in effect the ſame as to omit it altogether. If the ſenſe had been *pious*, it had probably been either the firſt or the laſt in the catalogue. As it ſtands, I think, it ought to be rendered *beneficent.*

There are certain words which, on ſome occaſions, are uſed with greater, and on others, with leſs, latitude. Thus the word δίκαιος ſometimes comprehends the whole of our duty to God, our neighbour, and ourſelves; ſometimes it includes only the virtue of juſtice. When οἱ δίκαιοι is oppoſed to οἱ πονηροὶ, the former is the caſe, and it is better to render it *the righteous*, and δικαιοσυνη *righteouſneſs;* but when δίκαιος or δικαιοσυνη occur in a liſt with other virtues, it is better to render them *juſt* or *juſtice.* Sometimes the word is employed in a ſenſe which has been called forenſic, as being derived from judicial proceedings. *He that juſtifieth the wicked*, ſays Solomon, Prov. xvii. 15. *and he that condemneth the juſt, even they both are abomination to the Lord.* The word *wicked*, means here no more than *guilty*, and the word *juſt*, guiltleſs of the crime charged. In like manner ὁσιότης, in one or two inſtances, may be found in the New Teſtament, in an extent of ſignification greater than uſual. In ſuch caſes it may be rendered *ſanctity*, a word rather more expreſſive of what concerns manners than *holineſs* is.

§ 18. But, as a further evidence that the Hebrew word חסיד *chaſid*, is not ſynonymous with קדוש *kadoſh*, and conſequently neither ὅσιος with ἅγιος, it muſt be obſerved, that the abſtract חסד *cheſed*, is not once rendered by the Seventy ὁσιότης, or, by our interpreters, *holineſs*, though the concrete is almoſt always rendered ὅσιος in Greek, and often *holy* in Engliſh. This ſubſtantive,

ſtantive, on the contrary, is tranſlated in the Septuagint, ελεος, ελεημοσυνη, οικτειρμια, ελπις, χαρις, or ſome ſuch term; once, indeed, and but once, ὁσια. In Engliſh it is tranſlated *kindneſs*, *favour*, *grace*, *mercy*, *loving-kindneſs*, *pity*, but never *holineſs*. The analogy of language (unleſs uſe were clear againſt it, which is not the caſe here) would lead us to think, that there muſt be a nearer relation in meaning than this, between the ſubſtantive and the adjective formed from it. Yet *worthy* does not more evidently ſpring from *worth*, than חסיד *chaſid*, ſprings from חסד *cheſed*. Of the term laſt mentioned it may be proper juſt to obſerve, that there is alſo an anomalous uſe (like that remarked in *kadoſh*) which aſſigns it a meaning, the reverſe of its uſual ſignification, anſwering to ανομια, ονειδος, *flagitium*, *probrum*. But it is only in two or three places that the word occurs in this acceptation.

§ 19. I ſhall conclude with obſerving, that *chaſid* or *hoſios* are ſometimes applied to God; in which caſe there can be little doubt of its implying *merciful*, *bountiful*, *gracious*, *liberal*, or *benign*. The only caſe wherein it has an affinity in meaning to the Engliſh words *ſaint* or *holy*, is when it expreſſes pious affections towards God. As theſe cannot be attributed to God himſelf, the term, when uſed of him, ought to be underſtood, according to its moſt frequent acceptation. The Pſalmiſt's words, which, in the common verſion, are, Pſal. clxv. 17. *The Lord is righteous in all his ways, and holy*, chaſid, *in all his works*, would have been more truly, as well as intelligibly and emphatically rendered, *The Lord is juſt in all his ways, and bountiful in all his works*. There is not equal reaſon for tranſlating in the ſame manner the Greek *hoſios*, when applied to God in the New Teſtament. Though *hoſios*, in the Septuagint, commonly occupies the place of *chaſid*, it does not always. It is ſometimes employed in tranſlating the Hebrew words תם *tham*, *perfect*, and ישר *jaſher*, *upright*. Once it is uſed for this laſt term when applied to God, Deut. xxxii. 4. Theſe words, therefore, ὁτι μονος ὁσιος, Rev. xv. 4. in an addreſs to God, ought to be tranſlated, *for thou alone art perfect* rather than *bountiful* or *gracious*. The addition of μονος to the other epithet, is a ſufficient ground for this preference. The context alſo favours it. But, in the more common acceptation of the term ὁσιος *hoſios*, there is this difference between it and ἁγιος *hagios*, as applied to God, that the latter appellation repreſents the Deity as awful, or rather terrible; the former as amiable. The latter checks all advances on our part. We are ready to cry with the men of Bethſhemeſh, 1 Sam. vi. 20. *Who is able to ſtand before this holy God?* The former emboldens us to approach. Thus they are ſo far from being ſynonymous in this application, that they may rather be contraſted with each other. As to their import, when applied to men, the word ἁγιος, in the beſt ſenſe, ſtill retains ſo much of its origin, as to appear

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rather a negative character, denoting a mind without ſtain; whereas the term ὁσιος is properly poſitive, and implies, in its utmoſt extent, both piety and benevolence.

§ 20. In regard to the manner of tranſlating *kadeſh* in the Old Teſtament, and *hagios* in the New; when all circumſtances are conſidered, I think it ſafeſt to retain very generally the common verſion *holy*. The ſame remark holds nearly alſo of the conjugates. It is very true that the ſenſe of the original in many places does not entirely ſuit the meaning which we affix to that word. But it is certain, on the other hand, that we have no one word that anſwers ſo well in all caſes. To change the term with each variation in meaning, would be attended with great inconveniency; and, in many caſes, oblige the tranſlator to expreſs himſelf either unintelligibly, and to appearance, inconſequentially, or too much in the manner of a paraphriſt. On the other hand, as the Engliſh term *holy* is ſomewhat indefinite in reſpect of meaning, and in a manner appropriated to religious ſubjects, nothing can ſerve better to aſcertain and illuſtrate the ſcriptural uſe than ſuch uniformity; and the ſcriptural uſe of a word hardly current in common diſcourſe, cannot fail to fix the general acceptation. But this would not hold of any words in familiar uſe on ordinary ſubjects. With regard to ſuch, any deviation from the received meaning would, to common readers, prove the occaſion of perplexity at leaſt, if not of error. But *chaſid* in the Old Teſtament, and *hoſios* in the New (except when uſed ſubſtantively, where it may be rendered *ſaint*), ought, when it reſpects the diſpoſition towards God, to be tranſlated *pious*; when it reſpects the diſpoſition towards men, *gracious*, *kind*, *humane*.

PART V.

Κηρυσσειν, ευαγγελιζειν, καταγγελλειν, and διδασκειν.

THE only other ſpecimen I ſhall here give of words ſuppoſed to be ſynonymous, or nearly ſo, ſhall be κηρυσσειν, ευαγγελιζειν, καταγγελλειν, and διδασκειν, all nearly related, the former three being almoſt always rendered in Engliſh *to preach*, and the laſt *to teach*. My intention is, not only to point out exactly the differences of meaning in theſe words, but to evince that the words whereby the two former are rendered in ſome, perhaps moſt modern languages, do not entirely reach the meaning of the original terms; and, in ſome meaſure, by conſequence, miſlead moſt readers. It happens in a tract of ages, through the gradual alterations which take place in reſpect of laws, manners, rites, and cuſtoms, that words

words come, as it were, along with these, by imperceptible degrees, to vary considerably from their primitive signification. Perhaps it is oftener than we are aware, to be ascribed to this cause, that the terms employed by translators, are found so feebly to express the meaning of the original.

§ 2. The first of the words above mentioned, κηρυσσειν, rendered *to preach*, is derived from κηρυξ, rendered *preacher*, whence also κηρυγμα, rendered *a preaching*. The primitive κηρυξ signifies properly both *herald* and *common crier*, and answers exactly to the Latin word *caduceator* in the first of these senses, and to *præco* in the second. The verb κηρυσσειν is accordingly *to cry*, *publish*, or *proclaim* authoritatively, or by commission from another, and the noun κηρυγμα is *the thing published* or *proclaimed*. The word κηρυξ occurs only twice in the Septuagint, and once in the apocryphal book Ecclesiasticus, and evidently means in them all *crier*. The other sense of the word, namely, *herald*, or messenger of important intelligence between princes and states, is nearly related, as the same persons had often the charge of carrying such embassies, and of proclaiming war or peace: but it is not quite the same. In the New Testament the word seems to partake of both senses, but more evidently of that of *crier*. And to this sense the derivatives κηρυσσω and κηρυγμα, more properly accord than to the other: for, to discharge the office of herald is, in Greek, κεκρυκευειν, and the office itself κεκρυκευσις. But these words, though frequent in classical writers, are not found in Scripture. The word κηρυξ occurs but thrice in the New Testament, once in each of the Epistles to Timothy, 1 Tim. ii. 7. 2 Tim. i. 11. wherein Paul calls himself κηρυξ και αποστολος; and once it is used by the Apostle Peter, who, speaking of Noah, calls him κηρυξ δικαιοσυνης, 2 Pet. ii. 5. The word κηρυγμα occurs but in three places in the Septuagint, and imports in them all *proclamation*, or *thing proclaimed*. In one of those places it relates to that made by the prophet Jonah, through the streets of Nineveh, called, as in the Gospel, *preaching*, Jonah iii. 2. and in another, 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22. is, in the common version, rendered *proclamation*. In the New Testament it occurs eight times, and is always rendered *preaching*. In two of those places it relates to Jonah's proclamation in Nineveh. The verb κηρυσσω occurs in the New Testament about five and twenty times, always in nearly the same sense: *I proclaim*, *prædico*, *palam annuncio*. In at least twelve of these cases it relates solely to proclamations made by human authority, and denotes in them all *to warn*, or, by crying out, to advertise people openly of any thing done or to be done, or danger to be avoided. This may be called the primitive sense of the word, and in this sense it will be found to be oftenest employed in the New Testament.

§ 3. Now, if it be asked, whether this suits the import of the English

Engliſh word, *to preach*, by which it is almoſt always rendered in the common verſion of this part of the canon, I anſwer, that, in my judgment, it does not entirely ſuit it. *To preach*, is defined, by Johnſon, in his Dictionary, "to pronounce a public diſcourſe "upon ſacred ſubjects." This expreſſes, with ſufficient exactneſs, the idea we commonly affix to the term. For, we may admit, that the attendant circumſtances of church, pulpit, text, worſhip, are but appendages. But the definition, given by the Engliſh lexicographer, cannot be called an interpretation of the term κηρυσσω, as uſed in Scripture. For, ſo far is it from being neceſſary that the κηρυγμα ſhould be a diſcourſe, that it may be only a ſingle ſentence, and a very ſhort ſentence too. Nay, to ſuch brief notifications we ſhall find the term moſt frequently applied. Beſides, the word κηρυσσω, and κερυγμα, were adopted, with equal propriety, whether the ſubject were ſacred or civil. Again, though the verb κηρυσσω always implied public notice of ſome event, either accompliſhed, or about to be accompliſhed, often accompanied with a warning, to do or forbear ſomething; it never denoted either a comment on, or explanation of any doctrine, critical obſervations on, or illuſtrations of any ſubject, or a chain of reaſoning, in proof of a particular ſentiment. And, if ſo, to pronounce publicly ſuch a diſcourſe, as, with us, is denominated ſermon, homily, lecture, or preaching, would, by no means, come within the meaning of the word κερυσσω, in its firſt and moſt common acceptation. It is, therefore, not ſo nearly ſynonymous with διδασκω, *to teach*, as is now commonly imagined.

§ 4. But, that we may be more fully ſatisfied of this, it will be neceſſary to examine more cloſely the application of the word in the Goſpels, and in the Acts. The firſt time it occurs, is in the account that is given of our Lord's harbinger, Matth. iii. 1, 2. *In thoſe days came John the Baptiſt*, κηρυσσων εν τη ερημω της Ιουδαιας, και λεγων, *making proclamation in the wilderneſs of Judea, and ſaying*. Now, what was it that he cried, or proclaimed in the wilderneſs? It immediately follows, Μετανοειτε ηγγικε γαρ η βασιλεια των ερανων *Reform, for the reign of heaven approacheth*. This is, literally, his κηρυγμα, proclamation, or preaching, ſtript of the allegorical language in which it is clothed by the prophet, Iſa. xl. 3. as quoted in the next verſe, to this effect: *For this is he to whom Iſaiah alludeth in theſe words, The cry of a crier in the deſert, "Prepare a way for the Lord, make his road ſtraight."* Hence we may learn, what the Evangeliſts call βαπτισμα μετανοιας, which John preached for the remiſſion of ſins. He proclaimed to all within hearing, that if they would obtain the pardon of former offences, they muſt now enter on a new life; for that the reign of the Meſſiah was juſt about to commence; and, as a pledge of their intended reformation, and an engagement to it, he

he called on all to come and be baptized by him, confeſſing their ſins.

Another public intimation, which John made to the people, and to which the word κηρυσσω is alſo applied, we have in Mark i. 7, 8.: *He proclaimed, ſaying,* "*After me cometh one mightier* "*than I, whoſe ſhoe latchet I am not worthy to ſtoop down and* "*untie. I indeed baptize you in water, but he will baptize you* "*in the Holy Spirit.*" Such ſhort calls, warnings, notices, or advertiſements, given with a loud voice to the multitude, from whomſoever, and on what ſubject ſoever, come under the notion of κηρυγματα, as uſed in Scripture. To the particular moral inſtructions which John gave the people ſeverally, according to their different profeſſions, the word κηρυσσω is not applied, but παρακαλεω, *to admoniſh, to exhort*, Luke iii. 18. Πολλα μεν ουν και ετερα παρακαλων ευηγγελιζετο τον λαον. Which is very improperly tranſlated, *And many other things in his exhortation preached he unto the people.* Πολλα is manifeſtly conſtrued with παρακαλων, not with ευηγγελιζετο, whoſe only regimen is τον λαον. The meaning is, therefore: *Accompanied with many other exhortations, he publiſhed the good news to the people.*

§ 5. Let us next conſider in what manner the term κηρυσσω is applied to our Saviour. The firſt time we find it uſed of him, Mat. iv. 17. the very ſame *proclamation* or preaching is aſcribed to him, which had been aſcribed to John the Baptiſt. *Reform, for the reign of heaven approacheth.* With giving this public notice he alſo began his miniſtry. Again, we are told, Mat. iv. 23. that *he went over all Galilee, teaching in their ſynagogues, and* κηρυσσων το ευαγγελιον της βασιλειας, *proclaiming the good news of the reign.* There can be no doubt that the ſame proclamation is here meant, which is quoted above from the ſame chapter. Nor is this the only place wherein this expreſſion is uſed of our Lord, Mat. ix. 35. Mark i. 14. Again, it is applied to Jeſus Chriſt by the Prophet Iſaiah, ch. lxi. 1. &c. as quoted in the Goſpel, Luke iv. 18, 19. as to which I ſhall only obſerve, at preſent (having made ſome remarks on the paſſage in a former Diſſertation), that the word κηρυσσω, which twice occurs in it, is uſed ſolely in relation to thoſe things which were wont to be notified by proclamation. In the laſt clauſe, *to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord*, there is a manifeſt alluſion to the jubilee, which was always proclaimed by ſound of trumpet, and accompanied with a proclamation of liberty to all the bondmen and bondwomen among them. It was by proclamation alſo, that Cyrus gave freedom to the captives of Judah, to return to their native land. I need only add, that the word κηρυσσω is ſometimes applied to our Lord indefinitely, where we are not told what he *proclaimed* or *preached.* In ſuch caſes, the rules of interpretation invariably require, that the expreſſions which are indefinite and defective, be explain-

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by thoſe which are definite and full; and that, by conſequence, they be underſtood to ſignify, that he gave public warning of the Meſſiah's approaching reign.

§ 6. Laſtly, as to the application of the term to the apoſtles, its firſt appearance is in the inſtructions which their Lord gave them, along with their firſt miſſion to the cities and villages of Iſrael. *As ye go*, ſays he, Matt. x. 7. κηρυσσετε λεγοντες, *proclaim, ſaying*, ηγγικε ἡ βασιλεια των ουρανων, *the reign of heaven approacheth*. Here we have the very words of their preaching, or proclamation, expreſsly given them. To the ſame purpoſe, another evangeliſt tells us, Luke ix. 2. Απεστειλεν αυτους κηρυσσειν την βασιλειαν τυ Θευ, which is literally, *He commiſſioned them to proclaim the reign of God*. The ſame is doubtleſs to be underſtood by Mark, who acquaints us, ch. vi. 12. Εξελθοντες εκηρυσσον ἱνα μετανοησωσι; which is ſaying, in effect, that wherever they went they made the ſame proclamation, which had been made by their Maſter, and his precurſor, before them: *Reform, for the reign of heaven approacheth*. Now, it deſerves our notice, that we no where find ſuch an order as διδασκειτε λεγοντες, *teach ſaying*, where the expreſs words of their teaching are preſcribed. It was neceſſary that this ſhould differ in manner, according to the occaſion, and be ſuited to the capacities and circumſtances of the perſons to be taught, and therefore, that it ſhould be left to the diſcretion of the teacher. No variation was neceſſary, or even proper, in the other, which was no more than the public notification of a fact, with a warning to prepare themſelves.

In the charge which our Lord gave to his apoſtles after his reſurrection, he ſays, Mark xvi. 15. *Go throughout all the world*, κηρυξατε το ευαγγελιον, *proclaim the good news to the whole creation*. And as the call to reformation was enforced by the promiſe of remiſſion in the name of Chriſt, theſe alſo are ſaid, Luke xxiv. 47. κηρυχθηναι εις παντα τα εθνη, *to have been proclaimed to all nations*. Indemnity for paſt ſins is the foundation of the call to reform, with which the proclamation of the reign of God was always accompanied. It is proper to remark, that the form ηγγικε γαρ, uſed firſt by the Baptiſt, then by our Lord himſelf, and laſtly, by his diſciples in his lifetime, is never repeated after his reſurrection. And we have reaſon to believe, from the material alteration in circumſtances which then took place, that they have then ſaid, not as formerly, ηγγικε, but ηδη γαρ ἡ βασιλεια των ουρανων. *The reign of heaven*, that is, of the Meſſiah, *is come*.

§ 7. Further, I muſt take notice, that though announcing publicly the reign of the Meſſiah, comes always under the denomination, κηρυσσειν, no moral inſtructions, or doctrinal explanations, given either by our Lord, or by his apoſtles, are ever, either in the Goſpels or in the Acts, ſo denominated. Thus, that moſt inſtructive diſcourſe of our Lord, the longeſt that is recorded in the

the Gospel, commonly named his sermon on the mount, is called teaching by the evangelist, both in introducing it, and after the conclusion, Matt. v. 2. vii. 28, 29. *Opening his mouth,* εδιδασκεν αυτους, *he taught them, saying:* and, *when Jesus had ended these sayings, the people were astonished,* επι τη διδαχη αυτου, *at his doctrine,* his manner of teaching. It is added, ην γαρ διδασκων αυτους; *for he taught them as one having authority, and not as the Scribes.* He is said to have been employed in teaching, (Matt. xiii. 54. Mark vi. 2. Luke iv. 15. 22.) when the wisdom, which shone forth in his discourses, excited the astonishment of all who heard him. In like manner, the instructions he gave by parables, are called teaching the people, not preaching to them, Mark iv. 1, 2. and those given in private to his apostles, are in the same way styled, (Mark viii. 31.) teaching, never preaching. And if teaching and preaching be found sometimes coupled together, the reason appears to be, because their teaching, in the beginning of this new dispensation, must have been frequently introduced by announcing the Messiah, which alone was preaching. The explanations, admonitions, arguments and motives, that followed, came under the denomination of teaching. Nor does any thing else spoken by our Lord and his disciples, in his lifetime, appear to have been called preaching, but this single sentence, Μετανοειτε· ηγγικε γαρ η βασιλεια των ουρανων. In the Acts of the apostles, the difference of meaning in the two words is carefully observed. The former is always a general and open declaration of the Messiah's reign, called emphatically the good news, or gospel; or, which amounts to the same, the announcing of the great foundation of our hope, the Messiah's resurrection; the latter comprehends every kind of instruction, public or private, that is necessary for illustrating the nature and laws of this kingdom, for confuting gainsayers, persuading the hearers, for confirming and comforting believers. The proper subject of each is fitly expressed in the conclusion of this book, Acts xxviii. 31. where, speaking of Paul, then confined at Rome in a hired house, the author tells us that he received all who came to him, κηρυσσων την βασιλειαν του Θεου, και διδασκων τα περι του Κυριου Ιησου Χριστου. Announcing to them the reign of God, and instructing them in every thing that related to the Lord Jesus Christ.

§ 8. Let it also be observed that, in all the quotations in the Gospels from the ancient prophets, neither the word κηρυσσω, nor any of its conjugates, is applied to any of them beside Jonah. What is quoted from the rest, is said to have been spoken, or foretold, or prophesied, but never *preached.* Jonah's prophecy to the Ninevites, on the contrary, is but twice quoted; and it is in both places called κηρυγμα, rendered *preaching*, properly *cry* or *proclamation.* The same name it has, in the book itself, in the Septuagint, and with great propriety, according to the explana-

tion above given of the word, for it was a real proclamation which God required him to make through the ſtreets of Nineveh. Thus he is charged, Jonah iii. 2. *Go to Nineveh, that great city, and preach to it the preaching that I bid thee.* The very words are preſcribed. It may be obſerved here, by the way, that both in the Hebrew and in the Greek, it is the ſame word which is here rendered *preach*, and in verſe fifth, *proclaim*, when uſed in reference to a faſt appointed by the king of Nineveh, for averting the divine anger, and notified to the people by *proclamation*. In obedience to the command of God, Jonah began to enter into the city, a day's journey, and to cry as he had been bidden. Now, what was the *preaching* which God put into his mouth? It was neither more nor leſs than this, *Yet forty days, and Nineveh ſhall be overthrown.* This warning the prophet, at proper diſtances, repeated as he advanced.

In one paſſage of the Apocalypſe, Rev. v. 2. the word occurs ſo manifeſtly in the ſame ſenſe, that it is one of the two places (for there are no more) in the New Teſtament, wherein our tranſlators have rendered it *proclaim*. *I ſaw a ſtrong angel proclaiming with a loud voice, Who is worthy to open the book, and to looſe the ſeals thereof?* That is, whoſoever is worthy to open the book and to looſe its ſeals, may come and do it. This is the whole of the angel's κηρυγμα, preaching or proclamation. In the Acts and Epiſtles, we find the verb κηρυσσω followed by τον Χριστον, τον Ιησουν, or ſomething equivalent. This is entirely proper. To proclaim the advent of the Meſſiah, and that Jeſus is the perſon, was the firſt ſtep of their important charge, and neceſſarily preceded their teaching and explaining his doctrine, or inculcating his precepts.

§ 9. So much for the primitive and moſt common meaning of the word κηρυσσω in the New Teſtament. But, as few words in any language remain perfectly univocal, I own there are ſome inſtances in which the term is employed in this part of Scripture with greater latitude. The firſt and moſt natural extenſion of the word is when it is uſed by hyperbole for publiſhing any how, divulging, making a thing to be univerſally talked of. The firſt inſtance of this is where we are told of the leper that was cleanſed by our Lord, and charged not to divulge the manner of his cure. *But he went out*, ſays the hiſtorian, Mark i. 45. *and began to publiſh it much*, κηρυσσειν πολλα. So our tranſlators very properly render the word. In ſome other places we find it in the ſame ſenſe, and in the ſame way rendered, Matt. x. 27. Luke xii. 3. All the inſtances are ſimilar, in that they relate to miraculous cures performed by our Lord, which ſome of thoſe who received, notwithſtanding the prohibition given them, were every where aſſiduous to divulge. Not that they did literally proclaim them, by crying aloud in the public places, but that they made

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the matter as well known, as though this method had been taken. Such hyperbolical idioms are to be found in all languages. How common is it to say of profligates, that they proclaim their infamy to all the world, because their lives make it as notorious as it could be made by proclamation? It is in the same sense of publishing, and by the same figure, that proclaiming from the house-tops (ibid.) is opposed to whispering in the ear. Nor is it certain, that the words κηρυσσω and κηρυγμα have any other meaning than those above specified in the Gospels and Acts.

§ 10. The only remaining sense of the words which I find in the New Testament, and which answers to the import of the English words *preach* and *preaching*, seems to be peculiar to the writings of Paul. *Thou*, says he, Rom. ii. 21. *who teachest another, teachest thou not thyself? Thou that preachest,* ὁ κηρυσσων, *a man should not steal, dost thou steal?* The two clauses illustrate each other, and shew that κηρυσσω in the latter, has nearly the same import with διδασκω in the former. For though we may speak properly of proclaiming laws, and *thou shalt not steal* is doubtless of the number, it is only of laws newly enacted, or at least not before promulgated, that we use that expression. The law here spoken of was sufficiently known and acknowledged every where; but though there was no occasion for proclaiming it, it might be very necessary to inculcate and explain it. Now this is properly expressed by the word *preach*. There are some other places in his Epistles, wherein it cannot be doubted, that the word is used in this large acceptation for teaching publicly. Thus we ought to understand his admonition to Timothy, 2 Tim. iv. 2. κηρυξον τον λογον, *preach the word.* Κηρυγμα is also used by him with the same latitude for all public teaching, as when he says, 1 Cor. i. 21. *It pleased God, by the foolishness of preaching,* δια της μωριας τε κηρυγματος, *to save them that believe.* Again, 1 Cor. ii. 4. *My speech and my preaching,* το κηρυγμα μυ, *was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in the demonstration of the spirit and of power;* there can be no question but the term is used for teaching in general, since κηρυγμα, in the confined sense it bears in the Gospels, could hardly admit variety or choice in the expression, nor consequently aught of the enticing words of man's wisdom. There is, besides, one place where the apostle Peter uses the word κηρυσσειν, 1 Pet. iii. 19. in speaking of our Lord's preaching to the spirits in prison; but the passage is so obscure, that no argument can safely be founded on it.

§ 11. Nothing, however, can be clearer to the attentive and critical reader of the original, than that the aforesaid words are not used with the same latitude in the historical books. In the Acts, in particular, several discourses are recorded, those especially of Peter and Paul, but to none of them are the terms κηρυσσω and κηρυγμα, ever applied. I think it the more necessary to make this

this remark, becauſe the Engliſh word *preach* is in the common verſion frequently applied to them. Now this tends to confound the diſtinction ſo well preſerved in the hiſtory, and to render all our ideas on this head extremely indeterminate. Some will perhaps be ſurpriſed to be informed, that there are in the Acts alone no fewer than ſix Greek words, not ſynonymous neither, which are, ſome of them oftener, ſome of them ſeldomer, tranſlated by the verb *preach*. The words are κηρυσσω, ευαγγελιζομαι, καταγγελλω, λαλεω, διαλεγομαι, and παρρησιαζομαι, which laſt is rendered *to preach boldly*. I admit that it is impoſſible, in tranſlating out of one language into another, to find a diſtinction of words in one exactly correſpondent to what obtains in the other, and ſo to preſerve uniformity in rendering every different word by a different word, and the ſame word by the ſame word. This is what neither propriety nor perſpicuity will admit. The rule however to tranſlate uniformly, when it can be done, in a conſiſtency both with propriety and perſpicuity, is a good rule, and one of the ſimpleſt and ſureſt methods I know, of making us enter into the conceptions of the ſacred writers, and adopt their very turn of thinking.

§ 12. I ſhall here take notice only of two paſſages in the common tranſlation, which, to a reader unacquainted with the original, may appear to contradict my remark in regard to the diſtinction ſo carefully obſerved by the hiſtorian. *When the Jews*, ſays he, Acts xiii. 42. *were gone out of the ſynagogue, the Gentiles beſought that theſe words might be preached to them*, λαληθηναι αυτοις τα ρηματα ταυτα, *the next Sabbath*; literally and ſimply, *that theſe words might be ſpoken to them*. The words here meant, are thoſe contained in the twenty-ſix preceding verſes. Our tranſlators, I ſuppoſe, have been the more inclinable to call it preaching, becauſe ſpoken in a ſynagogue by permiſſion of the rulers. In another place, Acts xx. 7. *when the diſciples came together to break bread, Paul preached unto them*, διελεγετο αυτοις. Soon after, ver. 9. *as Paul was long preaching*, διαλεγομενου επι πλειον. Διαλεγομαι is properly *differo, diſputo*. It occurs frequently in the Acts, but, except in this paſſage, is always rendered *to reaſon*, or *to diſpute*. I own that neither of theſe words ſuits the context here, as it appears that all preſent were diſciples. The word however implies not only *to diſpute*, but *to diſcourſe* on any ſubject. But what I take the freedom to cenſure in our tranſlators, is not their rendering διαλεγομαι in this place *preach*, which, conſidered by itſelf, might be juſtified; but it is their confounding it with ſo many words not ſynonymous, particularly with κηρυσσω, whoſe meaning in this book, as well as in the Goſpels, is totally different.

§ 13. Now, in regard to the manner wherein this word has been tranſlated, with which I ſhall finiſh what relates peculiarly to

to it, we may obſerve that *prædicare*, uſed in the Vulgate, and in all the Latin verſions, correſponds entirely to the Greek word in its primitive meaning, and ſignifies to give public notice by proclamation. In this ſenſe it had been uſed by the Latin claſſics, long before the tranſlation of the Bible into their tongue. But *prædicare*, having been employed uniformly in rendering κηρυσσειν, not only in the hiſtory, but in the Epiſtles, has derived from the latter uſe a ſignification different, and much more limited than it has in profane authors. Now, this additional, or acquired ſignification, is that which has principally obtained amongſt eccleſiaſtics; and hence has ariſen the ſole meaning in modern languages aſcribed to the word, whereby they commonly render the Greek κηρυσσω. The Latin word is manifeſtly that from which the Italian *predicare*, the French *precher*, and the Engliſh *to preach*, are derived. Yet theſe three words correſpond to the Latin only in the laſt mentioned and eccleſiaſtical ſenſe, not in the primitive and claſſical, which is alſo the ſcriptural ſenſe in the Goſpels and Acts. Thus the learned Academicians della Cruſca, in their Vocabulary, interpret the Italian *predicare*, not by the Latin *prædicare*, its etymon, but by *concionari, concionem habere;* terms certainly much nearer than the other to the import of the word uſed in the other two languages mentioned, though by no means adapted to expreſs the ſenſe of κηρυσσειν in the hiſtorical books. This is another evidence of what was obſerved in a former Diſſertation *, that a miſtake, occaſioned by ſuppoſing the word in the original, exactly correſpondent to the term in the common verſion, by which it is uſually rendered, is often confirmed, inſtead of being corrected by recurring to tranſlations into other modern tongues, inaſmuch as from the ſame, or ſimilar cauſes, the like deviation from the original import, has been produced in theſe languages, as in our own.

§ 14. I ſhould now examine critically the import of the word ευαγγελιζω, often rendered in the ſame way with κηρυσσω. But what might have been offered on this ſubject, I have in a great meaſure anticipated, in the explanation I gave of the name ευαγγελιον. It was impoſſible to conſider the noun and the verb ſeparately, without either repeating the ſame obſervations and criticiſms on each, or, by dividing things ſo cloſely connected, injuring the illuſtration of both. I ſhall therefore here, after referring the reader to that Diſſertation †, which is pretty full, point out, in the briefeſt manner, the chief diſtinctions in meaning that may be remarked between this word and κηρυσσω, already explained.

The former always refers to a meſſage or news in itſelf good and agreeable, the latter does not require this quality in the ſubject. What would come under the denomination of κακαγγελια, *bad*

* Diſſ. III. § 6. † Diſſ. V. Part II.

bad news, may be the ſubject of κηρυγμα, *proclamation*, as well as good news. We ſay, with equal propriety, κηρυσσειν πολεμον as κηρυσσειν ειρηνην, to proclaim war, as to proclaim peace. Nay, Jonah's cry through the ſtreets of Nineveh, *Yet forty days and Nineveh ſhall be overthrown*, is denominated κηρυγμα both in the Old Teſtament and in the New. But this is no where, nor indeed could be, ſtyled ευαγγελιον, *glad tidings*.

A ſecond difference is, the word κηρυσσω implies that the notification is made openly to many, whereas the word ευαγγελιζομαι may not improperly be uſed, in whatever way the thing be notified, publicly or privately, aloud or in a whiſper, to one or to many. Thus, in regard to the important and agreeable meſſage delivered by Gabriel to Zacharias the father of John the Baptiſt, when the latter was alone in the ſanctuary offering incenſe; the archangel ſays, Luke i. 19. *I am ſent*, ευαγγελισασθαι σοι ταυτα, *to ſhow thee theſe glad tidings*. And it is ſaid of Philip, when in the chariot with only the Ethiopian eunuch, Acts viii. 35. ευηγγελισατο αυτω τον Ιησουν. *He preached to him Jeſus*. The term *preached*, by which our tranſlators have rendered the word, does not in this place reach the meaning of the Greek word, nor does it anſwer to the ordinary acceptation of the Engliſh. It does not reach the meaning of the Greek, as the quality of the ſubject, its being good news, is not ſuggeſted. Nor is the Engliſh word proper here; for this teaching was neither public, nor have we reaſon to believe it was a continued diſcourſe. It is much more probable, that it was in the familiar way of dialogue, in which he had begun, that Philip continued to inſtruct this ſtranger in the doctrine of Chriſt.

Another diſtinction ſeems to ariſe from the original import of the words, though I will not ſay that it is uniformly obſerved. It is, that the word ευαγγελιζω relates to the firſt information that is given to a perſon or people, that is, when the ſubject may be properly called *news*. Thus, in the Acts, it is frequently uſed for expreſſing the firſt publication of the Goſpel in a city or village, or amongſt a particular people. In regard to the word κηρυσσω, there is no impropriety in ſpeaking of the ſame thing as repeatedly proclaimed among the ſame people. Thus the approach of the reign of God was, in fact, proclaimed to the Jews in our Saviour's lifetime, firſt by the Baptiſt, then by our Lord himſelf, afterwards by the Apoſtles, and laſtly by the ſeventy diſciples. I ſhall only add, that the word ευαγγελιζομαι is ſometimes, though not often, uſed more indefinitely for teaching or preaching in general, Acts xiv. 15. Gal. i. 23. In one place, Rev. x. 7. it is rendered by our tranſlators *declared*. But in the Goſpels it always preſerves the primitive ſignification. When, therefore, we find it there coupled with the verb διδασκω, we are not to underſtand the terms as ſynonymous, but as intended to acquaint

acquaint us that the teaching mentioned was accompanied, or perhaps introduced, with an intimation of the approaching reign of the Meſſiah.

The moſt obvious things are ſometimes the moſt apt to be overlooked by ingenious men. We ſhould otherwiſe think it unaccountable that men, eminent for their attainments in ſacred literature, ſhould be ſo far miſled by the ordinary meaning of a phraſe in the tranſlation, as entirely to forget the proper import of the original expreſſion. I am led to this reflection by obſerving, in a late publication, the following remark * on Luke xx. 1 "Διδασκοντας αυτον—και ευαγγελιζομενον. Why this ſpecification of "*preaching the goſpel?* Did he not always *preach the goſpel* "when *he taught the people?* Hence I conclude, that και ευαγγελι- "ζομενον ſhould be thrown out as a marginal reading, founded per- "haps on Mat. iv. 23. or ix. 35." Doubtleſs, according to the import of the Engliſh phraſe, he always preached the Goſpel when he taught, inaſmuch as his teaching conſiſted either in explaining the doctrine, or enforcing the precepts of the Chriſtian religion, which is all that we mean by *preaching the goſpel.* But his teaching was not always (as is manifeſt from his whole hiſtory) attended with the intimation above mentioned, which, in that hiſtory, is the only thing implied in ευαγγελιζομενον, though it was ſometimes attended with it. A cloſe verſion of the words removes every difficulty. *One day, as he was teaching the people in the temple, and publiſhing the good tidings.* In my judgment, this laſt circumſtance was the more worthy of being ſpecified here by the Evangeliſt, as it has probably been that which then incenſed the chief prieſts, and prompted them to demand of him in ſo peremptory a manner to ſhow his warrant for what he did. To ſay that the reign of the Meſſiah was about to commence, would be accounted by them very preſumptuous, and might be conſtrued into an inſinuation, that he himſelf was the Meſſiah, a poſition which we find them ſoon after pronouncing blaſphemy: and in any caſe they would conſider the declaration (which was well known not to originate from them) as an attempt to undermine their authority with the people.

Hence I alſo will take the liberty to conclude, that the common way of rendering the Greek verb, by the aid of conſecrated words, not only into Engliſh, but into Latin, and moſt modern languages, has produced an aſſociation in the minds of men ſtrong enough to miſlead critical, as well as ordinary readers: elſe men of letters, like Dr Owen and Mr Bowyer, had never fancied that there is here either a tautology, or ſo much as a redundancy of words. I further conclude, that if we were to proceed in the way propoſed by the former of theſe critics, and to expunge whatever in Scripture we diſlike, or imagine might be ſpared, it

* Bowyer's Conjectures.

it is impoſſible to ſay what would be left at laſt of the divine oracles. The remarker, if he would act conſiſtently, ought alſo to throw out as a marginal reading κηρυσσων το ευαγγελιον, which is coupled with διδασκων in the two places of Matthew referred to. We may not be able to diſcover the meaning or the uſe of a particular expreſſion; for who can diſcover every thing? but let us not be vain enough to think, that what we do not diſcover, no other perſon ever will *.

§ 15. The only other word in the New Teſtament that can be ſaid to be nearly ſynonymous with either of the preceding, is καταγγελλω *annuncio*, I announce, publiſh, or promulgate. It is an intermediate term between κηρυσσω and ευαγγελιζομαι. In regard to the manner, it implies more of public notice than is neceſſarily implied in ευαγγελιζομαι, but leſs than is denoted by κηρυσσω. In regard to the ſubject, though commonly uſed in a good ſenſe, it does not expreſs quite ſo much as ευαγγελιζομαι, but it expreſſes more than κηρυσσω, which generally refers to ſome one remarkable fact or event, that may be told in a ſentence or two. Accordingly both theſe words, καταγγελλω and ευαγγελιζομαι come nearer to a coincidence in ſignification with διδασκω than κηρυσσω does.

§ 16. The word ευαγγελιστης, rendered *evangeliſt*, occurs only thrice in the New Teſtament. Firſt in the Acts, xxi. 8. where Philip, one of the ſeven deacons, is called an Evangeliſt; ſecondly, in the Epiſtle to the Epheſians, ch. iv. 11. where *evangeliſts* are mentioned after apoſtles and prophets, as one of the offices which our Lord, after his aſcenſion, had appointed for the converſion of infidels, and the eſtabliſhment of order in his church; and, laſtly, in the injunction which Paul gives Timothy to do the work of an evangeliſt, 2 Tim. iv. 5. This word has alſo obtained another ſignification, which, though not canonical, is very ancient. As ευαγγελιον ſometimes denotes any of the four narratives of our Lord's life and ſufferings, which make a part of the canon, ſo evangeliſt means the compoſer. Hence Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, are called Evangeliſts.

§ 17. As to the word διδασκειν, it may ſuffice to obſerve, that it can hardly be wrong tranſlated into Latin by the verb *docere*, or into Engliſh by the verb *to teach*; and that it was mentioned in the title, not on account of any difficulty occaſioned by it, but ſolely for the ſake of ſuggeſting my purpoſe to ſhow that, far from being coincident, it has not even ſo great an affinity in ſignification to the other words there mentioned, as is commonly ſuppoſed. But, as the ſuppoſed coincidence or affinity always ariſes from miſtaking the exact import of the other words, and not from any error in regard to this, a particular explanation of this term is not neceſſary.

DISSER-

* Diſſ. XII. Part. II. § 13, 14

DISSERTATION THE SEVENTH.

INQUIRY INTO THE IMPORT OF CERTAIN TITLES OF HONOUR OCCURRING IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

I INTEND, in this Diſſertation, to offer a few remarks on thoſe titles of honour which moſt frequently occur in the New Teſtament, that we may judge more accurately of their import, by attending, not only to their peculiarities in ſignification, but alſo to the difference in the ancient Jewiſh manner of applying them, from that which obtains among the modern Europeans, in the uſe of words thought to be equivalent.

PART I.

Κυριος.

NOTHING can be more evident, than that, originally, titles were every where the names, either of offices, or of relations, natural or conventional, inſomuch that it could not be ſaid of any of them, as may be ſaid, with juſtice, of ſeveral of our titles at preſent, thoſe eſpecially called titles of quality, that they mark neither office nor relation, property nor juriſdiction, but merely certain degrees of hereditary honour, and rights of precedency. Relation implies oppoſite relation in the object. Now, when thoſe perſons for whoſe behoof a particular office was exerciſed, and who were conſequently in the oppoſite relation, were very numerous, as a whole nation, province, or kingdom, the language commonly had no correlate to the title expreſſing the office; that is, it had not a term appropriated to denote the people who ſtood in the oppoſite relation. But when there was only a ſmall number, there was a ſpecial term for denoting the relative connection in which theſe alſo ſtood. Thus the terms, *king*, *judge*, *prophet*, *pontiff*, hardly admitted any correlative term, but the general one of *people*. But this does not hold invariably. With us the correlate to *king* is *ſubject*. In like manner, offices which are exerciſed,

erciſed, not ſtatedly, to certain individuals, but variouſly and occaſionally, ſometimes to one, ſometimes to another, do not often require titles correlative. Of this kind are the names of moſt handicrafts, and ſeveral other profeſſions. Yet, with us, the *phyſician* has his *patients*, the *lawyer* his *clients*, and the *tradeſman* his *cuſtomers*. In moſt other caſes of relation, whether ariſing from nature or from convention, we find title tallying with title exactly. Thus, *father* has *ſon*, *huſband* has *wife*, *uncle* has *nephew*, *teacher* has *diſciple* or *ſcholar*, *maſter* has *ſervant*.

§ 2. I admit, however, that in the moſt ſimple times, and the moſt ancient uſages with which we are acquainted, things did not remain ſo entirely on the original footing, as that none ſhould be called *father*, but by his *ſon* or his *daughter*; none ſhould be ſaluted *maſter* but by his *ſervant*, or ſtyled *teacher* but by his *ſcholar*. There is a progreſſion in every thing relating to language, as, indeed, in all human ſciences and arts. Neceſſity, firſt, and ornament afterwards, lead to the extenſion of words beyond their primitive ſignification. All languages are ſcanty in the beginning, not having been fabricated beforehand, to ſuit the occaſions which might ariſe. Now, when a perſon, in ſpeaking, is ſenſible of the want of a proper ſign for expreſſing his thought, he, much more naturally, recurs to a word which is the known name of ſomething that has an affinity to what he means, than to a ſound which, being entirely new to the hearers, cannot, by any law of aſſociation in our ideas, ſuggeſt his meaning to them. Whereas, by availing himſelf of the name of ſomething related, by reſemblance, or otherwiſe, to the ſentiment he wants to convey, he touches ſome principle in the minds of thoſe whom he addreſſes, which (if they be perſons of any ſagacity) will quickly lead them to the diſcovery of his meaning. Thus, for expreſſing the reverence which I feel for a reſpectable character, in one who is alſo my ſenior, I ſhall naturally be led to ſtyle him *father*, though I be not literally his *ſon*; to expreſs my ſubmiſſion to a man of greater merit and dignity, I ſhall call him *maſter*, though I be not his *ſervant*; and, to expreſs my reſpect for one of more extenſive knowledge and erudition, I ſhall denominate him *teacher*, though I be not his *diſciple*. Indeed, theſe conſequences ariſe ſo directly from thoſe eſſential principles of the imagination, uniformly to be found in human nature, that deviations, in ſome degree ſimilar, from the earlieſt meanings of words, are to be found in all tongues, ancient and modern. This is the firſt ſtep from pure ſimplicity.

§ 3. Yet, that the differences in laws, ſentiments, and manners, which obtain in different nations, will occaſion in this, as well as in other things, conſiderable variety, is not to be denied. In Aſia, a common ſign of reſpect to ſuperiors was proſtration. In Europe, that ceremony was held in abhorrence. What I have remarked

remarked above, ſuits entirely the progreſs of civilization in the Aſiatic regions. The high-ſpirited republicans of Greece and Rome, appear, on the contrary, long to have conſidered the title *kyrios*, or *dominus*, given to a man, as proper only in the mouth of a ſlave. Octavius, the emperor, when maſter of the world, and abſolute in Rome, ſeems not to have thought it prudent to accept it. But, in deſpotic countries long accuſtomed to kingly government, it was otherwiſe.

§ 4. That ſuch honorary applications of words were quite common among the Jews, is evident to every body, who has read the Bible with attention. In ſuch applications, however, it muſt be noted, that the titles are not conſidered as ſtrictly due from thoſe who give them. They are conſidered rather as voluntary expreſſions of reſpect, in him who gives the title, being a ſort of tribute, either to politeneſs, or to the perſonal merit of him on whom it is beſtowed. But to affix titles to places and offices, to be given by all who ſhall addreſs thoſe poſſeſſed of ſuch places and offices, whether they that give them ſtand in the relation correſpondent to the title or not, or whether they poſſeſs the reſpect or eſteem implied or not, is comparatively a modern refinement in the civil intercourſe of mankind, at leaſt in the degree to which it is carried in Europe. This is the ſecond remove from the earlieſt and ſimpleſt ſtate of ſociety.

§ 5. There remains a third, ſtill more remarkable, to which I find nothing ſimilar in ancient times. We have gotten a number of honorary titles, ſuch as, *duke*, *marquis*, *earl*, *viſcount*, *baron*, *baronet*, &c. which it would be very difficult, or rather impoſſible, to define; as they expreſs, at preſent, neither office, nor relation, but which, nevertheleſs, deſcend from father to ſon, are regarded as part of a man's inheritance, and, without any conſideration of merit, or ſtation, or wealth, ſecure to him certain titular honours and ceremonial reſpect, and which are of a more unalienable nature than any other property (if they may be called property), real or perſonal, that he poſſeſſes. I am ſenſible, that thoſe modern titles were all originally names of offices, as well as the ancient. Thus, *duke* was equivalent to commander: *marquis*, or margrave (for they differed in different countries), to guardian of the marches; *count*, landgrave, alderman, or *earl*, to ſheriff; whence the ſhire is ſtill denominated county; *viſcount*, to deputy-ſheriff. *Vicecomes*, accordingly, is the Latin word, in law-writs, for the officiating ſheriff *. When the principal, in any kind of office, becomes too rich, and too lazy, for the ſervice, the burden naturally devolves upon the ſubſtitute; and the power of the conſtituent, through diſuſe, comes at laſt to be antiquated. But, ſo much was the title once connected with the office, that when the king intended to create a new *earl*, he had no other expedient,

* Blackſtone's Commentary, Introduc. Sect. 4. and B. I. ch. 12. § 3, 4.

expedient, than to erect a certain territory into a *county, earldom*, or *ſheriffdom* (for theſe words were then ſynonymous), and to beſtow the juriſdiction of it on the perſon honoured with the title. The *baron*, though his name was anciently common to all the nobility, was judge or lord of a ſmaller and ſubordinate juriſdiction, called a barony *. In proceſs of time, through the viciſſitudes that neceſſarily happen in the manners of the people, and in their methods of government, the offices came gradually to be ſuperſeded, or at leaſt to ſubſiſt no longer, on the ſame footing of hereditary poſſeſſion. But, when theſe had given place to other political arrangements, the titles, as a badge of anceſtry and of the right to certain privileges which accompanied the name, were, as we may naturally ſuppoſe, ſtill ſuffered to remain. It hardly now anſwers the firſt end, as a badge of anceſtry, in thoſe countries where there are often new creations: but it anſwers the ſecond, and beſides, ennobles their poſterity. In conſequence of theſe differences, the titles are regarded as due to him who ſucceeds to them, alike from all men, and that without any conſideration of either perſonal or official dignity, or even of territorial poſſeſſions. Thus, one who is entitled to be called my lord, is, in this manner, addreſſed not only by his inferiors, but by his equals, nay, even his ſuperiors. The king himſelf, in addreſſing his nobles, ſays, my lords.

§ 6. It was totally different among the Hebrews, I might have ſaid, among the ancients in general. The Greek word κυριος *kyrios*, anſwering to the Hebrew אדון *adon*, to the Latin *dominus*, and to the words *lord* or *maſter* in Engliſh, was not originally given, unleſs by a ſervant to his maſter, by a ſubject to his ſovereign, or in brief, by one bound to obey, to the perſon entitled to command. Soon however it became common to give it to a ſuperior, though the perſon who gave it had no dependence upon him; and if ſometimes it was, through complaiſance, beſtowed on an equal, ſtill the man who gave the title was conſidered as modeſtly putting himſelf on the footing of an inferior and ſervant, in as much as the title was invariably underſtood to expreſs, not only ſuperior rank, but even authority, in the perſon on whom it was conferred. We have examples in Scripture which put it beyond a doubt, that for any man to addreſs another by the title, my lord, and to acknowledge himſelf that perſon's ſervant, were but different ways of expreſſing the ſame thing, κυριος and δουλος being correlative terms. The courteous form of addreſſing with them, when they meant to be reſpectful, (for it was not uſed on all occaſions), was not that of moſt modern Europeans, who, in uſing the ſecond perſonal pronoun, employ the plural for the ſingular; nor that of the Germans, who change both perſon and number, making the third plural ſerve for the ſecond ſingular, but

* See Spelman's Gloſſary on the different names.

but it was what more rarely could occaſion ambiguity than either of theſe; the ſubſtitution of the third perſon for the firſt, the number being retained, whether ſingular or plural. This mode as occurring in Scripture, gives an additional illuſtration of the import of the term κυριε with them. "Let *thy ſervant*, I pray thee," ſaid Judah, Gen. xliv. 18. to his brother Joſeph, when governor of Egypt, "ſpeak a word in my lord's ears." "Nay, my lord," ſaid the Shunamite to the prophet Eliſha, "do not deceive *thine handmaid*," 2 Kings iv. 16. Some other inſtances are marked in the margin *.

Aſſiſted by theſe remarks, we may perceive the force of that obſervation of the apoſtle Peter, 1 Pet. iii. 5, 6. in regard to the conjugal reſpect and obedience yielded by Sarah to her huſband Abraham. *Being in ſubjection*, ſays he, ſpeaking of the wives, *to their own huſbands, even as Sarah obeyed Abraham, calling him lord*; that is, acknowledging, by this her uſual compellation, her inferiority, and obligation to obedience; for the intimacy of their relation hinders us from aſcribing it to a ceremonious civility. Some have cavilled at this argument brought by the apoſtle. The rank and quality of Abraham, ſay they, who, by the accounts we have of him, was a powerful prince, entitled him to be addreſſed in this manner by every body. Others, in the oppoſite extreme, have inferred that every dutiful wife ought to give the ſame teſtimony of reſpect and ſubmiſſion to her huſband, which this pious matron did to the patriarch. Both ways of reaſoning are weak, and proceed from the ſame ignorance of the different import of words reſulting from the difference of manners and cuſtoms. The title *lord* with us, as applied to men, is either hereditary in certain families, or annexed by royal authority, or immemorial uſage, to certain offices and ſtations. Wherever it is conſidered as due, nobody, of what rank ſoever, withholds it; and wherever it is not due, one would not only expoſe one's ſelf to ridicule by giving it, but, inſtead of paying a compliment to the perſon addreſſed, would put him out of countenance. It cannot therefore with us, ſerve as a token of ſubjection in the perſon who gives it. Such is the conſequence of the different footing whereon things now ſtand, that the titles which, in thoſe times of ſimplicity, were merely relative and ambulatory, are now abſolute and ſtationary. Whereas the man who, in thoſe ages, was well entitled to the compellation of *lord* in one company, had no title to it at all in another. It happens with us frequently, (to wit, as often as two or more who, by law or cuſtom, have a right to that mark of reſpect, converſe together), that the title of *lord* is reciprocally given and taken by the ſame perſons. But of this I do not recollect a ſingle inſtance in Scripture. Such a thing to the ancients muſt, doubtleſs, have appeared

* Gen. xxxii. 4, 5. xxxiii. 5. 8. xlii. 10. 1 Kings xviii. 7. 9.

ed ridiculous, as an acknowledgment of ſuperiority in the perſon on whom it was conferred, was always underſtood to be conveyed by it. For, though it was ſometimes, as I obſerved, politely given to an equal, he was thereby treated as ſuperior; and, as each could not be ſuperior, to retort the title on him who gave it, muſt have been conſidered by them as an indelicate rejection of the civility offered. To their ſentiments it ſeems to have been more conformable, that the honour ſhould be repaid with ſome other marks of reſpect or affection by the perſon who received it. The fact, if I remember right, is certain; this manner of accounting for it, I acknowlege to be no more than conjecture; but it is a conjecture which ſome paſſages in ancient hiſtory, particularly the converſation of Abraham with Ephron and the ſons of Heth, Gen. xxiii. 3. &c. and Jacob's interview with his elder brother Eſau, ch. xxxiii. 1,—15. after an abſence of more than fourteen years, render not improbable.

§ 7. The title of *maſter* (for the Hebrew *adon*, and the Greek *kyrios*, ſignify no more) was perhaps univerſally the firſt which, by a kind of catachreſis, was beſtowed on a ſuperior, or a perſon conſidered as ſuch, by one who was not his ſervant or dependent. But ſtill, as it implied the acknowledgment of ſuperiority, it varied with the company. There were few ſo low who were not entitled to this honourable compellation from ſome perſons; there were none (the king alone excepted) ſo high as to be entitled to it from every perſon. Joab, who was captain general of the army, is properly ſtyled by Uriah, 2 Sam. xi. 11. who was only an inferior officer, *my lord* Joab, but had the king himſelf, or any of the princes, given him that title, it could have been underſtood no otherwiſe than in deriſion. It would have been as if the ſovereign ſhould call any of his miniſters his maſter. The title *father*, though held in general ſuperior to *lord*, yet as the reſpect expreſſed by it, implied ſuperiority, not in ſtation, but in years, experience and knowledge, was ſometimes given to the prophets of the true God, even by kings. Thus the prophet Eliſha is in this manner addreſſed by the king of Iſrael, 2 Kings vi. 21. but no prophet is ever denominated lord or maſter by one veſted with the ſupreme authority. By others the prophets were often ſo denominated. Thus Obadiah, who was ſteward of the king's houſehold, calls the prophet Elijah, my lord Elijah, 1 Kings xviii. 7. 13. The ſame title we find alſo given to Eliſha, 2 Kings ii. 19. iv. 16. 28. Whereas to the king himſelf, the common addreſs, from men of all ranks, was, *my lord*, *O king*, or, as the expreſſion ſtrictly implied, *O king*, *my maſter*; but by the king, the title *my lord*, or *my maſter*, was given to none but God. The reaſon is obvious. A monarch, who was not tributary, acknowledged, in point of ſtation, no earthly ſuperior. And though in any rank inferior to the higheſt, good breeding might require

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it to be conferred on an equal, the royal dignity appears generally to have been conſidered as of too delicate a nature to admit the uſe of ſuch compliments without derogation. Crœſus king of Lydia, is repreſented by Herodotus *, as giving the title δεσποτης, which is of the ſame import, to Cyrus, king of Perſia; but it was after his kingdom was conquered by Cyrus, and when he himſelf was his captive, and conſequently, according to the uſages of thoſe times, his ſlave. Before that event, he would have diſdained to ſalute any man with this compellation. Ahab king of Iſrael, ſtyled Benhadad king of Syria, *my lord*; but it was when, through fear, he conſented to ſurrender himſelf, and all that he had, into his hands, 1 Kings xx. 4.

I am not, however, certain that the politeneſs of the Orientals, which, in the judgment of the Greeks, ſavoured of ſervility, did not ſometimes carry them thus far; for, though no ſuch title is found in the converſation between Solomon and the queen of Sheba, 1 Kings x. or between Jehoſhaphat king of Judah, and Ahab king of Iſrael, 1 Kings xxii. 2 Chron. xviii. as related either in the Firſt Book of Kings, or in the Second Book of Chronicles; or in the correſpondence between Hiram king of Tyre and Solomon, as related in the Firſt Book of Kings, ch. ix. 10. &c. yet, in the account we have of this correſpondence in the Second Book of Chronicles, ch. ii. 14, 15. which is by the bye of much later date, Hiram is repreſented as giving this title to both David and Solomon. Whether this ought to be conſidered as merely a ſtrain of eaſtern complaiſance, or as an acknowledgment of ſubordination, a ſtate to which many of the neighbouring princes had been reduced by thoſe monarchs, I will not take upon me to ſay. But it may hold as a general truth, that when this title is found given to a man in any ancient author, particularly in Scripture, before we can judge from it of the quality of the perſon accoſted, we muſt know ſomething of the quality of the perſon that accoſts. It is not ſo with us, or in any Chriſtian European country at preſent. When we find one addreſſed with the title of *highneſs*, or *grace*, or *lordſhip*, we diſcover his rank, without needing to know any thing of the addreſſer, ſave only that he is not ignorant of the current forms of civility.

When we find that Mary Magdalene addreſſes, with the title of lord (κυριε is her word, John xx. 15.) one whom ſhe took to be no higher than a gardener, we are apt to accuſe her in our hearts, either of flattery or of groſs ignorance, to accoſt a man in ſo low a ſtation with ſo high a title. But the ignorance is entirely our own, when we would vainly make our ideas, modes and uſages, a ſtandard for other ages and nations. Mary and a gardener might, in the world's account, have been on a level in point

* Lib. I.

point of rank. If ſo, as he was a ſtranger to her, modeſty and the laws of courteſy led her to yield to him the ſuperiority, by giving him this reſpectful title. Abraham's ſervant was addreſſed in the ſame way by Rebekah, before ſhe knew him, Gen. xxiv. 18. Paul and Silas, who cannot be ſuppoſed ſuperior in figure and appearance to ordinary mechanics, were, after having been publicly ſtripped, beaten, impriſoned, and put in the ſtocks, accoſted with the title κυριοι *lords*, Acts xvi. 30. though the common tranſlation has it *ſirs*. But it was given by a jailor, and, it may be added, after a miraculous interpoſition of heaven in their favour. To ſatisfy us, however, that this laſt circumſtance was not neceſſary to entitle mean people to be addreſſed in this manner by thoſe whoſe condition was equally mean or meaner, we may obſerve that the ſame title κυριε is given to Philip, John xii. 21. one of the apoſtles from Bethſaida of Galilee, who was probably not above the rank of a fiſherman. The perſons who gave it were Greeks, doubtleſs of the loweſt ſort, who had come to Jeruſalem to worſhip. With us, the title *lord*, given to one who by law or cuſtom has no right to it, is a ſort of injury to the whole order to whom the conſtitution of their country has given an excluſive privilege to be ſo denominated. With them it could affect no third perſon whatever, as it implied merely that the perſon ſpoken to was, by the ſpeaker, acknowledged his ſuperior.

It may appear to ſome an objection againſt this account of the relative import of the words *adon* and *kyrios*, that in the Engliſh Bible, we find the title *lord*, in one place of the ſacred hiſtory, uſed as we ſhould uſe the word *nobleman* or *grandee*, for denoting a perſon of a certain determinate rank. Thus we are informed of a *lord*, on whoſe hand king Jehoram leaned, who is mentioned thrice under this deſcription in the ſame chapter, 2 Kings vii. 2. 17. 19. I acknowledge, that if the Hebrew word there were *adon*, and the Greek *kyrios*, it would ſuffice to overturn what has been here advanced in regard to the difference between the ancient uſe of ſuch titles and the modern. But it is not *adon* and *kyrios*. In neither language is it a title of honour, but a mere name of office. In Hebrew it is שלישׁ *ſhaliſh*, in Greek τριστατης, *triſtates*, a word which occurs often in other places, and is never tranſlated *lord*, but always *captain*, as it ought to have been rendered here. The Vulgate interprets it not *dominus quidam*, but very properly *unus de ducibus*. Again, in the common verſion, we find mention of the *king and his lords*, Ezra viii. 25. preciſely in the manner wherein an Engliſh hiſtorian would ſpeak of his ſovereign and the peers of the realm. But neither here is the Hebrew word *adon*, nor the Greek *kyrios*. It is שריו *ſharaio*, in the former, and οι αρχοντες αυτου in the latter. In the Vulgate, it is rendered *principes ejus*, and ought to have been

been in Engliſh, *his chief men*, or *his principal officers*. Whereas אדניו *adonaio* in Hebrew, *οι κυριοι αυτου* in Greek, and *domini ejus* in Latin, would have meant *his maſters*, or thoſe whom he ſerved, a ſenſe quite foreign from the purpoſe. But though our word *lords*, uſed as in the above quotations, is not unſuitable to the Engliſh ſtyle, it would have been better in ſuch inſtances to conform to the Hebrew idiom, for a reaſon which will appear from the next paragraph. Herod is ſaid, by our tranſlators, to have made a ſupper to his *lords*, Mark vi. 21. The word is *μεγιστασιν grandees*. I ſhall only add, that the term *lords* is alſo uſed in the Engliſh tranſlation, where the correſponding words, both in Hebrew and in Greek, are names of offices equivalent to rulers, magiſtrates, governors of provinces. And therefore nothing can be concluded from the application of this title in the verſion.

§ 8. Now, with the aid of the above obſervations, on the relative value of honorary titles among the ancients, we may diſcover the full force of our Saviour's argument, in regard to the dignity of the Meſſiah. The modern uſe, in this particular, is ſo different from the ancient, that, without knowing this circumſtance, and reflecting upon it, a proper apprehenſion of the reaſoning is unattainable. I ſhall give the whole paſſage as rendered in this verſion, Matt. xxii. 41. &c. *While ſo many Phariſees were preſent, Jeſus aſked them, ſaying, What think ye of the Meſſiah? Whoſe ſon ſhould he be? They anſwered, David's. He replied, How then doth David, ſpeaking by inſpiration, call him his Lord? The Lord, ſaith he, ſaid to my Lord. Sit at my right hand, until I make thy foes thy footſtool. If the Meſſiah were David's ſon, would David call him his Lord? To this none of them could anſwer.* They were confounded. Yet from our very different uſages, whereby ſuch titles, if due at all, are due alike from ſuperiors as from inferiors and equals; we cannot eaſily, at firſt, feel the ſtrength of this argument. I have obſerved already, that an independent monarch, ſuch as David, acknowledged no lord or maſter but God. Far leſs would he beſtow this title on a ſon or deſcendent. It was cuſtomary, becauſe reſpectful, and in the natural order of ſubordination, for a ſon ſo to addreſs his father. Accordingly, in the parable of the man who had two ſons, the elder ſon is thus repreſented as anſwering his father, *Εγω κυριε*, Matt. xxi. 30. It is the ſame word which is commonly rendered *lord*, but in this place *ſir*. The ſame title was alſo given by Rachel to her father Laban, when he came into her tent, in queſt of his images, Gen. xxxi. 35. and even by Jacob, after his return from Padan Aram, to his elder brother Eſau, Gen. xxxii. 4, 5. In no inſtance however will it be found given by a father to his ſon. This, according to their notions of paternal dignity and authority, which were incomparably higher

than ours, would have been prepoſterous. The Phariſees, and other hearers, were ſo ſenſible of this, that, however much they ſhewed themſelves, on moſt occaſions, diſpoſed to cavil, our Saviour's obſervation ſtruck them dumb. *None of them could anſwer.*

§ 9. Though the general belief of the Jews at that time was, that the Meſſiah would be a much greater man than David, a mighty conqueror, and even a univerſal monarch, the ſovereign of the kings of the earth, who was to ſubdue all nations, and render them tributary to the choſen people; yet they ſtill ſuppoſed him to be a mere man, poſſeſſed of no higher nature than that which he derived from his earthly progenitors. Though their rabbies at that time agreed that the words quoted were ſpoken of the Meſſiah, and ſpoken by David, the difficulty ſuggeſteſt by our Lord ſeems never to have occurred to them; and now, that it was mentioned, they appeared by their ſilence, to admit that, on the received hypotheſis, it was incapable of a ſolution. It was plainly our Saviour's intention to inſinuate, that there was in this character, as delineated by the prophets, and ſuggeſted by the royal Pſalmiſt, ſomething ſuperior to human which they were not aware of. And, though he does not, in expreſs words, give the ſolution, he leaves no perſon who reflects, at a loſs to infer it. I have been the more particular in this illuſtration, in order to ſhew of how much importance it is, for attaining a critical acquaintance with the import of words in the ſacred languages, to become acquainted with the cuſtoms, ſentiments, and manners of the people.

§ 10. The name κυριος, in the New Teſtament, is moſt frequently tranſlated in the common verſion *lord*, ſometimes *ſir*, ſometimes *maſter*, and once *owner*. It correſponds pretty nearly, except when it is employed in tranſlating the name *Jehovah*, to the Latin *dominus*, and to the Italian *ſignore*. But there is not any one word, either in French or in Engliſh, that will ſo generally anſwer. It may occaſionally be applied to a man in any ſtation except the very loweſt, becauſe to men of every other ſtation there are inferiors. It is always proper as applied to God, to whom every creature is inferior. In the former of theſe applications, namely to man, it frequently correſponds, but not invariably, to the French *monſieur*, and to the Engliſh *ſir*, or *maſter*. In the application to God, it anſwers always to the French *ſeigneur* and to the Engliſh *lord*. There is a neceſſity, in theſe two languages, of changing the term, in compliance with the idiom of the tongue. *Domine* in Latin, and *ſignor* in Italian, in like manner as *kyrie* in Greek, and *adoni* in Hebrew, are equally ſuitable, in addreſſing God or man. But every body muſt be ſenſible, that this cannot be affirmed of the compellation of *monſieur* in French, or *ſir* in Engliſh.

§ 11. There

§ 11. There is something so peculiar in the English use of these familiar titles, that it may be proper to take particular notice of it, before I proceed to the application of them in translating. In regard to the term *sir*, the most common of all, let it be observed, first, that, in its ordinary acceptation, it is never used, except in the vocative answering to *kyrie* and *domine*; secondly, that it is never joined to the name of a person, neither to the Christian name, nor to the surname. When the proper name is used, *master*, not *sir*, must be prefixed. I say this of the word *sir*, in its ordinary acceptation; for when it serves as the distinguishing title of knighthood, it is used in all the cases, and is always prefixed to the Christian name. But for this application there is no occasion in translating. The third thing I shall observe, on the ordinary acceptation of the word, is, that it never admits the article, either definite or indefinite. This, indeed, is a consequence of its use being confined to the vocative. Lastly, it has not a proper plural. The word *sirs*, originally the plural, and equally respectful with the singular, is now rarely used. When it is used, it is with some difference in meaning. The compellation *sir*, almost always shews respect; but *sirs* shews a degree of familiarity hardly consistent with respect. It is most commonly employed in speaking to a crowd, or to inferiors. We usually supply the plural of *sir*, in our addresses to others, by the word *gentlemen*. But this bears so strong a signature of the distinctions which obtain in modern Europe, that it could not be used with propriety in the translation of an ancient author.

Now, as to the title of *lord*, I have several peculiarities to observe. In the first place, when in the vocative, without either the possessive pronoun *my* prefixed, or any name or title annexed, the application is, invariably, according to the best use at present, to God or Christ. When it is addressed to men (now it is only to noblemen, and to persons in certain eminent stations that use permits us to give it), it is always either preceded by the pronoun *my*, or followed by the title, or both. Thus, to say, *Lord*, or, *O Lord help me!* is nowhere proper, but in an address to God: whereas, *Help me, my Lord*, is proper only when spoken to a man. The distinction now taken notice of, is, if I mistake not, sacredly observed in the common version of the Old Testament. There are two cases, indeed, in which *my Lord*, in the vocative is applied to God; but the intention, in both, is sufficiently marked. In one case, whereof there occur a few examples, it is preceded by the interjection *O!* which adds solemnity to the invocation: *O! my Lord*, Exod. iv. 10. 13. The other is, when it is coupled with *my God*, as in this, Psal. xxxv. 23. *Awake to my judgment, my God, and my Lord.* Another thing to be remarked is, that when the term *lord* has the definite article prefixed, with no name, title, or description subjoined, it is to

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be underſtood as ſpoken of God, or of Chriſt. When the word is applied to men, whether the article be, or be not uſed, the name or title ſhould be annexed. If the frequent recurrence of the title render it proper to omit it, we muſt ſay *my lord*, not *the lord*, acted thus; or we may ſay, *his lordſhip*, this laſt form being never uſed of a celeſtial power.

§ 12. So much for the words *ſir* and *lord*, as uſed by us at preſent. In regard to the term *maſter*, there can be no queſtion that it comes nearer the primitive ſignification of κυριος, than either of the former. Κυριος and δεσποτης are correlates in Greek, juſt as *maſter* and *ſervant* are in Engliſh. Indeed, *lord* and *ſervant* are thus uſed in the common verſion of the Goſpels, but not ſo properly. *Vaſſal*, not *ſervant*, is, in Engliſh, correlative to *lord**. At leaſt, it was ſo anciently; for both were feudal terms, the latter denoting the proprietor of the land, the former the tenant, or him who held it under the proprietor. But, with the gradual abolition of feudal cuſtoms, the name *vaſſal* has gone almoſt into diſuſe; whereas the import of the term *lord* has been greatly altered, in ſome reſpects extended, and in ſome reſpects limited. But ſuch variations are incident to every language. A remain of this uſage, however, we have ſtill in Scotland, in the meaning aſſigned to the word *laird*, which is no other than the old Scots pronunciation of *lord*. In that dialect, it invariably denotes *landlord*, or, as Johnſon well explains it, *lord of the manor*. But to return: the reaſon why our tranſlators have choſen ſometimes to contraſt *ſervant* and *lord*, rather than *ſervant* and *maſter*, is becauſe they had preoccupied the word *maſter*, employing it to anſwer to διδασκαλος. This made it neceſſary to recur to ſome other term, to anſwer to κυριος, for which none fitter could be found than *lord*. I have thought it preferable to render διδασκαλος, more literally, *teacher*, and ſay, Mat. x. 24. *The diſciple is not above his teacher, nor the ſervant above his maſter.* That the motive of our tranſlators was preciſely what I have mentioned, is evident from this, that in the numerous paſſages in the Epiſtles, where the obſervance of the relative duties of maſters and ſervants is inculcated, the word κυριος, as well as δεσποτης, is always rendered *maſter*, and not *lord*. But there is an ambiguity, which ariſes from rendering διδασκαλος *maſter*, when the context does not point out what kind of maſter is meant. In the words of James, ch. iii. 1. Μη πολλοι διδασκαλοι γινεσθε, as expreſſed in the common tranſlation, *Be not many maſters*, hardly any of the unlearned ſuppoſe him to be ſpeaking of *teachers*.

§ 13. Now, let us conſider the ordinary method which our tranſlators have followed, in the hiſtory of Jeſus Chriſt. One who reads the Bible with reflection (which not one of a thouſand does),

* Blackſtone's Com. B. II. ch. 4.

does), is aſtoniſhed to find, that on the very firſt appearance of Jeſus Chriſt, as a teacher, though attended with no exterior marks of ſplendour and majeſty; though not acknowledged by the great and learned of the age; though meanly habited, in a garb not ſuperior to that of an ordinary artificer, in which capacity we have ground to believe he aſſiſted his ſuppoſed father in his earlier days, Mark vi. 3.; he is addreſſed by almoſt every body in the peculiar manner in which the Almighty is addreſſed in prayer. Thus the leper, Mat. viii. 2. *Lord, if thou wilt, thou canſt make me clean.* Thus the centurion, ver. 6. *Lord, my ſervant lieth at home.* The Canaaniteſh woman crieth after him, ch. xv. 22. *Have mercy on me, O Lord.* He is likewiſe mentioned ſometimes under the ſimple appellation of *The Lord*, John xx. 2. without any addition, a form of expreſſion which, in the Old Teſtament, our tranſlators, as above obſerved, had invariably appropriated to God. What is the meaning of this? Is it that, from his firſt ſhowing himſelf in public, all men believed him to be the Meſſiah; and not only ſo, but to be poſſeſſed of a divine nature, and entitled to be accoſted as God? Far from it. The utmoſt that can with truth be affirmed of the multitude, is, that they believed him to be a prophet. And even thoſe who, in proceſs of time, came to think him the Meſſiah, never formed a conception of any character, as belonging to that title, ſuperior to that of an earthly ſovereign, or of any nature ſuperior to the human. Nay, that the Apoſtles themſelves, before his reſurrection, had no higher notion, it were eaſy to prove. What then is the reaſon of this ſtrange peculiarity? Does the original give any handle for it? None in the leaſt. For, though the title that is given to him, is the ſame that is given to God, it is ſo far from being peculiarly ſo, as is the caſe with the Engliſh term ſo circumſtanced, that it is the common compellation of civility given not only to every ſtranger, but to almoſt every man of a decent appearance, by thoſe whoſe ſtation does not place them in an evident ſuperiority.

It is the title with which Mary Magdalene acoſted one whom ſhe ſuppoſed to be a gardener, John xx. 15. It is the title given by ſome Greek proſelytes to the Apoſtle Philip, John xii. 21. probably a fiſherman of Galilee. It is the title with which Paul the tentmaker, and Silas his companion, were ſaluted by the jailor at Thyatira, Acts xvi. 30. Laſtly, it is the title with which Pontius Pilate, the Roman procurator, a pagan and idolater, is addreſſed by the chief prieſts and Phariſees, Matth. xxvii. 63. And though the Jewiſh rulers would not refuſe what was merely reſpectful to the Roman procurator, who as ſuch was their ſuperior, we may be ſure they would not have given him a title that could be underſtood to imply any thing ſacred or divine. Our tranſlators have been ſo ſenſible of this, that even in the application

plication to the chief magiſtrate within the country, they have thought fit to render it only *ſir*. Further, it is the title which thoſe gave to Jeſus, who, at the time they gave it, knew nothing about him. In this manner, the Samaritan woman at Jacob's well addreſſed him, John iv. 11. when ſhe knew no more of him than that he was a Jew, which would not recommend him to her regard. Thus alſo he was addreſſed by the impotent man who lay near the pool of Bethesda, John v. 7. who, as we learn from the ſequel of the ſtory, did not then know the perſon who converſed with him, and who ſoon proved his benefactor. In theſe places indeed, and ſome others which might be mentioned, our tranſlators have rendered the word κυριε, not *lord*, but *ſir*. Why they have not uniformly done ſo, when the term is given by contemporaries to Jeſus reſiding on the earth, it would be impoſſible to aſſign a good reaſon. The only reaſon I can imagine, is the uniform practice that obtains very properly amongſt his followers ſince his aſcenſion, now when all power in heaven and on earth is committed to him, Matth. xxviii. 18. now when he is made head over all things unto his church, Eph. i. 22. and hath received a name that is above every name, Phil. ii. 9. &c. that at the name of Jeſus every knee ſhould bow of things in heaven, and things on the earth, and things under the earth, and every tongue ſhould confeſs that Jeſus Chriſt is LORD, to the glory of God the Father: in one word, now when men are more eſpecially obliged to honour the Son even as they honour the Father, John v. 23.

Is there any fitneſs in thus exhibiting the honours of deity, as appropriated to him in the very time of his humiliation, when for our ſakes, he was pleaſed to veil his glory, Phil. ii. 6. when he made himſelf of no reputation, diveſted himſelf, as the expreſſion ſtrictly implies, and took upon him the form of a ſervant? Or is there any conſiſtency in repreſenting men as uſing this ſtyle, whoſe ſentiments, on examination, will not ſupport it? The higheſt to which the faith of any of the people, not his diſciples, at that time roſe, was to think that he was John the Baptiſt riſen from the dead, Jeremiah, or one of the prophets, Matth. xvi. 13. &c. But where do we find any of the Prophets addreſſed with that peculiarity of idiom, which commonly diſtinguiſhes the Deity? There is, therefore, in this manner of tranſlating, a very great impropriety, firſt, as it produces an inconſiſtency between the ſtyle of the perſons introduced, and what from the hiſtory itſelf we diſcover of their ſentiments; ſecondly, as it thereby, to a mere Engliſh reader, throws a degree of incredibility on the whole narrative.

§ 14. If they had uniformly tranſlated the word κυριε *lord*, to whomſoever applied, they would have done better; becauſe every reader of common ſenſe muſt have perceived that the word

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was employed, not according to the Engliſh idiom, but according to the uſage of a tongue very different. Still, however, by comparing the various places where it occurs, it would have been practicable to reduce the term to its proper value. Not that I approve this ſervile manner of tranſlating, any more than that in the oppoſite extreme called liberal. To tranſlate the words, but not the idiom, is doing but half, and much the eaſier half, of the work of a tranſlator, and never fails to render obſcure and enigmatical in the tranſlation, what is perſpicuous and ſimple in the original. But our interpreters have, in this particular, followed neither the Hebrew idiom nor the Engliſh, but adopted a peculiarity in regard to Jeſus Chriſt, which repreſents moſt of his contemporaries, as entertaining the ſame opinions concerning him, which are now entertained among Chriſtians. Now, nothing can be more manifeſt than that, in thoſe days, the ideas of his Apoſtles themſelves were far inferior to what we entertain.

To do juſtice, therefore, to our idiom, to preſerve at once conſiſtency, perſpicuity, and propriety, it is neceſſary that the word κυριος, in an addreſs to heaven, be rendered *Lord*, or *O Lord*; when the Supreme Being is not addreſſed, but ſpoken of, *the Lord*; in addreſſing a king, or eminent magiſtrate, *my lord*; and in other ordinary caſes, *ſir*. Sometimes from a ſervant to his maſter, or from one in immediate ſubordination, to a perſon on whom he depends, it may be more emphatical to ſay *maſter*. Let it, however, be obſerved, that in tranſlating the Scripture, κυριος prefixed to a proper name, cannot be rendered either *ſir* or *maſter*, immediately followed by the name, on account of the particular idea which that mode of expreſſion conveys to us. Let it be alſo obſerved, that what I have ſaid of *kyrios*, as applied to Jeſus Chriſt, regards purely its application in the Goſpels. It is plain, that after Chriſt's aſcenſion into heaven, and exaltation to the right hand of the Father, he is viewed in a very different light. Addreſſes to him are conveyed only by prayer, and ought to be clothed in its language. When we ſpeak of him, it ought to be, not as of *a lord*, one poſſeſſed of great power and eminence, but as of *The Lord* of the creation, the heir of all things, to whom all authority in heaven and upon earth, and all judgment, are committed by the Father. That expreſſion of Thomas, therefore, ὁ Κυριος μου και ὁ Θεος μου, John xx. 28. cannot be otherwiſe rendered than it has been rendered by our tranſlators, *My Lord and my God*. It is manifeſt, from the exclamation, that Thomas viewed his Maſter now ſince his reſurrection, though not yet aſcended, in a light in which he had never viewed him before. For theſe reaſons, I think that in general no alteration would be proper in the way of rendering the word κυριος as applied to Jeſus, either in the Acts or in the Epiſtles. The caſe is different in the Goſpels.

§ 15. It

§ 15. It is proper to take notice, before I conclude this article, that the word κυριος is in the Septuagint alſo employed in tranſlating the Hebrew word יהוה *Jehovah*, the incommunicable name of God. Though this is a proper name, and not an appellative, the Seventy, probably from the ſuperſtitious opinion which had ariſen among the Jews (for it was evidently not from the beginning), that it was dangerous to pronounce that word, and conſequently to adopt it into another language, have thought fit to render it always κυριος, an appellative which, as we have ſeen, is of very extenſive application. Nay, in reading the Hebrew Scriptures, in the ſynagogue ſervice, their doctors to this day always read *adon*, or *adoni*, *Lord*, or *my Lord*, where they find Jehovah. The writers of the New Teſtament, who wrote in Greek, have ſo far conformed to the uſage of their countrymen, that they have never introduced this name in their writings. In quoting from the Old Teſtament, they have adopted the method of the Seventy, whoſe words they frequently uſe. The generality of Chriſtian tranſlators have in this imitated their practice. Our own, in particular, have only in four places of the Old Teſtament uſed the name *Jehovah*. In all other places, which are almoſt innumerable, they render it *the Lord*. But, for diſtinction's ſake, when this word correſponds to *Jehovah*, it is printed in capitals.

I once thought, that in tranſlating the New Teſtament, the word *Jehovah* might properly be replaced, wherever, in a quotation from the Old, that name was uſed in the Hebrew. On more mature reflection I now think differently. It ſeemed good to infinite wiſdom, in the old diſpenſation, when a peculiar nation was choſen, and contradiſtinguiſhed to all others, ſo far to condeſcend to the weakneſs of his creatures, as to diſtinguiſh himſelf as their God, by an appropriated name, which might diſcriminate him with them from the gods of the nations; the general names *God* and *Lord* being applied to them all. But, in the Goſpel diſpenſation, wherein all ſuch diſtinctions were to be aboliſhed, it was proper that there ſhould remain nothing which might appear to repreſent God as a national or local deity. A proper name is not neceſſary where there are no more than one of a kind. We are not ſenſible of the want of a proper name for the ſun, the moon, or the earth. It is not ſuitable in the interpreter of the New Teſtament, to ſhow a greater nicety of diſtinction than the ſacred penmen have warrantrd. It belongs rather to the annotator, than to the tranſlator, to mark ſuch differences. In tranſlating the Old Teſtament, the diſtinction, in my judgment, ought to be ſacredly preſerved, for the very ſame reaſon that no diſtinction ought to be made in the New. The tranſlator ought faithfully to repreſent his original, as far as the language

guage which he writes is capable of doing it. So much for the import of the word κυριος, and the different ſenſes that it bears, according to the application.

PART II.

Διδασκαλος, *Rabbi.*

I PURPOSE now to make a few obſervations on the word διδασκαλος, and ſome other titles of reſpect current in Judea in the days of our Saviour. After the Babyloniſh captivity, when Jeruſalem and the temple were rebuilt, and the people reſtored to their ancient poſſeſſions, care was taken, under the conduct of Ezra, and thoſe who ſucceeded him in the adminiſtration of affairs, to prevent their relapſing into idolatry, which had brought ſuch accumulated calamities on their country. It was juſtly conſidered as one of the beſt expedients for anſwering this end, as we learn partly from Scripture, and partly from Jewiſh writers, to promote amongſt all ranks the knowledge of God and of his law, and to excite the whole people throughout the land to join regularly in the public worſhip of the only true God. For their accommodation, ſynagogues came, in proceſs of time, to be erected in every city and village where a ſufficient number of people could be found to make a congregation. Every ſynagogue had its ſtated governors and preſident, that the public ſervice might be decently conducted, and that the people might be inſtructed in the ſacred writings, both the law and the prophets. The ſynagogues were fitted for anſwering among them the like purpoſes with pariſh-churches amongſt us Chriſtians. But this was not all. That the ſynagogues might be provided with knowing paſtors and wiſe rulers, it was neceſſary that there ſhould alſo be public ſeminaries or ſchools, wherein thoſe who were deſtined to teach others, were to be taught themſelves. And ſo great was their veneration for theſe ſchools or colleges, that they accounted them more ſacred than even ſynagogues, and next, in this reſpect, to the temple. They maintained that a ſynagogue might lawfully be converted into a ſchool, but not a ſchool into a ſynagogue. The former was aſcending, the latter deſcending. Both were devoted to the ſervice of God; but the ſynagogue, ſay they, is for the ſpiritual nouriſhment of the ſheep, the ſchool for that of the ſhepherds.

§ 2. Now their ſchools were properly what we ſhould call divinity colleges; for in them they were inſtructed in the ſacred language, the ancient Hebrew, not then the language of the

country, in the law and the traditions, the writings of the Prophets, the holy ceremonies, the ſtatutes, cuſtoms, and procedure of their judicatories; in a word, in whatever concerned the civil conſtitution and religion of their country. I make this diſtinction, of civil and religious, more in conformity to modern and Chriſtian notions, than in reference to ancient and Jewiſh. In that polity, theſe were ſo interwoven, or rather blended, as to be inſeparable. Their law was their religion, and their religion was their law; inſomuch that with them there was a perfect coincidence in the profeſſions of lawyer and divine. But as to their mode of education, that they had ſome kind of ſchools long before the time above mentioned, even from the beginning of their eſtabliſhment, under Joſhua, in the land of Canaan, or, at leaſt, from the time of Samuel, can hardly be made a queſtion. A certain progreſs in letters had been made very early by this people, and regularly tranſmitted from one generation to another. But this ſeems evidently to have been without ſuch fixed ſeminaries as were erected and endowed afterwards; elſe it is impoſſible there ſhould be ſo little notice of them in ſo long a tract of time, of which, as far as religion is concerned, we have a hiſtory pretty particular. All that appears before the captivity, on this ſubject, is, that numbers of young men were wont, for the ſake of inſtruction, to attend the moſt eminent Prophets, and were therefore called the ſons, that is, the diſciples, of the Prophets, and that, in this manner, were conſtituted a ſort of ambulatory ſchools, for communicating the knowledge of letters, and of the law. In theſe were probably taught the elements of the Hebrew muſic and verſification. We are informed alſo, 2 Chron. xvii. 7, 8, 9. that Jehoſhaphat, king of Judah, ſent Prieſts, Levites, and others, to teach in all the cities of Judah. But this appears to have been merely a temporary meaſure, adopted by that pious monarch for the inſtruction of the people in his own time, and not an eſtabliſhment, which ſecured a ſucceſſion and continuance. Now, this is quite different from the erection that obtained afterwards in their cities, of a ſort of permanent academies, for the education of the youth deſtined for the upper ſtations in ſociety.

§ 3. Further, to give the greater luſtre to thoſe ſeminaries, they were commonly men of note, in reſpect of their ſtation and quality, as well as diſtinguiſhed for their learning, who were appointed to preſide and teach in them. Theſe were moſtly Prieſts and Levites; but not entirely: for eminent perſons, from other tribes, were alſo admitted to ſhare in this honour. No ſooner did erudition become an object of national attention in Judea; no ſooner were endowments made for advancing and promoting it, than the emulation of literary men was excited to attain the honours peculiar to the profeſſion, by having the direction, or a principal part in the teaching, in ſome noted ſchool. Even a certificate,

certificate, from the perſons qualified, of being equal to the charge, was not a little prized. Though, at firſt ſight, it may appear but a ſmall circumſtance, it will be admitted, by the judicious to be a conſiderable evidence that, in our Saviour's time, learning was in general and high eſteem among the Jews, to find that thoſe titles which related to the buſineſs of teaching, were, with ſo much ſolicitude courted, and with ſo much oſtentation diſplayed, by perſons of diſtinction. Of this kind, the honorary titles, *father*, *rabbi*, *doctor*, or *teacher*, *guide*, or *conductor*, the name *ſcribe*, often indeed a name of office, *lawyer*, *doctor of law*, may juſtly be accounted. I do not, however, mean to affirm, that all theſe titles are of different import. Some of them, as will ſoon appear, are juſtly held ſynonymous.

§ 4. Some of theſe had come into uſe but a little before our Saviour's time. This was the caſe, in particular, of that moſt celebrated title *rabbi*, or as for ſome time it ſeems to have been diſtinguiſhed into *rab*, and *rabban*, with ſome difference of ſignification. In the Old Teſtament, we find the term רב *rab*, in compoſition with ſome other word, employed as a name of office and dignity, but not till the people became acquainted with the Chaldeans, concerning whom only it is uſed. The word, both in Hebrew and in Chaldee, ſignifies ſometimes *great*, ſometimes *many*, and, when uſed ſubſtantively, denotes one who is at the head of any buſineſs, of whatever kind it be. Thus רב החבל *rab hachbel*, Jonah i. 6. is, in the Septuagint, πρωρεὺς, מבחים רב *rab tebuchim*, Jer. xxxix. 11. ἀρχιμαγειρος, *chief cook*. The word will bear this verſion, but it does not ſuit the context in the paſſage where it is found, and רב סריס *rab ſeriſim*, Dan. i. 3. ἀρχιευνουχος, the firſt rendered in the Engliſh verſion, *ſhip-maſter*, the ſecond, *captain of the guard*, and the third, *maſter of the eunuchs*. It is uſed in the plural alſo for *chief men*, in general, ſuperintendants, or thoſe at the head of affairs. Thus, רבי המלך *rabbe hammelech*, Jer. xxxix. 13. are the chief men employed by the king over the different departments of the ſtate. It is rendered *the princes of the king* in the common tranſlation. The original term ſuits entirely the import of the Latin word *princeps*, but not of the Engliſh word *prince*, at leaſt in its moſt common acceptation: for it is not the king's ſons, or any order of nobles, who are ſo denominated. The word among the Chaldeans, appears evidently to have been equivalent to the term שר *ſhar* among the Hebrews. Accordingly, he who is ſtyled by Daniel, in the paſſage above quoted, רב סריס, is four times, in the ſame chapter, called שר הסריס *ſhar haſeriſim*, Dan. i. 7, 8, 9. 18. And this uſe of the name *rab* ſeems to have continued long in Syria, as well as in Chaldea. Thus, in the Syriac New Teſtament, it is found, in the ſame manner, united with the common appellation of any ſort of officer, in order to denote

denote the principal perſon in that office. Thus, *rab-cohana*, Mat. xxvi. 51. is the high-prieſt, *rab-machſa* is chief of the publicans, Luke xix. 2. and *rab-raghotha* 1 Pet. v. 4. is chief ſhepherd. *Rab*, conſtrued in this manner, is equivalent to the Greek αρχι, as uſed in compoſition. The preceding titles are accordingly thus expreſſed in Greek, αρχιερευς, αρχιτελωνης, and αρχιποιμην.

Again, the word *rab* is ſometimes found in that verſion, combined, not with the title of any ſort of officer, but with a term denoting the office or charge itſelf; in which caſe it always means the perſon who is principally entruſted with the buſineſs. Thus, *rab beth*, Matth. xx. 8 is the ſteward, επιτροπος, he who is over the houſehold; and *rab canoſhetha*, Mark v. 35. is the ruler of the ſynagogue, αρχισυναγωγος. It is not unlikely, though I do not find any example of it in Scripture, that the term has at firſt been ſimilarly compounded with ſome word ſignifying a ſchool, or, perhaps, with the name of the art or ſcience taught, in order to denote the overſeer of ſuch a ſeminary, or the teacher of ſuch an art. This hypotheſis is at leaſt favoured by analogy. As uſe, however, is variable, it appears, from what has actually happened, extremely probable, that when all other applications of the term have been dropped, it has ſtill remained as an honourable compellation of the learned. And when the term *rab* came to be peculiarly applied to ſuch, the word wherewith it was, at firſt, for diſtinction's ſake, compounded, would be ſuperſeded as unneceſſary.

It is, at leaſt, certain, that the Jewiſh doctors, who reſided at Babylon, about the time of our Saviour, were called ſimply *rab*. But, in the Old Teſtament, there is no trace of ſuch a title as *rab*, *rabbi*, or *rabban*, given to a man of letters; nor is any of the old prophets, or Scribes, or indeed any other perſon, diſtinguiſhed by this mark of reſpect prefixed to his name. Though the introduction of titles is always occaſioned by the erection of uſeful and important offices, it is commonly in the decline of merit that pompous titles are moſt affected. At firſt, no doubt, vain glory has led many to aſſume them, to whom they did not belong, in right of office, and an intereſted adulation has induced others to give them. Some of them, however, came ſoon, among the Jews, to be converted into a kind of academical diſtinctions, which, to give them more weight, are ſaid to have been conferred ſolemnly in their ſchools or colleges, accompanied with certain religious ceremonies. From this practice, I may obſerve by the way, ſprang literary degrees in Chriſtian univerſities, to which there is nothing ſimilar in all Pagan antiquity, either Greek or Roman, but to which the Jewiſh cuſtom above mentioned bears an evident and cloſe analogy.

§ 5. Thoſe who belonged to the ſchool were divided into three claſſes or orders. The loweſt was that of the diſciples, or learners;

ers; the second, that of the fellows, or companions, those who, having made considerable progress in learning, were occasionally employed by the masters, in teaching the younger students. The highest was that of the preceptors or teachers, to whom they appropriated the respectful title of *doctor*, or *rabbi*, which differs from *rab* only by the addition of the affix pronoun of the first person. All belonging to the school were accounted honourable in a certain degree. Even the lowest, the name *disciple*, was considered as redounding to the honour of those youths, who were selected from the multitude, had the advantage of a learned education, and by their diligence and progress, gave hopes that they would one day fill with credit the most important stations. The title *companion*, *fellow*, or *associate*, was considered as very honourable to the young graduate who obtained it, being a public testimony of the proficiency he had made in his studies. And the title *rabbi* was their highest academical honour. That it was only the youth, in what are called the genteeler stations, who had the advantage of a learned education, is manifest from the contempt which our Lord's parentage drew on him, as a teacher, from his fellow-citizens. *Whence*, say they, Matt. xiii. 54, 55. *hath this man this wisdom? Is not this the carpenter's son?* They conclude that he must be illiterate, from the mean condition of his parents. It was not the children of such then, we may reasonably infer, who were trained in those seminaries.

In the Gospels, διδασκαλος is given as the Greek translation of the Syriac *rabbi*, John i. 38. Yet this word does not, as the Greek, literally signify *teacher*; but, having been conferred, at first, as a mark of respect on actual teachers, and afterwards on other learned men, διδασκαλος was justly accounted as apposite a version as the Greek language afforded. It is certain, the term *rabbi* began soon to be used with great latitude. But though it came gradually to be bestowed on those who were not actual teachers, it always retained, ever since it had been appropriated to the learned, a relation to learning; and, being understood as an addition due only to literary merit, it still denoted that though the person who enjoyed it, might not be actually employed in teaching, he was well qualified for the office. *Rabban* is not the name of a degree superior to *rabbi*, though it seems intended for heightening the signification. It may be understood to denote eminent or learned rabbi, and appears to have been but very seldom used. The title *rabboni*, which we find twice given to our Lord, is *rabban*, with the addition of the affix of the first person, and accommodated to the pronunciation of Judea. One of those who addressed him with this compellation, was blind Bartimeus, when he applied for the recovery of his sight, Mark x. 51. The other

other was Mary Magdalene, when she first saw Jesus after his resurrection, John xx. 16.

That the use of the term *rabban* has not extended far beyond Palestine, may be presumed from the following circumstance. Though the word *rabbi* is very common in the Syriac translation, the Greek διδασκαλε being generally so rendered; yet in the only place where that translator introduces the word *rabboni*, which is that quoted from John, he prefixes *in Hebrew*, that is, in the dialect of Palestine, which was then so called, adding the explanation given by the evangelist, *that is, teacher;* which plainly shews that the word *rabboni* was not Syriac. This is the more remarkable, as in the other passage, where the historian interprets in the same manner the word *rabbi*, adding, John i. 38. ὁ λεγεται ἑρμηνευομενον διδασκαλε, that interpreter omits this explanatory clause as intended only for the Grecian reader, and of no use to those who understood Syriac. In the passage in Mark, where *rabboni* occurs, as the evangelist had added no explanation, his interpreter has not thought it necessary to change their own word *rabbi*. This is an evidence that he also considered the difference in signification between the two words as inconsiderable. Another strong presumption of the same point is, that the apostle John explains both by the same Greek word.

It may be observed here by the way, that they likewise used to raise the import of a title by doubling it. Thus our Lord, speaking of the Pharisees, says, They love to be called of men *rabbi*, *rabbi*, Matt. xxiii. 7. In this manner he was himself addressed by Judas at the time when that disciple chose to assume the appearance of more than ordinary regard, Mark xiv. 45. The title κυριε seems to have been used in the same manner. Not every one who saith unto me, *Lord, Lord,* κυριε, κυριε, Matt. vii. 21. This is very agreeable to the genius of the Oriental tongues, which often, by the repetition of an adjective, express the superlative degree.

§ 6. I took notice once before that, in the common version of the Gospels, διδασκαλος is generally rendered *master*. I cannot say that the word is mistranslated when so rendered, since it is the most common title with us, wherewith scholars address their teacher. But it is rather too indefinite, as this term does not distinguish the relation meant from almost any other relation, wherein superior and inferior are brought together. The word *master* serves equally for rendering κυριος, δεσποτης, επισατης, καθηγητης, as for διδασκαλος. And therefore in many cases, especially where the context requires a contra-distinction to any of those terms, the word *master* is not proper. It is indeed evident to me, that in the ordinary Hellenistic use, it corresponds nearly to the English word *doctor*. Both are honorary titles, expressive of the qualifications of the person to whom they are given. Both are literary

literary titles that relate to no other ſort of merit but learning; and both are ſolemnly conferred with certain ceremonies, which we call *graduation*, by thoſe who are accounted the proper judges. Our tranſlators have, in one place, very properly rendered it *doctor*. Joſeph and Mary, we are told, Luke ii. 46. found Jeſus in the temple ſitting *in the midſt of the doctors*, εν μεσω των διδασκαλων. To have ſaid, in the midſt of the maſters, would have been a very vague expreſſion of the ſenſe. Nor have we reaſon to believe that it would have been proper here to tranſlate the word *teachers*, as it did not imply that they were ſuch by profeſſion. In compoſition, our interpreters have commonly rendered it *doctors*, Luke v. 17. *There were Phariſees and* νομοδιδασκαλοι, *doctors of the law ſitting by*. Again, Acts v. 34. *There ſtood up one of the council, a Phariſee, named Gamaliel,* νομοδιδασκαλος, *a doctor of law*. Beſides, we are accuſtomed to hear the words *Jewiſh rabbies* and *Jewiſh doctors* uſed ſynonymouſly. In Juſtin Martyr's dialogue with Trypho, the Jew, the rabbies are always called διδασκαλοι.

§ 7. But it may be objected that this does not account for the application of the title to our Lord. As he did not derive his doctrine from any of thoſe learned ſeminaries frequented by ſuch of the youth as were reckoned the flower of the nation, the name *doctor* could not, with propriety, be applied to him. In anſwer to this, let it be obſerved, firſt, that as in Judea at that time they ſpoke not Greek, but a dialect of Chaldee, not differing conſiderably from what is called Syriac, it is evident that the actual compellation, whereby our Saviour was addreſſed, was *rabbi*. For this we have the expreſs teſtimony of the apoſtle John, in a paſſage lately quoted, who, though writing in a different tongue, thought proper to mention the title uſually given him in the language of the country, adding, merely for the ſake of thoſe readers who knew nothing of the Oriental languages, that it is equivalent to the Greek διδασκαλος. Now, as the Chaldaic word does not literally ſignify *teacher*, which the Greek word does, their equivalence muſt ariſe ſolely from the ordinary application of them as titles of reſpect to men of learning; and in this view the Engliſh word *doctor* is adapted equally to the tranſlation of both.

Secondly, though the title *rabbi* could regularly be conferred only by thoſe who had the ſuperintendency of their ſchools, we have ground to believe that with them, as with us, the people would be ready to give the compellation through courteſy, and on the preſumption that it had been conferred, wherever they ſaw or ſuppoſed diſtinguiſhed abilities in learning; and this is moſt probably the reaſon why we find it given alſo to John the Baptiſt, John iii. 26.

Thirdly, in the Jewiſh ſtate, a divine commiſſion was conceived

ved to confer all ſorts of dignities and honours, in an eminent manner, and ſo ſuperſeded ordinary rules and human deſtinations. On this account they conſidered a prophet, though not of the ſacerdotal family, as an extraordinary prieſt, and entitled to offer ſacrifice, in conſideration of the evidences he gave of his miſſion. Thus the prophets Samuel, 1 Sam. vii. 9. and Elijah, 1 Kings xviii. 31. &c. neither of whom was a prieſt, offered ſacrifice with acceptance and upon altars too not warranted by the law. It is evident that ſome of thoſe who gave the title of *rabbi* to our Saviour, were willing, either ſincerely or pretendedly, thus to account for their doing ſo. *Rabbi*, ſaid Nicodemus, a Phariſee, and a member of the Sanhedrim, John iii. 1. &c. *we know that thou art a teacher come from God; for no man can do theſe miracles that thou doſt, except God be with him.* Here he, as it were, aſſigns the reaſon why he ſaluted him *rabbi*, although he knew that he had not been educated in human literature, and had not received from men any literary honours. The ſame title was given him alſo by others of that ſect inſidiouſly, when, though they pretended friendſhip, their aim was to entangle him in his talk, that they might have a pretext for delivering him up to the Roman governor. In other caſes, they ſhew ſufficiently how little they were diſpoſed to admit his right to any degree of reſpect ariſing from knowledge. They ſaid, John vii. 15. *How knoweth this man letters, having never learned?* A charge, the truth of which our Lord very readily admitted by replying, *My doctrine is not mine, but his who ſent me.*

§ 8. Now, from the foregoing obſervations, it appears that the name διδασκαλος, as being nearly equivalent in import to the appellation *rabbi*, for which it has been ſubſtituted by the Evangeliſt, may be fitly expreſſed, either by the Engliſh term *doctor*, or by the Syriac *rabbi*, which is now ſo much naturalized amongſt us, that its meaning, as a Jewiſh title of literary honour, can hardly be miſtaken. In the addreſſes made to our Lord in his lifetime, the Syriac term is ſurely preferable; the Engliſh word, though very appoſite in reſpect of its origin, and ordinary acceptation, has conſiderably ſunk in its value, in conſequence of the ſlight manner wherein we are accuſtomed to hear it applied. But we all know that *rabbi* among the Jews of that age was a title in the higheſt degree reſpectful, and on that account interdicted by their Maſter, even to the apoſtles themſelves. It is alſo the word by which διδασκαλος is commonly rendered in the Syriac verſion of the New Teſtament, juſtly held the moſt reſpectable of all the tranſlations extant, as being both the oldeſt, and written in a language not materially different from that ſpoken by our Lord and his apoſtles. The difference appears not to be greater (if ſo great) than that which we obſerve between the Attic and the Ionic dialects in Greek. But when διδασκαλος, is conſtrued

ſtrued with other words, which either limit or appropriate it, we commonly judge it better to render it *teacher*, according to the ſimple and primitive ſignification of the word. In ſuch caſes it is probable, that the writer alludes merely to what is uſually implied in the Greek term. So much for the import of *rabbi* or διδασκαλος in the New Teſtament.

§ 9. Now, when we compare the titles *kyrios* and *didaſcalos* together, in reſpect of the Jewiſh uſe and application of them, we find ſeveral remarkable differences between them. From our modes of thinking, we ſhould be apt to conclude, that the former of theſe appellations would be much the more honourable of the two. Yet this is far from holding generally, though in particular caſes, it no doubt does. In regard to the term *kyrios*, I obſerved formerly, that, as it originally ſignified *maſter*, as oppoſed to *ſervant*, it retained in that nation, in our Saviour's time, ſo much of its primitive meaning, as to be always underſtood to imply an acknowledged inferiority in the perſon who gave it, to him to whom it was given. Civility might lead a man to give it to his equal. But to give it to one who either in the order of nature, or by human conventions, was conſidered as inferior and ſubordinate, would have looked more like an inſult than like a compliment. Hence it muſt be regarded as a term purely relative, which derived its value ſolely from the dignity of the perſon who ſeriouſly beſtowed it. To be entitled to this compellation from a monarch neither tributary nor dependent, denoted him who received it to be ſuperior to human. But no uſeful citizen was ſo low as not to be entitled to this mark of reſpect from a common beggar. And, as its value in every inſtance depended ſolely on the dignity of the giver, it might be either the moſt honourable title that could be conferred, or the moſt inſignificant. The uſe of the title *rabbi*, *didaſcalos*, or doctor, was, in this reſpect, totally different. As it was underſtood to expreſs not relation, but certain permanent qualifications in the perſon who received it, they did not conſider it as a matter of courteſy, but as a matter of right. It was not relative but abſolute. The ſame perſon did not (as was the caſe of *kyrios*) conſider himſelf as obliged to give it to one, and entitled to receive it from another. Whoever had this literary degree conferred on him, was entitled to receive the honourable compellation equally from all perſons, ſuperiors, inferiors, and equals. And we need not doubt that this vain-glorious race would brand with the ignominious character of ruſticity all who withheld it.

§ 10. Hence we may diſcover the reaſon why our Lord, when warning his diſciples (Matt. xxiii. 7. &c.) againſt imitating the oſtentation and preſumption of the Scribes and Phariſees in affecting to be denominated *rabbi*, father, guide, or conductor, does not once mention *kyrios*, though, of all titles of reſpect the moſt

common. It is manifeſt that his view was not to prohibit them from giving or receiving the common marks of civility, but to check them from arrogating what might ſeem to imply a ſuperiority in wiſdom and underſtanding over others, and a title to dictate to their fellows, a ſpecies of arrogance which appeared but too plainly in the Scribes and learned men of thoſe days. As to the title *kyrios*, he knew well that from their worldly ſituation and circumſtances, which in this matter were the only rule, they could expect it from none but thoſe in the loweſt ranks, who would as readily give it to an artiſan or a peaſant, and that therefore there could be no danger of vanity from this quarter. But the caſe was different with titles expreſſive not of fleeting relations, but of thoſe important qualifications which denote a fitneſs for being the lights and conductors of the human race. The title *father*, in the ſpiritual or metaphoric ſenſe, the moſt reſpectful of all, he prohibits his diſciples from either aſſuming or giving, chuſing that it ſhould be appropriated to God, and at the ſame time claims the title of guide and ſpiritual inſtructor to himſelf.

§ 11. Nor let it be imagined that the title διδασκαλοι, beſtowed on the firſt miniſters of the religion of Chriſt, ſtands in oppoſition to the admonitions here given The word, it muſt be owned, is equivocal, but is every where eaſily diſtinguiſhed by the connection; for when it is applied to ſuch as are literally employed in teaching, it muſt not be underſtood as a complimental title anſwering to the Chaldaic word *rabbi*, but as a name of office correſponding to the Hebrew word מלמד *melammed*, *teacher*, *preceptor*. Beſides, when applied even to the apoſtles, it is to be underſtood in a ſubordinate ſenſe. They are in like manner called *ſhepherds*, but ſtill in ſubordination to him who is the *chief Shepherd*, as well as the *chief Teacher* in his church. Chriſt is called the only foundation; *for other foundation*, ſays Paul, 1 Cor. iii. 11. *can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jeſus Chriſt*. Yet the ſame apoſtle does not heſitate to repreſent the church, Eph. ii. 20. as *built on the foundation of the apoſtles and prophets*. Nor does he conſider his ſtyling himſelf the father of thoſe in whoſe converſion he had been inſtrumental, as either incompatible with, or derogatory from, the honour of him who alone is our Father, and who is in heaven. When his meaning is ſo evident, no miſtake can ariſe from the word. *It is the Spirit that quickeneth*, ſaid our Lord, John vi. 63. *the fleſh profiteth nothing; the words that I ſpeak unto you, they are ſpirit, and they are life*. Now the ſpirit of the precept is tranſgreſſed, when his miniſters claim an undue ſuperiority over their Lord's heritage, arrogating to themſelves a dominion over the faith of his diſciples; and when, in conſequence of an undue attachment to worldly honours, or to the power that is underſtood to accompany

pany theſe, men become ſolicitous of being diſtinguiſhed from their equals, either by external marks of homage, or by an implicit deference and ſubmiſſion in point of judgment. With this character Diotrephes, (3 John 9.) ſeems to have been charged, whom the apoſtle John denominates φιλοπρωτευων, one who loves pre-eminence, a character which, not many ages after, became too general in the church.

§ 12. It was not, therefore, ſo much the titles, as that ſort of authority which was underſtood, among the Jews, to be conveyed under them, that was our Saviour's object in thoſe admonitions. Indeed, a fondneſs for title, a ſolicitude about precedency, or an affectation of being diſtinguiſhed by ſuch outward marks of reverence, are evidently condemned by him as a kind of earthly ambition unbecoming the meekneſs and humility of his diſciples, and that unremitted deference to the divine authority, which they ought ever to maintain. The practice of the apoſtles, and indeed the whole tenor of the New Teſtament, ſupply us with this commentary on the words. Whereas the cuſtomary marks of mere civil reſpect, ſo far from being condemned in Scripture, are always uſed by the inſpired penmen themſelves, when there is a proper occaſion of giving them.

§ 13. So much for the import of the principal titles of honour which occur in the New Teſtament, and the difference, in reſpect of application, between them and thoſe commonly ſuppoſed to correſpond to them, amongſt us.

DIS-

DISSERTATION THE EIGHTH.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE MANNER OF RENDERING SOME WORDS, TO WHICH THERE ARE NOT ANY THAT PERFECTLY CORRESPOND IN MODERN LANGUAGES.

It was obſerved in a former Diſſertation *, that there are words in the language of every people, which are not capable of being tranſlated into that of any other people who have not a perfect conformity with them in thoſe cuſtoms or ſentiments which have given riſe to thoſe words. The terms comprehended under this remark may be diſtributed into three claſſes. The firſt is of weights, meaſures, and coins; the ſecond of rites, ſects, and feſtivals; the third of dreſs, judicatories, and offices.

PART I.

Weights, Meaſures, and Coins.

As to the firſt claſs, it is evident that there is nothing wherein nations, eſpecially ſuch as are diſtant from one another in time and place, more frequently differ than in the meaſures and coins, which law or cuſtom has eſtabliſhed among them. Under coins I ſhall here include weights; becauſe it was chiefly by weight that money was anciently diſtinguiſhed. As commonly every people has names only for their own, it is often neceſſary, in the tranſlation of ancient and foreign books, to adopt their peculiar names, and by mentioning in the margin the equivalent in our own money, meaſures, and weights, to ſupply the reader with the proper information. This method has accordingly been often, though not always, taken by the tranſlators of holy writ. Into the common verſion of the Old Teſtament, ſeveral oriental, and other foreign names have been admitted, which are explained in the margin. Hence we have *ſhekel*, *ephah*, *bath*, *homer*, *cor*, and ſome

* Diſſ. II. P. I. § 5.

ſome others. This, however, (for what reaſon I know not), has not been attempted in the New Teſtament. Inſtead of it, one or other of theſe two methods has been taken; either ſome name of our own, ſuppoſed to be equivalent, or at leaſt not ſtrictly confined, by uſe, to a preciſe meaning, is adopted, ſuch as *pound, penny, farthing, buſhel, firkin;* or (which is the only other method ever uſed by our tranſlators) ſome general expreſſion is employed; as, *a piece of money, a piece of ſilver, tribute money, a meaſure*, and the like. Theſe are three ways, every one of which has ſome advantages, and ſome diſadvantages, and is, in ſome caſes, the moſt eligible method, but not in others.

One Monſieur le Cene, a French writer, who, in the end of the laſt century, wrote what he called, A Project for a new Tranſlation of the Bible into French, has recommended a fourth method, which is, to give in the verſion the exact value expreſſed in the money, or meaſures of the country into whoſe language the verſion is made. The anonymous author of an Eſſay, in Engliſh, for a new tranſlation, has adopted this idea; or rather, without naming Le Cene, has turned into Engliſh, and transferred to our uſe, all thoſe remarks of the Frenchman, which he accounted applicable to the Engliſh verſion. This fourth method, though much approved by ſome, on account of its ſuppoſed perſpicuity, is, in my judment, the worſt of them all, nor do I know a ſingle inſtance wherein I could ſay that it ought to be adopted *.

§ 2. But, before I enter on the diſcuſſion of theſe methods, it is proper here to premiſe, that as to meaſures, the enquiry may well be confined to thoſe called meaſures of capacity. The ſmaller length meaſures have originally, in every country, been borrowed from ſome of the proportions which take place in the human body. Hence *inch, handbreadth, ſpan, foot, cubit*. The larger meaſures, *pace, furlong, mile*, are but multiples of the leſs. Now, as there is not an exact uniformity of meaſure in the parts of individuals, it would naturally follow, that different nations would eſtabliſh, for themſelves, ſtandard-meaſures, not much different from thoſe of others, nor yet entirely the ſame. And this is what, in ſuch meaſures, has actually happened. When any of them, therefore, is mentioned, we know the meaſure nearly, but

* Till I read it lately in Dr Geddes' Proſpectus, I did not know that Le Cene had publiſhed a verſion of the Scriptures. The attentive reader will perceive that the criticiſms which follow in relation to him, do not refer to that tranſlation, which I never ſaw, but ſolely to his plan. If his verſion be conformable to his own rules, it is certainly a curioſity of its kind. But that cannot be; otherwiſe the learned Doctor, though not profuſe in its praiſe, would not, on ſome points, have ſpoken ſo favourably as he has done. Could he have ſaid, for inſtance, that he is very ſeldom biaſſed by party prejudices? If Le Cene was faultleſs on this article, much may be ſaid to exculpate Beza. Their parties were different, but their error was the ſame. See Diſſ. X. P.v. § 13.

but cannot know it accurately, till we are informed of what nation it is the inch, ſpan, foot, cubit, &c. The names have, by uſe, acquired a latitude and currency in theſe different applications. As to ſuperficial meaſure, we know it is reckoned no otherwiſe than by the ſquare of the long meaſure. Whereas, the cubical form, not anſwering ſo well in practice to the menſuration of ſolids, the ſtandards for them have generally been fixed without any regard to meaſures of length or ſurface. It is with theſe alone therefore that we are here concerned.

§ 3. Now, the beſt way of determining our choice properly, among the different methods of tranſlating above mentioned, is by attending to the ſcope of the paſſages wherein the mention of money and meaſures is introduced. Firſt, then, it ſometimes happens that accuracy, in regard to the value of theſe, is of importance to the ſenſe. Secondly, it ſometimes happens, that the value of the coin, or the capacity of the meaſure, is of no conſequence to the import of the paſſage. Thirdly, it happens alſo, ſometimes, that though the real value of the coin, or the capacity of the meaſure, does not affect the ſenſe of the paſſage, the comparative value of the different articles mentioned, is of ſome moment for the better underſtanding of what is ſaid. Let us conſider what methods ſuit beſt the ſeveral caſes now mentioned.

§ 4. Firſt, I obſerved, that accuracy, in regard to the value of the meaſures or coins mentioned, is ſometimes of importance to the ſenſe. When this is the caſe, and when we have no word exactly correſponding in import to the original term, that term ought to be retained in the verſion, and explained in the margin, according to the firſt method taken notice of. An inſtance, where the knowledge both of the capacity of the meaſure and of the value of the coin, are eſſential to the ſenſe, we have, in that public cry, Χοινιξ σιτου δηναριου, Rev. vi. 6. which our tranſlators render, *a meaſure of wheat for a penny*. It is evidently the intention of the writer to inform us of the rate of this neceſſary article, as a characteriſtic of the time whereof he is ſpeaking. But our verſion not only gives no information on this head, but has not even the appearance of giving any, which the word *chœnix* would have had, even to thoſe who did not underſtand it. But to ſay *a meaſure*, without ſaying what meaſure, is to ſay juſt nothing at all. The word *penny*, here, is alſo exceptionable, being uſed indefinitely, inſomuch that the amount of the declaration is, *a certain quantity of wheat for a certain quantity of money*. This ſuggeſts no idea of either dearth or plenty; and can be characteriſtical of no time, as it holds equally of every time. In this caſe, the original term, notwithſtanding its harſhneſs, ought to be retained in the text, and explained in the margin. Again, it was, doubtleſs, the intention of the ſacred penman, to acquaint us at how low a price our Saviour was ſold by his treacherous diſciple,

ciple, when he informs us, Mat. xxvi. 15. that the chief prieſts agreed to give Judas τριακοντα αργυρια. In like manner, when the Evangeliſt mentioned, John xii. 5. the indignant obſervation of Judas, that the ointment, wherewith our Lord's feet were anointed, might have been ſold for more than τριακοσιων δηναριων, it was, doubtleſs, his view to acquaint us with the value of the gift. Once more, when Philip remarked to our Lord, who had propoſed to feed the multitude in the deſert, John vi. 7. διακοσιων δηναριων αρτοι, *two hundred pennyworth of bread*, as it runs in the common verſion, *is not ſufficient for them, that every one of them may take a little*, it was the deſign of the hiſtorian to ſupply us with a kind of criterion for computing the number of the people preſent. But this could be no criterion, unleſs we knew the value of the δηναριον.

§ 5. 'But,' ſay thoſe modern correctors, 'in the examples 'above mentioned, when the knowledge of the value of the coin. 'and the capacity of the meaſure, is of importance to the ſenſe, 'no method can be equal, in point of perſpicuity, to that recom- 'mended by us, whereby both are reduced to an equivalent in 'the monies and meaſures of the country. Thus, the firſt paſ- 'ſage quoted would be rendered, *A meaſure of wheat capable of* '*ſupporting a man for one day*,' for thus Le Cene propoſes to tranſlate χοινιξ, '*for ſeven pence halfpenny*. The ſecond, *The* '*chief prieſts covenanted with Judas for three pounds fifteen ſhil-* '*lings ſterling*. The third, *Why was not this ointment ſold for* '*nine pounds ſeven ſhillings and ſix pence?* And the fourth, *Six* '*pounds five ſhillings would not purchaſe bread ſufficient*.'

The exceptions againſt this method are many. In the firſt place, it is a mere comment, and no tranſlation. Conſidered as a comment, it may be good; but that muſt be egregiouſly wrong as a verſion, which repreſents an author as ſpeaking of what he knew nothing about, nay, of what had no exiſtence in his time. And ſuch, ſurely, is the caſe with our ſterling money, which an interpretation of this ſort would repreſent as the current coin of Judea in the time of our Saviour. Nothing ought to be introduced by the tranſlator, from which the Engliſh reader may fairly deduce a falſe concluſion, in regard to the manners and cuſtoms of the time. Beſides, as the comparative value of their money and meaſures with ours is not founded on the cleareſt evidence, is it proper to give a queſtionable point the ſanction, as it were, of inſpiration? Add to all this, that no method can be deviſed, which would more effectually than this deſtroy the native ſimplicity and energy of the expreſſion. What is expreſſed in round numbers, in the original, is, with an abſurd minuteneſs, reduced to fractions in the verſion. Nothing can be more natural than the expreſſion, *Two hundred denarii would not purchaſe bread enough to afford every one of them a little*. This is ſpo-

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ken like one who makes a ſhrewd gueſs from what he ſees. Whereas, nothing can be more unnatural than, in ſuch a caſe, to deſcend to fractional parts, and ſay, *Six pounds five ſhillings would not purchaſe.* This is what nobody would have ſaid, that had not previouſly made the computation. Juſt ſo, the round ſum of three hundred denarii might very naturally be conjectured by one preſent, to be about the value of the ointment. But, for one to go ſo nearly to work as to ſay, *Nine pounds ſeven ſhillings and ſix pence might have been gotten for this liquor*, would directly ſuggeſt to the hearers, that he had weighed it, and computed its value at ſo much a pound. There is this additional abſurdity in the laſt example, that it is ſaid, πανω, *more than:* conſequently, it is mentioned, not as the exact account, but as a plauſible conjecture, rather under than above the price. But does any body, in conjectures of this kind, acknowledged to be conjectures, deſcend to fractional parts?

§ 6. Now, if this method would ſucceed ſo ill in the firſt of the three caſes mentioned, it will be found to anſwer ſtill worſe in the other two, where little depends on the knowledge of the value. In the ſecond, I may ſay, nothing depends on it. Now, there are ſeveral paſſages, wherein coins and meaſures are mentioned, in which the value of the coin, or the capacity of the meaſure, is of no conceivable conſequence to the import of the paſſage. In this caſe, either the ſecond or the third method, above ſpecified, is preferable to the introduction of a foreign term, not uſed in other places of the verſion, and noway neceſſary to the ſenſe. But let it be obſerved of the ſecond method, that I am never for uſing ſuch names of coins and meaſures as are peculiarly modern or European, and not applied to the money and meaſures of ancient and Oriental countries: for ſuch terms always ſuggeſt the notion of a coincidence with us, in things wherein there was actually no coincidence.

We read in the common verſion, Matth. v. 15. *Neither do men light a candle and put it under a buſhel*, υπο τον μοδιον, *but on a candleſtick.* Every perſon muſt be ſenſible, that the ſize of the meaſure is of no conſequence here to the ſenſe: the intention being ſolely to ſignify, that a light is brought, not to be covered up, but to be placed where it may be of uſe in lighting the houſehold. The general term *corn-meaſure*, perfectly anſwers the author's purpoſe in this place; and as nowhere, but in the expreſſion of this very ſentiment, does the word μοδιος occur in the Goſpels, there is no reaſon for adopting it. The term *buſhel* ſerves well enough for conveying the import of the ſentiment; but as it indirectly ſuggeſts an untruth, namely, the ancient uſe of that meaſure in Judea, it is evidently improper. For an example in money, our Lord ſays, when the Phariſees interrogated him about the lawfulneſs of paying the tribute impoſed by their conquerors,

conquerors, Luke xx. 24. Επιδειξατε μοι δηναριον, rendered in the common verſion, *ſhow me a penny*, the ſequel evinces that it was of no importance what the value of the money was; the argument is affected ſolely by the figure and inſcription on it. And, if in no other place of the Goſpels the value of that coin has affected the ſenſe more than it does here, it might have been rendered by the general phraſe *piece of money*. Now let us ſee how *Le Cene's* method does with thoſe two examples. In the firſt he would ſay, *Neither do men light a candle to put it under a meaſure which contains about a pint leſs than a peck*. Or, according to the manner which he ſometimes adopts, *containing ſuch a preciſe number of eggs* (I do not recollect how many); would not this particularity in fixing the capacity of the meaſure, but too manifeſtly convey the inſinuation that there would be nothing ſtrange or improper in men's putting a lighted candle under any other meaſure larger or ſmaller than that whereof the capacity is, as a matter of principal moment, ſo nicely aſcertained? A ſtrange way this of rendering Scripture perſpicuous!

Nor does it anſwer better in coins than in meaſures. When our Lord ſaid, Επιδειξατε μοι δηναριον, the very words imply that it was a ſingle piece he wanted to ſee; and what follows ſupplies us with the reaſon. But how does this ſuit *Le Cene's* mode of reduction? *Show me ſeven pence halfpenny*. Have we any ſuch piece? The very demand muſt, to an Engliſh reader, appear capricious, and the money aſked could not be preſented otherwiſe than in different pieces, if not in different kinds. It is added, *Whoſe image and ſuperſcription hath it?* Is this a queſtion which any man would put, *Whoſe image and ſuperſcription hath ſeven pence halfpenny?* 'But there may have been formerly *ſeven 'pence halfpenny pieces*, though we have none now.' Be it ſo. Still, as it is unſuitable to have the head and inſcription of a Roman emperor on what muſt, from the denomination, be underſtood to be Britiſh coin, they ought, for the ſake of conſiſtency, and for making the transformation of the money complete, to render the reply to the aforeſaid queſtion, *George's* inſtead of *Ceſar's*. If this be not tranſlating into Engliſh, it is perhaps ſuperior; it is what ſome moderns call, *Engliſhing*, *making Engliſh*, or *doing into Engliſh*; for all theſe expreſſions are uſed. Poems done in this manner are ſometimes more humbly termed *imitations*.

§ 7. I obſerved a third caſe that occurs in the Goſpels with reſpect to money and meaſure, which is when the value of the coin, or the capacity of the meaſure mentioned, does not, but the comparative value of the articles ſpecified, does, affect the ſenſe. Of this kind ſome of our Lord's parables furniſh us with excellent examples. Such is the parable of the pounds, Luke xix. 13, &c. I ſhall here give as much of it as is neceſſary for

my preſent purpoſe, firſt in the vulgar tranſlation, then in *Le Cene's* manner. 13. *He called his ten ſervants, and delivered them ten pounds, and ſaid unto them, Occupy till I come.* 16. *The firſt came, ſaying, Lord, thy pound hath gained ten pounds, and he ſaid unto him, Well, thou good ſervant: becauſe thou haſt been faithful in a very little, have thou authority over ten cities. And the ſecond came, ſaying, Lord, thy pound hath gained five pounds. And he ſaid likewiſe to him, Be thou alſo over five cities.* Nothing can be more manifeſt than that it is of no conſequence to the meaning and deſign of this brief narration, what the value of the pound was, great or little. Let it ſuffice that it here repreſents the whole of what we receive from our Creator to be laid out in his ſervice. In the accounts returned by the ſervants, we ſee the different improvements which different men make of the gifts of heaven; and in the recompences beſtowed, we have their proportional rewards. But theſe depend entirely on the numbers mentioned, and are the ſame, whatever be the value of the money. I ſhall now, in reducing them to our ſtandard, follow the rates aſſigned on the margin of the Engliſh Bible. Ducats, ſo often mentioned by *Le Cene*, are no better known to the generality of our people than talents or minæ are. Whether the rate of converſion I have adopted be juſt or not, is of no conſequence. I ſhall therefore take it for granted that it is juſt. The different opinions of the comparative value of their money and ours, nowiſe affect the argument. The objections are againſt the reduction from the one ſpecies to the other, not againſt the rule of reducing.

The foregoing verſes ſo rendered will run thus: *He called his ten ſervants, and delivered them thirty-one pounds five ſhillings ſterling, and ſaid, Occupy till I come. The firſt came, ſaying, Lord, thy three pounds two ſhillings and ſixpence, have gained thirty-one pounds five ſhillings; and he ſaid to him, Well, thou good ſervant, becauſe thou haſt been faithful in a very little, have thou authority over ten cities. And the ſecond came, ſaying, Lord, thy three pounds two ſhillings and ſixpence, have gained fifteen pounds twelve ſhillings and ſixpence. And he ſaid likewiſe to him, Be thou alſo over five cities.* In regard to the parable of the talents, Matt. xxv. 14. it is needleſs, after the ſpecimen now given, to be particular. I ſhall therefore give only part of one verſe thus expreſſed in the common verſion. *To one he gave five talents, to another two, and to another one;* which, in *Le Cene's* manner, would be, *To one he gave nine hundred thirty-ſeven pounds ten ſhillings ſterling. To another three hundred ſeventy-five pounds. And to another one hundred eighty-ſeven pounds ten ſhillings.* In both examples, what is of real importance, the comparative degrees of improvement and proportional rewards, which in the original, and in the common verſion, are diſcover-

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ed at a glance, are, if not loſt, ſo much obſcured by the complicated terms employed in the verſion, that it requires an arithmetical operation to diſcover them. In the example of the king who called his ſervants to account, Matt. xviii. 23. this manner is, if poſſible, ſtill more awkward, by reaſon of the largeneſs of the ſums. One of them is repreſented as owing to the king one million eight hundred ſeventy-five thouſand pounds, and his fellow-ſervant as indebted to him three pounds two ſhillings and ſixpence. There is ſome importance in the comparative value of the denarius and the talent, as it appears evidently one purpoſe of our Lord in this parable, to ſhow how inſignificant the greateſt claims we can make on our fellow-creatures are, compared with thoſe which divine juſtice can make on us. And though this be ſtrongly marked when the two ſums are reduced to one denomination, this advantage does not counterbalance the badneſs of the expreſſion ſo groſsly unnatural, unſcriptural, and, in every ſenſe, improper. In conveying religious and moral inſtruction, to embarraſs a reader or hearer with fractions and complex numbers, is in a ſpirit and manner completely the reverſe of our Lord's.

§ 8. I will not further try the patience of my readers with what has been propoſed in the ſame taſte, with reſpect to the meaſures, both liquid and dry, mentioned in Scripture, in the exhibition of their reſpective capacities by the number of eggs they could contain. I am afraid I have deſcended into too many particulars already, and ſhall therefore only add in general that, in this way, the beautiful and perſpicuous ſimplicity of holy writ, is exchanged for a frivolous minuteneſs, which deſcends to the loweſt denomination of parts, more in the ſtyle of a penurious money-broker, than in that of a judicious moraliſt, not to ſay, a divine teacher. Perſpicuity is therefore injured, not promoted by it, and to thoſe important leſſons, an appearance, or rather a diſguiſe, is given, which ſeems calculated to ruin their effect. That author has never reflected on what I think ſufficiently obvious, that when a piece of money is named, the name is underſtood to denote ſomething more than the weight of the ſilver or the gold. In the earlieſt ages, when it was only by weight that the money of the ſame metal was diſtinguiſhed, if the weight was the ſame, or nearly ſo, the names uſed in different languages ſerved equally well. It was therefore both natural and proper in the Seventy to render the Hebrew ככר *chechar*, in Greek ταλαντον, and שקל *ſhekel*, διδραχμα. For the Alexandrian διδραχμα, which was double the Attic referred to in the New Teſtament, was half an ounce. But though ſuch terms might, with propriety, be uſed promiſcuouſly, when the different denominations of money expreſſed ſolely their different weights, as was the caſe in the earlier ages of the Jewiſh commonwealth, it is not ſo now. The name ſignifies a coin of a particular form and ſize, ſtamp and

and inſcription. The Hebrew *ſhekel*, the Greek *ſtater*, and the Britiſh *half crown*, being each about half an ounce of ſilver, are nearly equivalent. But the names are not ſynonymous. If one had promiſed to ſhow you a *ſtater*, or a *ſhekel*, would you think he had diſcharged his promiſe by producing *half-a crown?*

§ 9. Words therefore which are by uſe excluſively appropriated to the coins and meaſures of modern nations, can never be uſed with propriety in the tranſlation of an ancient author. I have mentioned three ways which a tranſlator may take, and pointed out the different circumſtances by which the preference among thoſe methods may, in any inſtance, be determined. When the ſenſe of the paſſage does, in any degree, depend on the value of the coin, or the capacity of the meaſure, the original term ought to be retained, and if needful, explained in a note. This is the way conſtantly uſed in the tranſlation of books where mention is made of foreign coins or meaſures. What is more common than to find mention made in ſuch works of Dutch *guilders*, French *livres*, or Portugueſe *moidores?* I acknowledge, at the ſame time, the inconveniency of loading a verſion of Scripture with ſtrange and uncouth names. But ſtill this is preferable to expreſſions which, how ſmooth ſoever they be, do, in any reſpect, miſrepreſent the author, and miſlead the reader. Our ears are accuſtomed to the foreign names which are found in the common verſion of the Old Teſtament, ſuch as *ſhekel*, *bath*, *ephah*: though where the ſame coins and meaſures are evidently ſpoken of in the New, our tranſlators have not liked to introduce them, and have ſometimes, leſs properly, employed modern names which do not correſpond in meaning.

§ 10. We have, beſides, in the New Teſtament, the names of ſome Greek and Roman coins and meaſures not mentioned in the Old. Now, where the words are the ſame, or in common uſe coincident with thoſe uſed by the Seventy in tranſlating the Hebrew names above mentioned, I have thought it better to retain the Hebrew words, to which our ears are familiarized by the tranſlation of the Old, than to adopt new terms for expreſſing the ſame things. We ought not ſurely to make an apparent difference by means of the language, where we have reaſon to believe that the things meant were the ſame. When the word, therefore, in the New Teſtament, is the name of either meaſure or coin peculiar to Greeks or Romans, it ought to be retained; but when it is merely the term by which a Hebrew word occurring in the Old Teſtament, has ſometimes been rendered by the Seventy; the Hebrew name, to which the common verſion of the Old Teſtament has accuſtomed us, ought to be preferred. For this reaſon I have, in ſuch caſes, employed them in the verſion of the Goſpels. Αργυριον I have rendered *ſhekel*, when uſed for money. This was the ſtandard coin of the Jews; and when the

the Hebrew word for *ſilver* occurs in a plural ſignification, as muſt be the caſe when joined with a numeral adjective, it is evidently this that is meant. It is commonly in the Septuagint rendered *αργυρια*, and in one place in the common tranſlation, *ſilverlings*, Iſa. vii. 23. In Hebrew כסף *cheſeph* and שקל *ſhekel*, are often uſed indiſcriminately, and both are ſometimes rendered by the ſame Greek word. Though talent is not a word of Hebrew extraction, the Greek *ταλαντον* is ſo conſtantly employed by the Seventy in rendering the Hebrew ככר *checher*, and is ſo perfectly familiar to us, as the name of an ancient coin of the higheſt value, that there can be no doubt of the propriety of retaining it. As to the word *pound*, in Greek *μνα*, and in Hebrew מנה *maneh*, as the ſenſe of the only paſſage wherein it occurs in the Goſpel, could hardly, in any degree, be ſaid to depend on the value of the coin mentioned, I have alſo thought proper to retain the name which had been employed by the Engliſh tranſlators. Though *pound* is the name of a particular denomination of our own money, we all know that it admits alſo an indefinite application to that of other nations. This is ſo well underſtood, that where there is any riſk of miſtaking, we diſtinguiſh our own by the addition of *ſterling*. The Greek word and the Engliſh are alſo analogous in this reſpect, that they are names both of money and of weight. Both alſo admit ſome latitude, in the application to the monies and weights of different countries, whoſe ſtandards do not entirely coincide.

In regard to ſome other words, though *penny* is often uſed indefinitely, the common meaning differs ſo much from that of *δηναριον* in Scripture, and the plural *pence* is ſo rarely uſed with that latitude, that I thought it better to retain the Latin word. I have reſerved the word *penny* as a more proper tranſlation of *ασσαριον*, between which and a *penny ſterling*, the difference in value is inconſiderable. This naturally determined me to render *κοδραντης*, *farthing*; for *κοδραντης*, (that is, *quadrans*) is originally a Latin word as well as *δηναριον*. They correſpond in etymology as well as in value. By this I have avoided a double impropriety into which our tranſlators have fallen. Firſt, by rendering *δηναριον*, *a penny*, and *ασσαριον*, *a farthing*, they make us conſider the latter as a fourth part of the former, whereas it was but one-tenth. Again, by rendering *ασσαριον* and *κοδραντης* by the ſame word, they repreſent thoſe names as ſynonymous which belong to coins of very different value. In tranſlating *λεπτον*, I have retained the word *mite*, which is become proverbial for the loweſt denomination of money.

§ 11. As to meaſures, wherever the knowledge of the capacity was of no uſe for throwing light on the paſſage, I have judged it always ſufficient to employ ſome general term, as *meaſure*, *barrel*, &c. Of this kind is the parable of the unjuſt ſteward.

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The degree of his villany is ſufficiently diſcovered by the numbers. But where it is the expreſs view of the writer to communicate ſome notion of the ſize and capacity, as in the account given of the water pots at the marriage in Cana, or wherever ſuch knowledge is of importance to the ſenſe, thoſe general words ought not to be uſed. Such are the reaſons for the manner which I have adopted in this work, in regard to money and meaſures. There is no rule that can be followed, which is not attended with ſome inconveniencies. Whether the plan here laid down be attended with the feweſt, the judicious and candid reader will judge.

PART II.

Rites, Feſtivals, and Sects.

THE ſecond claſs of words to which it is not always poſſible to find in another language, equivalent terms, is the names of rites, feſtivals, and ſects, religious, political, or philoſophical. Of all words the names of ſects come the neareſt to the condition of proper names, and are almoſt always conſidered as not admitting a tranſlation into the language of thoſe who are unacquainted with the ſect. This holds equally of modern, as of ancient ſects. There are no words in other languages anſwering to the Engliſh terms *whig* and *tory*, or to the names of the Italian and German parties called *guelph* and *ghibelin*. It is exactly the ſame with philoſophical ſects, as *magian*, *ſtoic*, *peripatetic*, *epicurean*; and with religious ſects among the Jews, *phariſee*, *ſadducee*, *eſſene*, *karaite*. Yet even this rule is not without exception. When the ſect has been denominated from ſome common epithet or appellative that ought to be particularly applicable to the party, the tranſlation of the epithet or appellative, ſerves in other languages as a name to the ſect. Thus thoſe who are called by the Greeks τεσσαρεσκαιδεκατιται, from their celebrating Eaſter on the fourteenth day of the month, were, by the Romans, called *quartadecimani*, which is a tranſlation of the word into Latin. In like manner our *quakers* are called in French *trembleurs*. Yet in this their authors are not uniform, they ſometimes adopt the Engliſh word. In regard to the ſects mentioned in the New Teſtament, I do not know that there has been any difference among tranſlators. The ancient names ſeem to be adopted by all.

§ 2. As to rites and feſtivals, which, being nearly related, may be conſidered together, the caſe is ſomewhat different. The original

ginal word, when expreſſive of the principal action in the rite, or in the celebration of the feſtival, is ſometimes tranſlated and ſometimes retained. In theſe it is proper to follow the uſage of the language, even although the diſtinctions made may originally have been capricious. In ſeveral modern languages we have, in what regards Jewiſh and Chriſtian rites, generally followed the uſage of the Old Latin verſion, though the authors of that verſion have not been entirely uniform in their method. Some words they have transferred from the original into their language, others they have tranſlated. But it would not always be eaſy to find their reaſon for making this difference. Thus the word περιτομη they have tranſlated *circumciſio*, which exactly correſponds in etymology; but the word βαπτισμα they have retained, changing only the letters from Greek to Roman. Yet the latter was juſt as ſuſceptible of a literal verſion into Latin as the former. *Immerſio*, *tinctio*, anſwers as exactly in the one caſe, as *circumciſio* in the other. And if it be ſaid of thoſe words, that they do not reſt on claſſical authority, the ſame is true alſo of this. Etymology, and the uſage of eccleſiaſtic authors, are all that can be pleaded.

Now, the uſe with reſpect to the names adopted in the Vulgate, has commonly been imitated, or rather implicitly followed, through the weſtern parts of Europe. We have deſerted the Greek names where the Latins have deſerted them, and have adopted them where the Latins have adopted them. Hence we ſay *circumciſion*, and not *peritomy*; and we do not ſay *immerſion*, but *baptiſm*. Yet when the language furniſhes us with materials for a verſion ſo exact and analogical, ſuch a verſion conveys the ſenſe more perſpicuouſly than a foreign name. For this reaſon, I ſhould think the word *immerſion* (which, though of Latin origin, is an Engliſh noun, regularly formed from the verb *to immerſe*), a better Engliſh name than *baptiſm*, were we now at liberty to make a choice. But we are not. The latter term has been introduced, and has obtained the univerſal ſuffrage; and though to us not ſo expreſſive of the action; yet, as it conveys nothing falſe, or unſuitable to the primitive idea, it has acquired a right by preſcription, and is conſequently entitled to the preference.

§ 3. I ſaid that in the names of rites or ſacred ceremonies, we have commonly followed the Vulgate. In ſome inſtances, however, we have not. The great Jewiſh ceremony, in commemoration of their deliverance from Egypt, is called in the New Teſtament πασχα, the ſacred penmen having adopted the term that had been uſed by the Seventy, which is not a Greek word, but the Hebrew, or rather the Chaldaic, name in Greek letters. The Vulgate has retained *paſcha*, tranſferring it into the Latin character. The words in Greek and Latin have no meaning but

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as the name of this rite. In Engliſh the word has not been transferred, but tranſlated *paſſover*, anſwering in our language to the import of the original Hebrew. Σκηνοπηγια, *ſcenopegia*, in the Goſpel of John, ch. vii. 2. is retained by the Vulgate, and with us tranſlated *the feaſt of tabernacles*. It would have been ſtill nearer the original Hebrew, and more conformable to the Jewiſh practice, to have called it *the feaſt of booths*. But the other appellation has obtained the preference. The Latins have retained the Greek name *azyma*, which we render, properly enough, *unleavened bread*. But the words *jubilee*, *ſabbath*, *purim*, and ſome others, run through moſt languages.

§ 4. There is a conveniency in tranſlating, rather than tranſplanting, the original term, if the word choſen be appoſite, as it more clearly conveys the import, than an exotic word, that has no original meaning or etymology in the language. This appears never in a ſtronger light than when the reaſon of the name happens to be aſſigned by the ſacred author. I ſhall give, for inſtance, that Hebrew appellative, which I but juſt now obſerved, that both the Seventy and the Vulgate have retained in their verſions, and which the Engliſh interpreters have tranſlated. The word is, *paſcha*, *paſſover*. In the explanation which the people are commanded to give of this ſervice to their children, when they ſhall enquire concerning it, the reaſon of the name is aſſigned, Exod. xii. 27. *Ye ſhall ſay, It is the ſacrifice of the Lord's* PASSOVER, *who* PASSED OVER *the houſes of the children of Iſrael in Egypt, when he ſmote the Egyptians.* Now, this reaſon appears as clearly in the Engliſh verſion, which is literal, as in the original Hebrew; but it is loſt in the verſion of the Seventy, who render it thus: Ερειτε. Θυσια το ΠΑΣΧΑ τυτο Κυριω, ὡς ΕΣΚΕΠΑΣΕ τας οικας των υἱων Ισραηλ ἐν Αιγυπτῳ, ἡνικα ἐπαταξε τας Αιγυπτιας. Here, as the words πασχα and ἐσκεπασε have no affinity, it is impoſſible to diſcover the reaſon of the name. The authors of the Vulgate, who form the word *phaſe*, in the Old Teſtament, more cloſely after the Hebrew (though they call it *paſcha* in the New), have thought proper, in turning that paſſage, to drop the name they had adopted, and tranſlate the word *tranſitus*, that the alluſion might not be loſt. "Dicetis, victima TRANSITUS Do-"mini eſt, quando TRANSIVIT ſuper domos filiorum Iſrael in "Ægypto, percutiens Ægyptios."

This manner is ſometimes neceſſary, for giving a juſt notion of the ſenſe. But it is ſtill better when the uſual name, in the language of the verſion, as happens in the Engliſh, preſerves the analogy, and renders the change unneceſſary. In proper names, it is generally impoſſible to preſerve the alluſion in a verſion. In ſuch caſes, the natural reſource is the margin. The occaſion is not ſo frequent in appellatives, but it occurs ſometimes. It is ſaid by Adam of the woman, Gen. ii. 23. ſoon after her formation,

tion, *She ſhall be called* WOMAN, *becauſe ſhe was formed out of* MAN. Here the affinity of the names, woman and man, is preſerved without doing violence to the language. But in ſome verſions, the affinity diſappears altogether, and, in others, is effected by aſſigning a name which, if it may be uſed at all, cannot, with propriety, be given to the ſex in general. It is loſt in the Septuagint. Αυτη κληθησεται ΓΥΝΗ, ὁτι ἐκ τȣ ΑΝΔΡΟΣ αυτης ελημφθη αυτη. Not the ſhadow of a reaſon appears in what is here aſſigned as the reaſon. The ſounds γυνη and ανδρος have no affinity. The ſame may be ſaid of *mulier* and *vir* in Caſtalio's Latin. *Hæc vocabitur* MULIER, *quia ſumpta de* VIRO *eſt*. Other Latin interpreters have, for the ſake of that reſemblance in the words, on which the meaning of the expreſſion depends, choſen to ſacrifice a little of their latinity. The Vulgate, and Leo de Juda, have, *Hæc vocabitur* VIRAGO, *quia ſumpta de* VIRO *eſt*. Junius, Le Clerc and Houbigant, uſe the word *vira*, upon the authority of Feſtus. Neither of the words is good in this application; but not worſe than ανδρις ἐξ ανδρος, uſed by Symmachus for the ſame purpoſe. Much in the ſame taſte are Luther's *mœnnin*, the *bamaſſe* of the Genevah French, and the *buoma* of Diodati's Italian.

PART III.

Dreſs, Judicatories, and Offices.

I SHALL now proceed to the third general claſs of words, not capable of being tranſlated, with exactneſs, into the language of a people whoſe cuſtoms are not in a great meaſure conformable to the cuſtoms of thoſe amongſt whom ſuch words have ariſen. This claſs comprehends names relating to dreſs, peculiar modes, judicatories, and offices. In regard to *garments*, it is well known that the uſages of the ancients, particularly the Orientals, differed conſiderably from thoſe of modern Europeans. And though I am by no means of opinion, that it is neceſſary, in a tranſlation, to convey an idea of the exact form of their dreſs, when nothing in the piece tranſlated appears to depend on that circumſtance, I am ever for avoiding that which would poſitively convey a falſe notion in this or any other reſpect. Often, from that which may be thought a trivial deviation from truth, there will reſult inconveniences, of which one at firſt is not aware, but which, nevertheleſs, may produce in the mind of the attentive reader, unacquainted with the original, objections that affect the

credibility of the narration. A general name, therefore, like *clothes*, *raiment*, is ſufficient, when nothing depends on the form, in like manner as *a piece of money*, *a corn meaſure*, will anſwer, when no light for underſtanding the ſcope of the place, can be derived from the value of the one or the capacity of the other. Where ſome diſtinction, however, ſeems to have been intended in the paſſage, there is a neceſſity for uſing names more definitive. It is not often neceſſary, for naming the parts of dreſs, to retain the terms of a dead language. The Engliſh tranſlators have never done it, as far as I remember, except in naming that part of the ſacerdotal veſtments, called *the ephod*, for which it would be impoſſible to find an appoſite term in any European tongue. *Phylacteries*, too, will perhaps be accounted an exception.

§ 2. But, though it is rarely neceſſary to adopt the ancient or foreign names of garments, it may not be always proper to employ thoſe terms for expreſſing them, which are appropriated to particular pieces of the modern European habit. The word *coat* anſwers well enough as a name for the under garment, in Greek χιτων. *Cloak*, by which our tranſlators in the New Teſtament commonly render ἱματιον, the name for the upper garment, I do not ſo much approve. My reaſons are theſe: Firſt, *cloak* is not the term that they have uſed in the Old Teſtament for that veſtment; though we have no reaſon to believe that there was any change in the Jewiſh faſhions in this particular. It is well known that the modes, reſpecting dreſs, are not, nor ever were, in Aſia, as at preſent they are in Europe, variable and fluctuating. The Orientals are as remarkable for conſtancy in this particular, as we are for the contrary. Now, though the Hebrew words, anſwering to ἱματιον, are frequent in the Old Teſtament, and the Greek word itſelf in the tranſlation of the Seventy, the word *cloak* has never been admitted by our tranſlators into the verſion of the Old Teſtament, except once in Iſaiah, ch. lix. 17. where it is uſed only as a ſimile. Wherever they have thought proper to diſtinguiſh the upper garment from that worn cloſe to the body, they have named it the *mantle*. See the places marked in the margin *. But theſe are not all the places in which the original word might have been ſo rendered. Sometimes, indeed, it means garments in general, and in the plural eſpecially ſignifies *clothes*. Now, though the difference of a name employed in the verſion of the Old Teſtament may be thought too ſlight a circumſtance for founding an argument upon, in regard to the manner of tranſlating the New, I cannot help thinking that, even if the words *mantle* and *cloak* were equally proper, we ought not, by an unneceſſary change, without any reaſon, to give ground to imagine,

* Judges iv. 18. 1 Sam. xxviii. 14. 1 Kings xix. 13. 19. 2 Kings ii. 8. 13, 14. Ezra ix. 3. 5. Job i. 20. Job ii. 12. Pſalm cix. 29.

imagine, that there had been, in this article, any alteration in the Jewiſh cuſtoms.

Secondly, I am the more averſe to introduce, in the New Teſtament, a change of the name that had been uſed in the Old, as it is evident that, in Judea, they placed ſome ſhare of religion in retaining their ancient garb. They did not think themſelves at liberty to depart from the cuſtoms of their anceſtors in this point. As their law had regulated ſome particulars in relation to their habit, they looked upon the form as intended for diſtinguiſhing them from the heathen, and conſequently as ſacred, Numb. xv. 38, 39. Deut. xxii. 12.; the knots of ſtrings which they were appointed to put upon the four corners or wings, as they called them, did not ſuit any other form of outer garment, than that to which they had been always accuſtomed.

Thirdly, the word *mantle* comes nearer a juſt repreſentation of the looſe veſture worn by the Hebrews, than *cloak*, or any other term, which refers us to ſomething particular in the make. Whereas their ἱμάτιον was an oblong piece of cloth, ſquare at the corners, in ſhape reſembling more the *plaid* of a Scotch Highlander, than either the Greek *pallium* or the Roman *toga*. This mantle, it would appear, on ordinary occaſions, they threw looſely about them: and, when employed in any ſort of work in which it might encumber them, laid aſide altogether. To this, doubtleſs, our Lord refers in that expreſſion, Mark xiii. 16. *Let not him who ſhall be in the field, return home to fetch his mantle.* When ſetting out on a journey, or entering on any buſineſs, compatible with the uſe of this garment, they tucked it up with a girdle, that it might not incommode them. Hence, the ſimilitude of having their *loins girt*, to expreſs alertneſs, and habitual preparation for the diſcharge of duty. I know not why thoſe who have been ſo inclinable, in ſome other articles, to give a modern caſt to the manners of thoſe ancients, have not modernized them in this alſo, and transformed *girding their loins*, a very antique phraſe, into *buttoning their waiſtcoats*. This freedom would not be ſo great, as the reduction of their money and meaſures above conſidered. It would not even be greater than giving them *candles* for *lamps*, and making them ſit at their meals, inſtead of reclining on couches. In regard to this laſt mode, I propoſe to conſider it immediately.

§ 3. Of all their cuſtoms, they were not ſo tenacious, as of what regarded the form of their clothes. In things which were not conceived to be connected with religion, and about which neither the law, nor tradition, had made any regulation, they did not heſitate to conform themſelves to the manners of thoſe under whoſe power they had fallen. A remarkable inſtance of this appears, in their adopting the mode of the Greeks and Romans, in lying on couches at their meals. In the Old Teſtament times, the

the practice of ſitting, on ſuch occaſions, appears to have been univerſal. It is juſtly remarked by Philo *, that Joſeph "made "his brethren ſit down according to their ages; for men were "not then accuſtomed to lie on beds at entertainments." The words in the Septuagint, Gen. xliii. 33. are, εκαθισαν εναντιον αυτε; in the Engliſh tranſlation, *They ſat before him;* both literally from the Hebrew. In like manner, Gen. xxxvii. 25. εκαθισαν δε φαγειν αρτον, *they ſat down to eat bread;* and, Exod. xxxii. 6. εκαθισεν ὁ λαος φαγειν και πιειν, *the people ſat down to eat and drink.* But it were endleſs to enumerate all the examples. Suffice it to obſerve, that this is as uniformly employed to expreſs the poſture at table in the Old Teſtament, as ανακλινω, or ſome ſynonymous term, is employed for the ſame purpoſe in the New. The Hebrew word is equally unequivocal with the Greek. It is always יָשַׁב *jaſhab*, *to ſit*, never שָׁכַב *ſhachab*, or any other word that imports lying down.

Some, indeed, have contended, that this manner of eating was practiſed among the Jews before the captivity; and in ſupport of this opinion, have produced the paſſage in Samuel, 1 Sam. xxviii. 23. where Saul is ſpoken of as eating on the bed. But the paſſage, when examined, makes clearly againſt the opinion for which it has been quoted. The hiſtorian's expreſſion is, *ſat upon the bed.* Nor is this, as in the New Teſtament, the ſtyle merely of modern tranſlators, it is that of the original, as well as of all the ancient tranſlations. The Septuagint ſays εκαθισε, the Vulgate *ſedit*. Houbigant is the only tranſlator I know, who (miſled, I ſuppoſe, by the ordinary ſtyle of Latin authors), has ſaid *decubuit*. The Hebrew word is יָשַׁב *jaſhab*, which never ſignifies *to lie*. Now, whether a man on a bed take his repaſt ſitting after the European manner, with his feet on the floor, or after the Turkiſh, with his legs acroſs under him, his poſture differs totally from that of the ancient Greeks and Romans, who lay at their length.

The words of the Prophet Amos, ch. vi. 4. have alſo been thought to favour the ſame opinion: *Wo to them that lie upon beds of ivory, and ſtretch themſelves upon their couches, and eat the lambs out of the flock, and the calves out of the ſtall, that chant to the ſound of the viol*, &c. Here the Prophet upbraids the people with their ſloth and luxury, ſpecifying a few inſtances in their manner of living. But nothing is ſaid that implies any other connection among theſe inſtances, than that of their being the effects of the ſame cauſe, *voluptuouſneſs*. We have no more reaſon to connect their eating the lambs and the calves with their lying ſtretched on beds of ivory, than we have to connect with this

* Εξης δε προσαξαντος κατα τας ηλικιας καθιζεσθαι, μηπω των ανθρωπων εν ταις συμποτικαις συνουσιαις κατακλισει χρωμενων. Lib. de Joſepho.

this poſture, their chanting to the ſound of the viol, and anointing themſelves with ointments.

But in the Apocryphal writings, which are poſterior in compoſition to thoſe of the Old Teſtament, and probably poſterior to the Macedonian conqueſts, though prior to the books of the New, we have the firſt indications of this change of poſture. It is ſaid of Judith, ch. xii. 15. in the common verſion, that *her maid laid ſoft ſkins on the groun̄d for her over againſt Holofernes, that ſhe might ſit and eat upon them*, εις το εσθιειν κατακλινομενην επ' αυτων, literally, that *ſhe might eat lying upon them*. Again, in Tobit, ch. ii. 1. ανεπεσα τȣ φαλειν, not *I ſat*, but *I lay down to eat*. Other examples might be given which render it probable that this faſhion was firſt introduced into Judea by the Greeks, before the Jews became acquainted with the Romans. A ſure evidence this, that the Jews were not ſo obſtinately tenacious of every national cuſtom, as ſome have repreſented them. It is very remarkable that, in our Saviour's time, the change was univerſal in Judea, that the very common people always conformed to it. The multitudes which our Lord twice fed in the deſert, are by all the Evangeliſts repreſented as *lying*, not *ſitting*, upon the ground. It is ſtrange that our tranſlators have here, by miſinterpreting one word, as invariably exhibited them practiſing a cuſtom which they had abandoned, as they had formerly, by the unwarranted and unneceſſary change of a name, given ground to think that there was an alteration in their cuſtoms, when there was none.

§ 4. I know it is commonly pleaded in excuſe for ſuch deviations from the original, as that whereof I am now ſpeaking, that the poſture is a circumſtance noway material to the right underſtanding of the paſſages wherein it is occaſionally mentioned; that beſides, to us moderns, there appears in the expreſſions *lying down to meat*, and *laying themſelves at table*, from their repugnancy to our cuſtoms, an awkwardneſs which, ſo far from contributing to fix our minds on the principal ſcope of the author, would divert our attention from it. In anſwer to the firſt of theſe objections, I admit that it is ſometimes, not always, as will ſoon be ſhown, of no conſequence to the import of the paſſage, whether a mere circumſtance, which is but occaſionally mentioned, and on which the inſtruction conveyed in the ſtory does not depend, be rightly apprehended or not. The two miracles of the loaves and fiſhes are to all valuable purpoſes the ſame, whether the people partook of their repaſt ſitting or lying. The like may be ſaid of the greater part of ſuch narratives. For this reaſon I do not except againſt a general expreſſion, as, *placed themſelves at table*, where a literal verſion would be attended with the inconvenience of appearing unnatural: but I could never approve, for the ſake of elegance or ſimplicity, a verſion which, in effect, miſrepreſents

misrepresents the original; or, in other words, from which one may fairly deduce inferences that are not conformable to fact. In regard to the other exception, I cannot help observing, that it is only because the expression *lying at meat* is unusual, that it appears awkward. If the first translators of the Bible into English had thought fit, in this instance, to keep close to the original, the phrases would not now have sounded awkwardly. But it must be owned that no translators enjoy at present equal advantages with those who had, in a manner, the forming of our language in regard to things sacred. Their versions, by being widely dispersed, would soon give a currency to the terms used in them, which there was then no contrary use to counterbalance. And this is the reason why many things which might have been better rendered then, cannot now so well be altered.

§ 5. But to show that even such errors in translating, however trivial they may appear, are sometimes highly injurious to the sense, and render a plain story not only incredible but absurd, I must entreat the reader's attention to the following passage, as it runs in the common version, Luke vii. 36, 37, 38.: *One of the Pharisees desired Jesus that he would eat with him; and he went into the Pharisee's house, and sat down to meat. And behold a woman in the city, which was a sinner, when she knew that Jesus sat at meat in the Pharisee's house, brought an alabaster box of ointment, and stood at his feet behind him weeping, and began to wash his feet with tears, and did wipe them with the hairs of her head, and kissed his feet, and anointed them with the ointment.* Now a reader of any judgment will need to reflect but a moment to discover, that what is here told is impossible. If Jesus and others were in our manner sitting together at meat, the woman could not be behind them, when doing what is here recorded. She must in that case, on the contrary, have been under the table. The chairs, on which the guests were seated, would have effectually precluded access from behind. It is said also that she stood, while she bathed his feet with tears, wiped them with the hairs of her head, anointed and kissed them. Another manifest absurdity. On the supposition of their sitting, she must have been at least kneeling, if not lying on the floor. These inconsistencies instantly disappear, when the Evangelist is allowed to speak for himself, who, instead of saying that *Jesus sat down*, says expressly that he *lay down*, ανεκλιθη. And to prevent, if possible, a circumstance being mistaken or overlooked, on which the practicability of the thing depended, he repeats it by a synonymous term in the very next verse. "When she knew that "Jesus lay at table," ανακειται. The knowledge of their manner at meals makes every thing in this story level to an ordinary capacity.

§ 6. At their feasts, matters were commonly ordered thus: Three

Three couches were ſet in the form of the Greek Letter Π, the table was placed in the middle, the lower end whereof was left open, to give acceſs to the ſervants, for ſetting and removing the diſhes, and ſerving the gueſts. The other three ſides were incloſed by the couches, whence it got the name of triclinium. The middle couch, which lay along the upper end of the table, and was therefore accounted the moſt honourable place, and that which the Phariſees are ſaid particularly to have affected, was diſtinguiſhed by the name πρωτοκλισια, Matt. xxiii. 6. The perſon entruſted with the direction of the entertainment was called αρχιτρικλινος, John ii. 8 The gueſts lay with their feet backwards, obliquely, acroſs the couches, which were covered, for their better accommodation, with ſuch ſort of cloth, or tapeſtry, as ſuited the quality of the entertainer. As it was neceſſary, for the conveniency of eating, that the couches ſhould be ſomewhat higher than the table, the gueſts have probably been raiſed by them three feet, and upwards, from the floor. When theſe particulars are taken into conſideration, every circumſtance of the ſtory becomes perfectly conſiſtent and intelligible. This alſo removes the difficulty there is, in the account given by John, ch. xiii. 23. 25. of the paſchal ſupper, where Jeſus being ſet, as our tranſlators render it, at table, one of his diſciples is ſaid, in one verſe, to have been leaning on his boſom, and in another, to have been lying on his breaſt. Though theſe attitudes are hardly compatible with our mode of ſitting at meals, they were naturally conſequent upon theirs. As they lay forwards, in a direction ſomewhat oblique, feeding themſelves with their right hand, and leaning on their left arm; they no ſooner intermitted, and reclined a little, than the head of each came cloſe to the breaſt of him who was next on the left. Now, a circumſtance (however frivolous in itſelf) cannot be deemed of no conſequence, which ſerves to throw light on the ſacred pages, and ſolve difficulties, otherwiſe inextricable. This caſe, though not properly requiring the uſe of any ancient or foreign name, I could not help conſidering minutely in this place, on account of its affinity with the other topics of which I had been treating.

§ 7. I ſhall add a few things, on the manner adopted by other tranſlators in rendering what relates to this uſage. With regard to the Latin verſions, it may naturally be ſuppoſed, that the Vulgate would be literal, and conſequently, in this particular, juſt. There was no temptation to depart from the letter. It ſuited their cuſtoms at that period, as well as the idiom of their language. And though it did not ſuit the cuſtoms of the times of modern Latin interpreters, they could have no motive, in this article, to deſert the manner of the ancient tranſlator, expreſſed in a phraſeology which both Latin and Greek claſſics had rendered familiar. As to the tranſlations into modern tongues, Luther appears

appears to have been the firſt who, in his tranſlation into German, has, in this particular, forced the Evangeliſts into a conformity with modern fathions. The French tranſlator, Olivetan, has avoided the falſe tranſlation of *ſitting* for *lying*, and alſo the apparent awkwardneſs of a literal verſion. In the paſſage from Luke, above quoted, he ſays, *Il ſe mit a table ;* and ſpeaking of the woman, *Laquelle ayant connu qu'il etoit a table.* In the miraculous increaſe of the loaves and the fiſhes in the deſert, Matt. xv. 35. he thus expreſſes himſelf: *Il commanda aux troupes de s'arranger par terre.* Diodati has, in the firſt of theſe paſſages, adopted the ſame method with the French tranſlator, ſaying *ſi miſe a tavola ;* and *ch'egli era a tavola ;* in the other, he has fallen into the error of our common verſion, and ſaid, *Jeſu commando alle turbe, che ſi metteſſero a ſedere in terra.* Moſt other French verſions have taken the ſame method of eluding the difficulty. But all the late Engliſh verſions I have ſeen, follow implicitly the common tranſlation.

§ 8. To come now to offices and judicatories: it muſt be acknowledged that, in theſe, it is not always eaſy to ſay, as was remarked in a preceding Diſſertation *, whether the reſemblances to, or differences from, offices and judicatories of our own, ought to induce us to retain the original term, or to tranſlate it. But whatever be in this, or however the firſt tranſlators ought to have been determined in their choice between theſe methods, the matter is not equally open to us in this late age as it was to them. The election made by our predeceſſors, in this department, has eſtabliſhed an uſe which, except in ſome particular caſes, it would be dangerous in their ſucceſſors to violate; and which therefore, unleſs where perſpicuity or energy requires an alteration, ought to be followed. For example, who could deny that the Greek terms, αγγελος, αποστολος, διαβολος, might not have been as well rendered *meſſenger*, *miſſionary*, *ſlanderer*, as the words ιερευς, υπηρετης, αντιδικος, are rendered, *prieſt*, *miniſter*, *adverſary*. In regard to the import of the words, there does not appear to me to be a cloſer correſpondence in the laſt mentioned, than in the firſt. Beſides, as the firſt are themſelves no other than Greek tranſlations of the Hebrew words מלאך שלוח שטן, *ſatan*, *ſhaluch*, *malach*, which the Seventy have not judged neceſſary to retain in another language, and in this judgment have been followed by the writers of the New Teſtament; they have given the example of tranſlating, rather than transferring, theſe appellatives into other languages; the laſt name, *ſatan*, being the only one which is ever retained by them, and that very ſeldom.

But the true ſource of the diſtinction that has been made in this reſpect by European tranſlators, is not any particular propriety in the different caſes, but the example of the old Latin tranſla or.

* Diſſ. II. § 5.

tranſlator. The words which he retained with ſuch an alteration in the orthography, as adapted them to the genius of the tongue, we alſo retain, and the words which he tranſlated, we tranſlate. Becauſe he ſaid, *angelus*, *apostolus*, *diabolus*, which are not properly Latin words, we ſay, *angel*, *apoſtle*, *devil*, not originally Engliſh. Had he, on the contrary, uſed the terms *nuncius*, *legatus*, *calumniator*, we had probably ſubſtituted for them, *meſſenger*, *miſſionary*, *ſlanderer*, or ſome terms equivalent. For in thoſe caſes wherein the Latin interpreter has not ſcrupled to tranſlate the Greek by Latin words, neither have we ſcrupled to render them by Engliſh words. I am, however, far from affirming that the interpreters of the Latin church, either in the old Italic, or in the preſent Vulgate, have acted from caprice in their choice; though I do not always diſcover reaſons of ſuch weight for the diſtinctions they have made, as ſhould lead us implicitly to follow them.

There is only one example in titles of this ſort, wherein the moderns have taken the freedom to judge differently. The Greek παρακλητος, in John's Goſpel, is always retained by the author of the Vulgate, who uſes *paracletus*, but has not been followed by later tranſlators. Eraſmus has ſometimes adopted his word, and ſometimes ſaid *conſolator*, and is followed in both, by the tranſlator of Zuric. Caſtalio ſays *confirmator*, and Beza *advocatus*. Moſt modern verſions into Italian, French, and Engliſh, have, in this inſtance, followed Eraſmus in the import they have given the word in preference even to Beza. And of theſe our common verſion is one, uſing the word *comforter*. Nay, ſome French tranſlators from the Vulgate have deſerted that verſion, rendering the word either *conſolateur* or *avocat*. In general, I would pay that deference to the example of the ancient interpreters as to prefer their manner, wherever there is not, from perſpicuity, energy, or the general ſcope of the diſcourſe, poſitive reaſon to the contrary. Such reaſon, I think, we have in regard to the title laſt mentioned *. As to the term διαβολος, I have already conſidered the caſes in which it is not proper to render it *devil* †. The name αποστολος is ſo much appropriated in the New Teſtament, to a particular claſs of extraordinary miniſters, that there are very few caſes, and none that I remember in the Goſpels, where either perſpicuity or energy would require a change of the term.

§ 9. It is otherwiſe with the name αγγελος, in regard to which there are ſeveral occurrences, where the import of the ſentiment is, if not loſt, very much obſcured, becauſe the word in the verſion has not the ſame extent of ſignification with that in the original. It was obſerved before ‡, that there is this difference be-

* See the note on John xiv. 16. † Diſſ. VI. Part. I. § 2, 3, 4.
‡ Diſſ. VI. Part. I. § 1.

tween the import of such terms as they occur in their native tongues, whether Hebrew or Greek, and as modernized in versions, that in the former they always retain somewhat of their primitive signification, and beside indicating a particular being or class of beings, they are of the nature of appellatives, and mark a special character, function, or note of distinction in such beings; whereas, when latinized or englished, but not translated into Latin or English, they answer solely the first of those uses, and approach the nature of proper names. Now, where there happens to be a manifest allusion in the original, to the primitive and ordinary acceptation of the word in that language, that allusion must be lost in a translation, where the word is properly not translated, and where there is nothing in the sound that can suggest the allusion. It is particularly unfortunate if it be in an argument, as the whole will be necessarily involved in darkness.

§ 10. I shall illustrate the preceding observations by some remarks on the following passage, Heb. i. 4, &c. 4. *Being made so much better than the angels, as he hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent name than they:* 5. *For unto which of the angels said he at any time, Thou art my Son this day have I begotten thee? And again I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to me a Son.* 6. *And again when he bringeth in the first-begotten into the world, he saith, And let all the angels of God worship him.* 7. *And of the angels he saith, Who maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire.* 8. *But unto the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever.* I cannot help thinking with Grotius, that there is here a comparison of the dignity of the different personages mentioned, from the consideration of what is imported in their respective titles. This is at best but obscurely suggested in the common version. For though the word *son* is expressive of a natural and near relation, the word *angel* in our language is the name of a certain order of beings, and beside that expresses nothing at all. It is not, like the original appellation, both in Hebrew and in Greek, a name of office. Further, the seventh verse, as it stands with us, *Who maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire,* is unintelligible; and if some mystical sense may be put upon it, this is at best but a matter of conjecture, and appears quite unconnected with the argument. It is well known that the word πνευματα rendered *spirits,* signifies also *winds*. That this is the meaning of it here, is evident from the passage, Psal. civ. 4. whence the quotation is taken. For the Hebrew רוחות *ruach*, is of the same extent. And though it be in that place, for the sake of uniformity, rendered the same way as here, nothing can be more manifest, than that the Psalmist is celebrating the wonders of the material creation, all the parts of which execute, in their different ways, the commands of the Creator. Our translators

ſlators not only render the ſame Hebrew word *wind* in the third verſe, and *ſpirits* in the fourth, but in this laſt evidently ſtart aſide from the ſubject. Nothing, on the contrary, can be better connected than the whole paſſage in the true, which is alſo the moſt obvious, interpretation, and may be thus expreſſed: *Who covereth himſelf with light as with a mantle, who ſtretcheth out the heavens like a curtain; who layeth the beams of his chambers in the waters; who maketh the clouds his chariot; who walketh on the wings of the wind; who maketh winds his meſſengers, and flaming fire his miniſters* *; *who hath laid the foundations of the earth, that it ſhould never be removed.* There is an internal probability of the juſtneſs of this verſion, ariſing from the perſpicuous and cloſe connection of the parts, and an improbability in the common verſion, ariſing from their obſcurity and want of connection; ver. 4. *Who maketh his angels ſpirits, his miniſters a flaming fire,* being a digreſſion from the ſcope of the context, the material world, to the world of ſpirits.

Now, let us try in the paſſage of the Epiſtle to the Hebrews referred to, how the ſame tranſlation of the words πνευμα and αγγελος by *wind* and *meſſenger*, through the whole, will ſuit the Apoſtle's reaſoning. Speaking of our Lord, he ſays, *Being as far ſuperior to the heavenly meſſengers, as the title he hath inherited is more excellent than theirs: For to which of thoſe meſſengers did God ever ſay,* "*Thou art my ſon, I have to-day begot-*" *ten thee:*" *And again,* "*I will be to him a Father, and he* "*ſhall be to me a Son:*" *Again, when he introduceth the firſt-born into the world, he ſaith,* "*Let all God's meſſengers worſhip* "*him.*" *Whereas, concerning meſſengers, he ſaith,* "*Who mak-*" *eth winds his meſſengers, and flaming fire his miniſters:*" *But to the Son,* "*Thy throne, O God, endureth for ever.*" To me it is plain, firſt, that the aim of his reaſoning is to ſhow the ſuperior excellency of the Meſſiah, from the ſuperiority of his title of *Son*, given him in a ſenſe peculiar to him (and which, from analogy to the conſtitutions of the univerſe, ſhould imply of the ſame nature with the Father) to that of *meſſenger*, which does not differ eſſentially from ſervant. Now the Engliſh word *angel* does not expreſs this. It is a name for thoſe celeſtial beings, but without ſuggeſting their function. Secondly, that, in proof of the inferiority of the title *meſſenger*, the writer urges, that it is ſometimes given even to things inanimate, ſuch as ſtorms and lightning.

Every reader of reflection admits, that there runs, through the whole

* Dr Lowth (De ſacra Poeſi Hebræorum, Prælect. viii.), though he retains the word *angelus*, underſtands the paſſage juſt as I do, making winds the ſubject, and angels a metaphorical attribute. "Faciens ut venti ſint "angeli ſui, ut ignis ardens ſit ſibi miniſtrorum loco." He adds: "Deſcri-"buntur elementa in exequendis Dei mandatis, prompta et expedita quaſi "angeli, aut miniſtri tabernaculo deſervientes."

whole paſſage, a contraſt of the things ſpoken concerning the Meſſiah, to the things ſpoken concerning angels, in order to ſhow the ſupereminence of the former above the latter. The ſeventh verſe, as now rendered, perfectly ſuits this idea, and completes one ſide of the contraſt. But does it anſwer this purpoſe in the common verſion? Not in the leaſt: for, will any one ſay, that it derogates from the higheſt dignity to be called a *ſpirit*, when it is conſidered that God himſelf is ſo denominated? And as the term *flaming fire*, when applied to intelligent beings, muſt be metaphorical, the conſideration that, by ſuch metaphors, the energy and omniſcience of the Deity are ſometimes repreſented, will, in our eſtimation, ſerve rather to enhance than to depreſs the character. The caſe is totally different, when *flaming fire*, or lightning, in the literal ſenſe, is made the ſubject of the propoſition, and *God's meſſengers* the predicate.

§ 11. I know that it has been objected to this interpretation, that רוח *ruach*, though uſed in the ſingular for *wind*, does not occur in this ſenſe, in the plural, except when joined with the numeral adjective *four*. But from this, though it were true, we can conclude nothing. That the word is found in this meaning, in the plural, is a ſufficient ground for interpreting it ſo, when the connection requires it. Farther, though it were concluſive, it is not true. In Jeremiah, ch. xlix. 36. we find, in the ſame paſſage, both ארבע רוחות *arbaug ruchoth*, *four winds*, and כל הרוחות *col haruchoth*, *all the winds*, where it was never doubted, that both expreſſions were uſed of *the winds*. As to the inſinuation which ſome have thrown out concerning this explanation, as unfavourable to the doctrine of Chriſt's divinity, it can be accounted for only from that jealouſy, an invariable attendant on the polemic ſpirit, which ſtill continues too much to infect and diſhonour theological enquiries. This jealouſy, however, appears ſo much miſplaced here, that the above interpretation is manifeſtly more favourable to the common doctrine than the other. I ſay not this to recommend it to any party, knowing that, in theſe matters, we ought all to be determined by the impartial principles of ſound criticiſm, and not by our own prepoſſeſſions.

§ 12. But, to return; a ſecond caſe wherein it is better to employ the general word *meſſenger* is, when it is not clear from the context, whether the ſacred penmen meant a celeſtial or a terreſtrial being. In ſuch caſes, it is always beſt to render the term, ſo as that the verſion may admit the ſame latitude of interpretation with the original; and this can be effected only by uſing the general term. For this reaſon, in the following expreſſions, οἵτινες ἐλάβετε τὸν νόμον εἰς διαταγὰς ἀγγέλων, Acts vii. 53. and διαταγεὶς δι' ἀγγέλων ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου, Gal. iii. 19. it would have been better to tranſlate ἀγγέλων *meſſengers*, as it is not certain whether ſuch extraordinary

traordinary miniſters as Moſes and Joſhua, and the ſucceeding prophets, be meant, or any of the heavenly hoſt. The ſame may be ſaid of that paſſage, ὀφειλει ἡ γυνη ἐξουσιαν ἐχειν ἐπι της κεφαλης, διὰ τους ἀγγελους, 1 Cor. xi. 10. it being very doubtful whether the word, in this place, denotes *angels* or *men*.

§ 13. A third caſe, wherein (I do not ſay it muſt, but) it may properly be rendered *meſſengers*, is when, though it evidently refers to ſuperior beings, it is joined with ſome word or epithet, which ſufficiently marks the reference, as ἀγγελος Κυριου, *a meſſenger of the Lord*, οἱ ἀγγελοι των οὐρανων, *the heavenly meſſengers*, οἱ ἁγιοι ἀγγελοι, *the holy meſſengers*; for, with the addition of the epithet, the Engliſh is juſt as explicit as the Greek. Not but that ſuch epithets may in ſome ſenſe be applied to men alſo; but it is cuſtomary with the ſacred writers thus to diſtinguiſh the inhabitants of heaven. In this caſe, however, it muſt be admitted, that either way of tranſlating is good. There is one advantage in ſometimes adopting this manner, that it accuſtoms us to the word *meſſenger* in this application, and may conſequently aſſiſt the unlearned in applying it in doubtful caſes. In ſome caſes, not doubtful, to add the word *heavenly* in the verſion, is no interpolation, for the ſingle word ἀγγελος often includes it. Thus, though the word γλωσσα originally means no more than *tongue*, it is frequently employed to denote an unknown or foreign tongue.

§ 14. A fourth caſe wherein the general term is proper, is when the word is applied to a human being. This rule, however, admits ſome exceptions, ſoon to be taken notice of. Our tranſlators have rightly rendered it *meſſenger*, in the inſtances which fall under this deſcription, noted in the margin *, wherein they are not only human beings that are meant, but the meſſage is from men.

§ 15. I ſaid, that there are ſome exceptions from this rule. The firſt is, when not only the meſſage is from God, but when it appears to be the view of the writer to ſhew the dignity of the miſſion, from the title given to the miſſioner, as being a title which he has in common with ſuperior natures; in ſuch caſes, it is better to preſerve in the verſion the term *angel*, without which the alluſion is loſt, and by conſequence juſtice is not done to the argument. For this reaſon the word *angel* ought to be retained in the noted paſſage of the Goſpels concerning John the Baptiſt, Matt. xi. 9, 10. *What went ye to ſee? a prophet? yea, I tell you, and ſomething ſuperior to a prophet; for this is he concerning whom it is written, Behold I ſend mine angel before thee, who ſhall prepare thy way.* There is manifeſtly couched here a compariſon between the two titles *prophet* and *angel*, with a view to raiſe

* Luke vii. 24. ix. 52. James ii. 25.

raiſe the latter. Now, to this end the common Engliſh word *meſſenger* is not adapted, as it does not convey to us the idea of greater dignity than that of a prophet, or even of ſo great. My argument here may be thought not quite conſiſtent with what I urged in my firſt remark on this word. But the two caſes are rather oppoſite than ſimilar. The alluſion was there to the ordinary ſignification of the term; the alluſion is here not to the ſignification, but to the common application of it, to beings of a ſuperior order. The intention was there comparatively to depreſs the character, the intention here is to exalt it.

§ 16. Another caſe in which the word *angel* ought to be retained, though uſed of man, is when there would ariſe either obſcurity or ambiguity from the conſtruction, if the word *meſſenger* ſhould be employed. It cannot be doubted, that the angels of the ſeven churches mentioned in the Apocalypſe, Rev. i. 20. ii. 1. 8. 12. 18. iii. 1. 7. 14. are human creatures; but the term *meſſenger* would render the expreſſion ambiguous or rather improper. The meſſenger of ſocieties (in like manner as of individuals), is one ſent by them, not to them. In this, and ſome other inſtances, the Greek ἀγγελος is to be underſtood as correſponding in extent of ſignification to the Hebrew מלאך *malach*, which often denotes *a miniſter*, or ſervant employed in any charge of importance and dignity, though not a meſſage. It would, therefore, be no deviation from what is included in the Helleniſtic ſenſe of the word, if through the whole of that paſſage it were rendered *preſident*.

§ 17. In what concerns civil offices, our tranſlators have very properly retained ſome names to which we have none entirely equivalent. Of this number is the name *tetrarch*, which admits no explanation but by a periphraſis. *Centurion* and *publican* are of the ſame kind. The word *legion*, though not a name of office, being the name of a military diviſion, to which we have not any exactly correſponding, may be ranked in the ſame claſs. The three words laſt ſpecified are neither Hebrew, nor Greek, but Latin; and as they are the names of things familiar only to the Latins, they are beſt expreſſed by thoſe names of Latin derivation employed by our tranſlators. Two of them occur in the Latin form in the New Teſtament, λεγιων and κεντυριων, though for the latter word the Greek ἑκατονταρχος is oftener uſed.

It may be proper here to obſerve, in regard to ſuch Latin appellatives, that from the connection which has ſubſiſted between all European countries and the Romans, and from the general acquaintance which the Weſtern nations have long had with the ancient Roman uſages, hiſtory and literature; their names of offices, &c. are naturalized in moſt modern languages, particularly in Engliſh. This makes the adoption of the Latin name for an office,

office, or any other thing which the Jews had solely from the Romans, peculiarly pertinent. The remark now made holds, especially when the persons spoken of were either Romans, or the servants of Rome. If, therefore, after the Vulgate, we had rendered χιλιαρχος *tribune*, ανθυπατος *proconsul*, and perhaps σκηρα, *cohort*, the expression, without losing any thing in perspicuity to those of an inferior class, would have been to the learned reader more significant than *chief-captain*, *deputy*, *band*.

The word ἡγεμων also, though sometimes a general term, denoting *governor* or *president*; yet, as applied to Pilate, is known to import no more than *procurator*. Properly there was but one *president* in Syria, of which Judea was a part. He who had the superintendency of this part was styled *imperatoris procurator*. For this we have the authority of Tacitus, the Roman annalist, and of Philo, the Alexandrian Jew. And though the author of the Vulgate has commonly used the term *præses* for ἡγημων, yet, in translating Luke, ch. iii. 1. he has rendered ἡγεμονευοντος Ποντιε Πιλατε της Ιεδαιας, *procurante Pontio Pilato Judæam*. To those who know a little of the language, or even of the history, of ancient Rome, the Latin names, in many cases, are much more definite in their signification, than the words by which they are commonly rendered, and being already familiar in our language, are not, even to the vulgar, more obscure than names originally English, relating to things wherewith they are little acquainted. For a similar reason, I have also retained the name *pretorium*, which, though a Latin word, has been adopted by the sacred writers, and to which neither common-hall nor judgment-hall entirely answers. That the evangelists, who wrote in Greek, a more copious language, found themselves compelled to borrow from the Latin, the name of what belonged to the office of a Roman magistrate, is to their translators a sufficient authority for adopting the same method.

§ 18. I shall conclude this dissertation with observing, that there are two judicatories mentioned in the New Testament, one Jewish, the other Grecian, the distinguishing names of which may not, without energy, be preserved in a translation. Though the noun συνεδριον is Greek, and susceptible of the general interpretation *council* or senate; yet, as it is commonly in the Gospels and Acts appropriated to that celebrated court of senators or *elders* accustomed to assemble at Jerusalem, and from the Greek name, called *sanhedrim*, which was at once their national senate and supreme judicatory; and as it appears not in those books to have been ever applied to any other particular assembly, though sometimes to such in general as were vested with the highest authority; I have thought it reasonable to retain the word *sanhedrim* in every case where there could be no doubt that this is the court spoken of. The name has been long naturalized in the language;

language; and, as it is more confined in its application than any common term, it is ſo much the more definite and energetic. The other is the famous Athenian court called *the Areopagus*, and mentioned in the Acts, ch. xvii. 19. which, as it was in ſeveral reſpects peculiar in its conſtitution, ought to be diſtinguiſhed in a verſion, as it is in the original, by its proper name. To render it Mars-hill from etymology, without regard to uſe, would entirely miſlead the unlearned, who could never imagine that the hiſtorian ſpoke of bringing the apoſtle before a court, but would ſuppoſe that he only informed us that they brought him up to an eminence in the city, from which he diſcourſed to the people. This is in part effected by the common verſion; for, though in verſe 19. it is ſaid, *They brought Paul to Areopagus*, it is added in verſe 22. *Then Paul ſtood in the midſt of Mars-hill, and ſaid.* This leads one to think that theſe were two names for the ſame hill. *The Areopagus* with the article is the proper verſion in both places.

DIS-

DISSERTATION THE NINTH.

INQUIRY WHETHER CERTAIN NAMES WHICH HAVE BEEN ADOPTED INTO MOST TRANSLATIONS OF SCRIPTURE IN THE WEST, COINCIDE IN MEANING WITH THE ORIGINAL TERMS FROM WHICH THEY ARE DERIVED, AND OF WHICH THEY ARE USED AS THE VERSION.

IT was obſerved, in a former diſſertation *, as one cauſe of difficulty in the examination of the Scriptures, that before we begin to ſtudy them critically, we have been accuſtomed to read them in a tranſlation, whence we have acquired a habit of conſidering ſeveral ancient and Oriental terms as equivalent to certain words, in modern uſe, in our own language, by which they have been commonly rendered What makes the difficulty greater is, that when we become acquainted with other verſions beſide that into our mother-tongue, theſe, inſtead of correcting, ſerve but to confirm the prejudice. For, in theſe tranſlations, we find the ſame original words rendered by words which we know to correſpond exactly in thoſe tongues, to the terms employed in the Engliſh tranſlation. In order to ſet this obſervation in the ſtrongeſt light, it will be neceſſary to trace the origin of ſome terms which have become technical amongſt eccleſiaſtic writers, pointing out the changes in meaning which they have undergone. When alterations are produced gradually, they eſcape the notice of the generality of people, and ſometimes even of the more diſcerning. For a term once univerſally underſtood to be equivalent to an original term, whoſe place it occupies in the tranſlation, will naturally be ſuppoſed ſtill equivalent, by thoſe who do not attend to the variations in the meanings of words, which a tract of time often inſenſibly produces. Sometimes etymology contributes to favour the deception.

How few are there, even among the readers of the original, who entertain a ſuſpicion that the words *myſtery*, *blaſphemy*, *ſchiſm*, *hereſy*, do not convey to moderns preciſely thoſe ideas which the Greek words (being the ſame except in termination)

* Diſſ. II. Part III. § 6.

tion) μυστηριον, βλασφημια, σχισμα, αιρεσις, in the New Teſtament, conveyed to Chriſtians in the times of the apoſtles? Yet, that there is not ſuch a correſpondence in meaning between them as is commonly ſuppoſed, I intend, in the preſent Diſſertation, to put beyond a doubt. That there is a real difference, in regard to ſome of thoſe words is, I think, generally allowed by men of letters; but as all are not agreed in regard to the preciſe difference between the one and the other, I ſhall here examine briefly the import of the original terms, in the order above mentioned, that we may be qualified to judge how far they are rightly rendered by the words ſuppoſed to correſpond to them, and that we may not be miſled, by the reſemblance of ſound, to determine concerning the fameneſs of ſignification.

PART I.

Of Mystery.

THE Greek word μυστηριον occurs frequently in the New Teſtament, and is uniformly rendered, in the Engliſh tranſlation, *myſtery*. We all know that by the moſt current uſe of the Engliſh word *myſtery* (as well as of the Latin eccleſiaſtic word *myſterium*, and the correſponding terms in modern languages), is denoted ſome doctrine to human reaſon incomprehenſible; in other words, ſuch a doctrine as exhibits difficulties, and even apparent contradictions, which we cannot ſolve or explain. Another uſe of the word, which, though not ſo univerſal at preſent, is often to be met with in eccleſiaſtic writers of former ages, and in foreign writers of the preſent age, is to ſignify ſome religious ceremony or rite, eſpecially thoſe now denominated ſacraments. In the communion office of the church of England, the elements, after conſecration, are ſometimes termed *holy myſteries*. But this uſe ſeems not now to be common among Proteſtants, leſs perhaps in this country than in any other. Johnſon has not ſo much as mentioned it in his Dictionary. Indeed in the fourth, and ſome ſucceeding centuries, the word μυστηριον was ſo much in vogue with the Greek fathers, and *myſterium* or *ſacramentum*, as it was often rendered, with the Latin, that it would be impoſſible to ſay in what meaning they uſed the words; nay, whether or not they affixed any meaning to them at all. In every thing that related to religion, there were found *myſteries* and *ſacraments*, in doctrines and precepts, in ordinances and petitions; they could even

even discover numbers of them in the Lord's Prayer. Nay, so late as father Possevini, this unmeaning application of these terms has prevailed in some places. That Jesuit is cited with approbation by Walton in the prolegomena to his Polyglot, for saying, "Tot esse in Hebraica Scriptura sacramenta, quot literæ; tot "mysteria, quot puncta; tot arcana, quot apices," a sentence, I acknowledge, as unintelligible to me, as Father Simon owns it was to him. But passing this indefinite use, of which we know not what to make, the two significations I have mentioned, are sufficiently known to theologians, and continue, though not equally, still in use with modern writers.

§ 2. When we come to examine the Scriptures critically, and make them serve for their own interpreters, which is the surest way of attaining the true knowledge of them, we shall find, if I mistake not, that both these senses are unsupported by the usage of the inspired penmen. After the most careful examination of all the passages in the New Testament, in which the Greek word occurs, and after consulting the use made of the term, by the ancient Greek interpreters of the Old, and borrowing aid from the practice of the Hellenist Jews, in the writings called Apocrypha, I can only find two senses nearly related to each other, which can strictly be called scriptural. The first, and what I may call the leading sense of the word, is *arcanum*, a secret, any thing not disclosed, not published to the world, though perhaps communicated to a select number.

§ 3. Now, let it be observed, that this is totally different from the current sense of the English word *mystery*, something incomprehensible. In the former acceptation, a thing was no longer a mystery than whilst it remained unrevealed; in the latter, a thing is equally a mystery after the revelation as before. To the former we apply properly the epithet *unknown*, to the latter we may, in a great measure, apply the term *unknowable*. Thus, that God would call the Gentiles, and receive them into his church, was as intelligible, or, if ye like the term better, comprehensible, as that he once had called the descendents of the patriarchs, or as any plain proposition or historical fact. Yet, whilst undiscovered, or at least veiled under figures and types, it remained in the scriptural idiom, a *mystery*, having been hidden from ages and generations. But, after it had pleased God to reveal this his gracious purpose to the apostles by his Spirit, it was a mystery no longer.

The Greek words, αποκαλυψις and μυστηριον, stand in the same relation to each other that the English words *discovery* and *secret* do. Μυστηριον αποκαλυφθεν, is a *secret discovered*, and consequently a secret no longer. The discovery is the extinction of the secret as such. These words, accordingly, or words equivalent, as μυστηριον γνωρισθεν, φανερωθεν, are often brought together by the apostles,

ſtles, to ſhew that what were once the ſecret purpoſes and counſels of God, had been imparted to them, to be by them promulgated to all the world. Thus they invited the grateful attention of all to what was ſo diſtinguiſhed a favour on the part of Heaven, and muſt be of ſuch unſpeakable importance to the apoſtate race of Adam. The terms, communication, revelation, manifeſtation, plainly ſhew the import of the term μυστηριον, to which they are applied. As this, indeed, ſeems to be a point now univerſally acknowledged by the learned, I ſhall only refer the judicious reader, for further proof of it from the New Teſtament, to the paſſages quoted in the margin *; in all which, he will plainly perceive, that the apoſtle treats of ſomething which had been concealed for ages (and for that reaſon called μυστηριον), but was then openly revealed; and not of any thing, in its own nature, dark and inconceivable.

§ 4. If, in addition to the evidence ariſing from ſo many direct and clear paſſages in the writings of Paul, it ſhould be thought neceſſary to recur to the uſage of the Seventy, we find that, in the Prophet Daniel, ch. ii. 18, 19. 27. 28, 29. 30. 47. iv. 9. the word μυστηριον occurs not fewer than nine times, anſwering always to the Chaldaic רָזָא *raza, res arcana*, and uſed in relation to Nebuchadnezzar's dream, which was become *a ſecret*, even to the dreamer himſelf, as he had forgot it. The word there is uniformly rendered in the common verſion *ſecret*; and it deſerves to be remarked that, in thoſe verſes, it is found connected with the verbs γνωριζω, φανιζω, and αποκαλυπτω; in a way exactly ſimilar to the uſage of the New Teſtament above obſerved. It occurs in no other place of that verſion, but one in Iſaiah, of very doubtful import. In the apocryphal writings (which, in matters of criticiſm on the Helleniſtic idiom, are of good authority), the word μυστηριον frequently occurs in the ſame ſenſe, and is uſed in reference to human ſecrets, as well as to divine. Nay, the word is not, even in the New Teſtament, confined to divine ſecrets. It expreſſes ſometimes thoſe of a different, and even contrary, nature. Thus, the Apoſtle, ſpeaking of the antichriſtian ſpirit, ſays, *The myſtery of iniquity doth already work.* 2 Theſſ. ii. 7. The ſpirit of antichriſt hath begun to operate; but the operation is latent and unperceived. The Goſpel of Chriſt is a bleſſing, the ſpirit of antichriſt a curſe. Both are equally denominated *myſtery*, or ſecret, whilſt they remain concealed.

§ 5. I ſhall be much miſunderſtood, if any one infer, from what has been now advanced, that I mean to ſignify, that there is nothing in the doctrines of religion which is not, on all ſides, perfectly comprehenſible to us, or nothing from which difficulties may be raiſed, that we are not able to give a ſatisfactory ſolution of.

* Rom. xvi. 25, 26. 1 Cor. ii. 7, 8, 9, 10. Eph. i. 9. iii. 3. 5. 6. 9. vi. 19. Col. i. 26, 27.

of. On the contrary, I am fully convinced, that in all sciences, particularly natural theology, as well as in revelation, there are many truths of this kind, whose evidence such objections are not regarded by a judicious person, as of force sufficient to invalidate. For example, the divine omniscience is a tenet of natural religion. This manifestly implies God's foreknowledge of all future events. Yet, to reconcile the divine prescience with the freedom, and even the contingency, and consequently, with the good or ill desert of human actions, is what I have never yet seen atchieved by any, and indeed despair of seeing. That there are such difficulties also in the doctrines of revelation, it would, in my opinion, be very absurd to deny. But the present inquiry does not affect that matter in the least. This inquiry is critical and concerns solely the scriptural acceptation of the word μυστηριον, which I have shown to relate merely to the secrecy for some time observed with regard to any doctrine, whether mysterious, in the modern acceptation of the word, or not.

§ 6. The foregoing observations will throw some light on what Paul says of the nature of the office with which he was vested: *Let a man so account of us, as of the ministers of Christ, and stewards of the mysteries of God*, 1 Cor. iv. 1 οικονομους μυστηριων Θεου, dispensers to mankind of the gracious purposes of heaven, heretofore concealed, and therefore denominated secrets. Nor can any thing be more conformable than this interpretation both to the instructions given to the Apostles, during our Lord's ministry, and to the commission they received from him. In regard to the former, he tells them, *To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven*; no secret, relating to this subject is withheld from you; *but to them it is not given*, Matt. xiii. 41. that is, not yet given. For these very Apostles, when commissioned to preach, were not only empowered, but commanded to disclose to all the world, (Matt. xxviii. 19. Mark xvi. 15.) the whole mystery of God, his secret counsels in regard to man's salvation. And that they might not imagine that the private informations, received from their Master, had never been intended for the public ear, he gave them this express injunction, *What I tell you in darkness, that speak ye in light. And what ye hear in the ear, that preach ye upon the house tops.* He assigns the reason, the divine decree; a topic to which he oftener than once recurs. *There is nothing covered that shall not be revealed, and hid that shall not be known*, Matt. x. 26, 27. Again: *There is nothing hid, which shall not be manifested; neither was any thing kept secret, but that it should come abroad*, Mark iv. 22. This may serve to explain to us the import of these phrases which occur in the Epistles, as expressing the whole Christian institution, *the mystery of the gospel, the mystery of the faith, the mystery of God, and the mystery of Christ*; mystery, in the singular number,

ber, not myſteries, in the plural, which would have been more conformable to the modern import of the word, as relating to the incomprehenſibility of the different articles of doctrine. But the whole of the goſpel, taken together, is denominated *the myſtery*, the grand ſecret, in reference to the ſilence or concealment under which it was formerly kept: as, in like manner, it is ſtyled the revelation of Jeſus Chriſt, in reference to the publication afterwards enjoined.

§ 7. I ſignified, before, that there was another meaning which the term μυστηριον ſometimes bears in the New Teſtament. But it is ſo nearly related to, if not coincident with, the former, that I am doubtful whether I can call it other than a particular application of the ſame meaning. However, if the thing be underſtood, it is not material which of the two ways we denominate it. The word is ſometimes employed to denote the figurative ſenſe, as diſtinguiſhed from the literal, which is conveyed under any fable, parable, allegory, ſymbolical action, repreſentation, dream, or viſion. It is plain that, in this caſe, the term μυστηριον is uſed comparatively; for, however clear the meaning, intended to be conveyed in the apologue, or parable, may be to the intelligent, it is obſcure, compared with the literal ſenſe, which, to the unintelligent, proves a kind of veil. The one is, as it were, open to the ſenſes; the other requires penetration and reflection. Perhaps there was ſome alluſion to this import of the term, when our Lord ſaid to his diſciples, *To you it is given to know the myſtery of the kingdom of God: but to them that are without all theſe things are done in parables*, Mark iv. 11. The Apoſtles were let into the ſecret, and got the ſpiritual ſenſe of the ſimilitude, whilſt the multitude amuſed themſelves with the letter, and ſearched no further.

In this ſenſe μυστηριον is uſed in theſe words: *The myſtery of the ſeven ſtars which thou ſaweſt in my right hand, and the ſeven golden candleſticks. The ſeven ſtars are the angels of the ſeven churches, and the ſeven candleſticks are the ſeven churches*, Rev. i. 20. Again, in the ſame book: *I will tell thee the myſtery of the woman, and of the beaſt that carrieth her*, &c. Rev. xvii. 7. There is only one other paſſage, to which this meaning of the word is adapted, and on which I ſhall have occaſion to remark afterwards *. *This is a great myſtery, but I ſpeak concerning Chriſt and the church*, Eph. v. 32. Nor is it any objection to this interpretation of the word *myſtery* here, that the Apoſtle alluded not to any fiction, but to an hiſtorical fact, the formation of Eve out of the body of Adam her huſband. For, though there is no neceſſity that the ſtory which ſupplies us with the body of the parable or allegory (if I may ſo expreſs myſelf), be literally true; there is, on the other hand, no neceſſity that it be falſe. Paſſages of true hiſtory

* Diſſ. X. Part III. § 9.

hiſtory are ſometimes allegorized by the ſacred penmen. Witneſs the ſtory of Abraham and his two ſons, Iſaac by his wife Sarah, and Iſhmael by his bondwoman Hagar, of which the Apoſtle has made an allegory for repreſenting the comparative natures of the Moſaic diſpenſation and the Chriſtian, Gal. iv. 22, &c.

§ 8. As to the paſſage quoted from the Epiſtle to the Epheſians, let it be obſerved, that the word μυστηριον is there rendered, in the Vulgate *ſacramentum*. Although this Latin word was long uſed very indefinitely, by eccleſiaſtical writers, it came, at length, with the more judicious, to acquire a meaning more preciſe and fixed. Firmilian calls Noah's ark the ſacrament of the church of Chriſt*. It is manifeſt, from the illuſtration he ſubjoins, that he means the ſymbol, type, or emblem, of the church; alluding to an expreſſion of the Apoſtle Peter, 1 Ep. iii. 20, 21. This may, on a ſuperficial view, be thought nearly coincident with the ſecond ſenſe of the word μυστηριον above aſſigned. But, in fact, it is rather an inverſion of it. It is not, in Scripture language, the type that is called the *myſtery*, but the antitype; not the ſign, in any figurative ſpeech or action, but the thing ſignified. It would, therefore, have correſponded better to the import of the Greek word, to ſay, "The church of Chriſt is the ſacra-"ment of Noah's ark;" το μυστηριον, the ſecret antitype, which that veſſel, deſtined for the ſalvation of the choſen few, from the deluge, was intended to adumbrate. This uſe, however, not uncommon among the fathers of the third century, has given riſe to the definition of a ſacrament, as *the viſible ſign of an inviſible grace*; a definition to which ſome regard has been paid by moſt parties, Proteſtant as well as Romiſh.

§ 9. But to return to μυστηριον: it is plain that the earlieſt perverſion of this word, from its genuine and original ſenſe (a *ſecret*, or ſomething concealed), was in making it to denote ſome ſolemn and ſacred ceremony. Nor is it difficult to point out the cauſes that would naturally bring eccleſiaſtic writers to employ it in a ſenſe, which has ſo cloſe an affinity to a common application of the word in profane authors. Among the different ceremonies employed by the heathen, in their idolatrous ſuperſtitions, ſome were public and performed in the open courts, or in thoſe parts of the temples to which all had acceſs; others were more ſecretly performed in places from which the crowd was carefully excluded. To aſſiſt, or even be preſent at theſe, a ſelect number only was admitted, to each of whom a formal and ſolemn initiation was neceſſary. Theſe ſecret rites, on account of this very circumſtance, their ſecrecy, were generally denominated *myſteries*. They were different, according to what was thought agreeable to the different deities, in whoſe honour they were celebrated. Thus they had the myſteries of Ceres, the myſteries of Proſerpine,

* Cyp. Epiſt. 75. in ſome editions 43.

pine, the myſteries of Bacchus, &c. Now there were ſome things in the Chriſtian worſhip, which, though eſſentially different from all Pagan rites, had as much reſemblance in this circumſtance, the excluſion of the multitude, as would give ſufficient handle to the heathen, to ſtyle them the Chriſtian myſteries.

§ 10. Probably the term would be firſt applied only to what was called in the primitive church, *the euchariſt*, which we call *the Lord's ſupper;* and afterwards extended to *baptiſm* and other ſacred ceremonies. In regard to the firſt mentioned ordinance, it cannot be denied, that in the article of concealment, there was a pretty cloſe analogy. Not only were all infidels, both Jews and Gentiles, excluded from witneſſing the commemoration of the death of Chriſt; but even many believers, particularly the catechumens and the penitents; the former, becauſe not yet initiated by baptiſm into the church; the latter, becauſe not yet reſtored to the communion of Chriſtians, after having fallen into ſome ſcandalous ſin. Beſides, the ſecrecy that Chriſtians were often, on account of the perſecutions to which they were expoſed, obliged to obſerve, which made them meet for ſocial worſhip in the night-time, or very early in the morning, would naturally draw on their ceremonies, from the Gentiles, the name of *myſteries*. And it is not unreaſonable to think, that a name which had its riſe among their enemies, might afterwards be adopted by themſelves. The name *Chriſtians*, firſt uſed at Antioch, ſeems, from the manner wherein it is mentioned in the Acts, ch. xi. 26. to have been at firſt given contemptuouſly to the diſciples by infidels, and not aſſumed by themſelves. The common titles by which, for many years after that period, they continued to diſtinguiſh thoſe of their own ſociety, as we learn both from the Acts, and from Paul's Epiſtles, were *the faithful*, or believers, *the diſciples*, and *the brethren*. Yet, before the expiration of the apoſtolic age, they adopted the name *Chriſtian*, and gloried in it. The Apoſtle Peter uſes it in one place, 1 Ep. iv. 16. the only place in Scripture wherein it is uſed by one of themſelves. Some other words and phraſes which became faſhionable amongſt eccleſiaſtic writers, might naturally enough be accounted for in the ſame manner.

§ 11. But how the Greek μυστηριον came firſt to be tranſlated into Latin *ſacramentum*, it is not eaſy to conjecture. None of the claſſical ſignifications of the Latin word ſeems to have any affinity to the Greek term. For whether we underſtand it ſimply for a ſacred ceremony, *ſacramentum* from *ſacrare*, as *juramentum* from *jurare*, or for the pledge depoſited by the litigants in a proceſs, to enſure obedience to the award of the judge, or for the military oath of fidelity, none of theſe conveys to us either of the ſenſes of the word μυστηριον explained above. At the

ſame

same time it is not denied that in the classical import, the Latin word may admit an allusive application to the more solemn ordinances of religion, as implying in the participants a sacred engagement equivalent to an oath. All that I here contend for, is that the Latin word *sacramentum* does not, in any of these senses, convey exactly the meaning of the Greek name μυστηριον, whose place it occupies in the Vulgate. Houbigant, a Romish priest, has, in his Latin translation of the Old Testament, used neither *sacramentum* nor *mysterium*; but where either of these terms had been employed in the Vulgate he substitutes *secretum*, *arcanum*, or *absconditum*. Erasmus, though he wrote at an earlier period, has only once admitted *sacramentum* into his version of the New Testament, and said with the Vulgate *sacramentum septem stellarum*.

Now it is to this practice, not easily accounted for, in the Old Latin translators, that we owe the ecclesiastical term *sacrament*, which, though not scriptural, even Protestants have not thought fit to reject: they have only confined it a little in the application, using it solely of the two primary institutions of the Gospel, *baptism* and *the Lord's supper*; whereas the Romanists apply it also to five other ceremonies, in all seven. Yet even this application is not of equal latitude with that wherein it is used in the Vulgate. The sacrament of God's will, Eph. i. 9. the sacrament of piety, 1 Tim. iii. 16. the sacrament of a dream, Dan. ii. 18. 30. 47. the sacrament of the seven stars, Rev. i. 20. and the sacrament of the woman, Rev. xvii. 7. are phrases which sound very strangely in our ears.

§ 12. So much for the introduction of the term *sacrament* into the Christian theology, which (however convenient it may be for expressing some important rites of our religion), has, in none of the places where it occurs in the Vulgate, a reference to any rite or ceremony whatever, but is always the version of the Greek word μυστηριον, or the corresponding term in Hebrew or Chaldee. Now the term μυστηριον, as has been shown, is always predicated of some doctrine, or of some matter of fact wherein it is the intention of the writer to denote that the information he gives either was a secret formerly, or is the latent meaning of some type, allegory, figurative description, dream, vision, or fact referred to. No religion abounded more in pompous rites and ordinances than the Jewish, yet they are never, in Scripture, (any more than the ceremonies of the New Testament) denominated either mysteries or sacraments. Indeed with us Protestants, the meanings in present use assigned to these two words, are so totally distinct, the one relating solely to doctrine, the other solely to positive institutions, that it may look a little oddly to bring them together, in the discussion of the same critical question. But to those who are acquainted with Christian anti-

quity, and foreign uſe in theſe matters, or have been accuſtomed to the Vulgate tranſlation, there will be no occaſion for an apology.

§ 13. Before I finiſh this topic, it is proper to take notice of one paſſage wherein the word μυστηριον, it may be plauſibly urged, muſt have the ſame ſenſe with that which preſent uſe gives to the Engliſh word *myſtery*, and denote ſomething which, though revealed, is inexplicable, and, to human faculties, unintelligible. The words are, *Without controverſy great is the myſtery of godliness: God was manifeſt in the fleſh, juſtified in the ſpirit, ſeen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles, believed on in the world, received up into glory*, 1 Tim. iii. 16. I do not here enquire into the juſtneſs of this reading, though differing from that of the two moſt ancient verſions, the Syriac and the Vulgate, and ſome of the oldeſt manuſcripts. The words, as they ſtand, ſufficiently anſwer my purpoſe. Admit then that ſome of the great articles enumerated may be juſtly called myſteries, in the eccleſiaſtical and preſent acceptation of the term; it does not follow that this is the ſenſe of the term here. When a word in a ſentence of holy writ is ſuſceptible of two interpretations, ſo that the ſentence, whichſoever of the two ways the word be interpreted, conveys a diſtinct meaning ſuitable to the ſcope of the place; and when one of theſe interpretations expreſſes the common import of the word in holy writ, and the other aſſigns it a meaning which it plainly has not in any other paſſage of Scripture, the rules of criticiſm manifeſtly require that we recur to the common acceptation of the term. Nothing can vindicate us in giving it a ſingular, or even a very uncommon ſignification, but that all the more uſual meanings would make the ſentence involve ſome abſurdity or nonſenſe. This is not the caſe here. The purport of the ſentence plainly is "Great unqueſtionably is the divine "ſecret, of which our religion brings the diſcovery; God was "manifeſt in the fleſh, &c."

PART II.

Of Blaſphemy.

I PROPOSED, in the ſecond place, to offer a few thoughts on the import of the word βλασφημια, frequently tranſlated *blaſphemy*. I am far from affirming that in the preſent uſe of the Engliſh word, there is ſuch a departure from the import of the original, as in that remarked in the preceding article, between μυστηριον and *myſtery*;

mystery: at the same time it is proper to observe, that in most cases there is not a perfect coincidence. Βλασφημια properly denotes *calumny*, *detraction*, *reproachful* or *abusive language*, against whomsoever it be vented. There does not seem, therefore, to have been any necessity for adopting the Greek word into our language, one or other of the English expressions above mentioned, being, in every case, sufficient for conveying the sense. Here, as in other instances, we have, with other moderns, implicitly followed the Latins, who had in this no more occasion than we, for a phraseology not originally of their own growth. To have uniformly translated, and not transferred, the words βλασφημια and βλασφημειν, would have both contributed to perspicuity, and tended to detect the abuse of the terms when wrested from their proper meaning. That βλασφημια and its conjugates are in the New Testament very often applied to reproaches not aimed against God, is evident from the following passages: Matt. xii. 31, 32. xxvii. 39. Mark xv. 29. Luke xxii. 65. xxiii. 39. Rom. iii. 8. xiv. 16. 1 Cor. iv. 13. x. 30. Eph. iv. 31. 1 Tim. vi. 4. Tit. iii. 2. 1 Pet. iv. 4. 14. Jude 9. 10. Acts vi. 11. 13. 2 Pet. ii 10, 11.; in the much greater part of which the English translators, sensible that they could admit no such application, have not used the words *blaspheme* or *blasphemy*, but *rail, revile, speak evil*, &c. In one of the passages quoted, a reproachful charge brought even against the devil, is called κρισις βλασφημιας, Jude 9. and rendered by them *railing accusation*. That the word in some other places (Acts xiii. 45. xviii. 6. xxvi. 11. Col. iii. 8. 1 Tim. i. 13. 2 Tim. iii. 2.) ought to have been rendered in the same general terms, I shall afterwards show. But with respect to the principal point, that the word comprehends all verbal abuse, against whomsoever uttered, God, angel, man, or devil; as it is universally admitted by the learned, it would be losing time to attempt to prove. The passages referred to will be more than sufficient to all who can read them in the original Greek.

§ 2. But it deserves our notice, and it is principally for this reason that I judged it proper to make some remarks on the word, that even when βλασφημια refers to reproachful speeches against God, and so comes nearer the meaning of our word *blasphemy*; still the primitive notion of this crime has undergone a considerable change in our way of conceiving it. The causes it would not perhaps be difficult to investigate, but the effect is undeniable. In theological disputes nothing is more common, to the great scandal of the Christian name, than the imputation of blasphemy thrown by each side upon the other. The injustice of the charge on both sides will be manifest on a little reflection, which it is the more necessary to bestow, as the commonness of the accusation, and the latent, but contagious, motives of employing it, have gradually perverted our conceptions of the thing.

§ 3.

§ 3. It has been remarked already, that the import of the word βλασφημια is *maledicentia*, in the largeſt acceptation, comprehending all ſorts of verbal abuſe, imprecation, reviling, and calumny. Now let it be obſerved, that when ſuch abuſe is mentioned as uttered againſt God, there is properly no change made on the ſignification of the word; the change is only in the application, that is, in the reference to a different object. The idea conveyed in the explanation now given is always included, againſt whomſoever the crime be committed. In this manner every term is underſtood that is applicable to both God and man. Thus the meaning of the word *diſobey* is the ſame, whether we ſpeak of diſobeying God or of diſobeying man. The ſame may be ſaid of *believe*, *honour*, *fear*, &c. As therefore the ſenſe of the term is the ſame, though differently applied, what is eſſential to conſtitute the crime of detraction in the one caſe, is eſſential alſo in the other. But it is eſſential to this crime as commonly underſtood, when committed by one man againſt another, that there be in the injurious perſon the will or diſpoſition to detract from the perſon abuſed. Mere miſtake in regard to character, eſpecially when the miſtake is not conceived by him who entertains it, to leſſen the character, nay, is ſuppoſed, however erroneouſly, to exalt it, is never conſtrued by any into the crime of defamation. Now, as blaſphemy is, in its eſſence, the ſame crime, but immenſely aggravated, by being committed againſt an object infinitely ſuperior to man, what is fundamental to the very exiſtence of the crime, will be found in this, as in every other ſpecies, which comes under the general name. There can be no blaſphemy, therefore, where there is not an impious purpoſe to derogate from the divine majeſty, and to alienate the minds of others from the love and reverence of God.

§ 4. Hence, we muſt be ſenſible of the injuſtice of ſo frequently uſing the odious epithet *blaſphemous* in our controverſial writings; an evil imputable ſolely to the malignity of temper, which a habit of ſuch diſputation rarely fails to produce. Hence it is, that the Arminian and the Calviniſt, the Arian and the Athanaſian, the Proteſtant and the Papiſt, the Jeſuit and the Janſeniſt, throw and retort on each other the unchriſtian reproach. Yet it is no more than juſtice to ſay, that each of the diſputants is ſo far from intending to diminiſh, in the opinion of others, the honour of the Almighty, that he is, on the contrary, fully convinced, that his own principles are better adapted to raiſe it than thoſe of his antagoniſt, and, for that very reaſon, he is ſo ſtrenuous in maintaining them. But to blacken, as much as poſſible, the deſigns of an adverſary, in order the more effectually to render his opinions hateful, is one of the many common, but deteſtable reſources of theological controvertiſts. It is to be hoped that the ſenſe, not only of the injuſtice of this meaſure, but of its ineffi-

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cacy for producing conviction in the mind of a reasonable antagonist, and of the bad impression it tends to make on the impartial and judicious, in regard both to the arguers and to the argument, will at length induce men to adopt more candid methods of managing their disputes; and even, when provoked by the calumnious and angry epithets of an opposer, not to think of retaliating; but to remember, that they will derive more honour from imitating, as is their duty, the conduct of Him who, when he was reviled, reviled not again.

§ 5. But, after observing that this perversion of the word *blasphemy* results, for the most part, from the intemperate heat and violence with which polemic writers manage their religious contests; it is no more than doing justice to theologians and ecclesiastics, though it may look like a digression, to remark that this evidence of undue acrimony is by no means peculiar to them. So uncontrolable is this propensity in men of violent passions, that even sceptics cannot pretend an entire exemption from it. Some allowances ought doubtless to be made for the rage of bigots inflamed by contradiction, from the infinite consequence they always ascribe to their own religious dogmas; but when a reasoner, an enquirer into truth, and consequently a dispassionate and unprejudiced person (as doubtless such a man as Bolingbroke chose to be accounted), falls into the same absurdity, adopts the furious language of fanaticism, and rails against those whose theory he combats, calling them impious blasphemers, to what allowance can we justly think him entitled? I know of none, except our pity, to which indeed a manner so much beneath the dignity of the philosopher, and unbecoming the patience and self-command implied in cool inquiry, seems to give him a reasonable claim. Since, however, with this defect of discernment, candour and moderation, philosophers as well as zealots, infidels as well as fanatics, and men of the world as well as priests, are sometimes chargeable, it may not be unreasonable to bestow a few reflections on it.

§ 6. First, to recur to analogy and the reason of the thing: I believe there are few who have not sometimes had occasion to hear a man warmly, and with the very best intentions, commend another, for an action which in reality merited not praise, but blame. Yet no man would call the person who, through simplicity, acted this part, a slanderer, whether the fact he related of his friend were true or false, since he seriously meant to raise esteem of him; for an intention to depreciate, is essential to the idea of slander. To praise injudiciously is one thing, to slander is another. The former perhaps will do as much hurt to the character, which is the subject of it, as the latter; but the merit of human actions depends entirely on the motive. There is a maliciousness in the calumniator, which no person who reflects is in

in danger of confounding with the unconſcious blundering of a man whoſe praiſe detracts from the perſon whom he means to honour. The blaſphemer is no other than the calumniator of Almighty God. To conſtitute the crime, it is as neceſſary that this ſpecies of calumny be intentional, as that the other be. He muſt be one, therefore, who by his impious talk endeavours to inſpire others with the ſame irreverence towards the Deity, or perhaps abhorrence of him, which he indulges in himſelf. And though, for the honour of human nature, it is to be hoped that very few arrive at this enormous guilt, it ought not to be diſſembled, that the habitual profanation of the name and attributes of God, by common ſwearing, is but too manifeſt an approach towards it. There is not an entire coincidence. The latter of theſe vices may be conſidered as reſulting ſolely from the defect of what is good in principle and diſpoſition; the former, from the acquiſition of what is evil in the extreme: but there is a cloſe connection between them, and an inſenſible gradation from the one to the other. To accuſtom one's ſelf to treat the Sovereign of the univerſe with irreverent familiarity, is the firſt ſtep; malignly to arraign his attributes, and revile his providence, is the laſt.

§ 7. But it may be ſaid, that an inquiry into the proper notion of βλασφημια, in the ſacred writings, is purely a matter of criticiſm, concerning the import of a word, whoſe ſignification muſt be ultimately determined by ſcriptural uſe. Our reaſonings, therefore, are of no validity, unleſs they are ſupported by fact. True; but it ought to be conſidered, on the other hand, that as the word βλασφημειν, when men are the objects, is manifeſtly uſed for intentional abuſe, the preſumption is, that the ſignification is the ſame, when God is the object. Nay, according to the rules of criticiſm, it is evidence ſufficient, unleſs a poſitive proof could be brought, that the word, in this application, undergoes a change of meaning. In the preſent inſtance, however, it is unneceſſary to recur to the preſumption, as poſitive teſtimony can be produced, that both the verb and the noun have the ſame meaning in theſe different applications.

§ 8. Let it be obſerved then that ſometimes, in the ſame ſentence, the word is applied in common both to divine and to human beings, which are ſpecified as the objects, and conſtrued with it, and ſometimes the word, having been applied to one of theſe, is repeated in an application to the other; the ſacred writers thereby ſhewing, that the evil is the ſame in kind in both caſes, and that the caſes are diſcriminated ſolely by the dignity of the object. Thus our Lord ſays, as in the common tranſlation, *All manner of blaſphemy*, πασα βλασφημια, *ſhall be forgiven unto men: but the blaſphemy againſt the Holy Ghoſt ſhall not be forgiven*, Matt. xii. 31. (See the paſſage in this Tranſlation, and the note upon it.) The difference in point of atrociouſneſs is here exceedingly

ceedingly great, the one being repreſented as unpardonable, and the other as what may be pardoned; but this is exhibited as reſulting purely from the infinite diſparity of the objects. The application of the ſame name to the two crimes compared, gives us to underſtand the immenſe diſproportion there is, in reſpect of guilt, between the ſame criminal behaviour, when aimed againſt our fellow-creatures, and when directed againſt the Author of our being. As the Engliſh word *blaſphemy* is not of the ſame extent of ſignification with the Greek, and is not properly applied to any abuſe vented againſt man, it would have been better here to have choſen a common term which would have admitted equally an application to either, ſuch as *ſlander* or *detraction*. The expreſſion of the evangeliſt Mark, in the parallel place, Mark iii. 28, 29. is to the ſame purpoſe. Again, in the Acts, *We have heard him ſpeak blaſphemous words*, ρηματα βλασφημα, *againſt Moſes and againſt God*, Acts vi. 11. Like to this is that paſſage in the Old Teſtament, where the falſe witneſſes who were ſuborned to teſtify againſt Naboth ſay, *Thou didſt blaſpheme God and the king*, 1 Kings xxi. 10. Though the word in the Septuagint is not βλασφημειν, it is a term which, in that verſion, is ſometimes uſed ſynonymouſly, as indeed are all the terms which in the original denote *curſing*, *reviling*, *defaming*.

§ 9. Further, with the account given above, of the nature of *blaſphemy*, the ſtyle of Scripture perfectly agrees. No errors concerning the divine perfections can be groſſer than thoſe of polytheiſts and idolaters, ſuch as the ancient pagans. Errors on this, if on any ſubject, are ſurely fundamental. Yet thoſe errors are never in holy writ brought under the denomination of blaſphemy; nor are thoſe who maintain them ever ſtyled blaſphemers. Nay, among thoſe who are no idolaters, but acknowledge the unity and ſpirituality of the divine nature, as did all the Jewiſh ſects, it is not ſufficient to conſtitute this crime, that a man's opinions be, in their conſequences, derogatory from the divine majeſty, if they be not perceived to be ſo by him who holds them, and broached on purpoſe to diminiſh men's veneration of God. The opinions of the Sadducees appear in effect to have detracted from the juſtice, the goodneſs, and even the power of the Deity, as their tendency was but too manifeſtly to diminiſh in men the fear of God, and conſequently to weaken their obligations to obey him. Yet neither our Saviour, nor any of the inſpired writers, calls them blaſphemous, as thoſe opinions did not appear to themſelves to detract, nor were advanced with the intention of detracting from the honour of God. Our Lord only ſaid to the Sadducees, *Ye err, not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God*, Matt. xxii 19. Nay, it does not appear that even their adverſaries the Phariſees, though the firſt who ſeem to have perverted the word (as ſhall be remarked afterwards), and though

though immoderately attached to their own tenets, ever reproached them as blaſphemers, on account of their erroneous opinions. Nor is indeed the epithet *blaſphemous*, or any ſynonymous term, ever coupled in Scripture, as is common in modern uſe, with *doctrines*, *thoughts*, *opinions*. It is never applied but to words and ſpeeches. *A blaſphemous opinion*, or *blaſphemous doctrine*, are phraſes, which (how familiar ſoever to us) are as unſuitable to the ſcriptural idiom, as a *railing opinion*, or *ſlanderous doctrine*, is to ours.

§ 10. But to proceed from what is not, to what is, called blaſphemy in Scripture; the firſt divine law publiſhed againſt it, *He that blaſphemeth the name of the Lord*, (or Jehovah, as it is in the Hebrew) *ſhall be put to death*, Lev. xxiv. 16. when conſidered, along with the incident that occaſioned it, ſuggeſts a very atrocious offence in words, no leſs than abuſe or imprecations vented againſt the Deity. For, in what way ſoever the crime of the man there mentioned be interpreted, whether as committed againſt the true God, the God of Iſrael, or againſt any of the falſe gods whom his Egyptian father worſhipped, the law in the words now quoted is ſufficiently explicit; and the circumſtances of the ſtory plainly ſhew, that the words which he had uſed were derogatory from the Godhead, and ſhocking to the hearers.

And if we add to this, the only other memorable inſtance, in ſacred hiſtory, namely that of Rabſhakeh, it will lead us to conclude that it is ſolely a malignant attempt, in words, to leſſen men's reverence of the true God, and, by vilifying his perfections, to prevent their placing confidence in him, which is called in Scripture blaſphemy, when the word is employed to denote a ſin committed directly againſt God. This was manifeſtly the attempt of Rabſhakeh when he ſaid, "Neither let Hezekiah make you truſt in the Lord," (the word is Jehovah) "ſaying, Jehovah will ſurely deliver us. Hath any of the gods of the nations delivered his land out of the hand of the king of Aſſyria? Where are the gods of Hamath and of Arpad? Where are the gods of Sepharvaim, Hena, and Ivah? Have they delivered Samariah out of my hand? Who are they among all the gods of the countries, that have delivered their country out of mine hand, that Jehovah ſhould deliver Jeruſalem out of mine hand?" 2 Kings xviii. 30. 33, 34, 35.

§ 11. Blaſphemy, I acknowledge, like every other ſpecies of defamation, may proceed from ignorance combined with raſhneſs and preſumption; but it invariably implies (which is not implied in mere error) an expreſſion of contempt or deteſtation, and a deſire of producing the ſame paſſions in others. As this conduct, however, is more heinous in the knowing than in the ignorant, there are degrees of guilt even in blaſphemy. God's

name

name is said to be blaſphemed among the heathen, through the ſcandalous conduct of his worſhippers. And when Nathan ſaid to David, *By this deed thou haſt given occaſion to the enemies of Jehovah to blaſpheme*, 2 Sam. xii. 14. his deſign was evidently to charge on that monarch a conſiderable ſhare of the guilt of thoſe blaſphemies to which his heinous tranſgreſſion in the matter of Uriah would give riſe, among their idolatrous neighbours; for here, as in other caſes, the flagrant iniquity of the ſervant, rarely fails to bring reproach on the maſter, and on the ſervice. It is, without doubt, a moſt flagitious kind of blaſphemy whereof thoſe men are guilty who, inſtead of being brought to repentance by the plagues wherewith God viſits them for their ſins, are fired with a monſtrous kind of revenge againſt their Maker, which they vent in vain curſes and impious reproaches. Thus, in the Apocalypſe, we are informed of thoſe who *blaſphemed the God of heaven, becauſe of their pains and their ſores, and repented not of their deeds.* Rev. xvi. 11.

§ 12. It will perhaps be objected, that even the inſpired penmen of the New Teſtament ſometimes uſe the word with greater latitude than has here been given it. The Jews are ſaid, by the ſacred hiſtorian, *to have ſpoken againſt the things preached by Paul, contradicting and blaſpheming*, Acts xiii. 45. And it is ſaid of others of the ſame nation, *When they oppoſed themſelves and blaſphemed*, xviii. 6. Now, as zeal for God and religion was the conſtant pretext of the Jews for vindicating their oppoſition to Chriſtianity, it cannot be imagined they would have thrown out any thing like direct blaſphemy or reproaches againſt God. It may therefore be plauſibly urged, that it muſt have been (if we may borrow a term from the law) ſuch conſtructive blaſphemy, as when we call fundamental errors in things divine, by that odious name. But the anſwer is eaſy. It has been ſhewn already, that the Greek word implies no more than to *revile, defame*, or *give abuſive language*. As the term is general, and equally applicable, whether God be the object of the abuſe, or man, it ought never to be rendered *blaſpheme*, unleſs when the context manifeſtly reſtrains it to the former application. There is this advantage, if the caſe were dubious, in preſerving the general term, that if God be meant as the object of their reproaches, ſtill the verſion is juſt. In the ſtory of the ſon of the Iſraelitiſh woman, the terms *curſing God* and *blaſpheming him*, Lev. xxiv. 11. 14. are uſed ſynonymouſly; and, in regard to Rabſhakeh's blaſphemy, the phraſes, *to reproach the living God* or *Jehovah*, and to blaſpheme him, 2 Kings xix. 4. 16. 22. 23. are both uſed in the ſame way; but, on the other hand, if the writer meant abuſe levelled againſt men, to render it blaſpheme is a real miſtranſlation, inaſmuch as, by repreſenting the divine Majeſty as

the object, which the Engliſh word *blaſpheme* always does, the ſenſe is totally altered.

Our tranſlators have, on other occaſions, been ſo ſenſible of this, that in none of the places marked in the margin * have they uſed *blaſpheme*, or any of its conjugates; but, inſtead of it, the words *rail*, *revile*, *report ſlanderouſly*, *ſpeak evil*, *defame*, though the word in the original is the ſame, nay, in ſome places, where Jeſus Chriſt is the object, they tranſlate it in the ſame manner, Matt. xxvii. 39. Mark xv. 29. Luke xxiii. 39. There can be no doubt, that in the two paſſages quoted from the Acts, the apoſtles themſelves were the objects of the abuſe which fiery zeal prompted their countrymen to throw out againſt the propagators of a doctrine conſidered by them as ſubverſive of the religion of their fathers. Both paſſages are juſtly rendered by Caſtalio; the firſt, "Judæi contradicebant iis quæ a Paulo dicebantur, reclamantes ac conviciantes;" the ſecond, "Quumque illi reſiſterent ac maledicerent."

§ 13. The ſame will ſerve for anſwer to the objection founded on Paul's ſaying of himſelf before his converſion that he was a *blaſphemer*, 1 Tim. i. 13. the word ought to have been rendered *defamer*. Of this we can make no doubt, when we conſider the honourable teſtimony which this apoſtle, after his converſion, did not heſitate to give of his own piety when a Jew, *Brethren*, ſaid he, *I have lived in all good conſcience before God* (rather *towards God*, τῳ Θεῳ, not ενωπιον τȣ Θεȣ) *until this day*, Acts xxiii. 1. This expreſſion, therefore, regards what is ſtrictly called *duty to God*. But could he have made this declaration, if his conſcience had charged him with blaſphemy, of all crimes againſt God the moſt heinous? Should it be aſked, In what ſenſe could he charge himſelf with defamation? Whom did he defame? The anſwer is obvious. Not only the Lord Jeſus Chriſt the head, but the members alſo of the Chriſtian community, both miniſters and diſciples. Not that he conſidered himſelf as guilty of this crime by implication, for diſbelieving that Jeſus is the Meſſiah; for neither Jews nor Pagans are ever repreſented as either blaſphemers or calumniators, merely for their unbelief; but becauſe he was conſcious that his zeal had carried him much further, even to exhibit the author of this inſtitution as an impoſtor and falſe prophet, and his apoſtles as his accomplices, in maliciouſly impoſing upon the nation, and ſubverting the true religion. That he acted this part, the account given of his proceedings, not to mention this declaration, affords the moſt ample evidence. We are told that he breathed out threatenings and ſlaughter againſt the diſciples, Acts ix. 1.; and he ſays himſelf, that he was exceedingly

* Rom. iii. 8. xiv. 6. 1 Cor. iv. 13. x. 30. Eph. iv. 31. 1 Tim. vi. 4. Tit. iii. 2. 1 Pet. iv. 4. 14. 2 Pet. ii. 10, 11. Jude, 9, 10.

ingly mad againſt them, and even compelled them to join in the abuſe and reproaches, (Acts xxvi. 11.) of which he accuſes himſelf as ſetting the example. And though I doubt not that in this, Paul acted according to his judgment of things at the time, for he tells us expreſsly that he thought verily with himſelf that he *ought* to do many things contrary to the name of Jeſus, Acts xxvi. 9. this ignorance did indeed extenuate his crime, but not excuſe it; for it is not he only who invents, but he alſo who malignantly and raſhly, or without examination and ſufficient evidence, propagates an evil report againſt his neighbour, who is juſtly accounted a defamer.

Nor is the above-mentioned the only place wherein the word has been miſinterpreted *blaſphemer*. We have another example, in the character which the ſame apoſtle gives of ſome ſeducers who were to appear in the church, and of whom he tells us, that they would *have a form of godlineſs*, but *without the power*, 2 Tim. iii. 5. Now, blaſphemy is alike incompatible with both, though experience has ſhewn, in all ages, that ſlander and abuſe vented againſt men, however inconſiſtent with the power of godlineſs, are perfectly compatible with its form. Some other places in the New Teſtament, in which the word ought to have been tranſlated in its greateſt latitude, that is, in the ſenſe of defamation, or reviling in general, are marked in the margin *. Indeed, as was hinted before, it ought always to be ſo, unleſs where the ſcope of the paſſage limits it to that impious defamation, whereof the Deity is the object.

§ 14. I know but one other argument that can be drawn from Scripture, in favour of what I call the controverſial ſenſe of the word blaſphemy, that is, as applied to errors, which, in their conſequences, may be thought to derogate from the perfections or providence of God. In this way the Phariſees, oftener than once, employ the term againſt our Lord; and, if their authority were to us a ſufficient warrant, I ſhould admit this plea to be deciſive. But the queſtion of importance to us is, Have we the authority of any of the ſacred writers for this application of the word? Did our Lord himſelf, or any of his apoſtles, ever retort this charge upon the Phariſees? Yet it cannot be denied, that the doctrine then in vogue with them gave, in many things, if this had been a legitimate uſe of the term *blaſphemy*, a fair handle for ſuch recrimination. They made void, we are told, the commandment of God, to make room for their tradition, Matt. xv. 6. Mark vii. 13. and thus, in effect, ſet up their own authority in oppoſition to that of their Creator. They diſparaged the moral duties of the law, in order to exalt poſitive and ceremonial

* Matt. xii. 31. xv. 19. Mark iii. 28, 29. vii. 22. Luke xxii. 65. Col. iii. 8. James ii. 7.

nial obſervances, Matt. xxiii. 23. Luke xi. 42. Now this cannot be done by the teachers of religion, without ſome miſrepreſentation of the moral attributes of the Lawgiver, whoſe character is thereby degraded in the minds of the people. Yet there is nowhere the moſt diſtant inſinuation given that, on any of theſe accounts, they were liable to the charge of blaſphemy.

But no ſooner did Jeſus ſay to the paralytic, *Thy ſins are forgiven thee*, than the Scribes laid hold of the expreſſion. *This man blaſphemeth*, ſaid they; *who can forgive ſins but God?* Matt. ix. 3. Mark ii. 7. Their plea was, it is an invaſion of the prerogative of God. Grotius obſerves juſtly of this application of the term, *Dicitur hic βλασφημειν, non qui Deo maledicit, ſed qui quod Dei eſt, ſibi arrogat.* Such undoubtedly was their notion of the matter. But I do not ſee any warrant they had for thus extending the ſignification of the word. In the ſimple and primitive import of the name *blaſphemer*, it could not be more perfectly defined in Latin, than by theſe three words, *qui Deo maledicit;* and therefore, I cannot agree with the generality of expoſitors, who ſeem to think, that if Jeſus had not been the Meſſiah, or authorized of God to declare to men the remiſſion of their ſins, the ſcribes would have been right in their verdict. On the contrary, if one, unauthorized of Heaven, had ſaid what our Lord is recorded to have ſaid to the paralytic, he would not, in my opinion, have been liable to that accuſation; he would have been chargeable with great preſumption, I acknowledge, and if he had been conſcious that he had no authority, he would have been guilty of groſs impiety; but every ſpecies of impiety is not blaſphemy. Let us call things by their proper names. If any of us uſurp a privilege that belongs excluſively to another man, or if we pretend to have his authority when we have it not, our conduct is very criminal; but nobody would confound this crime with calumny. No more can the other be termed blaſphemy, eſpecially when it reſults from miſapprehenſion, and is unaccompanied with a malevolent intention, either to depreciate the character, or to defeat the purpoſe, of the Almighty. The falſe prophets, who knowingly told lies in the name of God, and pretended a commiſſion from him, which they knew they had not, were liable to death; but they are no where ſaid to blaſpheme, that is, to revile, or to defame their Maker. Much leſs could it be ſaid of thoſe who told untruths through miſtake, and without any deſign of detracting from God.

This polemic application of the term *blaſphemy*, muſt, therefore have originated in the ſchools of the rabbies, and appears to have been in the time of our Lord and his apoſtles, in general vogue with the ſcribes. Nay, which is exceedingly repugnant to the original import of the name, they even applied it to expreſſions, the immediate object whereof is not perſons, but things.

Thus,

Thus, the hiſtorian, in relating the charge brought againſt Stephen, acquaints us, Acts vi. 13. that *they ſet up falſe witneſſes, which ſaid, This man ceaſeth not to ſpeak blaſphemous words againſt this holy place, and the law:* an application of the word, perhaps till then unexampled. But we need not wonder at this liberty, when we conſider that the perverſion of the term anſwered for them a double purpoſe; firſt, it afforded them one eaſy expedient for rendering a perſon whom they diſliked odious to the people, amongſt whom the very ſuſpicion of blaſphemy excited great abhorrence; ſecondly, it increaſed their own juriſdiction. Blaſphemy was a capital crime, the judgment whereof was in the ſanhedrim, of whom the chief prieſts, and ſome of the ſcribes, always made the principal part. The farther the import of the word was extended, the more caſes it brought under their cognizance, and the more perſons into their power. Hence it proceeded, that the word *blaſphemy*, which originally meant a crime no leſs than maliciouſly reviling the Lord of the univerſe, was at length conſtrued to imply the broaching of any tenet, or the expreſſing of any ſentiment (with whatever view it was done) which did not quadrate with the reigning doctrine. For that doctrine, being preſuppoſed to be the infallible will of God, whatever oppoſed it was ſaid, by implication, to revile its Author. Such will ever be the caſe, when the principles of human policy are grafted upon religion.

§ 15. When we conſider this, and remark, at the ſame time, with what plainneſs our Lord condemned, in many particulars, both the maxims and the practice of the Phariſees, we cannot be ſurpriſed that, on more occaſions than one, that vindictive and envious ſect traduced him to the people, as a perſon chargeable with this infernal guilt. Once, indeed, ſome of them proceeded ſo far as to *take up ſtones to ſtone him*, John x. 31. 33.: for that was the puniſhment which the law had awarded againſt blaſphemers. But he thought proper then to elude their malice, and, by the anſwer he gave to their unmerited reproach, evidently ſhowed that their application of the term was unſcriptural, John x. 34, 35, 36. Thoſe who, on other occaſions, watched our Lord to entrap him in his words, ſeem to have had it principally in view to extract either blaſphemy or treaſon from what he ſaid. By the firſt, they could expoſe him to the fury of the populace, or, perhaps, ſubject him to the Jewiſh rulers; and, by the ſecond, render him obnoxious to the Roman procurator. What uſe they made of both articles at laſt, is known to every body. Nor let it be imagined that, at his trial, the circumſtances, apparently ſlight, of the high-prieſt's rending his clothes, when he pronounced him a blaſphemer, an example which muſt have been quickly followed by the whole ſanhedrim, and all within hearing, was not a matter of the utmoſt conſequence, for effecting their

their malicious purpoſe. We have reaſon to believe, that it contributed not a little, in working ſo wonderful a change in the multitude, and in bringing them to view the man with deteſtation, to whom ſo ſhort while before they were almoſt ready to pay divine honours.

§ 16. But here it may be aſked, 'Can we not then ſay, with 'truth, of any of the falſe teachers, who have ariſen in the 'church, that they vented blaſphemies?' To affirm that we cannot, would, I acknowledge, be to err in the oppoſite extreme. Juſtin Martyr ſays of Marcion *, that he taught many to blaſpheme the Maker of the world. Now, it is impoſſible to deny the juſtice of this charge, if we admit the truth of what Irenæus † and others, affirm concerning that bold hereſiarch, to wit, that he maintained, that the author of our being, the God of Iſrael, who gave the law by Moſes, and ſpoke by the Prophets, is one who perpetrates injuries, and delights in war, is fickle in his opinions, and inconſiſtent with himſelf. If this repreſentation of Marcion's doctrine be juſt, who would not ſay that he reviled his Creator, and attempted to alienate from him the love and confidence of his creatures? The blaſphemy of Rabſhakeh was aimed only againſt the power of God; Marcion's, not ſo much againſt his power, as againſt his wiſdom and his goodneſs. Both equally manifeſted an intention of ſubverting the faith and veneration of his worſhippers. Now, it is only what can be called a direct attack, not ſuch as is made out by implication, upon the perfections of the Lord of the univerſe, and what clearly diſplays the intention of leſſening men's reverence of him, that is blaſphemy, in the meaning (I ſay not of the rabbies, or of the canoniſts, but) of the ſacred code. In ſhort, ſuch falſe and injurious language, as, when applied to men, would be denominated *reviling*, *abuſing*, *defaming*, is, when applied to God, *blaſphemy*. The ſame terms in the original tongues are uſed for both; and it would perhaps have been better, for preventing miſtakes, that in modern tongues alſo, the ſame terms were employed. Indeed, if we can depend on the juſtneſs of the accounts, which remain of the oldeſt ſectaries, there were ſome who went greater lengths in this way than even Marcion.

§ 17. Before I finiſh this topic, it will naturally occur to enquire, What that is, in particular, which our Lord denominates *blaſphemy againſt the Holy Spirit?* Matt. xii. 31, 32. Mark iii. 28, 29. Luke xii. 10. It is foreign from my preſent purpoſe, to enter minutely into the diſcuſſion of this difficult queſtion. Let it ſuffice here to obſerve, that this blaſphemy is certainly not of the conſtructive kind, but direct, manifeſt, and malignant. Firſt, it is mentioned as comprehended under the ſame genus with abuſe againſt man, and contradiſtinguiſhed only by the object.

* Apol. 2. † Lib. i. c. 29.

ject. Secondly, it is further explained, by being called *ſpeaking againſt*, in both caſes. Ὁς αν ειπη λογον κατα τȣ υἱȣ τȣ ανθρωπȣ,—ὁς δ'αν ειπη κατα τȣ πνευματος τȣ ἁγιȣ. The expreſſions are the ſame, in effect, in all the Evangeliſts who mention it, and imply ſuch an oppoſition as is both intentional and malevolent. This cannot have been the caſe of all who diſbelieved the miſſion of Jeſus, and even decried his miracles; many of whom, we have reaſon to think, were afterwards converted by the Apoſtles. But it is not impoſſible, that it may have been the wretched caſe of ſome who, inſtigated by worldly ambition and avarice, have ſlandered what they knew to be the cauſe of God, and, againſt conviction, reviled his work as the operation of evil ſpirits.

§ 18. A late writer *, more ingenious than judicious, has, after making ſome juſt remarks on this ſubject, proceeded ſo far as to maintain that there can be no ſuch crime as *blaſphemy*. His argument (by ſubſtituting *defamation* for blaſphemy, *defame* for blaſpheme, and *man* for God) ſerves equally to prove that there is no ſuch crime as defamation, and ſtands thus: 'Defamation 'preſuppoſes malice; where there is malice, there is miſapprehenſion. Now the perſon who, miſapprehending another defames him, does no more than put the *man's* name (I uſe the 'author's phraſeology) to his own miſapprehenſions of him. 'This is ſo far from ſpeaking evil of *the man*, that it is not 'ſpeaking of him at all. It is only ſpeaking evil of a wild idea, 'of a creature of the imagination, and exiſting nowhere but 'there †.' From this clear manner of reaſoning the following corollary, very comfortable to thoſe whom the world has hitherto miſnamed ſlanderers, may fairly be deduced. If you have a ſpite againſt any man, you may freely indulge your malevolence, in ſaying of him all the evil you can think of. That you cannot be juſtly charged with defamation, is demonſtrable. If all that you ſay be true, he is not injured by you, and therefore you are no detractor. If the whole or part be falſe, what is falſe does not reach him. Your abuſe in that caſe is levelled againſt an ideal being, a chimera to which you only affix his name (a mere trifle, for a name is but a ſound), but with which the man's real character is not concerned. Therefore, when you have ſaid the worſt that malice and reſentment can ſuggeſt, you are not chargeable with

* Independent Whig, No. 55.

† That the reader may be ſatisfied that I do not wrong this author, I ſhall annex, in his own words, part of his reaſoning concerning blaſphemy. "As it is a crime that implies malice againſt God, I am not able to conceive how any man can commit it. A man who knows God, cannot "ſpeak evil of him. And a man who knows him not, and reviles him, "does therefore revile him, becauſe he knows him not. He therefore "puts the name of God to his own miſapprehenſions of God. This is ſo "far from ſpeaking evil of the Deity, that it is not ſpeaking of the Deity "at all. It is only ſpeaking evil of a wild idea, of a creature of the imagination, and exiſting nowhere but there."

with defamation, which was the point to be proved. Thus the argument of that volatile author goes further to emancipate men from all the reſtraints of reaſon and conſcience than, I believe, he himſelf was aware. He only intended by it, as one would think, to releaſe us from the fear of God; it is equally well calculated for freeing us from all regard to man. Are we from this to form an idea of the liberty, both ſacred and civil, of which that author affected to be conſidered as the patron and friend; and of the deference he profeſſes to entertain for the Scriptures and primitive Chriſtianity? I hope not; for he is far from being at all times conſiſtent with himſelf. Of the many evidences which might be brought of this charge, one is, that no man is readier than he to throw the imputation of blaſphemy on thoſe whoſe opinions differ from his own *.

PART III.

Of Schism.

THE next term I propoſed to examine critically was σχισμα, *ſchiſm*. The Greek word frequently occurs in the New Teſtament, though it has only once been rendered *ſchiſm* by our tranſlators. However, the frequency of the uſe among theologians has made it a kind of technical term in relation to eccleſiaſtical matters: and the way it has been bandied as a term of ignominy from ſect to ſect reciprocally, makes it a matter of ſome conſequence to aſcertain, if poſſible, the genuine meaning it bears in holy writ. In order to this, let us, abſtracting alike from the uncandid repreſentations of all zealous party-men, have recourſe to the oracles of truth, the ſource of light and direction.

§ 2. As to the proper acceptation of the word σχισμα, when applied to objects merely material, there is no difference of ſentiments amongſt interpreters. Every one admits that it ought to be rendered *rent*, *breach*, or *ſeparation*. In this ſenſe it occurs in the Goſpels, as where our Lord ſays, *No man putteth a piece*

* In the dedication of the book, to the lower houſe of convocation, the author adviſes them to clear themſelves from the imputation of maintaining certain ungodly tenets, by expoſing the *blaſphemies* of thoſe of their own body: in No. 23, we are told that falſe zeal talks *blaſphemy* in the name of the Lord; in No. 24, that perſecutors *blaſphemouſly* pretend to be ſerving God; and in No. 27, that it is a kind of *blaſphemy* to attempt to perſuade people that God takes pleaſure in vexing his creatures. More examples of the commiſſion of this impracticable crime might be produced from that author, if neceſſary.

piece of new cloth to an old garment; for that which is put in to fill it up, taketh from the garment, and the rent *is made worse*, Matt ix. 16. Χειρον σχισμα γινεται. The ſame phraſe occurs in the parallel paſſage in Mark, ch. ii. 21. From this ſenſe it is transferred by metaphor to things incorporeal. Thus it is uſed once and again by the Evangeliſt John, to ſignify a difference in opinion expreſſed in words. Of the conteſt among the Jews, concerning Jeſus, ſome maintaining that he was, others that he was not, the Meſſiah; the ſacred hiſtorian ſays, Σχισμα ουν εν τω οχλω εγενετο δι' αυτον. *So there was a diviſion among the people becauſe of him*, John vii. 43. Here it is plain the word is uſed in a ſenſe perfectly indifferent; for it was neither in the true opinion ſupported by one ſide, nor in the falſe opinion ſupported by the other, that the *ſchism* or diviſion lay, but in the oppoſition of theſe two opinions. In this ſenſe of the word, there would have been no *ſchism*, if they had been all of one opinion, whether it had been the true opinion, or the falſe. The word is uſed preciſely in the ſame ſignification by this Apoſtle, in two other places of his Goſpel, ch. ix. 16. x. 19.

§ 3. But it is not barely to a declared deference in judgment, that even the metaphorical uſe of the word is confined. As *breach* or *rupture* is the literal import of it in our language; wherever theſe words may be figuratively applied, the term σχισμα ſeems likewiſe capable of an application. It invariably preſuppoſes that among thoſe things whereof it is affirmed, there ſubſiſted an union formerly, and as invariably denotes that the union ſubſiſts no longer. In this manner the Apoſtle Paul uſes the word, applying it to a particular church or Chriſtian congregation. Thus he adjures the Corinthians by the name of the Lord Jeſus, that there be no diviſions or ſchiſms among them, 1 Cor. i. 10. ινα μη η εν υμιν σχισματα; and in another place of the ſame Epiſtle, ch. xi. 18. he tells them, *I hear that there are diviſions* or ſchiſms *among you*, ακουω σχισματα εν υμιν υπαρχειν. In order to obtain a proper idea of what is meant by a breach or ſchiſm in this application, we muſt form a juſt notion of that which conſtituted the union whereof the ſchiſm was a violation. Now the great and powerful cement which united the ſouls of Chriſtians, was their mutual love. *Their hearts*, in the emphatical language of holy writ, *were knit together in love*, Col. ii. 2. This had been declared by their Maſter to be the diſtinguiſhing badge of their profeſſion. *By this ſhall all men know that ye are my diſciples, if ye have love one to another*, John xiii. 35. Their partaking of the ſame baptiſm, their profeſſing the ſame faith, their enjoying the ſame promiſes, and their joining in the ſame religious ſervice, formed a connection merely external and of little ſignificance, unleſs, agreeably to the Apoſtle's expreſſion, Eph. iii. 17. it was rooted and grounded in love. As this, there,

fore, is the great criterion of the Chriſtian character, and the foundation of the Chriſtian unity, whatever alienates the affections of Chriſtians from one another, is manifeſtly ſubverſive of both, and may conſequently, with the greateſt truth and energy, be denominated *ſchiſm*. It is not ſo much what makes an outward diſtinction or ſeparation (though this alſo may in a lower degree be ſo denominated), as what produces an alienation of the heart, which conſtitutes ſchiſm in the ſenſe of the Apoſtle: for this ſtrikes directly at the vitals of Chriſtianity. Indeed both the evil and the danger of the former, that is, an external ſeparation, is principally to be eſtimated from its influence upon the latter, that is, in producing an alienation of heart; for it is in the union of affection among Chriſtians, that the ſpirit, the life, and the power, of religion, are principally placed.

§ 4. It may be ſaid, Does it not rather appear, from the paſſage firſt quoted, to denote ſuch a breach of that viſible unity in the outward order ſettled in their aſſemblies, as reſults from ſome jarring in their religious opinions, and by conſequence in the expreſſions they adopted? This, I own, is what the words in immediate connection, conſidered by themſelves, would naturally ſuggeſt. *I beſeech you, brethren, that ye all ſpeak the ſame thing, and that there be no diviſions* (ſchiſms) *among you, and that ye be perfectly joined together in the ſame mind and in the ſame judgment*, 1 Cor. i. 10. It cannot be denied that a certain unanimity, or a declared aſſent to the great articles of the Chriſtian profeſſion, was neceſſary in every one, in order to his being admitted to, and kept in the communion of, the church. But then it muſt be allowed, on the other hand, that thoſe articles were at that time, few, ſimple, and perſpicuous. It is one of the many unhappy conſequences of the diſputes that have ariſen in the church, and of the manner in which theſe have been managed, that ſuch terms of communion have ſince been multiplied, in every part of the Chriſtian world, and not a little perplexed with metaphyſical ſubtleties, and ſcholaſtic quibbles. Whether this evil conſequence was, in its nature, avoidable, or, if it was, in what manner it might have been avoided, are queſtions, though important, foreign to the preſent purpoſe. Certain it is, however, that ſeveral phraſes uſed by the Apoſtles, in relation to this ſubject, ſuch as ὁμοφρονες, το αυτο φρονουντες, and ſome others, commonly underſtood to mean unanimous in opinion, denote, more properly, coinciding in affection, concurring in love, deſire, hatred, and averſion, agreeably to the common import of the verb φρονειν both in ſacred authors and in profane, which is more ſtrictly rendered *to ſavour, to reliſh*, than *to be of opinion*.

§ 5. Further, let it be obſerved, that in matters whereby the eſſentials of the faith are not affected, much greater indulgence to diverſity of opinion was given, in thoſe pure and primitive times, than

than has been allowed ſince, when the externals, or the form of religion, came to be raiſed on the ruins of the eſſentials, or the power, and a ſuppoſed correctneſs of judgment made of greater account than purity of heart. In the apoſtolic age, which may be ſtyled the reign of charity, their mutual forbearance in regard to ſuch differences, was at once an evidence, and an exerciſe, of this divine principle. *Him that is weak in the faith*, ſays our Apoſtle, *receive ye, but not to doubtful diſputations. For one believeth that he may eat all things: another who is weak, eateth herbs. Let not him that eateth, deſpiſe him that eateth not; and let not him who eateth not, judge him that eateth*, Rom. xiv. 1, 2, 3. *One man eſteemeth one day above another: another eſteemeth every day alike.* As to theſe diſputable points, *let every man be fully perſuaded in his own mind*, (Rom. xiv. 5.) and as far as he himſelf is concerned, act according to his perſuaſion. But he does not permit even him who is in the right, to diſturb his brother's peace, by ſuch unimportant inquiries. *Haſt thou faith?* ſays he; the knowledge and conviction of the truth on the point in queſtion? *Have it to thyſelf before God. Happy is he who condemneth not himſelf in that thing which he alloweth*, Rom. xiv. 22. And in another place, *Let us, therefore, as many as be perfect, be thus minded; and if in any thing ye be otherwiſe minded, God ſhall reveal even this unto you. Nevertheleſs, whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the ſame rule, let us mind the ſame thing*, Phil. iii. 15, 16. We are to remember, that *as the kingdom of God is not meat and drink*, ſo neither is it logical acuteneſs in diſtinction, or grammatical accuracy of expreſſion; but it is *righteouſneſs, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghoſt. For he that in theſe things ſerveth Chriſt, is acceptable to God, and approved of men*, Rom. xiv. 17, 18.

§ 6. Now, if we enquire, by an examination of the context, into the nature of thoſe differences among the Corinthians, to which Paul affixes the name σχίσματα, nothing is more certain, than that no cauſe of difference is ſuggeſted, which has any the leaſt relation to the doctrines of religion, or to any opinions that might be formed concerning them. The fault which he ſtigmatiſed with that odious appellation, conſiſted then ſolely in an undue attachment to particular perſons, under whom, as chiefs or leaders, the people ſeverally ranked themſelves, and thus, without making ſeparate communions, formed diſtinctions among themſelves, to the manifeſt prejudice of the common bond of charity, claſſing themſelves under different heads. *Now this I ſay*, adds the Apoſtle, *that every one of you ſaith, I am of Paul, and I of Apollos, and I of Cephas, and I of Chriſt*, 1 Cor. i. 12. It deſerves to be remarked, that of the differences among the Roman converts, concerning the obſervance of days, and the diſtinction of meats, which we ſhould think more material, as they more

more nearly affect the juſtneſs of religious ſentiments, and the purity of religious practice, the Apoſtle makes ſo little account, that he will not permit them to haraſs one another with ſuch queſtions; but enjoins them to allow every one to follow his own judgment; at the ſame time that he is greatly alarmed at differences among the Corinthians, in which, as they reſult ſolely from particular attachments and perſonal eſteem, neither the faith nor the practice of a Chriſtian appears to have an immediate concern. But it was not without reaſon that he made this diſtinction. The hurt threatened by the latter was directly againſt that extenſive love commanded by the Chriſtian law; but not leſs truly, though more indirectly, againſt the Chriſtian doctrine and manners. By attaching themſelves ſtrongly to human, and conſequently fallible, teachers and guides, they weakened the tie which bound them to the only divine guide and teacher, the Meſſiah, and therefore to that alſo which bound them all one to another.

§ 7. What it was that gave riſe to ſuch diſtinctions in the church of Corinth, we are not informed, nor is it material for us to know. From what follows in the Epiſtle, it is not improbable, that they might have thought it proper in this manner to range themſelves, under thoſe who had been the inſtruments of their converſion to Chriſtianity, or perhaps, thoſe by whom they had been baptized, or for whom they had contracted a ſpecial veneration. It is evident, however, that theſe petty differences, as we ſhould account them, had already begun to produce conſequences unfriendly to the ſpirit of the Goſpel; for it is in this point of view ſolely that the Apoſtle conſiders them, and not as having an immediate bad influence on its doctrine. Thus reſuming the ſubject, he ſays, *Ye are yet carnal; for whereas there is among you envying and ſtrife and diviſions, are ye not carnal and walk as men? For while one ſaith, I am of Paul, and another I am of Apollos, are ye not carnal?* 1 Cor. iii. 3, 4. Thus it is uncontrovertible, in the firſt place, that the accuſation imports that the Corinthians, by their conduct, had given a wound to charity, and not that they had made any deviation from the faith; and in the ſecond place, that, in the apoſtolical acceptation of the word, men may be ſchiſmatics, or guilty of ſchiſm, by ſuch an alienation of affection from their brethren as violates the internal union ſubſiſting in the hearts of Chriſtians, though there be neither error in doctrine nor ſeparation from communion, and conſequently no violation of external unity in ceremonies and worſhip. Fauſtus, a Manichean biſhop in the fourth century (however remote from truth the leading principles of his party were on more important articles), entertained ſentiments on this ſubject entirely ſcriptural. "Schiſma," ſays he, "niſi fallor, eſt "eadem opinantem atque eodem ritu collentem quo cæteri, ſolo "congregationis

"congregationis delectari diſſidio." Fauſt. l. xx. C. iii. ap. Auguſt.

§ 8. After ſo clear a proof of the import of the term, if it ſhould be thought of conſequence to allege in confirmation what muſt be acknowledged to be more indirect, ye may conſider the only other paſſage in which the term is uſed in the New Teſtament, and applied metaphorically to the human body. In the ſame Epiſtle, the Apoſtle having ſhown that the different ſpiritual gifts beſtowed on Chriſtians, rendered them mutually ſubſervient, and made all, in their ſeveral ways, harmoniouſly contribute to the good of the Chriſtian community, gives a beautiful illuſtration of this doctrine from the natural body, the different functions of whoſe members admirably conduce to the benefit and ſupport of one another, and to the perfection and felicity of the whole. He concludes in theſe words: *God hath tempered the body together, having given more abundant honour to that part which lacked, that there ſhould be no ſchiſm in the body,* ινα μη η σχισμα εν τω σωματι, *but that the members ſhould have the ſame care one for another: and whether one member ſuffer, all the members ſuffer with it, or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it,* 1 Cor. xii. 24, 25, 26. It is obvious that the word *ſchiſm* is here employed to ſignify, not a ſeparation from the body, ſuch as is made by amputation or fracture, but ſuch a defect in utility and congruity, as would deſtroy what he conſiders as the mutual ſympathy of the members, and their care one of another.

§ 9. As to the diſtinctions on this ſubject, which in after-times obtained among theologians, it is proper to remark, that error in doctrine was not ſuppoſed eſſential to the notion of ſchiſm; its diſtinguiſhing badge was made ſeparation from communion in religious offices, inſomuch that the words *ſchiſmatic* and *ſeparatiſt*, have been accounted ſynonymous. By this, divines commonly diſcriminate *ſchiſm* from *hereſy*, the eſſence of which laſt is repreſented as conſiſting in an erroneous opinion obſtinately maintained, concerning ſome fundamental doctrine of Chriſtianity; and that whether it be accompanied with ſeparation in reſpect of the ordinances of religion, or not. We have now ſeen that the former definition does not quadrate with the application of the word in the New Teſtament, and that *ſchiſm*, in ſcriptural uſe, is one thing, and *ſchiſm*, in eccleſiaſtical uſe, another.

PART

PART IV.

Of Hereſy.

LET us now enquire with the ſame freedom and impartiality, into the ſcriptural uſe of the other term. The Greek word αἱρεσις, which properly imports no more than *election*, or *choice*, was commonly employed by the Helleniſt Jews, in our Saviour's time, when the people were much divided in their religious ſentiments, to denote, in general, any branch of the diviſion, and was nearly equivalent to the Engliſh words, *claſs*, *party*, *ſect*. The word was not, in its earlieſt acceptation, conceived to convey any reproach in it, ſince it was indifferently uſed, either of a party approved, or of one diſapproved, by the writer. In this way it occurs ſeveral times in the Acts of the Apoſtles, where it is always (one ſingle paſſage excepted) rendered *ſect*. We hear alike of the ſect of the Sadducees, αἱρεσις των Σαδδυκαιων, Acts v. 17. and of the ſect of the Phariſees, αἱρεσις των Φαρισαιων, Acts xv. 5. In both places the term is adopted by the hiſtorian, purely for diſtinction's ſake, without the leaſt appearance of intention to convey either praiſe or blame. Nay, on one occaſion, Paul, in the defence he made for himſelf before king Agrippa, where it was manifeſtly his intention to exalt the party to which he had belonged, and to give their ſyſtem the preference to every other ſyſtem of Judaiſm, both in ſoundneſs of doctrine, and purity of morals, expreſſes himſelf thus: *My manner of life from my youth, which was at the firſt among mine own nation at Jeruſalem, know all the Jews, which knew me from the beginning, if they would teſtify; that after the moſt ſtraiteſt ſect of our religion,* κατα την ακριβεστατην αἱρεσιν της ἡμετερας θρησκειας, *I lived a Phariſee*, Acts xxvi. 4, 5.

§ 2. There is only one paſſage in that hiſtory, wherein there is an appearance that ſomething reproachful is meant to be conveyed under the name αἱρεσις. It is in the accuſation of Paul, by the orator Tertullus, on the part of the Jews, before the governor Felix; where, amongſt other things, we have theſe words; *We have found this man a peſtilent fellow, and a mover of ſedition among all the Jews throughout the world, and a ringleader of the ſect of the Nazarenes,* πρωτοστατην τε της των Ναζωραιων αἱρεσεως, Acts xxiv. 5. I ſhould not, however, have imagined that any part of the obloquy lay in the application of the word laſt mentioned, if it had not been for the notice which the apoſtle takes of it in his anſwer. *But this I confeſs unto thee, that after the way which*

which they call hereſy, ἣν λέγουσιν αἵρεσιν, ſo worſhip I the God of my fathers, Acts xxiv. 14.

§ 3. Here, by the way, I muſt remark a great impropriety in the Engliſh tranſlation, though in this, I acknowledge, it does but follow the Vulgate. The ſame word is rendered one way in the charge brought againſt the priſoner, and another way in his anſwer for himſelf. The conſequence is, that though nothing can be more appoſite than his reply, in this inſtance, as it ſtands in the original, yet nothing can appear more foreign than this paſſage in the two verſions above mentioned. The apoſtle ſeems to defend himſelf againſt crimes of which he is not accuſed. In both places, therefore, the word ought to have been tranſlated in the ſame manner, whether *hereſy* or *ſect*. In my judgment, the laſt term is the only proper one; for the word *hereſy*, in the modern acceptation, never ſuits the import of the original word, as uſed in Scripture. But, when one attends to the very critical circumſtances of the apoſtle at this time, the difficulty in accounting for his having conſidered it as a reproach to be denominated of a *ſect*, diſclaimed by the whole nation, inſtantly vaniſhes. Let it be remembered, firſt, that, ſince the Jews had fallen under the power of the Romans, their ancient national religion had not only received the ſanction of the civil powers for the continuance of its eſtabliſhment in Judea, but had obtained a toleration in other parts of the empire; ſecondly, that Paul is now pleading before a Roman governor, a Pagan, who could not well be ſuppoſed to know much of the Jewiſh doctrine, worſhip or controverſies: and that he had been arraigned by the rulers of his own nation, as belonging to a turbulent and upſtart ſect; for in this way they conſidered the Chriſtians, whom they reproachfully named Nazarenes. The natural conſequence of this charge, with one who underſtood ſo little of their affairs as Felix, was to make him look upon the priſoner, as an apoſtate from Judaiſm, and therefore, as not entitled to be protected, or even tolerated, on the ſcore of religion. Againſt a danger of this kind, it was of the utmoſt importance to our apoſtle to defend himſelf.

§ 4 Accordingly, when he enters on this part of the charge, how ſolicitous is he to prove, that his belonging to that ſect did not imply any defection from the religion of his anceſtors; and thus to prevent any miſtaken judgment, on this article of his arraignment, into which a heathen judge muſt have otherwiſe unavoidably fallen. His own words will, to the attentive, ſuperſede all argument or illuſtration: *But this I confeſs to thee, that after the way which they call a ſect, ſo worſhip I;* whom? No new divinity, but, on the contrary, *the God of our fathers:* he adds, in order the more effectually to remove every ſuſpicion of apoſtaſy, *Believing all things which are written in the law and the*

the prophets ; and have the ſame hope towards God, which they themſelves alſo entertain, that there ſhall be a reſurrection of the dead, both of the juſt and of the unjuſt, Acts xxiv. 14, 15. Nothing could have been more ridiculous, than for the apoſtle ſeriouſly to defend his doctrine againſt the charge of heterodoxy, before an idolater and polytheiſt, who regarded both him and his accuſers as ſuperſtitious fools, and conſequently as, in this reſpect, preciſely on a footing ; but it was entirely pertinent in him to evince before a Roman magiſtrate, that his faith and mode of worſhip, however much traduced by his enemies, were neither eſſentially different from, nor any way ſubverſive of that religion which the ſenate and people of Rome were ſolemnly engaged to protect ; and that therefore he was not to be treated as an apoſtate, as his adverſaries, by that article of accuſation, that he was of the ſect of the Nazarenes, ſhewed evidently that they deſired he ſhould. Thus the apoſtle, with great addreſs, refutes the charge of having revolted from the religious inſtitution of Moſes, and, at the ſame time, is ſo far from diſclaiming, that he glories in the name of a follower of Chriſt.

§ 5. There is only one other place in this hiſtory, in which the word occurs, namely, where the Jews at Rome (for whom Paul had ſent on his arrival) ſpeaking of the Chriſtian ſociety, addreſs him in theſe words : *But we deſire to hear of thee what thou thinkeſt ; for as concerning this ſect*, περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης, *we know that it is every where ſpoken againſt*, Acts xxviii. 22. There cannot be a queſtion here, of the propriety of rendering the word αἵρεσις, *ſect*, a term of a middle nature, not neceſſarily implying either good or bad. For, as to the diſpoſition wherein thoſe Jews were at this time, it is plain they did not think themſelves qualified to pronounce either for or againſt it, till they ſhould give Paul who patroniſed it a full hearing. This they were willing to do, and therefore only acquainted him, in general, that they found it to be a party that was univerſally decried. Thus, in the hiſtorical part of the New Teſtament, we find the word αἵρεσις employed to denote *ſect* or *party*, indiſcriminately, whether good or bad. It has no neceſſary reference to opinions, true or falſe. Certain it is, that ſects are commonly, not always, cauſed by difference in opinion, but the term is expreſſive of the effect only, not of the cauſe.

§ 6. In order to prevent miſtakes, I ſhall here further obſerve, that the word *ſect*, among the Jews, was not, in its application, entirely coincident with the ſame term as applied by Chriſtians to the ſubdiviſions ſubſiſting among themſelves. We, if I miſtake not, invariably uſe it of thoſe who form ſeparate communions, and do not aſſociate with one another in religious worſhip and ceremonies. Thus we call Papiſts, Lutherans, Calviniſts, different ſects, not ſo much on account of their differences in opinion,

nion, as becauſe they have eſtabliſhed to themſelves different fraternities, to which, in what regards public worſhip, they confine themſelves, the ſeveral denominations above mentioned having no intercommunity with one another in ſacred matters. High church and low church we call only parties, becauſe they have not formed ſeparate communions. Great and known differences in opinion, when followed by no external breach in the ſociety, are not conſidered with us as conſtituting diſtinct ſects, though their differences in opinion, may give riſe to mutual averſion. Now, in the Jewiſh ſects (if we except the Samaritans) there were no ſeparate communities erected. The ſame temple, and the ſame ſynagogues, were attended alike by Phariſees and by Sadducees. Nay, there were often of both denominations in the Sanhedrim, and even in the prieſthood.

Another difference was, that the name of the ſect was not applied to all the people who adopted the ſame opinions, but ſolely to the men of eminence among them, who were conſidered as the leaders and inſtructors of the party. The much greater part of the nation, nay, the whole populace, received implicitly the doctrine of the Phariſees, yet Joſephus never ſtyles the common people Phariſees, but only followers and admirers of the Phariſees. Nay, this diſtinction appears ſufficiently from ſacred writ. *The Scribes and Phariſees*, ſays our Lord, Matt. xxiii. 2. *ſit in Moſes' ſeat.* This could not have been ſaid ſo generally, if any thing further had been meant by Phariſees, but the teachers and guides of the party. Again, when the officers ſent by the chief prieſts to apprehend our Lord, returned without bringing him, and excuſed themſelves by ſaying, *Never man ſpake like this man*, they were aſked, *Have any of the rulers or of the Phariſees believed on him?* John vii. 48. Now, in our way of uſing words, we ſhould be apt to ſay, that all his adherents were of the Phariſees; for the Phariſaical was the only popular doctrine. But it was not to the followers, but to the leaders, that the name of the ſect was applied. Here however we muſt except the Eſſenes, who, as they all, of whatever rank originally, entered into a ſolemn engagement, whereby they confined themſelves to a peculiar mode of life, which, in a great meaſure, ſecluded them from the reſt of mankind, were conſidered almoſt in the ſame manner as we do the Benedictines or Dominicans, or any order of monks or friars among the Romaniſts.

Joſephus, in the account he has given of the Jewiſh ſects, conſiders them all as parties who ſupported different ſyſtems of philoſophy, and has been not a little cenſured for this by ſome critics. But as things were underſtood then, this manner of conſidering them was not unnatural. Theology, morality, and queſtions regarding the immortality of the ſoul and a future ſtate, were principal branches of their philoſophy. "Philoſophia,"

ſays Cicero *, " nos primum ad deorum cultum, deinde ad jus " hominum quod ſitum eſt in generis humani ſocietate, tum ad " modeſtiam, magnitudinemque animi erudivit : eademque ab " animo tanquam ab oculis, caliginem diſpulit, ut omnia ſupera, " infera, prima, ultima, media, videremus." Beſides, as it was only men of eminence qualified to guide and inſtruct the people, who were dignified with the title either of Phariſee or of Sadducee, there was nothing ſo analogous among the Pagans, as their different ſects of philoſophers, the Stoics, the Academics, and the Epicureans, to whom alſo the general term αἱρεσις was commonly applied. Epiphanius, a Chriſtian writer of the fourth century, from the ſame view of things with Joſephus, reckons, among the αἱρεσεις, ſects or hereſies, if you pleaſe to call them ſo, which aroſe among the Greeks, before the coming of Chriſt, theſe claſſes of philoſophers, the Stoics, the Platoniſts, the Pythagoreans, and the Epicureans. Of this writer it may alſo be remarked, that in the firſt part of his work, he evidently uſes the word αἱρεσις in all the latitude in which it had been employed by the ſacred writers, as ſignifying ſect or party of any kind, and without any note of cenſure. Otherwiſe he would never have numbered Judaiſm, whoſe origin he derives from the command which God gave to Abraham to circumciſe all the males of his family, among the original hereſies. Thus, in laying down the plan of his work, he ſays, Εν τω εν πρωτω βιβλιω πρωτε τομε αἱρεσεις εικοσιν, αἱ εισιν αἱδε, βαρβαρισμος, σκυθισμος, ἑλληνισμος, ιουδαισμος, κ. τ. ἑ. This only by the way.

§ 7. But it may be aſked, is not the acceptation of the word, in the Epiſtles, different from what it has been obſerved to be in the hiſtorical books of the New Teſtament? Is it not, in the former invariably uſed in a bad ſenſe, as denoting ſomething wrong, and blameable? That in thoſe, indeed, it always denotes ſomething faulty or even criminal, I am far from diſputing : nevertheleſs, the acceptation is not materially different from that in which it always occurs in the Acts of the apoſtles. In order to remove the apparent inconſiſtency in what has been now advanced, let it be obſerved that the word *ſect* has always ſomething relative in it, and therefore in different applications, though the general import of the term be the ſame, it will convey a favourable idea, or an unfavourable, according to the particular relation it bears. I explain myſelf by examples. The word *ſect* may be uſed along with the proper name, purely by way of diſtinction from another party of a different name, in which caſe the word is not underſtood to convey either praiſe or blame. Of this we have examples in the phraſes above quoted, the ſect of the Phariſees, the ſect of the Sadducees, the ſect of the Nazarenes.

* Tuſcul. Quæſt. lib. I.

renes. In this way we may ſpeak of a ſtrict ſect, or a lax ſect, or even of a good ſect, or a bad ſect. If any thing reprehenſible or commendable be ſuggeſted, it is not ſuggeſted by the term ſect, αἱρεσις, but by the words conſtrued with it. Again, it may be applied to a formed party in a community, conſidered in reference to the whole. If the community, of which the ſect is a part, be of ſuch a nature as not to admit this ſubdiviſion without impairing and corrupting its conſtitution, to charge them with ſplitting into ſects, or forming parties, is to charge them with corruption, in what is moſt eſſential to them as a ſociety. Hence ariſes all the difference there is in the word, as uſed in the hiſtory, and as uſed in the Epiſtles of Peter and Paul; for theſe are the only apoſtles who employ it. In the hiſtory, the reference is always of the firſt kind; in the Epiſtles, always of the ſecond. In theſe, the apoſtles addreſs themſelves only to Chriſtians, and are not ſpeaking of ſects without the church, but either reprehending them for, or warning them againſt, forming ſects among themſelves, to the prejudice of charity, to the production of much miſchief within their community, and of great ſcandal to the unconverted world without. So Paul's words to the Corinthians were underſtood by Chryſoſtom, and other ancient expoſitors. In both applications, however, the radical import of the word is the ſame.

§ 8. But even here, it has no neceſſary reference to doctrine, true or falſe. Let us attend to the firſt paſſage, in which it occurs in the Epiſtles, and we ſhall be fully ſatisfied of the truth of this remark. It follows one quoted in Part III. of this Diſſertation. *For there muſt be alſo hereſies among you*, 1 Cor. xi. 19. Δει γαρ και αἱρεσεις εν ὑμιν ειναι. Ye muſt alſo have ſects amongſt you. It is plain, that what he reproves under the name σχισματα, in the former verſe, is in effect the ſame with what he here denominates αἱρεσεις. Now, the term σχισμα, I have ſhewn already to have there no relation to any erroneous tenet, but ſolely to undue regards to ſome individual teachers, to the prejudice of others, and of the common cauſe. In another paſſage of this Epiſtle, where, ſpeaking of the very ſame reprehenſible conduct, he uſes the words ſtrife and factions, ἐρις και διχοστασιαι, 1 Cor. iii. 3. words nearly coincident with σχισματα και αἱρεσεις; his whole aim in theſe reprehenſions is well expreſſed in theſe words, *that ye might learn in us* (that is, in himſelf and Apollos, whom he had named, for example's ſake), *not to think of men above that which is written*, above what Scripture warrants, *that no one of you be puffed up for one*, make your boaſt of one, *againſt another*, 1 Cor. iv. 6.

§ 9. It may be ſaid, Does not this explanation repreſent the two words *ſchiſm* and *hereſy* as ſynonymous? That there is a great affinity in their ſignifications is manifeſt, but they are not convertible terms. I do not find that the word σχισμα is ever applied

applied in holy writ to a formed party, to which the word αἱρεσις is commonly applied. I underſtand them in the epiſtles of this apoſtle, as expreſſive of different degrees of the ſame evil. An undue attachment to one part, and a conſequent alienation of affection from another part of the Chriſtian community, comes under the denomination of σχισμα. When this diſpoſition has proceeded ſo far as to produce an actual party or faction among them, this effect is termed αἱρεσις. And it has been remarked, that even this term was at that time currently applied, when matters had not come to an open rupture and ſeparation, in point of communion. There was no appearance of this, at the time referred to, among the Corinthians. And even in Judaiſm, the Phariſees and the Sadducees, the two principal ſects, nay, the only ſects mentioned in the Goſpel, and (which is ſtill more extraordinary) more widely different in their religious ſentiments than any two Chriſtian ſects, ſtill joined together, as was but juſt now obſerved, in all the offices of religious ſervice, and had neither different prieſts and miniſters, nor ſeparate places for ſocial worſhip, the reading of the law, or the obſervance of the ordinances.

§ 10. It will perhaps be ſaid, that in the uſe at leaſt which the apoſtle Peter has made of this word, it muſt be underſtood to include ſome groſs errors ſubverſive of the very foundations of the faith. The words in the common verſion are, "But there were "falſe prophets alſo among the people, even as there ſhall be "falſe teachers among you, who privily ſhall bring in damnable "hereſies, even denying the Lord that bought them, and bring "upon themſelves ſwift deſtruction," 2 Pet. ii. 1. That the apoſtle in this paſſage foretells that there will ariſe ſuch αἱρεσεις, ſects or factions, as will be artfully and ſurreptitiouſly formed by teachers, who will entertain ſuch pernicious doctrines, is moſt certain; but there is not the leaſt appearance that this laſt character was meant to be implied in the word αἱρεσεις. So far from it, that this character is ſubjoined as additional information concerning, not the people ſeduced, or the party, but the ſeducing teachers; for it is of them only, (though one would judge differently from our verſion), that what is contained in the latter part of the verſe is affirmed. The words in the original are, Εν ὑμιν εσονται ψευδοδιδασκαλοι, οἱτινες παρεισαξουσιν αἱρεσεις απωλειας, και τον αγορασαντα αυτους δεσποτην αρνουμενοι, επαγοντες ἑαυτοις ταχινην απωλειαν. Obſerve it is αρνουμενοι and επαγοντες, in the maſculine gender and nominative caſe, agreeing with ψευδοδιδασκαλοι, not αρνουμενας and επαγουσας in the feminine gender, and accuſative caſe, agreeing with αἱρεσεις. Again, if the word αἱρεσεις did not imply the effect produced, ſects or factions, but the opinions taught, whether true or falſe, which are often, not always, the ſecret ſpring of diviſion, he would probably have expreſſed himſelf in this manner, ψευδοδιδασκαλοι

ψευδοδιδασκαλοι οιτινες διδαξουσι αιρεσεις απωλειας, who will teach damnable, or rather deſtructive hereſies; for doctrine of every kind, ſound and unſound, true and falſe, is properly ſaid to be taught; but neither here, nor any where elſe in Scripture, I may ſafely add, nor in any of the writings of the two firſt centuries, do we ever find the word αιρεσις conſtrued with διδασκω, κηρυσσω, or any word of like import, or an opinion, true or falſe, denominated αιρεσις. There are therefore two diſtinct and ſeparate evils in thoſe falſe teachers of which the apoſtle here gives warning. One is, their making diviſion, by forming to themſelves ſects or parties of adherents; the other is, the deſtructive principles they will entertain, and, doubtleſs, as they find occaſion, diſſeminate among their votaries.

§ 11. The only other paſſage in which the word αιρεσις occurs in the New Teſtament, is where Paul numbers αιρεσεις, *ſects* among the works of the fleſh, Gal. v. 20. and very properly ſubjoins them to διχοστασιαι, *factions*, as the word ought to be rendered, according to the ſenſe in which the apoſtle always uſes it. Such diſtinctions and diviſions among themſelves, he well knew, could not fail to alienate affection and infuſe animoſity. Hence we may learn to underſtand the admonition of the apoſtle, *A man that is a heretic*, αιρετικον ανθρωπον, *after the firſt and ſecond admonition reject, knowing that he that is ſuch, is ſubverted and ſinneth, being condemned of himſelf*, Tit. iii. 10, 11. It is plain, from the character here given, as well as from the genius of the language, that the word αιρετικος in this place does not mean a member of an αιρεσις or ſect, who may be unconſcious of any fault, and ſo is not equivalent to our word *ſectary*; much leſs does it anſwer to the Engliſh word *heretic*, which always implies one who entertains opinions in religion, not only erroneous, but pernicious; whereas, we have ſhewn that the word αιρεσις, in Scriptural uſe, has no neceſſary connection with opinion at all. Its immediate connection is with diviſion or diſſenſion, as it is thereby that ſects and parties are formed. Αιρετικος ανθρωπος muſt therefore mean one who is the founder of a ſect, or at leaſt has the diſpoſition to create αιρεσεις, or ſects, in the community, and may properly be rendered *a factious man*. This verſion perfectly coincides with the ſcope of the place, and ſuits the uniform import of the term αιρεσις, from which it is derived. The admonition here given to Titus is the ſame, though differently expreſſed, with what he had given to the Romans, when he ſaid, *Mark them which cauſe diviſions*, διχοστασιας ποιουντας, make parties or factions, *and avoid them*, Rom. xvi. 17. As far down indeed as the fifth century, and even lower, error alone, however groſs, was not conſidered, as ſufficient to warrant the charge of hereſy. Malignity, or perverſeneſs of diſpoſition was held eſſential to this crime. Hence the famous adage of Auguſtine, "Errare poſſum,

ſum, hæreticus eſſe nolo;" which plainly implies that no error in judgment, on any article, of what importance ſoever, can make a man a heretic, where there is not pravity of will. To this ſentiment, even the ſchoolmen have ſhewn regard in their definitions. "Hereſy," ſay they, "is an opinion maintained with obſtinacy againſt the doctrine of the church." But if we examine a little their reaſoning on the ſubject, we ſhall quickly find the qualifying phraſe *maintained with obſtinacy*, to be mere words which add nothing to the ſenſe; for if what they account the church have declared againſt the opinion, a man's obſtinacy is concluded from barely maintaining the opinion, in what way ſoever he maintain it, or from what motives ſoever he be actuated. Thus mere miſtake is made at length to incur the reproach originally levelled againſt an inſpiring factious temper, which would ſacrifice the deareſt intereſts of ſociety to its own ambition.

§ 12. I cannot omit taking notice here, by the way, that the late Dr Foſter, an eminent Engliſh diſſenting miniſter, in a ſermon he preached on this ſubject, has, in my opinion, quite miſtaken the import of the term. He had the diſcernment to diſcover that the characters annexed would not ſuit the common acceptation of the word *heretic*; yet he was ſo far miſled by that acceptation, as to think that error in doctrine muſt be included as part of the deſcription, and therefore defined a *heretic* in the Apoſtle's ſenſe, "a perſon who, to make himſelf conſiderable, "propagates falſe and pernicious doctrine, knowing it to be "ſuch." Agreeably to this notion, the anonymous Engliſh tranſlator renders with his uſual freedom ἁμαρτανει ων αυτοκατακριτος, *knows in his own conſcience that his tenets are falſe*. To Foſter's explanation there are inſuperable objections. Firſt, it is not agreeable to the rules of criticiſm, to aſſign, without any evidence from uſe, a meaning to a concrete term which does not ſuit the ſenſe of the abſtract. Αιρεσις is the abſtract, αιρετικος the concrete. If αιρεσις could be ſhown, in any inſtance, to mean the profeſſion and propagation of opinions not believed by him who profeſſes and propagates them, I ſhould admit that αιρετικος might denote the profeſſor or propagator of ſuch opinions. But it is not pretended that αιρεσις, in any uſe, ſcriptural, claſſical, or eccleſiaſtical, ever bore that meaning: there is therefore a very ſtrong probability againſt the ſenſe given by that author to the word αιρετικος. Secondly, this word, though it occurs but once in Scripture, is very common in ancient Chriſtian writers, but has never been ſaid, in any one of them, to bear the meaning which the Doctor has here fixed upon it. Thirdly, the apoſtolical precept in this way explained is of little or no uſe. Who can know whether a man's belief in the opinions profeſſed by him, be ſincere or hypocritical? Titus, you may ſay, had the gift of diſcerning ſpirits, and therefore might know. Was the precept, after his life-time, to

to be of no ſervice in the church? This I think incredible, eſpecially as there is no other direction in the chapter, or even in the Epiſtle, which requires a ſupernatural gift to enable men to follow To what purpoſe enjoin us to avoid a heretic, if it be impoſſible without a miracle to know him? In fine, though I would not ſay that ſuch a ſpecies of hypocriſy as Foſter makes eſſential to the character, has never appeared, I am perſuaded, it very rarely appears. It is the natural tendency of vanity and ambition to make a man exert himſelf in gaining proſelytes to his own notions, however trifling, and however raſhly taken up. But it is not a natural effect of this paſſion to be zealous in promoting opinions which the promoter does not believe, and to the propagation of which he has no previous inducement from intereſt. It is ſufficient to vindicate the application of the term αυτοκατακριτος, or *ſelf-condemned*, that a factious or turbulent temper, like any other vicious diſpoſition, can never be attended with peace of mind, but, in ſpite of all the influence of ſelf-deceit, which is not greater in regard to this than in regard to other vices, muſt, for the mortal wounds it gives to peace and love, often be diſquieted by the ſtings of conſcience. In ſhort, the αιρετικος, when that term is applied to a perſon profeſſing Chriſtianity, is the man who, either from pride, or from motives of ambition or intereſt, is led to violate theſe important precepts of our Lord, Υμεις δε μη κληθητε ραββι· εις γαρ εστιν υμων ο διδασκαλος, ο Χριστος. μηδε κληθητε καθηγηται· εις γαρ υμων εστιν ο καθηγητης, ο Χριστος: which I render thus: *But as for you, aſſume not the title of Rabbi; for ye have only one teacher, the Meſſiah: neither aſſume the title of leaders, for ye have only one leader, the Meſſiah,* Matt. xxiii. 8. 10.

§ 13. It deſerves further to be remarked, that, in the early ages of the church, after the finiſhing of the canon, the word αιρετικος was not always limited (as the word *heretic* is in modern uſe) to thoſe who, under ſome form or other, profeſs Chriſtianity. We at preſent invariably diſtinguiſh the *heretic* from the *infidel*, The firſt is a corrupter of the Chriſtian doctrine, of which he profeſſes to be a believer and a friend; the ſecond a declared unbeliever of that doctrine, and conſequently an enemy: whereas, in the times I ſpeak of, the head of a faction in religion, or in ethics (for the term ſeems not to have been applied at firſt to the inferior members), the founder, or at leaſt a principal promoter of a ſect or party, whether within or without the church; that is, whether of thoſe who called themſelves the diſciples of Chriſt, or of thoſe who openly denied him, was indiſcriminately termed αιρετικος.

The not attending to this difference in the ancient application of the word, has given riſe to ſome blunders and apparent contradictions in eccleſiaſtic hiſtory; in conſequence of which, the early

early writers have been unjuſtly charged with confuſion and inconſiſtency in their account of things; when, in fact, the blunders imputed to them by more modern authors, have ariſen ſolely from an ignorance of their language. We confine their words by an uſage of our own, which did not obtain in their time, though it came gradually to obtain ſome ages afterwards. Hence Doſitheus, Simon Magus, Menander, and ſome others, are commonly ranked among the ancient heretics; though nothing can be more evident, from the accounts given by the moſt early writers, who ſo denominate them, than that they were deniers of Jeſus Chriſt in every ſenſe, and avowed oppoſers of the goſpel. Doſitheus gave himſelf out * to his countrymen, the Samaritans, for the Meſſiah promiſed by Moſes. Simon Magus, as we learn from holy writ †, was baptiſed; but that, after the rebuke which he received from Peter, inſtead of repenting, he apoſtatized, the uniform voice of antiquity puts beyond a queſtion. Origen ſays expreſsly ‡, "The Simonians by no means acknowledge Jeſus to "be the Son of God; on the contrary, they call Simon the power "of God." Accordingly, they were never confounded with the Chriſtians in the time of perſecution, or involved with them in any trouble or danger ||. Juſtin Martyr is another evidence of the ſame thing §; as is alſo Irenæus, in the account which, in his treatiſe againſt hereſies, he gives ¶ of Simon and his diſciple Menander. So is likewiſe Epiphanius. From them all it appears manifeſtly, that the above named perſons were ſo far from being, in any ſenſe, followers of Jeſus Chriſt, that they preſumed to arrogate to themſelves his diſtinguiſhing titles and prerogatives, and might therefore be more juſtly called Antichriſts than Chriſtians. The like may be ſaid of ſome other ancient ſects which, through the ſame miſtake of the import of the word, are commonly ranked among the hereſies which aroſe in the church. Such were the *Ophites*, of whom Origen acquaints us, that they were ſo far from being Chriſtians, that our Lord was reviled by them as much as by Celſus, and that they never admitted any one into their ſociety, till he had vented curſes againſt Jeſus Chriſt *.

Moſheim, ſenſible of the impropriety of claſſing the declared enemies of Chriſt among the *heretics*, as the word is now univerſally applied, and, at the ſame time, afraid of appearing to contradict

* Orig. adv. Celſ. lib. I. † Acts viii. 13.

‡ Ουδαμως τον Ιησȣν ὁμολογȣσι ὑιον Θεȣ Σιμωνιανοι, αλλα δυναμιν Θεȣ λεγȣσι τον Σιμωνα. Orig. adv. Celſ. lib. V.

|| Orig. adv. Celſ. lib VI. § Apol. 2da. Dialog. cum Tryphone.

¶ Adv. Hæreſes, lib. I. cap. xx. xxi.

* Οφιανοι καλȣμενοι τοσȣτον αποδεȣσι τȣ ειναι Χριςιανοι, ὡςε ȣκ ελαττον Κελσȣ κατηγορειν αυτȣς τȣ Ιησȣ. Και μη προτερον προσιεσθαι τινα επι το συνεδριον ἑαυτων, εαν μη αρασθηται κατα τȣ Ιησȣ. Adver. Celſ. lib. VI.

tradict the unanimous teſtimony of the three firſt centuries, acknowledges that they cannot be ſuitably ranked with thoſe ſectaries who ſprang up within the church, and apologizes, merely from the example of ſome moderns who thought as he did, for his not conſidering thoſe ancient party-leaders in the ſame light wherein the early eccleſiaſtic authors, as he imagines, had conſidered them. But he has not ſaid any thing to account for ſo glaring an inaccuracy, not of one or two, but of all the primitive writers who have taken notice of thoſe ſects. For even thoſe who deny that they were Chriſtians, call them *hæretics**. Now, I will take upon me to ſay, that though this, in one ſingle writer, might be the effect of overſight, it is morally impoſſible that, in ſo many, it ſhould be accounted for otherwiſe than by ſuppoſing that their ſenſe of the word αἱρετικος did not coincide with ours; and that it was therefore no blunder in them, that they did not employ their words according to an uſage which came to be eſtabliſhed long after their time. I am indeed ſurpriſed, that a man of Moſheim's critical ſagacity, as well as profound knowledge of Chriſtian antiquity, did not perceive that this was the only reaſonable ſolution of the matter. But what might ſometimes be thought the moſt obvious truth, is not always the firſt taken notice of. Now, I cannot help conſidering the eaſy manner in which this account removes the difficulty, as no ſmall evidence of the explanation of the word in ſcriptural uſe, which

* "Quotquot tribus prioribus ſæculis SIMONIS Magi meminerunt, etſi hæreticorum eum familiam ducere jubent. per ea tamen quæ de eo referunt, hæreticorum ordine excludunt, et inter Chriſtianæ religionis hoſtes collocant. ORIGENES Simonianos diſertiſſime ex Chriſtianis lectis exturbat, eoſque non Ieſum Chriſtum, ſed Simonem colere narrat. Cum hoc cæteri omnes, alii claris verbis, alii ſententiis, quas SIMONI tribuunt, conſentiunt: quæ quidem ſententiæ ejus ſunt generis, ut nulli conveniant quam homini CHRISTO longiſſime ſe præferenti, et divini legati dignitatem ſibimet ipſi arroganti. Hinc *Simoniani* etiam, quod ORIGENES et JUSTINUS MARTYR præter alios teſtantur, quum Chriſtiani quotidianis periculis expoſiti eſſent, nullis moleſtiis et injuriis afficiebantur: CHRISTUM enim eos deteſtari, publice notum erat. Sic ego primus, niſi fallor, quum ante viginti annos de Simone ſentirem, erant, quibus periculoſum et nefas videbatur, tot ſanctorum virorum, qui SIMONEM hæreticorum omnium patrem fecerunt, fidem in diſceptationem vocare, tot ſæculorum auctoritatem contemnere. Verum ſenſim plures hæc ſententia patronos, per ipſam evidentiam ſuam ſibi acquiſivit. Et non ita pridem tantum potuit apud Jos. AUGUSTINUM ORSI, quem ſummo cum applauſu ipſius Pontificis Maximi Romæ *Hiſtoriam Eccleſiaſticam* Italico ſermone ſcribere notum eſt, ut eam approbaret." *Moſhemius de Rebus Chriſtianis ante Conſtantinum Magnum Commentarii* Sæculum Primum, § lxv. No. 3. The words in the text, to which the preceding note refers, are "Toti hæreticorum agmini, maxime cohorti gnoſticæ, omnes veteris eccleſiæ doctores præponunt SIMONEM MAGUM — Omnia quæ de SIMONE memoriæ ipſi prodiderunt, manifeſtum faciunt, eum non in corruptorum religionis Chriſtianæ, id eſt, hæreticorum, ſed inſenſiſſimorum ejus hoſtium numero ponendum eſſe, qui et ipſum CHRISTUM maledictis inſectabatur, et progredienti rei Chriſtianæ quæ poterat, impedimenta objiciebat."

has been given above. To obſerve the gradual alterations which ariſe in the meanings of words, as it is a point of ſome nicety, is alſo of great conſequence in criticiſm; and often proves a powerful means both of fixing the date of genuine writings, and of detecting the ſuppoſititious.

§ 14. I ſhall obſerve, in paſſing, that the want of due attention to this circumſtance in another inſtance, has greatly contributed to ſeveral errors in relation to Chriſtian antiquities, and, particularly, to the multiplication of the primitive martyrs, far beyond the limits of probability. The Greek word μαρτυς, though ſignifying no more originally, than *witneſs*, in which ſenſe it is always uſed in the New Teſtament, came, by degrees, in eccleſiaſtical uſe, to be conſiderably reſtrained in its ſignification. The phraſe ὁ μαρτυρις τȣ Ιησȣ, *the witneſſes of Jeſus*, was, at firſt, in the church, applied, by way of eminence, only to the Apoſtles. The reality of this application, as well as the grounds of it, we learn from the Acts *. Afterwards, it was extended to all thoſe who, for their public teſtimony to the truth of Chriſtianity, eſpecially when emitted before magiſtrates and judges, were ſufferers in the cauſe, whether by death or by baniſhment, or in any other way. Laſtly, the name *martyr* (for then the word was adopted into other languages) became appropriated to thoſe who ſuffered death in conſequence of their teſtimony: the term ὁμολογητης, *confeſſor*, being, for diſtinction's ſake, aſſigned to thoſe witneſſes who, though they ſuffered in their perſons, liberty, or goods, did not loſe their lives in the cauſe. Now, ſeveral later writers, in interpreting the ancients, have been miſled by the uſage of their own time; and have underſtood them as ſpeaking of thoſe who died for the name of Jeſus, when they ſpoke only of thoſe who openly atteſted his miracles and miſſion, agreeably to the primitive and ſimple meaning of the word μαρτυς. Of this Moſheim has juſtly taken notice in the work above quoted. I have here only obſerved it, by the way, for the ſake of illuſtration; for, as to the ſenſe wherein the word is uſed in the New Teſtament, no doubt ſeems ever to have ariſen †.

§ 15.

* Acts i. 8. 22. ii. 32. iii. 15. v 32. x. 39. xxii. 15. xxvi. 16. The laſt two paſſages quoted relate to Paul, who, by being deſigned of God *a witneſs of the Lord Jeſus to all men*, was underſtood to be received into the apoſtleſhip, and into the ſociety of the twelve.

* "Ipſa vocabuli *martyr* ambiguitas apud homines imperitos voluntatem gignere potuit fabulas de tragico eorum [apoſtulorum] exitu cogitandi. *Martyr* Græcorum ſermone quemlibet *teſtem* ſignificat. Sacro vero Chriſtianorum ſermone idem nomen eminentiore ſenſu *teſtem* CHRISTI ſive hominem deſignat, qui moriendo teſtari voluit, ſpem omnem ſuam in CHRISTO poſitam eſſe. Priori ſenſu apoſtoli ab ipſo CHRISTO μαρτυρις nominantur, et ipſi eodem vocabulo muneris ſui naturam explicant. Fieri vero facile potuit, ut indocti homines ad hæc ſacri codicis dicta poſteriorem vocabuli *Martyr* ſignificationem transferrent, et temere ſibi propterea perſuaderent,

§ 15. I ſhall conclude, with adding to the obſervations on the words *ſchiſm* and *hereſy*, that how much ſoever of a ſchiſmatical or heretical ſpirit, in the apoſtolic ſenſe of the terms, may have contributed to the formation of the different ſects into which the Chriſtian world is at preſent divided; no perſon who, in the ſpirit of candour and charity, adheres to that which, to the beſt of his judgment, is right, though in this opinion he ſhould be miſtaken, is, in the ſcriptural ſenſe, either ſchiſmatic or heretic, and that he, on the contrary, whatever ſect he belong to, is more entitled to theſe odious appellations, who is moſt apt to throw the imputation upon others. Both terms, for they denote only different degrees of the ſame bad quality, always indicate a diſpoſition and practice unfriendly to peace, harmony, and love.

DIS-

perſuaderent, Apoſtolos inter eos poni debere, quos excellentiori ſenſu Chriſtiani *Martyres* appellare ſolebant." Sæc. prim. § 16. No. Our hiſtorian is here, from the ambiguity of the word, accounting only for the alleged martyrdom of all the Apoſtles except John. But every body who reflects will be ſenſible, that the ſame miſtake muſt have contributed to the increaſe of the number in other inſtances. For even in Apoſtolical times, others than the Apoſtles, though more rarely, were called *witneſſes*. Stephen and Antipas are ſo denominated in ſacred writ. And as both theſe were put to death for their teſtimony, this has probably given riſe in after-times to the appropriation of the name *witneſs* or *martyr*, to thoſe who ſuffered death in the cauſe.

DISSERTATION THE TENTH.

THE CHIEF THINGS TO BE ATTENDED TO IN TRANSLATING.—A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE OPPOSITE METHODS TAKEN BY TRANSLATORS OF HOLY WRIT.

PART I.

The things to be attended to in tranſlating.

To tranſlate has been thought, by ſome, a very eaſy matter to one who underſtands tolerably the language from which, and has made ſome proficiency in the language into which, the tranſlation is to be made. To tranſlate well is, however, in my opinion, a taſk of more difficulty than is commonly imagined. That we may be the better able to judge in this queſtion, let us conſider what a tranſlator, who would do juſtice to his author, and his ſubject, has to perform. The firſt thing, without doubt, which claims his attention, is to give a juſt repreſentation of the ſenſe of the original. This, it muſt be acknowledged, is the moſt eſſential of all. The ſecond thing is, to convey into his verſion, as much as poſſible, in a conſiſtency with the genius of the language which he writes, the author's ſpirit and manner, and, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, the very character of his ſtyle. The third and laſt thing is, to take care, that the verſion have, at leaſt, ſo far the quality of an original performance, as to appear natural and eaſy, ſuch as ſhall give no handle to the critic to charge the tranſlator with applying words improperly, or in a meaning not warranted by uſe, or combining them in a way which renders the ſenſe obſcure, and the conſtruction ungrammatical, or even harſh.

§ 2. Now, to adjuſt matters ſo as, in a conſiderable degree, to attain all theſe objects, will be found, upon inquiry, not a little arduous, even to men who are well acquainted with the two languages, and have great command of words. In purſuit of one of the ends above mentioned, we are often in danger of loſing ſight totally of another: nay, on ſome occaſions, it will appear impoſſible to attain one, without ſacrificing both the others. It may

may happen, that I cannot do juſtice to the ſenſe, without frequent recourſe to circumlocutions; for the words of no language whatever will, at all times, exactly correſpond with thoſe of another. Yet, by this method, a writer whoſe manner is conciſe, ſimple, and energetic, is exhibited, in the tranſlation, as employing a ſtyle which is at once diffuſe, complex, and languid. Again, in endeavouring to exhibit the author's manner, and to confine myſelf, as nearly as poſſible, to the ſame number of words, and the like turn of expreſſion, I may very imperfectly render his ſenſe, relating obſcurely, ambiguouſly, and even improperly, what is expreſſed with great propriety and perſpicuity in the original. And, in regard to the third object mentioned, it is evident, that when the two languages differ very much in their genius and ſtructure, it muſt be exceedingly difficult for a tranſlator to render this end perfectly compatible with the other two. It will perhaps be ſaid, that this is of leſs importance, as it ſeems ſolely to regard the quality of the work, as a performance in the tranſlator's language, whereas the other two regard the work only as an exhibition of the original. I admit that this is an object inferior to the other two; I meant it ſhould be underſtood ſo, by mentioning it laſt. Yet even this is by no means ſo unimportant as ſome would imagine. That a writing be perſpicuous in any language, much depends on the obſervance of propriety; and the beauty of the work (at leaſt as far as purity is concerned) contributes not a little to its utility. What is well written, or well ſaid, is always more attended to, better underſtood, and longer remembered, than what is improperly, weakly, or awkwardly expreſſed.

§ 3. Now, if tranſlation is in general attended with ſo much difficulty, what muſt we think of the chance of ſucceſs which a tranſlator has, when the ſubject is of ſo great importance, that an uncommon degree of attention to all the above mentioned objects, will be exacted of him; and when the difference, in point of idiom, of the language from which, and of that into which the verſion is made, is as great, perhaps, as we have any example of. For, in tranſlating the New Teſtament into Engliſh, it is not to the Greek idiom, nor to the Oriental, that we are required to adapt our own, but to a certain combination of both; often rather to the Hebrew and Chaldaic idioms, involved in Greek words and ſyntax. The analogy and prevailing uſage in Greek, will, if we be not on our guard, ſometimes miſlead us. On the contrary, theſe are ſometimes ſafe and proper guides. But, without a conſiderable acquaintance with both, it will be impoſſible to determine when we ought to be directed by the one, and when by the other.

§ 4. There are two extremes in tranſlating, which are commonly taken notice of by thoſe who examine this ſubject critically:

cally; from one extreme, we derive what is called a close and literal, from the other, a loose and free translation. Each has its advocates. But though the latter kind is most patronized, when the subject is a performance merely human, the general sentiments, as far as I am able to collect them, seem rather to favour the former, when the subject is any part of holy writ. And this difference appears to proceed from a very laudable principle, that we are not entitled to use so much freedom with the dictates of inspiration, as with the works of a fellow-creature. It often happens however, on such general topics, when no paticular version is referred to as an example of excess on one side or on the other, that people agree in words, when their opinions differ, and differ in words when their opinions agree. For, I may consider a translation as close, which another would denominate free, or as free, which another would denominate close. Indeed, I imagine that, in the best sense of the words, a good translation ought to have both these qualities. To avoid all ambiguity, therefore, we shall call one extreme *literal*, as manifesting a greater attention to the letter than to the meaning; the other *loose*, as implying under it, not liberty, but licentiousness. In regard even to literal translations, there may be so many differences in degree, that, without specifying, it is in vain to argue, or to hope to lay down any principles that will prove entirely satisfactory.

PART II.

Strictures on Arias Montanus.

AMONG the Latin translations of Scripture, therefore, for I shall confine myself to these in this Dissertation, let us select *Arias Montanus* for an example of the literal. His version of both Testaments is very generally known, and commonly printed along with the original, not in separate columns, but, for the greater benefit of the learner, interlined. This work of Arias, of all that I know, goes the farthest in this way, being precisely on the model of the Jewish translations, not so much of the Septuagint, though the Septuagint certainly exceeds in this respect, as on the model of Aquila, which, from the fragments that still remain of that version, appears to have been servilely literal. Arias therefore is a fit example of what may be expected in this mode of translating.

§ 2. Now, that we may proceed more methodically in our examination, let us inquire how far every one of the three ends in translating, above mentioned, is answered by this version, or can be

be anſwered by a verſion conſtructed on the ſame plan. The firſt and principal end is to give a juſt repreſentation of the ſenſe of the original. But how, it may be aſked, can a tranſlator fail of attaining this end, who never wanders from the path marked out to him; who does not, like others, turn aſide for a moment to pluck flowers by the way, wherewith to garniſh his performance; who is, on the contrary, always found in his author's track; in ſhort, who has it as his ſole object, to give you, in the words of another language, exactly what his author ſays, and in the order and manner wherein he ſays it, and, I had almoſt added (for this too is his aim, though not always attainable) not one word more or leſs than he ſays? However he might fail in reſpect of the other ends mentioned, one would be apt to think he muſt certainly ſucceed in conveying the ſentiments of his author. Yet, upon trial, we find that, in no point whatever does the literal tranſlator fail more remarkably than in this, of exhibiting the ſenſe. Nor will this be found ſo unaccountable upon reflection, as on a ſuperficial view it may appear. Were the words of the one language exactly correſpondent to thoſe of the other, in meaning and extent; were the modes of combining the words in both entirely ſimilar, and the grammatical or cuſtomary arrangement the ſame, and were the idioms and phraſes reſulting thence perfectly equivalent, ſuch a concluſion might reaſonably be deduced; but, when all the material circumſtances are nearly the reverſe, as is certainly the caſe of Hebrew compared with Latin; when the greater part of the words of one are far from correſponding accurately, either in meaning or in extent, to thoſe of the other; when the conſtruction is diſſimilar, and the idioms, reſulting from the like combinations of correſponding words, by no means equivalent, there is the greateſt probability that an interpreter, of this ſtamp, will often exhibit to his readers what has no meaning at all, and ſometimes a meaning very different from, or perhaps oppoſite to, that of his author.

§ 3. I ſhall briefly illuſtrate, from the aforeſaid tranſlation, what I have advanced, and that, firſt, in words, next, in phraſes or idioms. I had occaſion, in a former Diſſertation *, to take notice of a pretty numerous claſs of words which, in no two languages whatever are found perfectly to correſpond, though, in thoſe tongues wherein there is a greater affinity, they come nearer to ſuit each other, than in thoſe tongues wherein the affinity is leſs. In regard to ſuch, I obſerved, that the tranſlator's only poſſible method of rendering them juſtly, is by attending to the ſcope of the author, as diſcovered by the context, and chuſing ſuch a term in the language which he writes, as ſuits beſt the original term, in the particular ſituation in which he finds it.

§ 4. But

* Diſſert. II. § 4.

§ 4. But this is far from being the method of the literal tranſlator. The defenders of this manner would, if poſſible, have nothing ſubjected to the judgment of the interpreter, but have every thing determined by general and mechanical rules. Hence, they inſiſt, above all things, on preſerving uniformity, and rendering the ſame word in the original, wherever it occurs, or however it is connected, by the ſame word in the verſion. And as the much greater part of the words, not of one tongue only, but of every tongue, are equivocal, and have more ſignifications than one, they have adopted theſe two rules for determining their choice, among the different meanings of which the term is ſuſceptible. The firſt is, to adopt the meaning, wherever it is diſcoverable, to which etymology points, though in defiance of the meaning ſuggeſted, both by the context and by general uſe. When this rule does not anſwer, as when the derivation is uncertain, the ſecond is, to adopt that which of all the ſenſes of the word appears to the tranſlator the moſt common, and adhere to it inflexibly, in every caſe, whatever abſurdity or nonſenſe it may involve him in. Perhaps, not even the moſt literal interpreters obſerve inviolably theſe rules. But one thing is certain, that in thoſe caſes wherein they aſſume the privilege of diſpenſing with them, this meaſure is, in no reſpect, more neceſſary than in many of the caſes wherein they rigidly obſerve them. I may add another thing as equally certain, that whenever they think proper to ſuperſede thoſe rules, they betray a conſciouſneſs of the inſufficiency of the fundamental principles of their method, as well as of the neceſſity there is that the tranſlator uſe his beſt diſcernment and ſkill for directing him, firſt, in the diſcovery of the meaning of his author, and, ſecondly, in the proper choice of words for expreſſing it in his verſion.

§ 5. I ſhall exemplify the obſervance of the two rules above mentioned, in the verſion I propoſed to conſider. And, firſt, for that of etymology; the paſſage in Geneſis, ch. i. 20. which is properly rendered in the common tranſlation, *Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature:* Arias renders, *Reptificent aquæ reptile.* It is true, that the word which he barbarouſly tranſlates *reptificent* (for there is no ſuch Latin word) is in the Hebrew conjugation called *hiphil*, of a verb which in *kal*, that is, in the ſimple and radical form, ſignifies *repere, to creep.* Analogically, therefore, the verb in *hiphil* ſhould import, *to cauſe to creep.* It had been accordingly rendered by Pagninus, a critic of the ſame ſtamp, but not ſuch an adept as Arias, *repere faciant.* But in Hebrew, as in all other languages, uſe, both in altering and in adding, exerciſes an uncontroulable dominion over all the parts of ſpeech. We have juſt the ſame evidence that the original verb in *hiphil*, commonly ſignifies to produce in abundance, like fiſhes and reptiles, as we have that in *kal*, it ſignifies *to creep.*

creep. Now, paſſing the barbariſm, *reptificent*, the ſenſe which this verſion conveys, if it convey any ſenſe, is totally different from the manifeſt ſenſe of the author. It is the creation or firſt production of things which Moſes is relating. Arias, in this inſtance, as well as Pagnin, ſeems to exhibit things as already produced, and to relate only how they were ſet in motion. What other meaning can we give to words importing, "Let the waters "cauſe the creeping thing to creep?" or if, by a ſimilar barbariſm in Engliſh, we may be allowed to give a more exact repreſentation of the barbarous Latin of Arias, "Let the waters "creepify the creeper?"

Another example of etymological verſion, in defiance of uſe and of common ſenſe, we have in the beginning of the ſong of Moſes, Deut. xxxii. 2. The words rendered in the Engliſh tranſlation, *My doctrine ſhall drop as the rain*, Arias tranſlates, "Stil-"labit ut pluvia aſſumptio mea." The word here rendered *aſſumptio* has, for its etymon, a verb which commonly ſignifies *ſumo, capio.* That ſage interpreter, it ſeems, thought it of more importance to acquaint his reader with this circumſtance, than with the obvious meaning of the word itſelf. And thus a paſſage which, in the original, is neither ambiguous nor obſcure, is rendered in ſuch a manner as would defy Oedipus to unriddle.

§ 6. As to the ſecond rule mentioned, of adopting that which of all the ſignifications of the word, appears to the tranſlator the moſt common, and to adhere to it inflexibly in every caſe, however unſuitable it may be to the context, and however much it may mar the ſenſe of the diſcourſe, there is hardly a page, nay, a paragraph, nay, a line in Arias, which does not furniſh us with an example. Nor does it take place in one only, but in all the parts of ſpeech. Firſt, in nouns, Joſhua v. 4. *Et hoc verbum quo circumcidit.* The Hebrew word rendered *verbum*, anſwers both to *verbum*, and to *res*; but as the more common meaning is *verbum*, it muſt, by this rule, be made always ſo, in ſpite of the connection. In this manner he corrects Pagnin, who had rendered the expreſſion, juſtly and intelligibly, *Hæc eſt cauſa quare circumcidit.* In that expreſſion, Gen. xlix. 22. *Filius fructeſcens Joſeph ſuper fontem*, we have both his rules exemplified, the firſt in the barbarous participle *fructeſcens*, which has a derivation ſimilar to the Hebrew word; the ſecond in the ſubſtantive *filius*, which is no doubt the moſt common ſignification of the Hebrew בן *ben*, and in the prepoſition *ſuper.* In this manner he corrects Pagnin, who had ſaid, not badly, *Ramus creſcens Joſeph juxta fontem.*

§ 7. And to ſhew that he made as little account of the reproach of ſoleciſm as of that of barbariſm, he ſays, as abſurdly as unmeaningly, *Pater fuit ſedentis tentorium*, Gen. iv. 20. giving a

regimen to a neuter verb. Pagnin had ſaid, *inhabitantis*. That this is conformable to the ſignification of the Hebrew word in this paſſage, which the other is not, there can be no queſtion; but it might fairly bear a queſtion, whether *ſedeo* or *inhabito* be the more common meaning of the Hebrew word. The ſame ſtrange rule he follows in the indeclinable parts of ſpeech, the prepoſitions in particular, which being few in Hebrew, and conſequently of more extenſive ſignification, he has choſen always to render the ſame way, thereby darkening the cleareſt paſſages, and expreſſing, in the moſt abſurd manner, the moſt elegant.

As I would avoid being tedious, I ſhall produce but two other examples of this, having given one already from Jacob's benediction to his ſons, though the whole work abounds with examples. The expreſſion uſed by Pagnin, in the account of the creation, *Dividat aquas ab aquis*, Gen. i. 6. he has thus reformed, *Sit dividens inter aquas ad aquas*. The other is in the account of the murder of Abel, Gen. iv. 8. *Surrexit Cain ad Hebel*, where Pagnin had uſed the prepoſition *contra*. As a ſpecimen of the ſervile manner in which he traces the arrangement and conſtruction of the original, to the total ſubverſion of all rule and order in the language which he writes, I ſhall give the following paſſage in the New Teſtament, not ſelected as peculiar, for ſuch are to be found in every page: *De quidem enim miniſterio in ſanctos, ex abundanti mihi eſt ſcribere vobis*, 2 Cor. ix. 1.

§ 8. To proceed now, as I propoſed, to phraſes or combinations of words: I ſhall, firſt, produce ſome examples which convey a mere jargon of words, combined ungrammatically, and therefore to thoſe who do not underſtand the language out of which the tranſlation is made, unintelligibly. Such are the following: *Iſtæ generationes cœli et terræ, in creari ea, in die facere Deus terram et cælum*, Gen. ii. 4.—*Emiſit eum Dominus ad colendam terram quod ſumptus eſt inde*, Gen. iii. 23.—*Major iniquitas mea quam parcere*, Gen. iv. 13. But as, in certain caſes, this manner of copying a foreign idiom, makes downright nonſenſe, in other caſes, the like combinations of correſponding words, in different languages, though not unmeaning, do not convey the ſame meaning, nay, ſometimes convey meanings the very reverſe of one another. Thus, two negatives in Greek and French deny ſtrongly, in Latin and Engliſh they affirm. כל לא *col la*, in Hebrew is *none: non omnis*, in Latin, which is a literal verſion, and *not all*, in Engliſh, denote *ſome*. In like manner, ουκ, conſtrued with ουδεις, in Greek, is ſtill *nobody; non nemo*, in Latin, which is a literal verſion, is *ſomebody*. The words και ου μελει σοι περι ουδενος, Mark xii. 14. rendered properly in the common verſion, *and careſt for no man*, are tranſlated by Arias, *Et non cura eſt tibi de nullo;* the very oppoſite of the author's ſentiment,

timent, which would have been more juſtly rendered, *Et cura eſt tibi de nullo;* or, as it is in the Vulgate, *Non curas quenquam.* In this, however, hardly any of the literal interpreters have judged proper to obſerve a ſtrict uniformity; though I will venture to ſay, it would be impoſſible to aſſign a good reaſon why, in ſome inſtances, they depart from that method, whilſt in others they tenaciouſly adhere to it.

§ 9. It ought, withal, to be obſerved, that ſeveral interpreters who, in tranſlating ſingle words, have not confined themſelves to the abſurd method above mentioned, could not be perſuaded to take the ſame liberty with idioms and phraſes. Thus Arias has but copied the Vulgate in tranſlating, Ὅτι οὐκ ἀδυνατήσει παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ πᾶν ῥῆμα, Luke i. 37. *Quia non erit impoſſibile apud Deum omne verbum.* In this ſhort ſentence there are no fewer than three improprieties, one ariſing from the miſ-tranſlation of a noun, and the other two from miſ-tranſlated idioms. Ῥῆμα, in Helleniſtic uſage, is equivalent to the Hebrew דבר *daber*, which, as has been obſerved, ſignifies not only *verbum*, a word, but *res*, or *negotium*, a thing; which laſt is the manifeſt ſenſe of it in the paſſage quoted; the ſecond is the rendering of οὐ πᾶν, *non omne*, and not, as it ought to have been, *nullum;* the third ariſes from uſing the future in Latin, in the enunciation of an univerſal truth. It ought to have been remembered, that the Hebrew has no preſent tenſe, and is conſequently obliged often to uſe the other tenſes, and eſpecially the future, in enunciating general truths, for which, in all modern languages, as well as in Greek and Latin, we employ the preſent. In conſequence of theſe blunders, the verſion, as it lies, is perfectly unmeaning; whereas, no perſon, that is even but a ſmatterer in Hebrew, will heſitate to declare, that the ſenſe is completely expreſſed in Engliſh in theſe words, *For nothing is impoſſible with God.*

§ 10. There are few of the old verſions which have kept entirely clear of this fault. In the ancient Latin tranſlation called the Italic, whereof we have not now a complete copy remaining, there were many more barbariſms than in the preſent Vulgate. And even Jerom himſelf acquaints us that, when he ſet about making a new verſion, he left ſeveral things which he knew to be not properly expreſſed, for fear of giving offence to the weak, by his numerous and bold alterations. This idiom of *non omne*, for *nihil* or *nullum*, ſeems to have been one which, in many places, though not in all, he has corrected. Thus, what in the old Italic, after the Septuagint, was *Non eſt omne recens ſub ſole*, Eccleſ. i. 9. he has rendered perſpicuouſly and properly, *Nihil ſub ſole novum.* A ſlaviſh attachment to the letter, in tranſlating, without any regard to the meaning, is originally the offſpring of the ſuperſtition, not of the church, but of the ſynagogue, where it would have been more ſuitable in Chriſtian interpreters, the miniſters,

miniſters, not of the letter, but of the ſpirit, to have allowed it to remain.

§ 11. That this is not the way to anſwer the firſt and principal end of tranſlating, has, I think, been ſufficiently demonſtrated. Inſtead of the ſenſe of the original, it ſometimes gives us downright nonſenſe; frequently a meaning quite different, and not ſeldom it makes the author ſay in another language, the reverſe of what he ſaid in his own. Can it then be doubted, that this is not the way to attain the ſecond end in tranſlating? Is this a method whereby a tranſlator can convey into his verſion, as much as poſſible, in a conſiſtency with the genius of a different language, the author's ſpirit and manner, and (ſo to ſpeak) the very character of his ſtyle? It is evident, that the firſt end may be attained where this is not attained. An author's meaning may be given, but in a different manner; a conciſe writer may be made to expreſs himſelf diffuſely, or a diffuſe writer conciſely; the ſenſe of an elegant work may be juſtly given, though in a homely dreſs. But it does not hold converſely, that the ſecond end may be attained without the firſt; for when an author's ſenſe is not given, he is not fairly repreſented. Can we do juſtice to his manner, if, when he reaſons conſequentially, he be exhibited as talking incoherently; if what he writes perſpicuouſly, be rendered ambiguouſly or obſcurely; if what flows from his pen naturally and eaſily, in the true idiom and conſtruction of his language, be rendered ruggedly and unnaturally, by the violence perpetually done to the conſtruction of the language, into which it is tranſmuted, rather than tranſlated? The manner of a tall man, who walks with dignity, would be wretchedly repreſented by a dwarf who had no other mode of imitation, but to number and trace his footſteps. The immoderate ſtrides and diſtortions which this ridiculous attempt would oblige the imitator to employ, could never convey to the ſpectators an idea of eaſy and graceful motion.

§ 12. The third end of tranſlating, that of preſerving purity and perſpicuity in the language into which the verſion is made, is not ſo much as aimed at, by any of the literal tribe. Upon the whole, I cannot expreſs my ſentiments more juſtly both of Arias and of Pagnin, than in the words of Houbigant, who *, in aſſigning his reaſons for not adopting the verſion of either, ſays, "Non facerem meam illam verſionem Ariæ Montani horridam, "inficetam, obſcuram, talem denique qualem compoſuiſſet, ſi quis "homines deterrere ab ſacris codicibus legendis voluiſſet. Non "illam Pagnini, quam Arias, jam malam, fecit imitando ac inter-"polando pejorem." In this laſt remark, which may in part be juſtified by ſome of the foregoing examples, he perfectly agrees with father Simon, who ſays of Arias' amendments on Pagnin's

* Proleg. p. 178.

Pagnin's tranſlation, *Quot correctiones, tot corruptiones.* For there is hardly any thing altered that is not for the worſe. Such Latin verſions would be quite unintelligible, if it were not for the knowledge we have of the original, and of the common Engliſh verſion, which is as literal as any verſion ought to be, and ſometimes more ſo. The coincidence of two or three words recals the whole paſſage to our memory; but we may venture to pronounce that, to an ancient Roman, who knew nothing of the learning or opinions of the Eaſt, the whole of Arias' Bible would appear no better than a jumble of words without meaning.

§ 13. To all the other evil conſequences reſulting from ſuch verſions, we ought to add that they neceſſarily lead the unlearned reader into an opinion that the original, which is ſuſceptible of them, muſt be totally indefinite, equivocal, and obſcure. Few, without making the experiment, can allow themſelves to think that it is equally poſſible by this mode of tranſlation, completely to disfigure and render unintelligible what is written with plainneſs and ſimplicity, and without any ambiguity in their mother tongue. Yet nothing is more certain than that the moſt perſpicuous writing, in any language, may be totally diſguiſed by this treatment *. Were the ancient Greek or Latin claſſics, in proſe or

* As it is impoſſible, without an example, to conceive how monſtrous the transformation is which it occaſions, I ſhall here ſubjoin a ſpecimen of a few Engliſh ſentences tranſlated into Latin, in the taſte and manner of Arias. "Ego inveni aliquod pecus in meo frumento, et poſui illa in meam libram. Ego rogavi unum qui ſtabat per, ſi ille novit cujus illa erant. Sed ille vertit unum viam a me, et fecit non ita multum ut vindicare ſalvum ad redire mihi ullam reſponſionem. Super hoc ego rogavi unum alium qui dixit unam magnam tabulam abiegnam in replicatione quam ego feci non ſubſtare. Quam unquam ego volui non habere poſita illa ſurſum, habui ego notum ad quem illa pertinebant; nam ego didici poſt cuſtodias quod ille fuit unus ego fui multum aſpectus ad." Were theſe few lines put into the hands of a learned foreigner, who does not underſtand Engliſh, he might ſooner learn to read Chineſe, than to divine their meaning. Yet a little attention would bring an Engliſhman, who knows Latin, ſoon to diſcover that they were intended as a verſion, if we may call it ſo, of the following words, which, in the manner of Arias, I give with the verſion interlined.

Ego inveni aliquod pecus in meo frumento, et poſui illa in meam
I found ſome cattle in my corn, and put them into my
libram. Ego rogavi unum qui ſtabat per ſi ille novit cujus illa erant.
pound. I aſked one who ſtood by if he knew whoſe they were.
Sed ille vertit unam viam a me, et fecit non ita multum ut vindicare
But he turned a way from me, and did not ſo much as vouch
ſalvum ad redire mihi ullam reſponſionem. Super hoc ego rogavi unum
ſafe to return me any anſwer. Upon this I aſked ano-
alium qui dixit unam magnam tabulam abiegnam in replicatione quam ego
ther who ſaid a great deal in reply which I
feci non ſubſtare. Quam unquam ego volui non habere poſita illa ſurſum,
did not underſtand. How ever I would not have put them up,
habui

or verſe, to be thus rendered into any modern tongue, nobody could bear to read them. Strange indeed, that a treatment ſhould ever have been accounted reſpectful to the ſacred penmen, which, if given to any other writer, would be univerſally condemned, as no better than dreſſing him in a fool's coat.

I am not at all ſurpriſed that certain great men of the church of Rome, like Cardinal Cajetan, who, (though, with foreign aſſiſtance, he tranſlated the Pſalms) did not underſtand a word of Hebrew, ſhew themſelves great admirers of this method. The more unintelligible the Scriptures are made, the greater is the need of an infallible interpreter, an article of which they never loſe ſight. But that others, who have not the ſame motive, and poſſeſs a degree of underſtanding ſuperior to that of a Jewiſh cabaliſt, ſhould recommend an expedient, which ſerves only for debaſing and diſcrediting the dictates of the divine ſpirit, appears perfectly unaccountable. I ſhall only add, that verſions of this kind are very improperly called tranſlations. The French have a

habui ego notum ad quem illa pertinebant, nam ego didici poſt cuſtodias *had I known to whom they belonged, for I learned afterwards* quod ille fuit unus ego fui multum aſpectus ad.
that he was one I was much beholden to.

Should one object that the Latin words here employed do not ſuit the ſenſe of the correſponding words in the paſſage tranſlated, it is admitted that they do not; but they are ſelected in exact conformity to the fundamental rules followed by Arias. Thus *una via* away, *vindicare ſalvum* vouchſafe, *quam unquam* however, *tabula abiegna* deal, *ſubſtare* underſtand, *poſt cuſtodias* afterwards, *aſpectus* beholden, are all agreeable to the primary rule of etymology, and, in no reſpect, worſe than *reptifico*, where both ſenſe and uſe required *produco*; or *aſſumptio* for *doctrina*, to the utter deſtruction of all meaning, or *non omnis* for *nullus*, which gives a meaning quite different. But by what rule, it may be aſked, is *pound* rendered *libra*, in a caſe wherein it manifeſtly means *ſeptum*? By the ſame rule, it is anſwered, whereby *iaſhab* is rendered *ſedere*, in a caſe wherein both the ſenſe and the conſtruction required *inhabitare*, and *daber* is rendered *verbum* where it manifeſtly means *res*, the golden rule of uniformity, by which every term ought always to be rendered the ſame way, and agreeably to its moſt common ſignification, without minding whether it make ſenſe or nonſenſe ſo rendered. [The literal tranſlator follows implicitly the ſage direction given by Cajetan, "Non ſit vobis curæ, ſi ſenſus non apparet, quia non eſt veſtri officii exponere, ſed interpretari: interpretamini ſicut jacet, et relinquatis expoſitoribus curam intelligendi." Præf. Comment. in Pſalm.] Now it is certain that *pound* occurs oftener in the ſenſe of *libra* than in that of *ſeptum*. But how do you admit ſuch groſs ſoleciſms as *redire reſponſionem*? I anſwer, Is this more ſo than *ſedere tentorium*? or do the prepoſitions as uſed here in *ſtabat per* and *aſpectus ad*, make the conſtruction more monſtrous, than *inter ad* in that ſentence *ſit dividens inter aquas ad aquas*? Beſides, there is not a word in the above ſpecimen, which taken ſeverally is not Latin: ſo much cannot be ſaid for Arias, whoſe work is overrun with barbariſms as well as ſoleciſms. Witneſs his *fructeſcens* and *reptificent*, in the few examples above produced. And in regard to the total incoherence and want of conſtruction, can any thing in this way exceed *in creari ea*, or *in die facere Deus*, or *ad terram quod ſumptus eſt inde*, or *major iniquitas quam parcere*?

a convenient word *traveſty*, by which they denote the metamorphoſis of a ſerious work into mere burleſque by dreſſing it in ſuch language as renders it ridiculous, makes the nobleſt thoughts appear contemptible, the richeſt images beggarly, and the moſt judicious obſervations abſurd. I would not ſay, therefore, the Bible *tranſlated*, but the Bible *traveſtied*, by Arias Montanus. For that can never deſerve the name of a tranſlation, which gives you neither the matter nor the manner of the author, but, on the contrary, often exhibits both as the reverſe of what they are. Malvenda, a Dominican, is another interpreter of the ſame tribe with his brother Pagnin, and with Arias, whom he is ſaid greatly to have exceeded in darkneſs, barbariſm and nonſenſe. I never ſaw his verſion, but have reaſon to believe, from the accounts given of it by good judges, that it can anſwer no valuable purpoſe.

PART III.

Strictures on the Vulgate.

I PROCEED now to conſider a little the merit of ſome other Latin tranſlations of holy writ. The firſt doubtleſs, that deſerves our attention, in reſpect both of antiquity, and I may ſay, of univerſality in the Weſtern churches, is the *Vulgate*. The verſion which is known by this name, at leaſt the greater part of it, is juſtly aſcribed to Jerom, and muſt therefore be dated from the end of the fourth, or the beginning of the fifth century. As its reception in the church was gradual, voluntary, and not in conſequence of the command of a ſuperior, and as, for ſome ages, the old Latin verſion, called the *Italic*, continued, partly from the influence of cuſtom, partly from reſpect to antiquity, to be regarded and uſed by many, there is reaſon to believe that a part of that verſion ſtill remains in the Vulgate, and is, in a manner, blended with it. One thing at leaſt is certain, that in ſeveral places of the Vulgate we find thoſe expreſſions and ways of rendering which that learned father in his works ſtrongly condemned, at the ſame time that, in other parts, we ſee his emendations regularly followed. Beſides, as I hinted before, there were ſeveral corrections, which, though his judgment approved them, he did not think it prudent to adopt, for fear of ſhocking the ſentiments of the people. From this it may naturally be inferred, that the manner and ſtyle of the Vulgate will not be found equal and uniform. And I believe no perſon who has examined it with a critical eye, will deny that this is the caſe.

§ 2.

§ 2. From what remains of the old Italic, it appears to have been much in the taſte of almoſt all the Jewiſh tranſlations, extremely literal, and conſequently, in a great degree, obſcure, ambiguous, and barbarous. To give a Latin tranſlation of the Scriptures, which might at once be more perſpicuous, and more juſt to the original, was the great and laudable deſign of that eminent light of the Weſtern churches above mentioned. The Old Teſtament part of the Italic verſion had been made entirely from the Septuagint (for the Hebrew Scriptures were for ſome ages of no eſtimation in the church); but Jerom, being well ſkilled in Hebrew, undertook to tranſlate from the original. This itſelf has made, in ſome paſſages, a conſiderable difference on the ſenſe. And, as the verſion of the Seventy has generally the mark of a ſervile attachment to the letter, there can be no doubt that there muſt have been conſiderable differences of reading, in the Hebrew manuſcripts extant at the times when the ſeveral parts of that verſion were made, from thoſe in common uſe at preſent. And though I think upon the whole, that the Hebrew Scriptures are much preferable, an acquaintance with the Septuagint is of great importance for ſeveral reaſons, and particularly for this, that it often aſſiſts in ſuggeſting the true reading in caſes where the preſent Hebrew copies are obſcure, or appear to have been vitiated. Jerom judiciouſly recurred to that tranſlation in ſuch caſes, and often borrowed light from it, when it was more perſpicuous than the Hebrew, and when the meaning which it contained ſeemed better adapted to the context. Perhaps he would have done ſtill better to have recurred oftener. For, however learned thoſe Jews were, to whoſe aſſiſtance he owed the acquiſition of the language, they were ſtrongly tinctured with the cabaliſtical prejudices which prevailed, more or leſs, in all the literati of that nation. Hence they were ſometimes led, on very fanciful grounds, to aſſign to words and phraſes, meanings not ſupported by the obvious ſenſe of the context, nor even by the moſt ancient verſions and paraphraſes. In this caſe, there can be no doubt that theſe were more to be confided in than his Jewiſh inſtructors.

§ 3. No intelligent perſon will queſtion the fitneſs of that judicious and learned writer, for the taſk of tranſlating the Bible into his native language. But that we may not be led too far in transferring to the work, the perſonal merit of the author, we ought to remember two things, firſt, that the Vulgate, as we have it at preſent, is not entirely the work of Jerom; and, ſecondly, that even in what Jerom tranſlated, he left many things, as he himſelf acknowledges, which needed correction, but which he did not chuſe to alter, leſt the liberties taken with the old tranſlation ſhould ſcandaliſe the vulgar. It is no wonder, then, that great inequalities ſhould be obſervable in the execution. In many

many places it is excellent. The ſenſe of the original is conveyed juſtly and perſpicuouſly; no affectation in the ſtyle; on the contrary, the greateſt ſimplicity combined with purity. But this cannot be ſaid with truth of every part of that work.

§ 4. In a preceding part of this Diſſertation, (§ 9.) I took notice of one paſſage rendered exactly in the manner of Arias, who found nothing to alter in it, in order to bring it down to his level. Indeed there are many ſuch inſtances. Thus ουκ αν εσωθη πασα σαρξ is rendered, *Non fieret ſalva omnis caro*, Matt. xxiv. 22. In ſome places we find barbariſms and ſoleciſms, to which it would be difficult to diſcover a temptation, the juſt expreſſion being both as literal and as obvious as the improper one that has been preferred to it. Of this ſort, we may call, *Neque nubent, neque nubentur*, Matt. xxii. 30. Mark xii. 25. *Nonne vos magis plures eſtis illis?* Matt. vi. 26. *Non capit prophetam perire extra Jeruſalem*, Luke xiii. 33. and *Filius hominis non venit miniſtrari ſed miniſtrare*, Matt. xx. 28. Yet, as to the laſt example, the ſame words in another Goſpel are rendered without the ſoleciſm, *Filius hominis non venit ut miniſtraretur ei, ſed ut miniſtraret*, Mark x. 45. Very often we meet with inſtances of the ſame original word rendered by the ſame Latin word, when the ſenſe is manifeſtly different, and the idiom of the tongue does not admit it. This abſurdity extends even to conjunctions. The Greek ὁτι anſwers frequently to the Latin *quia, becauſe*, and not ſeldom, to *quod, that*. Here, however, it is almoſt uniformly rendered *quia* or *quoniam*, in defiance of grammar and common ſenſe. Thus, *Tunc confitebor illis quia nunquam novi vos*, Matt. vii. 23. and *Magiſter ſcimus quia verax es*, Matt. xxii. 16. Theſe expreſſions are no better Latin, than theſe which follow are Engliſh: *Then will I confeſs to them, becauſe I never knew you*, and, *Maſter we know becauſe thou art true:* words, which if they ſuggeſt any meaning, it is evidently not the meaning of the author; nor is it a meaning which the original would ever have ſuggeſted to one who underſtands the language.

Nay, ſometimes even the favourite rule of uniformity is violated, but not for the ſake of keeping to the ſenſe, the ſenſe being rather hurt by the violation. Thus λαος anſwering to *populus*, and commonly ſo rendered, is ſometimes improperly tranſlated *plebs*. Εποιησε λυτρωσιν τω λαω αυτου, Luke i. 68. is rendered *Fecit redemptionem plebis ſuæ*. Sometimes the moſt unmeaning barbariſms are adopted merely to repreſent the etymology of the original term. Τον αρτον ημων τον επιουσιον δος ημιν σημερον, is rendered *Panem noſtrum ſuperſubſtantialem da nobis hodie*, Matt. vi. 11. *Panis ſuperſubſtantialis* is juſt as barbarous Latin as *ſuperſubſtantial bread* would be Engliſh, and equally unintelligible. There is an additional evil reſulting from this manner of treating holy writ, that the ſoleciſms, barbariſms, and nonſenſical expreſſions

which it gives rise to, prove a fund of materials to the visionary, out of which his imagination frames a thousand mysteries.

§ 5. I would not, however, be understood by these remarks, as passing a general censure on this version, which, though not to be followed implicitly, may, I am convinced, be of great service to the critic. It ought to weigh with us, that even the latest part of this translation was made about fourteen hundred years ago, and is consequently many centuries prior to all the Latin translations now current, none of which can claim an earlier date than the revival of letters in the West. I do not use this argument from an immoderate regard to antiquity, or from the notion that age can give a sanction to error. But there are two things in this circumstance which ought to recommend the work in question to the attentive examination of the critic. First that, having been made from manuscripts older than most, perhaps than any, now extant, it serves, in some degree, to supply the place of those manuscripts, and furnish us with the probable means of discovering what the readings were, which Jerom found in the copies he so carefully collated. Another reason is, that being finished long before those controversies arose, which are the foundation of the sects now subsisting, we may rest assured that, in regard to these, there will be no bias from party zeal to either side of the question. We cannot say so much for the translations which have been made since the rise of Protestantism, either by Protestants or by Papists. And these are, in my opinion, two not inconsiderable advantages.

§ 6. I take notice of the last the rather, because many Protestants, on account of the declaration of its authenticity, solemnly pronounced by the council of Trent, cannot avoid considering it as a Popish Bible, calculated for supporting the Roman Catholic cause. Now this is an illiberal conclusion, the offspring of ignorance, which I think it of some consequence to refute. It is no further back than the sixteenth century, since that judgment was given in approbation of this version, the first authoritative declaration made in its favour. Yet the estimation in which it was universally held throughout the Western churches, was, to say the least, not inferior before that period to what it is at present. And, we may say with truth, that though no judicious Protestant will think more favourably of this translation, on account of their verdict; neither will he, on this account, think less favourably of it. It was not because this version was peculiarly adapted to the Romish system, that it received the sanction of that synod; but because it was the only Bible with which the far greater part of the members had from their infancy had the least acquaintance. There were but few in that assembly who understood either Greek or Hebrew. They had heard that the Protestants, the new heretics, as they called them, had frequent recourse

recourſe to the original, and were beginning to make verſions from it; a practice of which their own ignorance of the original made them the more jealous. Their fears being thus alarmed, they were exceedingly anxious to interpoſe their authority, by the declaration above mentioned, for preventing new tranſlations being obtruded on the people. They knew what the Vulgate contained; and had been early accuſtomed to explain it in their own way. But they did not know what might be produced from new tranſlations. Therefore, to preoccupy men's minds, and prevent every true ſon of the church from reading other, eſpecially modern, tranſlations, and from paying any regard to what might be urged from the original, the very indefinite ſentence was pronounced in favour of the Vulgate, *vetus et vulgata editio*, that in all diſputes it ſhould be held for authentic, *ut pro authentica habeatur*.

§ 7. Now if, inſtead of this meaſure, that council had ordered a tranſlation to be made by men nominated by them, in oppoſition to thoſe publiſhed by Proteſtants, the caſe would have been very different: for we may juſtly ſay, that amidſt ſuch a ferment as was then excited, there ſhould have appeared, in a verſion ſo prepared, any thing like impartiality, candour, or diſcernment, would have been morally impoſſible. Yet even ſuch a production would have been entitled to a fair examination from the critic, who ought never to diſdain to receive information from an adverſary, and to judge impartially of what he offers. As that, however, was not the caſe, we ought not to conſider the verſion in queſtion as either the better or the worſe for their verdict. It is but doing juſtice to ſay, that it is noway calculated to ſupport Romiſh errors and corruptions. It had been in current uſe in the church, for ages before the much greater part of thoſe errors and corruptions was introduced. No doubt the ſchoolmen had acquired the knack of explaining it in ſuch a way as favoured their own prejudices. But is this any more than what we find the moſt diſcordant ſects acquire with regard to the original, or even to a tranſlation which they uſe in common? For my own part, though it were my ſole purpoſe, in recurring to a verſion, to refute the abſurdities and corruptions of Popery, I ſhould not deſire other or better arguments than thoſe I am ſupplied with by that very verſion, which one of their own councils has declared authentical.

§ 8. I am not ignorant that a few paſſages have been produced, wherein the Vulgate and the original convey different meanings, and wherein the meaning of the Vulgate appears to favour the abuſes eſtabliſhed in that church. Some of theſe, but neither many, nor of great moment, are no doubt corruptions in the text, probably not intentional, but accidental, to which the originals in Hebrew and Greek have been in like manner liable, and from which

which no ancient book extant can be affirmed to be totally exempted. With reſpect to others of them, they will be found, upon a nearer inſpection, as little favourable to Romiſh ſuperſtition, as the common reading in the Hebrew or the Greek. What is juſtly rendered, in our verſion, *I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy ſeed and her ſeed: it ſhall bruiſe thy head, and thou ſhalt bruiſe his heel*, Gen. iii. 15. is in ſuch a manner tranſlated in the Vulgate, as to afford ſome colour for the extraordinary honours paid the virgin mother of our Lord. *Inimicitias ponam inter te et mulierem, et ſemen tuum et ſemen illius. Ipſa conteret caput tuum, et tu inſidiaberis calcaneo ejus.* "She "ſhall bruiſe thy head." In this way it has been underſtood by ſome of their capital painters, who, in their pictures of the Virgin, have repreſented her treading on a ſerpent. It is, however, certain, that their beſt critics admit this to be an error, and recur to ſome ancient manuſcripts of the Vulgate, which read *ipſum*, not *ipſa*.

A ſtill groſſer blunder, which ſeems to give countenance to the worſhip of relics, is in the paſſage thus rendered by our interpreters: *By faith, Jacob when he was a dying, bleſſed both the ſons of Joſeph; and worſhipped, leaning upon the top of his ſtaff*, Heb. xi. 21.: in the Vulgate thus: *Fide Jacob moriens ſingulos filiorum Joſeph benedixit, et adoravit foſtigium virgæ ejus*; "adored the top of his rod;" as the verſion made from the Vulgate by Engliſh Romaniſts, and publiſhed at Rheims, expreſſes it. But the beſt judges among Roman Catholics admit, that the Latin text is not entire in this place, and that there has been an accidental omiſſion of the prepoſition, through the careleſſneſs of tranſcribers. For they have not now a writer of any name who infers, from the declaration of authenticity, either the infallibility of the tranſlator, or the exactneſs of the copiers. Houbigant, a prieſt of the Oratory, has not been reſtrained, by that ſentence, from making a new tranſlation of the Old Teſtament from the Hebrew into Latin, wherein he uſes as much freedom with the Vulgate, in correcting what appeared to him faulty in it, as any reaſonable Proteſtant, in this country, would do with the common Engliſh tranſlation. Nay, which is more extraordinary, in the execution of this work, he had the countenance of the then reigning Pontiff. In his verſion he has corrected the paſſage quoted from Geneſis, and ſaid, "*Illud*" (not *illa*) "con- "teret caput tuum." I make no doubt that he would have corrected the other paſſage alſo, if he had made a verſion of the New Teſtament.

§ 9. I know it has alſo been urged, that there are ſome things in the Vulgate, which favour the ſtyle and doctrine of Rome, particularly in what regards the ſacraments; and that ſuch things are to be found in places where there is no ground to ſuſpect a various

various reading, nor that the text of the Vulgate has undergone any alteration, either intentional or accidental. Could this point be evinced in a satisfactory manner, it would allow more to Popery, on the score of antiquity, than, in my opinion, she is entitled to. It is true, that marriage appears, in one passage, to be called a sacrament. Paul, after recommending the duties of husbands and wives, and enforcing his recommendations by the resemblance which marriage bears to the relation subsisting between Christ and his church, having quoted these words from Moses, *For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall be joined unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh*; adds, as it is expressed in the Vulgate, *Sacramentum hoc magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et in ecclesia*, Eph. v. 32.; as expressed in the English translation, *This is a great mystery; but I speak concerning Christ and the Church*; which is in effect, as I had occasion to observe in the preceding Dissertation, to which I refer the reader *, 'This is capable of an important and figurative interpretation, I mean, as it relates to Christ and the church.' Under the Mosaic economy, the relation wherein God stood to Israel, is often represented under the figure of marriage; and it is common, with the penmen of the New Testament, to transfer those images, whereby the union between God and his people is illustrated in the Old, to that which subsists between Christ and his church. It is evident, that by the Latin word *sacramentum*, the Greek μυστηριον is frequently rendered in the New Testament; and it is no less evident, not only from the application of the word in that version, but from the general use of it, in ecclesiastical writers, in the primitive ages, that it often denoted no more than an allegorical or figurative meaning, which may be assigned to any narrative or injunction; a meaning more sublime than that which is at first suggested by the words. Thus, the moral conveyed under an apologue or parable was with them the *sacrament*, that is, the hidden meaning of the apologue or parable. Thus, in *ego dicam tibi sacramentum mulieris et bestiæ quæ portat eam*, Rev. xvii. 7. I will tell thee the mystery of the woman, and of the beast which carrieth her; it is indubitable, that μυστηριον, or *sacramentum*, means the hidden meaning of that vision. It is very plain that, in their use, the sense of the word *sacramentum*, was totally different from that which it has at present, either among Protestants or among Papists †. At the same time, there can be no question, that the misunderstanding of the passage quoted above, from the Epistle to the Ephesians, has given rise to the exaltation of matrimony into a sacrament. Such are the effects of the perversion of words, through the gradual change of customs; a perversion incident to every language, but which no translator can foresee.

No

* Differ. IX. Part I. § 7, 8. † Diff. IX. Part I.

No more is their doctrine of merit supported by the following expression, *Talibus hostiis promeretur Deus*, Heb. xiii. 16. which, though faulty in point of purity, means no more than is expressed in the English translation, in these words: *With such sacrifices God is well pleased.* It is by common use, and not by scholastic quibbles, that the language of the sacred writers ought to be interpreted. Again, the command which so often occurs in the gospels, *pœnitentiam agite*, seems at first to favour the Popish doctrine of *penance*. In conformity to this idea, the Rhemish translators render it *do penance*. But nothing is more evident, than that this is a perversion of the phrase from its ancient meaning, occasioned by the corruptions which have insensibly crept into the church. That the words, as used by the Latin translator, meant originally as much, at least, as the English word *repent*, cannot admit a question; and thus much is allowed by the critics of that communion. In this manner, Maldonat, a learned Jesuit, in his Commentary on Matt. vii. 15. explains *pœnitentiam agite*, as of the same import with *parate vias Domini, rectas facite semitas ejus*; and both as signifying *Relinquite errores et sequimini veritatem; discedite a malo, et facite bonum.* He understood no otherwise the *agite pœnitentiam* of the Latin translator, than we understand the μετανοειτε of the evangelist. Accordingly, the same Greek word is in one place of that version rendered *pœnitemini*, Mark i. 15. But the introduction of the doctrine of auricular confession, of the necessity for obtaining absolution, of submitting to the punishment prescribed by the priest for the sins confessed, which they have come to denominate *pœnitentia*, and their styling the whole of this institution of theirs the *sacrament of penance*, which is of a much later date than that version, has diverted men's minds from attending to the primitive and only proper import of the phrase. *Agite pœnitentiam* was not, therefore, originally a mis-translation of the Greek μετανοειτε, though not sufficiently expressive; but the abuse which has gradually taken place in the Latin church, and the misapplication of the term which it has occasioned, have in a manner justled out the original meaning, and rendered the words, in their present acceptation, totally improper *.

§ 10. Several other words and expressions give scope for the like observations. But after what has been said, it is not necessary to enter further into particulars. The Vulgate may reasonably be pronounced upon the whole, a good and faithful version. That it is unequal in the style, in respect both of purity and of perspicuity, is very evident; nay, to such a degree, as plainly to evince that it has not all issued from the same pen. Considered in gross, we have reason to think it greatly inferior to Jerom's translation, as finished by himself. I may add, we have reason also

* For further illustration on this article, see Dissert. XI. Part II. § 4.

alſo to conſider the verſion which Jerom actually made, as greatly inferior to what he could have made, and would have made, if he had thought himſelf at liberty to follow entirely his own judgment, and had not been much reſtrained by the prejudices of the people. I have already obſerved the advantages redounding to the critic from the uſe of this verſion, which are in ſome degree peculiar. I ſhall only add, that its language, barbarous as it often is, has its uſe in aſſiſting us to underſtand more perfectly the Latin eccleſiaſtical writers of the early ages.

PART IV.

Strictures on Caſtalio.

HAVING ſhewn, that it is impoſſible to do juſtice to an author, or to his ſubject, by attempting to track him, and always to be found in his footſteps, I ſhall now animadvert a little on thoſe tranſlators who are in the oppoſite extreme; whoſe manner is ſo looſe, rambling and deſultory, that though they move nearly in the ſame direction with their author, pointing to the ſame object, they keep ſcarcely within ſight of his path. Of the former exceſs, Arias Montanus is a perfect model; the Vulgate is often too much ſo. Of the latter, the moſt remarkable example we have in Latin, is Caſtalio. Yet Caſtalio's work is no paraphraſe, ſuch as we have ſometimes ſeen under the name of *liberal tranſlations*; for in theſe, there are always interwoven with the thoughts of the author, thoſe of his interpreter, under the notion of their importance, either for illuſtrating, or for enforcing the ſentiments of the original. The paraphraſt does not confine himſelf to the humble taſk of the tranſlator, who propoſes to exhibit, pure and unmixed, the ſentiments of another, clothed indeed in a different dreſs, namely, ſuch as the country into which he introduces them, can ſupply him with. The paraphraſt, on the contrary, claims to ſhare with the author in the merit of the work, not in reſpect of the language merely, for to this every interpreter has a claim, but in reſpect of what is much more important, the ſenſe; nay, further, if the ſentiments of theſe two happen to jar, no uncommon caſe, it is eaſy to conjecture whoſe will predominate in the paraphraſe. But it is not with paraphraſts that I have here to do. A looſe manner of tranſlating is ſometimes adopted, not for the ſake of inſinuating artfully the tranſlator's opinions, by blending them with the ſentiments of

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the author, but merely for the ſake of expreſſing with elegance, and in an oratorical manner, the ſenſe of the original.

§ 2. This was acknowledged to be in a high degree Caſtalio's object in tranſlating. He had obſerved, with grief, that great numbers were withheld from reading the Scriptures, that is, the Vulgate, the only verſion of any account then extant, by the rudeneſs, as well as the obſcurity of the ſtyle. To give the public a Bible more elegantly and perſpicuouſly written, he conſidered as at leaſt an innocent, if not a laudable artifice, for inducing ſtudents, eſpecially thoſe of the younger ſort, to read the Scriptures with attention, and to throw aſide books full of indecencies then much in vogue, becauſe recommended by the beauty and ornaments of language. "Cupiebam," ſays he *, "exta-re Latiniorem aliquam, necnon fideliorem, et magis perſpicuam ſacrarum literarum tranſlationem, ex qua poſſet eadem opera pietas cum Latino ſermone diſci, ut hac ratione et tempori conſuleretur, et homines ad legenda ſacra pellicerentur." The motive was ſurely commendable; and the reaſon whereon it was founded, a general diſuſe of the Scriptures, on account of the badneſs of their language, is but too notorious. Cardinal Bembo, a man of ſome note and literature under the pontificate of Leo X. in whoſe time the Reformation commenced, is ſaid to have expreſſed himſelf ſtrongly on this ſubject, that he durſt not read the Bible for fear of corrupting his ſtyle; an expreſſion which had a very unfavourable aſpect, eſpecially in a churchman. Nevertheleſs, when we conſider that by the Bible he meant the Vulgate, and by his ſtyle his Latinity, this declaration will not be found to merit all the cenſure which Brown †, and others, have beſtowed upon it. For ſurely no one who underſtands Latin will ſay, that he wiſhes to form his ſtyle, in that language on the Vulgate. Nor does any reflection on the language of that tranſlation affect, in the ſmalleſt degree, the ſacred writers. The character of Moſes' ſtyle, in particular, is ſimplicity, ſerioufneſs, perſpicuity, and purity. The firſt and ſecond of theſe qualities are, in general, well exhibited in the Vulgate; the third is ſometimes violated, and the fourth often.

§ 3. But, to return to Caſtalio; he was not entirely diſappointed in his principal aim. Many Romaniſts, as well as Proteſtants, who could not endure the foreign idioms and obſcurity of the Vulgate, attracted by the fluency, the perſpicuity, and partly, no doubt, by the novelty of Caſtalio's diction, as employed for conveying *the mind of the Spirit*, were delighted with the performance; whilſt the ſame quality of novelty, along with what looked like affectation in the change, exceedingly diſguſted others. One thing is very evident, in regard to this tranſlator, that when his

* Caſt. Def. inſ. Tranſlat. &c. † Eſſays on the Characteriſtics.

his work first made its appearance, nobody seemed to judge of it with coolness and moderation. Almost every person either admired or abhorred it. At this distant period, there is a greater probability of judging equitably than there was when it was first published, and men's passions, from the circumstances of the times, were so liable to be inflamed on every new topic of discussion, wherein religion was concerned.

§ 4. If we examine this work by the three great ends of translating, above observed, we shall be qualified to form some judgment of his merit in this department. As to the first and principal end, conveying the true sense of his author, I think he has succeeded, at least as well as most other translators into Latin, and better than some of those who, with much virulence, traduced his character and decried his work. He had indeed one great advantage, in being an excellent linguist, and knowing more of the three languages, Hebrew, Greek and Latin, than most of the critics of his time; but that his immoderate passion for classical elocution did sometimes lead him to adopt expressions which were feeble, obscure and improper, is very certain. And it must be owned, notwithstanding his plausible defence, that Beza had reason to affirm, that the words ὁτι επεσκεψατο και εποιησε λυτρωσιν τω λαω αυτυ, Luke i. 68. are but ambiguously and frigidly rendered, *qui populi sui liberationem procuret* The difference is immense, between the notions of Pagans concerning the agency of their gods in human affairs, and the ideas which Scripture gives us of the divine efficiency; and therefore even Cicero, in a case of this kind, is no authority. The following instance, cited by Houbigant, is an example of obscurity arising from the same cause, Proleg. "Tu isti populo terræ hæreditatem hercisceris," Josh. i. 6. *Hercisco* is merely a juridical term which, though it might have been proper, in a treatise on the civil law, or in pleading in a court of judicature, no Roman author, of any name, would have used in a work intended for the people. But to no sort of style are technical terms more unsuitable than to that of holy writ. It was the more inexcusable in this place, where the simple and natural expression was so obvious: "Tu terram—dabis isti populo possidendam." Whereas, the phrase which Castalio has adopted, would have probably been unintelligible to the much greater part of the people, even in Rome, at the time when Latin was their mother tongue.

§ 5. As to the second object of translating, the conveyance of the spirit and manner of the author, in a just exhibition of the character of his style; I hinted before that, in this particular, he failed *entirely*, and I may even add *intentionally*. The first characteristical quality of the historic style of holy writ, *simplicity*, he has totally renounced. The simple style is opposed both to the complex, and to the highly ornamented. The complex is,

when the diction abounds in periods, or in sentences consisting o several members, artfully combined. This is much the manner of Castalio, but far from that of the sacred historians. In a former Dissertation *, I gave a specimen of this difference, in his manner of rendering the first five verses of Genesis. Now, for the transformation he has made them undergo, he has no excuse from either necessity or perspicuity. The simple style will suit any tongue, (though the complex will not always), and is remarkably perspicuous. His affecting so often, without any necessity, to give, in the way of narrative, what, in the original, is in the way of dialogue, is another flagrant violation of ancient simplicity.

Nor is simplicity alone hurt by this change. How cold and inanimate, as well as indefinite, is the oblique but classical turn, which Castalio has endeavoured to give to Laban's salutation of Abraham's servant: "Eumque a Jova salvere jussum, hortatur, ne foris maneat:" compared with the direct and vivid address in the Vulgate, literally from the Hebrew, "Dixitque, Ingredere, benedicte Domini: cur foris stas?" Or, as it is in the English translation, *Come in, thou blessed of the Lord; wherefore standest thou without?* Gen. xxiv. 31. That he transgresses in this respect also, by a profusion of ornament, is undeniable. By his accumulated diminutives, both in names and epithets, in the manner of Catullus, intended surely to be ornamental, he has injured the dignity, as well as the simplicity and seriousness of Solomon's Song.

Another ornament, in the same taste, by which the simplicity of the sacred writers has been greatly hurt in his translation, is the attempt, when the same ideas recur, of expressing them almost always in different words and varied phrases. It is not only essential to the simplicity, but it adds to the majesty of the inspired penmen, that there never appears in them any solicitude about their words. No pursuit of variety, or indeed of any thing in point of diction, out of the common road. Very different is the manner of this interpreter. I had occasion to remark before, (Diss. VI. Part iii. § 11.) that there were no fewer than seven or eight phrases, employed by Castalio, in different places of the New Testament, for expressing the import of the single verb μετανοεω, though used always in the same acceptation. And as another specimen of this inordinate passion, I shall add, that, to express διωγμος, he uses, beside the word *persequutio*, the far too general terms, *vexatio, afflictio, infectatio, adversa, res adversæ*. Nay, in some instances, his love of variety has carried him so far as to sacrifice, not barely the style of his author, but his sense. What can be a stronger example of it than his denominating God

* Diss. III. § 4.

God, *Deus obtrectator*, Josh. xxiv. 19. rather than recur, with his author, to any term he had employed before. For the Hebrew קַנָּא *kone*, rendered *jealous* in the English translation, he had used, in one place, *æmulus*, in another, *socii impatiens*, and in a third, *rivalis impatiens*. Though some exception might be made to the two last, the first was as good as the language afforded. Another translator would not have thought there was any occasion for a fourth; but so differently thought our classical interpreter, in matters of this kind, that he preferred a most improper word, which might contribute to give his style the graces of novelty and variety, to an apposite, but more common term, which he had employed before. The word *obtrectator* is never used, as far as I remember, but in a bad sense. It is acknowledged, that when jealousy is ascribed to God, the expression is not strictly proper. He is spoken of after the manner of men. But then the term, by itself, does not imply any thing vicious. We may say of a man properly in certain cases, that he had reason to be *jealous*, but with no propriety can we say, in any case, that a man had reason to be *envious*, that he had reason to be *calumnious*. These epithets are better suited to the diabolical nature than to the divine. Yet both are included in the word *obtrectator*.

In short, his affectation of the manner of some of the poets and orators, has metamorphosed the authors he interpreted, and stript them of the venerable signatures of antiquity, which so admirably befit them; and which, serving as intrinsic evidence of their authenticity, recommend their writings to the serious and judicious. Whereas, when accoutred in this new fashion, nobody would imagine them to have been Hebrews; and yet (as some critics have justly remarked) it has not been within the compass of Castalio's art to make them look like Romans.

§ 6. I am far from thinking that Castalio merited, on this account, the bitter invectives vented against him by Beza, and others, as a wilful corrupter of the word of God. His intention was good; it was to entice all ranks, as much as possible, to the study of the divine oracles. The expedient he used appeared at least harmless. It was, in his judgment, at the worst, but like that which Horace observes, was often practised by good natured teachers:

Ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi
Doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima.

He regarded the thoughts solely as the result of inspiration, the words and idiom as merely circumstantial. "Erant Apostoli," says he *, "natu Hebræi; et peregrina, hoc est Græca lingua "scribentes

* Defens.

" ſcribentes hebraizabant ; non quod id juberet ſpiritus : neque " enim pluris facit ſpiritus Hebraiſmos quam Græciſmos." Indeed, if the liberty Caſtalio has taken with the diction had extended no further than to reject thoſe Hebraiſms which, how perſpicuous ſoever they are in the original, occaſion either obſcurity or ambiguity, when verbally tranſlated, and to ſupply their place by ſimple expreſſions in the Latin idiom, clearly conveying the ſame ſenſe, no perſon who is not tinctured with the cabaliſtical ſuperſtition of the Jews could have cenſured his conduct.

Very often, the freedoms he uſed with the ſtyle of the ſacred penmen aimed no higher. Thus, the expreſſion of the prophet, which is literally in Engliſh, *My beloved had a vineyard in a horn of the ſon of oil ;* and which is rendered in the Vulgate, " Vinea facta eſt dilecto meo in cornu filio olei ;" Caſtalio has tranſlated much better, becauſe intelligibly, " Habebat amicus " meus vineam in quodam pingui dorſo." Had he uſed the more familiar term, *collis*, inſtead of *dorſum*, it would have been ſtill better. The Engliſh tranſlation expreſſes the ſenſe very properly, *My well beloved hath a vineyard in a very fruitful hill*, Iſa. v. 1. But, as I have ſhewn, the freedoms taken by Caſtalio went ſometimes a great deal further than this, and tended to leſſen the reſpect due to the ſacred oracles, by putting them too much on a footing with compoſitions merely human, and by changing their ſerious manner for one comparatively light and trifling, nay, even playful and childiſh.

§ 7. As to the other two qualities of the hiſtorical ſtyle of Scripture, perſpicuity and purity, he ſeems in general, to have been obſervant of them. To the latter he is cenſured chiefly for having ſacrificed too much. Yet his attention to this quality has proved a principal means of ſecuring his perſpicuity ; as it is certain that the exceſſive attempts of others to preſerve in their verſion the Oriental idiom, have both rendered the plaineſt paſſages unintelligible, and given bad Latin for what was good Hebrew or Chaldee. The example laſt quoted is an evidence of this ; and ſurely none can doubt that it has more perſpicuity, as well as propriety, to ſay in Latin, *ut nemo uſque evaderet* with Caſtalio, than to ſay, *ut non fieret ſalva omnis caro* with the Vulgate ; and, *Nulla res eſt quam Deus facere non poſſit* with the former, than *non erit impoſſibile apud Deum omne verbum* with the latter. Nevertheleſs, in a few inſtances, an immoderate paſſion for claſſical phraſeology has, as we have ſeen, betrayed him into obſcurities, and even blunders, of which inferior interpreters were in no danger.

§ 8. To illuſtrate the different effects on the appearance of the ſacred penmen, produced by the oppoſite modes of tranſlating, which Arias and Caſtalio have adopted, I ſhall employ a ſimilitude of which Caſtalio himſelf has given me the hint. In his epiſtle

epiſtle dedicatory to king Edward, he has theſe words: "Quod "ad latinitatem attinet, eſt oratio nihil aliud quam rei quædam "quaſi veſtis, et nos ſartores ſumus." In conformity to this idea, I ſhould ſay that thoſe venerable writers, the apoſtles and evangeliſts, appear, in their own country, in a garb plain indeed, and even homely, but grave withal, decent, and well fitted to the wearers. Arias, intending to introduce them to the Latins, has, to make them look as little as poſſible like other men, and, one would think, to frighten every body from deſiring their acquaintance, clothed them in filthy rags, which are indeed of Roman manufacture, but have no other relation to any thing worn in the country, being alike unfit for every purpoſe of decency and uſe. For ſurely that ſtyle is moſt aptly compared to tattered garments, in which the words can, by no rule of ſyntax in the language, be rendered coherent, or expreſſive of any ſenſe. Caſtalio, on the contrary, not ſatisfied that when abroad they ſhould be gravely and properly habited, as they were at home, will have them tricked up in finery and lace, that they may appear like men of faſhion, and even make ſome figure in what the world calls good company. But though I conſider both theſe interpreters as in extremes, I am far from thinking their performances are to be deemed, in any reſpect, equivalent. It is not in my power to diſcover a good uſe that can be made of Arias' verſion, unleſs to give ſome aſſiſtance to a ſchool-boy in acquiring the elements of the language. Caſtalio's, with one great fault, has many excellent qualities.

§ 9. In regard to the third object of tranſlating, which is to write ſo far properly and agreeably in the language into which the tranſlation is made, as may, independently of its exactneſs, ſerve to recommend it as a valuable work in that tongue; if Caſtalio failed here, he has been particularly unlucky, ſince the latinity and elegance of the work muſt, by his own acknowledgment, have been more an object to him than to other tranſlators, this being the great means by which he wanted to draw the attention of the youth of that age to the ſtudy of the holy Scriptures. But however much his taſte may, in this reſpect, have been adapted to the times wherein he lived, we cannot conſider it as perfectly chaſte and faultleſs. Sufficient grounds for this cenſure may be collected from the remarks already made. The ſuperficial and the ſhining qualities of ſtyle ſeem often to have had more attractions with him than the ſolid and the uſeful.

§ 10. In other reſpects he appears to have been well qualified for the taſk of tranſlating. Converſant in the learned languages, poſſeſſed of a good underſtanding and no inconſiderable ſhare of critical acuteneſs, candid in his diſpoſition, and not over confident of his own abilities, or exceſſively tenacious of his own opinion, he was ever ready to hearken, and, when convinced, to ſubmit

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to reaſon, whether preſented by a friend or by a foe, whether in terms of amity and love, or of reproach and hatred. Of this he gave very ample evidence in the corrections which he made on ſome of the later editions of his Bible.

He was far from pretending, like ſome interpreters and commentators, to underſtand every thing. When he was uncertain about the ſenſe, he could do no other than follow the words in tranſlating. This expreſſion of the Apoſtle Peter, 1 Pet. iv 6. *Εις τουτο γαρ και νεκροις ευηγγελισθη, ινα κριθωσι μεν κατα ανθρωπους σαρκι, ζωσι δε κατα Θεον πνευματι*, he tranſlates in this manner, *Nam ideo mortuis quoque nunciatus eſt, ut et ſecundum homines carne judicentur, et ſecundum Deum ſpiritu vivant*; adding this note on the margin: *Hunc locum non intelligo, ideoque ad verbum tranſtuli.* There are ſeveral other ſuch inſtances. In one place he has on the margin: *Hos duos verſus non intelligo, ideoque de mea tranſlatione dubito*, Iſa. xxvii. 6, 7. It is worth while to take notice of the manner in which he himſelf ſpeaks of ſuch paſſages: "Quod autem alicubi ſcribo, me aliquem locum non intelligere: "id non ita accipi volo, quaſi cætera plane intelligam: ſed ut "ſciatur, me in aliis aliquid ſaltem obſcuræ lucis habere, in illis "nihil: tum autem ut meæ tranſlationi in quibuſdam hujuſmodi "locis non nimium confidatur. Neque tamen ubique quid non "intelligam oſtendo: eſſet enim hoc infinitum *."

§ 11. In regard to the changes he made in adopting claſſical terms inſtead of certain words and phraſes, which had been long in uſe amongſt eccleſiaſtic writers, and were ſuppoſed to be univerſally underſtood, I cannot agree entirely with, either his ſentiments, or thoſe of his adverſaries. In the firſt place, I do not think, as he ſeems once to have thought (though in this reſpect he afterwards altered his conduct, and conſequently, we may ſuppoſe, his opinion), that no word deſerved admiſſion into his verſion, which had not the ſanction of ſome Pagan claſſic. For this reaſon, the words *baptiſma, angelus, eccleſia, proſelytus, ſynagoga, propheta, patriarcha, mediator, dæmoniacus, hypocrita, benedictus*, and the words *fides* and *fidelis*, when uſed in the theological ſenſe, he ſet aſide for *lotio, genius, reſpublica, adventitius, collegium, vates, ſummus pater, ſequeſter, furioſus, ſimulator, collaudandus, fiducia, fidens*. Some of the more uſual terms, as *angelus, baptiſma, eccleſia, ſynagoga*, were, in later editions, reſtored. In regard to ſome others, conſidering the plan he had adopted, his choice cannot be much blamed, as they were ſufficiently expreſſive of the ſenſe of the original. A few, indeed, were not ſo.

Genius is not a verſion of *αγγελος*, nor *furioſus* of *δαιμονιζομενος*. The notions entertained by the heathen of their *genii*, no more correſponded to the ideas of the Hebrews, in regard to *angels*, than the fancies which our anceſtors entertained of elves and fairies,

* Ad lectores amonitio.

fairies, corresponded to the Christian doctrine concerning the heavenly inhabitants. Αγγελος was a literal version made by the Seventy into Greek, of the Hebrew מלאך *malach*, a name of office, which, if Castalio after them had literally rendered into Latin, calling it *nuntius*, it would have been as little liable to exception, as his rendering the words βασιλευς and ὑπηρετης, *rex* and *minister*. *Furiosus* is not a just translation of δαιμονιζομενος. The import of the original name, which only suggests the cause, is confined, by the translator's opinion, to the nature of the disorder: *furiosus* means no more than *mad*, whereas δαιμονιζομενος is, repeatedly in Scripture, given as equivalent to, δαιμονιον εχων. Nor does the disease of those unhappy persons appear to have been always *madness*. And if, in this, we regard etymology alone, the traditionary fables, about the three infernal goddesses, called *furies*, are noway suited to the ancient popular faith, of either Jews or Pagans, concerning demons. And, even though *adventitius* corresponds exactly in etymology with προσηλυτος, the Latin word does not convey the idea which, in the Hellenistic idiom, is conveyed by the Greek. *Simulator* can hardly be objected to, as a version of ὑποκριτης. In some instances, it answers better than *hypocrita*. This name is, in Latin, confined, by use, to those who lead a life of dissimulation in what regards religion; whereas the Greek term is sometimes employed in the New Testament, in all the latitude in which we commonly use the word *dissembler*, for one who is insincere in a particular instance. But the classical word *collaudandus* does not suit the Greek ευλογητος as used in holy writ, near so well as does the ecclesiastical epithet *benedictus*. And *summus pater* is too indefinite a version of πατριαρχης.

It is a good rule, in every language, to take the necessary terms in every branch of knowledge or business, from those best acquainted with that branch: because, among them, the extent of the terms, and their respective differences, will be most accurately distinguished. In what, therefore, peculiarly concerned the undisputed tenets, or rites, either of Judaism or of Christianity, it was much more reasonable to adopt the style used by Latin Jews or Christians, in those early ages, before they were corrupted with philosophy, than, with the assistance of but a remote analogy, to transfer terms used by Pagan writers, to the doctrines and ceremonies of a religion with which they were totally unacquainted. I must, therefore, consider the rejection of several terms established by ecclesiastic use, and conveying precisely the idea intended by the sacred penmen, as an indication of an excessive squeamishness in point of Latinity. Such terms, in my judgment, are, in matters of revelation, entitled even to be preferred to classical words. For, though the latter may nearly suit the idea, they cannot

cannot have, to the ſame degree as the former, the ſanction of uſe in that application.

§ 12. But let it be obſerved, on the other hand, that the preference above mentioned, is limited by this expreſs condition, that the eccleſiaſtic term, in its common acceptation, plainly convey to the reader the ſame idea which the original word, uſed by the ſacred penmen, was intended to convey to the readers for whom they wrote. To plead, on the contrary, with Father Simon and others, for the preferable adoption of certain theologic words and phraſes conſecrated by long uſe, as they are pleaſed to term it, though admitted to be obſcure, ambiguous, or even improper, is to me the greateſt abſurdity. It is really to make the ſacred authors give place to their ancient interpreters: it is to throw away the ſenſe of the former in compliment to the words of the latter. We muſt ſurely conſider inſpiration as a thing of very little conſequence, when we ſacrifice it knowingly to human errors. This would, in effect, condemn all new tranſlations, whatever occaſion there might be for them, for correcting the faults of former verſions. But into the truth of this ſentiment I ſhall have occaſion to enquire more fully afterwards. Only let it be remembered, that the limitation now mentioned affects two claſſes of words, firſt, thoſe by which the original terms were early miſ-tranſlated; ſecondly, thoſe which, though at firſt they exhibited the true ſenſe of the original, have come gradually to convey a different meaning. For theſe, in conſequence of a change inſenſibly introduced in the application, are become now, whatever they were formerly, either improper or ambiguous.

There are ſome terms in the Vulgate which, in my judgment, were never perfectly adapted to thoſe in the original, in whoſe place they were ſubſtituted. Whether *ſacramentum* for μυστηριον were originally of this number or not, it is certain that the theological meaning, now conſtantly affixed to that word, does not ſuit the ſenſe of the ſacred authors, which is fully and intelligibly expreſſed in Latin, as Caſtalio and Houbigant have commonly done, by the word *arcanum*. The Vulgate ſometimes renders it *myſterium*, which is not much better than *ſacramentum*. For *myſterium*, not being Latin, and being variouſly uſed as a technical term by theologians, muſt be vague and obſcure. Many other latinized Greek words (as *ſcandalizo*, *blaſphemia*, *hæreſis*, *ſchiſma*) are in ſome meaſure liable to the ſame objection. The original terms are none of thoſe, which were obſerved formerly *, not to be ſuſceptible of a tranſlation into another language. And in that caſe to transfer the words, leaving them untranſlated, rarely fails either to keep the reader in ignorance, or to lead him into error. For this reaſon I am far from condemning with Boys, Simon,

* Diſſ. II. Part I. § 5.

Simon, and ſome others, the modern tranſlators, particularly Caſtalio, for rendering them into proper Latin. I intend, in another Diſſertation, to evince that they would not have executed faithfully the office they had undertaken, if they had not done it. The words with which Caſtalio has commonly ſupplied us, inſtead of thoſe above mentioned (*officio*, *maledictum*, or *impia dicta*, *ſecta*, *diſſidium*, or *factio*), are in general as appoſite for expreſſing the ſenſe of the original, as any other words of the ſame claſs. And even the Vulgate is not uniform in regard to thoſe words. Αἱρεσις is, in ſeveral places of that verſion, rendered *ſecta*, and σχισμα *ſciſſura* and *diſſenſio*. But of this I have treated already in the preceding Diſſertation.

§ 13. After all the zeal Caſtalio has ſhown, and the ſtretches he has made for preſerving claſſical purity, could it have been imagined that he would have admitted into his verſion manifeſt barbariſms, both words and idioms of no authority whatever? Yet that he has afforded a few inſtances of this ſtrange inconſiſtency, is unqueſtionable. It would not be eaſy to aſſign a ſatisfactory reaſon for his rejecting the term *idolum* idol, a claſſical word, and uſed by Pagans in the ſame meaning in which it is uſed by us. If it be ſaid, that in their uſe, it was not accompanied with the ſame kind of ſentiment as when uſed by us; as much may be affirmed, with truth, of *Deus*, *Numen*, and every word that relates to religion, which could not fail to affect differently the mind of a heathen, from the way in which it affects the mind of a Jew or a Chriſtian. Ought we to have different names for the Pagan deities, Jupiter, Juno, &c. becauſe the mention of them was attended with reverence in Pagans, and with contempt in Chriſtians?

But what ſhall we ſay of his ſupplying *idolum* by a barbariſm of his own, *deaſter*, a word of no authority, ſacred or profane? It ſuited the fundamental principles of his undertaking to reject *idolatra*, idolater, becauſe, though analogically formed from a good word, it could plead only eccleſiaſtic uſe. But by what principle he has introduced ſuch a monſter as *deaſtricola*, that was never heard of before, it would be impoſſible to ſay. He could be at no loſs for a proper expreſſion. *Idolorum* or *ſimulacrorum cultor* would have ſerved. He has given but too good reaſon, by ſuch uncouth ſounds as *deaſter*, *deaſtricola*, and *infidens* infidel, to ſay that his objections lay only againſt the liberties in language which had been taken by others. Caſtalio argues againſt barbariſms as being obſcure; ſurely this argument ſtrikes more againſt thoſe of his own coining, than againſt thoſe (if they can be called barbariſms) which are recommended by ſo long continued, and ſo extenſive, an uſe. For, though he ſhould not allow the uſe of theologians to be perfectly good, it is ſurely, on thoſe ſubjects, ſufficient for removing the objection of obſcurity.

I do not ſee any thing in his work which has ſo much the appearance of ſelf conceit as this. In other reſpects, I find him modeſt and unaſſuming. It has been alſo obſerved, that his idioms are not always pure. *Dominus, ad cujus normam*, is not in the Latin idiom. *Norma legis* is proper, not *norma dei*, or *norma hominis*. But this I conſider as an overſight, the other as affectation.

§ 14. I ſhall add a few words on the ſubject of Hebraiſms, which Caſtalio is accuſed of rejecting altogether. This charge he is ſo far from denying, that he endeavours to juſtify his conduct in this particular. Herein, I think, if his adverſaries went too far on one ſide, in preferring the mere form of the expreſſion, to the perſpicuous enunciation of the ſenſe, this interpreter went too far on the oppoſite ſide, as he made no account of giving to his verſion the ſtrong ſignatures which the original bears of the antiquity, the manners, and the character, of the age and nation of the writers. Yet both the credibility of the narrative, and the impreſſion which the ſentiments are adapted to make on the readers, are not a little affected by that circumſtance. That thoſe are in the worſe extreme of the two, who would ſacrifice perſpicuity and propriety (in other words, the ſenſe itſelf) to that circumſtance, is not indeed to be doubted. The patrons of the literal method do not advert, that by carrying the point too far, the very exhibition of the ſtyle and manner of the author, is, with both the other ends of tranſlating, totally annihilated. "Quo pertinent," ſays Houbigant *, "iſtiuſmodi interpretationes, quæ nihil quidquam reſonant, niſi adhibes interpretis alterum interpretem?" Again, "Num proprietas hæc cenſenda eſt, quæ mihi exprimat obſcure ac inhumane, id quod ſacri ſcriptores, dilucide ac liberaliter expreſſerunt?" The ſentiments of this author, in regard to the proper mean between both extremes, as they ſeem entirely reaſonable, and equally applicable to any language (though expreſſed in reference to Latin verſions only), I ſhall ſubjoin to the foregoing obſervations on Caſtalio: "Utroque in genere tam metrico quam ſoluto, retinendas eſſe veteres loquendi formas, nec ab iſta linea unquam diſcedendum, niſi gravibus de cauſis, quæ quidem nobis eſſe tres videntur: primo, ſi Hebraiſmi veteres, cum retinentur, fiunt Latino in ſermone, vel obſcuri vel ambigui; ſecundo, ſi eorum ſignificantia minuitur, niſi circuitione quadam uteris; tertio, ſi vergant ad aliam, quam Hebraica verba, ſententiam †."

§ 15. I ſhall finiſh my critique on this tranſlator, with ſome remarks on a charge brought againſt him by Beauſobre and Lenfant, who affirm that ‡, abſtracting from the falſe elegance of his ſtyle,

* Proleg. † Ibidem.

‡ Preface Generale, P. II. des Verſions du N. T.

ſtyle, he takes greater liberty (they muſt certainly mean with the ſenſe) than a faithful interpreter ought to take. Of this his verſion of the following paſſage, Acts xxvi. 18. is given as an example. Τυ επιςρεψαι απο σκοτους εις φως, και της εξουσιας τυ Σαταναι επι τον Θεον, τυ λαβειν αυτους αφεσιν αμαρτιων, και κληρον εν τοις ηγιασμενοις, πιςει τη εις εμε; which is thus rendered by Caſtalio: "Ut ex tenebris in "lucem, et ex Satanæ poteſtate ad Deum ſe convertant, et ita "peccatorum veniam, et eandem cum iis ſortem conſequantur, "qui fide mihi habenda ſancti facti fuerint:" and by Beza, whom they here oppoſe to him: "Et convertas eos a tenebris ad lu-"cem, et a poteſtate Satanæ ad Deum, ut remiſſionem peccato-"rum et ſortem inter ſanctificatos accipiant per fidem quæ eſt in "me." In my opinion there is a real ambiguity in the original, which, if Caſtalio be blameable for fixing in one way, Beza is not leſs blameable for fixing it, in another. The words πιςει τη εις εμε, may be conſtrued with the verb λαβειν at ſome diſtance, or with the participle ηγιασμενοις immediately preceding. In the common way of reckoning, if one of theſe methods were to be ſtyled a ſtretch, or a liberty, it would be Beza's, and not Caſtalio's, both becauſe the latter keeps cloſer to the arrangement of the original, and becauſe the Apoſtle, not having uſed the adjective ἁγιοις, but the participle ηγιασμενοις, gives ſome ground to regard the following words as its regimen. Accordingly, Beza has conſidered the verſion of Eraſmus, which is to the ſame purpoſe with Caſtalio's, and with which the Tigurine verſion alſo agrees; "ut accipiant "remiſſionem peccatorum, et ſortem inter eos qui ſanctificati ſunt, "per fidem quæ eſt erga me;" as exhibiting a ſenſe quite different from his own; at the ſame time, he freely acknowledges, that the original is ſuſceptible of either meaning. "Τη πιςει. "Poteſt quidem hoc referri ad participium ηγιασμενοις, quemadmo-"dum retulit Eraſmus." In this inſtance Beza, though not remarkable for moderation, has judged more equitably than the French tranſlators above mentioned, who had no reaſon to affirm, dogmatically, that the words ought to be joined in the one way, and not in the other; or to conclude, that Caſtalio affected to give the words this turn, in order to exclude the idea of *abſolute election*. Did the Engliſh tranſlators, for this purpoſe, render the paſſage after Eraſmus and Caſtalio, not after Beza, *That they may receive forgiveneſs of ſins, and inheritance among them which are ſanctified by faith that is in me?* Nobody, I dare ſay, will ſuſpect it.

I cannot help thinking thoſe critics unlucky in their choice of an example: for had there been more to ſay, in oppoſition to this verſion of the paſſage, than has yet been urged, it would ſtill have been hard to treat that as a liberty peculiar to Caſtalio, in which he was evidently not the firſt, and in which he has had the concurrence of more tranſlators than can be produced on the other

other ſide. For my part, as I acknowledge that ſuch tranſpoſitions are not unfrequent in holy writ, my opinion is, that the connection and ſcope of the place ought chiefly to determine us in doubtful caſes. In the preſent caſe, it appears to me to yield the cleareſt ſenſe, and to be every way the moſt eligible, to join the words πιστει τη εις εμε, neither to ἡγιασμενοις, nor to λαβειν, but to the foregoing verb επιστρεψαι; for when the regimen is thrown to the end of the ſentence, it is better to join it to the firſt verb, with which it can be ſuitably conſtrued, than to an intermediate verb, explicative of the former. Nothing can give a more plain, or a more appoſite meaning, than the words under examination, thus conſtrued; *To bring them by the faith that is in me* (that is, by my doctrine, the faith, ἡ πιστις being often uſed by the ſacred writers for the object of faith, or *thing believed,*) *from darkneſs to light*, &c.

§ 16. Thus, I have endeavoured to examine, with impartiality, Caſtalio's character as a tranſlator, without aſſuming the province of either the accuſer or the apologiſt. I have neither exaggerated, nor extenuated, either his faults or his virtues, and can pronounce truly, upon the whole, that though there are none (Arias and Pagnin excepted), whoſe general manner of tranſlating is more to be diſapproved; I know not any by which a ſtudent may be more aſſiſted in attaining the true ſenſe of many places, very obſcure in moſt tranſlations, than by Caſtalio's.

PART V.

Strictures on Beza.

BEZA, the celebrated Geneva tranſlator of the New Teſtament, cannot be accuſed of having gone to either of the extremes in which we find Arias and Caſtalio. In general, he is neither ſervilely literal, barbarous, and unintelligible, with the former; nor does he appear aſhamed of the unadorned ſimplicity of the original, with the latter. It was, therefore, at firſt, my intention not to criticiſe his verſion, no more than to enquire into the manner of all the Latin tranſlators of ſacred writ, but barely to point out the moſt egregious faults in the plan of tranſlating ſometimes adopted, ſpecifying, in the way of example and illuſtration, thoſe verſions only, wherein ſuch faults were moſt conſpicuous. On more mature reflection, I have judged it proper to beſtow a few thoughts on Beza, as his tranſlation has, in a great meaſure, been made the ſtandard of moſt of the tranſlations of the reformed churches

churches (I do not include the Lutheran) into modern tongues. He has, perhaps, had leſs influence on the Engliſh tranſlators, than on thoſe of other countries; but he has not been entirely without influence, even on them. And though he writes with a good deal of purity and clearneſs, without florid and oſtentatious ornaments; there are ſome faults, which it is of great moment to avoid, and with which he is, upon the whole, more chargeable, than any other tranſlator of the New Teſtament I know.

§ 2. His verſion of the New Teſtament is nearly in the ſame taſte with that of the Old, by Junius and Tremellius, but better executed. Theſe two tranſlations are commonly bound together, to complete the verſion of holy writ. Junius and Tremellius have been accuſed of obtruding upon the ſacred text, a number of pronouns, *ille*, *hic*, and *iſte*, for which the original gives no warrant. Their excuſe was, that the Latin has not articles, as the Hebrew, and that there is no other way of ſupplying the articles, but by pronouns. But it may with reaſon be queſtioned, whether it were not better, except in a few caſes, to leave them unſupplied, than to ſubſtitute what may darken the expreſſion, and even render it more indefinite, nay, what may ſometimes alter the ſenſe. At the ſame time, I acknowledge that there are caſes in which this method is entirely proper. In the addition of an emphatic epithet, the article is fitly ſupplied by the pronoun. Thus the words, Επεσε Βαβυλων ἡ πολις ἡ μεγαλη, Rev xiv. 8. are juſtly tranſlated by Beza, *Cecidit Babylon urbs illa magna:* and the expreſſion uſed by Nathan to David, *Thou art the man*, 2 Sam. xii. 7. is properly rendered by Junius, *Tu vir ille es.* The neceſſity of recurring to the pronoun, in theſe inſtances, has been perceived alſo by the old tranſlator and Caſtalio.

Nor are theſe the only caſes wherein the Greek or Hebrew article may, not only in Latin, but even in Engliſh, which has articles, be rendered properly by the pronoun. For example, a particular ſpecies is diſtinguiſhed from others of the ſame genus, by ſome attributive conjoined with it; but when the occaſion of mentioning that ſpecies ſoon recurs, the attributive is ſufficiently ſupplied by the article; and, in ſuch inſtances, it often happens, that the article is beſt ſupplied, in another language, by the pronoun. In the queſtion put to our Lord, Τι αγαθον ποιησω, ινα εχω ζωην αιωνιον, Matt. xix. 16. a ſpecies of life to which the queſtion relates, is diſtinguiſhed from all others, by the epithet αιωνιον. The article would contribute nothing here to the diſtinction. But when, in the anſwer, ver. 17. the ſame ſubject is referred to, the epithet is dropped, and the article is prefixed to ζωην, which aſcertains the meaning with equal perſpicuity. Ει δε θελεις εισελθειν εις την ζωην. I have ſeen no Latin tranſlation, no not Beza's, which renders it, *Si vis in vitam illam ingredi;* and yet it is evident, that ſuch is, in this paſſage, the force of the article. The Engliſh

Engliſh idiom rarely permits us to give articles to abſtract nouns. For this reaſon, it would not be a juſt expreſſion of the ſenſe to ſay, *If thou wouldſt enter into the life*, to wit, *eternal life*, the life enquired about. Our only way of marking the reference to the queſtion, is by ſaying, *If thou wouldſt enter into that life.* As, in French, the article is, on the contrary, added to all abſtract nouns, the pronoun is equally neceſſary with them as with us, for making the diſtinction. There is, beſides, ſomething like an impropriety in ſaying to the living, *If thou wouldſt enter into life.*

But there are unqueſtionably caſes in which the Geneveſe interpreters employ the pronoun unneceſſarily, awkwardly, and even improperly. *In that day ſhall the deaf hear the words of the book*, Iſa. xxix. 18. ſay the Engliſh tranſlators. *Audient die illa ſurdi iſti verba literarum*, ſay Junius and his aſſociate. Any perſon who underſtands Latin, on hearing the verſe read by itſelf, will ſuppoſe that there muſt have been mention of ſome deaf perſons in the foregoing verſes, to which the pronoun *iſti*, in this verſe has a reference. But, on inquiry, he will find there is no ſuch thing; and that it is deaf perſons in general of whom the prophet ſpeaks. The introduction of the pronoun, therefore, ſerves only to miſlead. "Matthæus ille publicanus," Matt. x. 3. in Beza's verſion, evidently ſuggeſts that Matthew was a man famous as a publican, before he became an apoſtle. In ſome places, it not only appears awkward, but injures the ſimplicity of the ſtyle. Junius ſays, in his account of the creation, "Dixit Deus, Eſto lux, et fuit lux; viditque Deus lucem hanc eſſe bonam: et diſtinctionem fecit Deus inter hanc lucem et tenebras," Gen. i. 3, 4. Here I think the pronoun is not only unneceſſary and affected, but ſuggeſts ſomething ridiculous, as if that light only had been diſtinguiſhed from darkneſs. However, as *lux* is firſt mentioned, without an attendant, the pronoun which attends it, when mentioned afterwards, does not make the expreſſion ſo indefinite and obſcure as in the former example. But, when Beza makes the evangeliſt ſay, Matt. i. 11, 12. "Jonas genuit Jechoniam in tranſportatione illa Babylonica; poſt autem tranſportationem illam Babylonicam, Jechonias genuit Salathielem;" what more is expreſſed, in relation to the period, than if he had ſaid ſimply, "in tranſportatione Babylonica, et poſt tranſportationem Babylonicam?" The addition of this epithet makes the noun ſufficiently definite, without any pronoun. Nay, does not the pronoun, thus ſuperadded, ſuggeſt one of two things; either that the tranſportation here referred to, had been mentioned in the preceding words, or that the hiſtorian meant to diſtinguiſh, out of ſeveral tranſportations, one more noted than the reſt? Now, neither of theſe was the caſe; no mention had been made before of the Babylonian tranſportation, and there were not more

Babylonian

Babylonian tranſportations, or more tranſportations any whither, than one which the Jewiſh nation had undergone. With this fault Eraſmus alſo is chargeable, but much ſeldomer. Greek, as well as Hebrew, has an article, and ſo have modern languages. But, in tranſlating out of theſe into Latin, nobody, I believe, has ever, either before or ſince, thought of making the pronoun ſupply the article, except in a few ſpecial inſtances, ſuch as thoſe above excepted. In ſuch inſtances, I acknowledge, there is an evident propriety.

§ 3. Beza, with natural talents conſiderably above the middle rate, had a good deal of learning, and underſtood well both Greek and Latin; but he neither knew Hebrew (though he had the aſſiſtance of ſome who knew it) nor does he ſeem to have been much converſant in the tranſlation of the Seventy. Hence it has happened, that his critical acuteneſs is not always ſo well directed as it might have been. The ſignifications of words and idioms are often determined by him from claſſical authority, which might, with greater eaſe and more preciſion, have been aſcertained by the uſage of the ſacred writers, and their ancient interpreters. As to words which do not occur in other Greek writers, or but rarely, or in a ſenſe manifeſtly different from what they bear in Scripture, Beza's chief aid was etymology. This has occaſioned his frequent recourſe, without neceſſity, to circumlocution, to the prejudice always of the diction, and ſometimes of the ſenſe. Examples of this we have in his manner of rendering σπλαγχνιζομαι, Mat. ix. 36. κληρονομεω, Mat. v. 5. πληροφορεω, Luke i. 1. συκοφαντεω, Luke xix. 8. χειροτονεω, Acts xiv. 23. and ſeveral others. On the laſt of theſe, I ſhall ſoon have occaſion to make ſome remarks. For the other four, I ſhall only refer to my notes on thoſe paſſages in the Goſpels. It is, no doubt, to this attempt at tracing the origin of the words in his verſion, that he alludes in that expreſſion, "Verborum proprietatem ſtudioſe ſum ſectatus *." This however has been ſhewn not to be always the ſureſt method of attaining the ſignification wanted †.

§ 4. But of all the faults with which Beza is chargeable as a tranſlator, the greateſt is, undoubtedly, that he was too violent a party-man to poſſeſs that impartiality, without which it is impoſſible to ſucceed as an interpreter of holy writ. It requires but a very little of a critical eye to diſcern in him a conſtant effort to accommodate the ſtyle of the ſacred writers to that of his ſect. Nay, what he has done in this way is done ſo openly, I might have ſaid avowedly, that it is aſtoniſhing it has not more diſcredited his work.

In this particular, as in the application of the pronouns above mentioned,

* Epiſt. ad Eliſ. Reg. Angl. † Diſſ. IV. § 15. &c.

mentioned, Junius and Tremellius have alſo juſtly fallen under the animadverſion of all impartial judges. What is thus well expreſſed in the Engliſh tranſlation, *They gave the ſenſe, and cauſed them to underſtand the reading.* Neh. viii. 8. is rendered by theſe interpreters, "Exponendo ſenſum dabant intelligentiam PER SCRIPTURAM IPSAM." The three laſt words are an evident interpolation. There is no ellipſis in the ſentence; they are no way neceſſary, for the ſenſe is complete without them: but with them it is moſt unwarrantably limited to expreſs the private opinion of the tranſlators. I am as zealouſly attached as any man to the doctrine that Scripture will ever be found its own beſt interpreter, an opinion which I have conſidered in a former diſſertation *, and which is ſufficiently ſupported by the principles of ſound criticiſm and common ſenſe. But no perſon can deteſt more ſtrongly a method of defending even a true opinion, ſo unjuſtifiable as that of foiſting it into the ſacred Scriptures. If any thing can ſerve to render a juſt ſentiment queſtionable, it is the detection of ſuch groſs unfairneſs in the expedients employed for promoting it. Yet this has been copied into the Geneva French verſion, after it had received the corrections of Bertram, by whom it has been made to ſay, "Ils en donnoient l'intelligence, la faiſant entendre par l'ecriture meme." It is but juſt to obſerve, that neither Olivetan, the tranſlator, nor Calvin, who afterwards reviſed his work, had diſcovered any warrant for the laſt clauſe in the original, or had admitted it into the verſion.

The inſertion of this comment has here this additional bad conſequence, that it miſleads the reader in regard to the expoſition meant by the ſacred penman. Who would not conclude, from the verſion of Junius, that Ezra, or ſome of the Levites who attended, after reading a portion of Scripture, pronounced an explanatory diſcourſe (ſuch as in ſome Chriſtian ſocieties is called a lecture) on the paſſage. Whereas the whole import appears to be that, as the people, after the captivity, did not perfectly underſtand the ancient Hebrew, in which the law was written, this judicious teacher found it expedient, by himſelf or others, to interpret what was read, one paragraph after another, into that dialect of Chaldee which was current among them; a practice long after continued in the ſynagogue, and not improbably, as learned men have thought, that which gave riſe to the *targums* or paraphraſes in that tongue extant to this day.

I do not remember a paſſage wherein Beza has gone quite ſo far, as Junius and Tremellius have preſumed to do in this inſtance; but that he has ſhewn throughout the whole work, a manifeſt partiality to the theology then prevalent in Geneva, is beyond

* Diſſ. II. Part II.

yond a doubt. I shall select a few examples out of a much greater number, which might be brought.

§ 5. The first shall be from that celebrated discourse of our Lord's, commonly called his sermon on the mount, wherein these words, ηκουσατε ὁτι ἐρρεθη τοις αρχαιοις, Matt. v. 21. 27. 33. are always rendered, *Audistis dictum fuisse* a *veteribus;* in contradiction to all the versions which had preceded, Oriental and Occidental, and in opposition to the uniform idiom of the sacred writers. [See the note on that passage in this version.] Beza does not hesitate in his annotations to assign his reason, which is drawn not from any principle of criticism, not from a different reading in any ancient manuscripts, of which he had several, but professedly from the fitness of this version for supporting his own doctrine. "Præ-"stat τοις αρχαιοις explicare quasi scriptum sit ὑπο των αρχαιων (*ut* "*sic notentur synagogæ doctores*, jampridem sic docentes, qui so-"lebant patrum et majorum nomina suis falsis interpretationibus "prætexere) quam ad auditores referre." But this correction of the ancient version was every way unsuitable, and the expedient weak. It was essential to the Pharisaical notion of traditions, to consider them as precepts which God himself had given to their fathers verbally, and which were therefore called the *oral* law, in contra-distinction to the *written* law, or the Scriptures. Consequently Beza's representation of their presumption is far short of the truth. He ought to have said, *Qui solebant* (not *patrum et majorum nomina*, but) *Dei nomen* (for the fact is indubitable) *suis falsis interpretationibus prætexere.* And let it be observed, that our Lord does not here give any sanction to their distinction of the law into *oral* and *written.* He does not once say, *It was said to the ancients,* but uniformly, *Ye have heard that it was said.* He speaks not of what God did, but of what they pretended that he did.

His words, therefore, and the doctrine of the Pharisees, are alike misrepresented by this bold interpreter; and that for the sake of an advantage merely imaginary against an adverse sect. The one interpretation is not more favourable to the Socinians than the other. But if it had been otherwise, no person will consider that as a good reason for misrepresenting, unless he is more solicitous of accommodating Scripture to his sentiments, than of accommodating his sentiments to Scripture. The former has indeed been but too common with interpreters, though with few so much and so barefacedly, as with Beza. I am sorry to add that, in the instance we have been considering, Beza has been followed by most of the Protestant translators of his day, Italian, French and English.

§ 6. The following is another example of the strong inclination which this translator had, even in the smallest matters, to make his version conformable to his own prepossessions. He

renders these words, συν γυναιξι, Acts i. 14. though without either article or pronoun, *cum uxoribus*, as though the expression had been συν ταις γυναιξιν αυτων. In this manner he excuses himself in the notes: "Conveniebat apostolorum etiam uxores confirmari, "quas vel peregrinationis illorum comites esse opportebat, vel "eorum absentiam domi patienter expectare." Very well; and because Theodore Beza judges it to have been convenient that the apostles' wives, for their own confirmation, should be there, he takes the liberty to make the sacred historian say, that they were there, when, in fact, he does not so much as insinuate that there were any wives among them. The use of the Greek word γυνη is entirely similar to that of the French word *femme*. Nobody that understands French would translate *avec les femmes* with the wives, but with the women, whereas the proper translation of *avec leurs femmes* is, with their wives.

It is impossible for one who knows the state of things at the time when that version was made, not to perceive the design of this mis-interpretation. The Protestant ministers, amongst whom marriage was common were exposed to much obloquy among the Romanists, through the absurd prejudices of the latter, in favour of celibacy. It was, therefore, deemed of great consequence to the party, to represent the apostles as married men. But could one imagine that this consideration would have weight enough to lead a man of Beza's abilities and character into such a flagrant, though not very material mis-translation? A translator ought surely to express the full meaning of his author, as far as the language which he writes is capable of expressing it. But here there is an evident restriction of his author's meaning.

The remark of the canon of Ely is unanswerable: "Qui mu-"lieres dicit, uxores etiam sub eadem appellatione comprehen-"dere potest. At qui uxores nominat, solas illas nominat.— "Igitur quo generalior eo tutior erit, et Græcis convenientior in-"terpretatio." Besides, there may have been, for aught we know, no wives in the company, in which case Beza's words include a direct falsehood. And this falsehood he boldly puts into the mouth of the sacred penman. We know that Peter had once a wife, as we learn from the Gospel, that his wife's mother was cured by Jesus of a fever, Matt. viii. 14, 15. But whether she was living at the time referred to in the Acts, or whether any more of the apostles were married, or whether their wives were disciples, we know not. Now, this falsification, though in a little matter, is strongly characteristical of that interpreter. I am glad to add, that in this he has been deserted by all the Protestant translators I know.

A similar instance the very next chapter presents us with, Acts ii. 27. The words οτι εγκαταλειψεις την ψυχην μου εις αδου, he translates, *Non derelinques cadaver meum in sepulchro*, not only rendering

rendering ἅδης *ſepulchrum*, according to an opinion which, though ſhewn above *, to be ill-founded, is pretty common; but ψυχὴ *cadaver*, carcaſe, wherein, I believe he is ſingular. His motive is ſtill of the ſame kind. The common verſion, though unexceptionable, might be thought to ſupport the Popiſh limbo. "Quod autem annotavi ex vetere verſione *animam meam* natum "eſſe errorem, ac propterea me maluiſſe aliud nomen uſurpare, "non temere feci, cum hunc præcipue locum a Papiſtis torqueri "ad ſuum limbum conſtituendum videamus, et veteres etiam "inde deſcenſum illum animæ Chriſti ad inferos excogita-"rint †."

This ſpecimen from Beza, it may be thought, ſhould have been overlooked, becauſe, though inſerted in the firſt, it was corrected in the ſubſequent editions of his verſion. This, I confeſs, was my own opinion, till I obſerved, that in the annotations of thoſe very editions, he vindicates his firſt tranſlation of the words, and acknowledges that he had altered it, not from the conviction of an error, but to gratify thoſe who, without reaſon, were, through ignorance of the Latin idiom, diſſatisfied with the manner in which he had firſt rendered it. "In priore noſtra edi-"tione," ſays he ‡, "recte interpretatus eram, NON DERELIN-"QUES CADAVER, &c. quod tamen nunc mutavi, ut iis obſequar, "qui conqueſti ſunt me a Græcis verbis diſceſſiſſe, et nomine *ca-"daveris* (inſcitia certe potius Latini ſermonis quam recto ullo "judicio) offenduntur."

To Beza's reaſon for rejecting the common verſion, Caſtalio retorts, very juſtly, that if the poſſibility of wreſting a paſſage in ſupport of error, were held a good reaſon for tranſlating it otherwiſe, Beza's own verſion of the paſſage in queſtion, would be more exceptionable than what he had pretended to correct. "De-"inde non minus ex ejus tranſlatione poſſit error naſci, et quidem "longe pernicioſior. Cum enim animam Chriſti vertat in cada-"ver, periculum eſt ne quis animam Chriſti putet nihil fuiſſe "niſi cadaver ‖." And even this opinion, which denies that Jeſus Chriſt had a human ſoul, has not been unexampled. It was maintained by Beryllus, biſhop of Boſtra in Arabia, in the third century. But on this ſtrange principle of Beza's, where is the verſion of any part of Scripture in which we could ſafely acquieſce?

§ 7. A third example of the ſame undue bias (for I reckon not the laſt, becauſe corrected, whatever was the motive) we have in his verſion of theſe words, χειροτονησαντες δε αυτοις πρεσβυτερους, Acts xiv. 23. which he renders *Quumque ipſi per ſuffragia creaſſent preſbyteros*. The word χειροτονησαντες he tranſlates from etymology, a manner

* Diſſ. VI. Part II. § 4. &c.
† Bezæ Reſp. ad Caſt.
‡ Bezæ Annotationes, ed. 1598.
‖ Caſt. Defen. adverſus Errores.

manner which, as was obſerved before, he ſometimes uſes. χειροτονειν literally ſignifies, *to ſtretch out the hand.* From the uſe of this manner, in popular elections, it came to denote *to elect*, and thence again, *to nominate*, or appoint any how. Now Beza, that his intention might not eſcape us, tells us in the note, "Eſt no-"tanda vis hujus verbi, ut Paulum ac Barnabam ſciamus nil pri-"vato arbitrio geſſiſſe, nec ullam in eccleſia exercuiſſe tyranni-"dem: nil denique tale feciſſe quale hodie Romanus papa et ip-"ſius aſſeclæ, quos ordinarios vocant." Now, though no man is more an enemy to eccleſiaſtic tyranny than I am, I would not employ againſt it weapons borrowed from falſehood and ſophiſtry. I cannot help, therefore, declaring, that the verſion which the Vulgate has given of that paſſage, *Et quum conſtituiſſent illis preſbyteros*, fully expreſſes the ſenſe of the Greek, and conſequently that the words *per ſuffragia*, are a mere interpolation, for the ſake of anſwering a particular purpoſe. It was obſerved before *, that uſe, where it can be diſcovered, muſt determine the ſignification in preference to etymology. And here we are at no loſs to affirm that χειροτονεω, whatever were its origin, is not confined to electing or conſtituting by a plurality of voices.

But whatever be in this, in the inſtance before us, the χειροτονησαντες, or electors, were no more than Paul and Barnabas; and it could not, with any propriety, be ſaid of two, that they elected by a majority of votes, ſince there can be no doubt that they muſt have both agreed in the appointment; and if it had been the diſciples, and not the two apoſtles, who had given their ſuffrages, it would have been of the diſciples, and of them only, not of the apoſtles, that the term χειροτονησαντες could have been uſed, which the conſtruction of the ſentence manifeſtly ſhews that here it is not. The ſenſe of the word here given by Beza, is therefore totally unexampled; for, according to him, it muſt ſignify not *to elect*, but *to conſtitute thoſe whom others have elected* For if this be not what he means by *per ſuffragia creaſſent*, applied to no more than two, it will not be eaſy to divine his meaning, or to diſcover in what manner it anſwered the purpoſe expreſſed in his note. And if this be what he means, he has given a ſenſe to the word, for which I have not ſeen an authority from any author, ſacred or profane. The common import of the word is no more than to conſtitute, ordain, or appoint any how, by election, or otherwiſe, by one, two, or more. When it is by election, it is ſolely from the ſcope of the paſſage that we muſt collect it. In the only other place, 2 Cor. viii. 19. where it occurs in the New Teſtament, it no doubt relates to a proper election. But it is from the words immediately connected, χειροτονηθεις υπο των εκκλησιων, we learn that this is the ſenſe there; as it is from

* Diſſ. IV. § 15. &c.

from the words immediately connected that we learn, with equal certainty, that it relates here to an appointment made by two persons only.

The word occurs once in composition with the preposition προ. Αλλα μαρτυσι τοις προκεχειροτονημενοις ὑπο τυ Θευ, Acts x. 41. rendered by Beza himself, *sed testibus quos ipse prius designaverat.* Here there can be no question that it refers to a destination, of which God alone is the author, and in which, therefore, there could be no suffrages. For even Beza will not be hardy enough to pretend, that such is the force of this verb, as to show, that God did nothing but by common consent, and only destined those whom others had elected. That the word χειροτονεω was commonly used in all the latitude here assigned to it, Dr Hammond has, from Philo, Josephus, and Pagan writers of undoubted authority, given the amplest evidence in his Commentary.

But, so great was the authority of Beza with the Protestant translators, who favoured the model of Geneva, that his exposition of this passage, however singular, was generally adopted. Diodati says, still more explicitly, *E dopo ch' ebbero loro ordinati* PER VOTI COMMUNI, *degli antiani.* The French, *Et apres que* PAR L'AVIS DES ASSEMBLEES, *ils eurent etabli des anciens.* The English Geneva Bible, *And when they had ordained them elders* BY ELECTION. The words in these versions, distinguished by the character, are those which, after Beza's example are interpolated. In the English translation, these words are discarded. Our translators did not concur in sentiments with the Genevese, at least in this article.

§ 8. Again, that he might avoid every expression which appeared to favour the doctrine of universal redemption, the words of the Apostle, concerning God, Ὁς παντας ανθρωπους θελει σωθηναι, 1 Tim. ii. 4. literally rendered in the Vulgate, *Qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri,* he translates, *Qui quosvis homines vult servari**. A little after, in the same Epistle, Ὁς εστι σωτηρ παντων ανθρωπων, μαλιστα πιστων, 1 Tim. iv. 10. in the Vulgate, *Qui est salvator omnium hominum, maxime fidelium;* Beza renders, *Qui est conservator*

* In the same manner he renders these words, Tit. ii. 11. Επιφανη γαρ ἡ χαρις τυ Θευ ἡ σωτηριος πασιν ανθρωποις, "Illuxit enim gratia illa Dei "salutifera *quibusvis* (not *omnibus*) hominibus." No modern translation that I am acquainted with follows Beza in his interpretation of this verse. The Geneva French says, *Car la grace de Dieu salutaire a tous hommes, est clairement apparue.* The Geneva English, *For that grace of God that bringeth salvation unto all men, hath appeared* The translators of the version in common use, have considered πασιν ανθρωποις as governed by επιφανη, and not by σωτηριος, rendering it, *For the grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men.* Of this version the original is evidently capable Diodati has done still better in retaining the ambiguity. *Percioche e apparita la gratia di Dio salutare a tutti gli huomini.*

conſervator omnium hominum, maxime vero fidelium. Let it be obſerved, that this is the only place, in his verſion, where σωτηρ is rendered *conſervator*, preſerver: in every other paſſage but one, where he uſes a periphraſis, the word is *ſervator*, anſwering to *ſalvator*, in the Vulgate, *ſaviour*. If it had not been for the annexed clauſe, μαλιστα πιστων, Beza, I ſuppoſe, would have retained the word *ſervator*, and had recourſe to the expedient he had uſed ſo lately for eluding the difficulty, by ſaying, *Servator quorumvis hominum.* But he perceived, that παντων ανθρωπων muſt be here taken in the moſt comprehenſive ſenſe, being contradiſtinguiſhed to πιστων. I do not mean, by theſe remarks, to affirm, whether or not the word *conſervator* be equivalent to the import of the original term, as uſed in this place. It is enough for my purpoſe, that as this difference of meaning does not neceſſarily reſult, either from the words in immediate connection, or from the purport of the Epiſtle, no perſon is entitled to alter the expreſſion, in order to accommodate it to his own opinions.

An exact counterpart to this is the manner in which an anonymous Engliſh tranſlator has rendered theſe words of our Lord, Το περι πολλων εκχυνομενον εις αφεσιν αμαρτιων, Matt. xxvi. 28. *which is ſhed for mankind. for the remiſſion of ſins;* defending himſelf in a note, by obſerving, that "πολλοι is frequently uſed for ALL." Admit it were. The common acceptation of the word is doubtleſs *many*, and not *all*. And if no good reaſon for departing from the common meaning can be alleged, either from the words in conſtruction, or from the ſcope of the paſſage, it ought to remain unchanged: otherwiſe, all dependence on tranſlations, except for the theological ſyſtem of the tranſlator, is deſtroyed. Of the conduct of both tranſlators, in theſe inſtances, though acting in ſupport of oppoſite opinions, the error is the ſame. And the plea which vindicates this writer, will equally vindicate Beza, and the plea which vindicates Beza, will equally vindicate this writer. The analogy of the faith, that is, the conformity to his particular ſyſtem, is the genuine plea of each.

The ſafeſt and the faireſt way for a tranſlator is, in every diſputable point, to make no diſtinction, where the divine Spirit has not diſtinguiſhed. To apply to this the words uſed by Boys, in a ſimilar caſe, "Cur enim cautiores ſimus, magiſque religioſi "quam Spiritus Sanctus? Si Spiritus Sanctus non dubitavit di-"cere παντας et σωτηρ, cur nos vereamur dicere *omnes* et *ſerva-*"*tor?*" In the ſame manner would I expoſtulate with certain divines amongſt ourſelves, who, I have obſerved, in quoting the preceding paſſages of Scripture, never ſay, *would have all men to be ſaved*, and, *the Saviour of all men*, but invariably, *all ſorts of men;* charitably intending, by this prudent correction, to ſecure the unwary from being ſeduced by the latitudinarian expreſſions of the Apoſtle. If this be not being *wiſe above what is written*, I know

know not what is. In the firſt of the two paſſages quoted, I know no tranſlator who has choſen to imitate Beza; in the ſecond he is followed by the Geneva French only, who ſays, *Le conſervateur de tous hommes*. But it is proper to add, that it was not ſo in that verſion, till it had undergone a ſecond or third reviſal: for the corrections have not been all for the better.

§ 9. Further, the words χαρακτηρ της υποστασεως αυτου, Heb. i. 3. rendered, in the Vulgate, *figura ſubſtantiæ ejus*, he has tranſlated, *character perſonæ illius*. My only objection here is, to his rendering ὑποστασις *perſona*. However much this may ſuit the ſcholaſtic ſtyle, which began to be introduced into theology in the fourth century, it by no means ſuits the idiom of a period ſo early as that in which the books of the New Teſtament were written. It is of real conſequence to ſcriptural criticiſm, not to confound the language of the ſacred penmen with that of the writers of the fourth, or any ſubſequent century. The change in ſtyle was gradual, but in proceſs of time became very conſiderable. There was ſcarcely a new controverſy ſtarted, which did not prove the ſource of new terms and phraſes, as well as of new or unuſual applications of the old. The word ὑποστασις occurs four times in the New Teſtament, but in no other place is it rendered *perſon*. It occurs often in the Septuagint, but it is never the verſion of a Hebrew word which can be rendered *perſon*. Jerom, though he lived when the Sabellian and Arian controverſies were freſh in the minds of men, did not diſcover any reaſon to induce him to change the word *ſubſtantia*, which he found in the former verſion, called the Italic. I take notice of this, principally (for I acknowledge that the expreſſion is obſcure, either way rendered) on account of the manner wherein Beza defends his verſion. "Quominus *ſubſtantiam* interpretarer, eo ſum adductus, quod "videam pleroſque ὑποστασιν hoc loco pro ουσια eſſe interpretatos, "perinde ac ſi inter eſſentiam et ſubſtantiam nihil intereſſet— "Deinde hoc etiam commodi habet iſta interpretatio quod hypo- "ſtaſes adverſus Sabellium aperte diſtinguit et το ὁμοουσιον confir- "mat adverſus Arianos." Here we have a man who, in effect, acknowledges that he would not have tranſlated ſome things in the way he has done, if it were not that he could thereby ſtrike a ſeverer blow againſt ſome adverſe ſect, or ward off a blow, which an adverſary might aim againſt him. Of theſe great objects he never loſes ſight. Accordingly, the controvertiſt predominates throughout his whole verſion, as well as commentary; the tranſlator is, in him, but a ſubordinate character; inſomuch that he may juſtly be called what Jerom calls Aquila, *contentioſus interpres*.

I own, indeed, that my ideas on this ſubject are ſo much the reverſe of Beza's, that I think a tranſlator is bound to abſtract from, and, as far as poſſible, forget all ſects and ſyſtems, together with

with all the polemic jargon which they have been the occaſion of introducing. His aim ought to be invariably to give the untainted ſentiments of the author, and to expreſs himſelf in ſuch a manner as men would do, or (which is the ſame thing) as thoſe men actually did, amongſt whom ſuch diſputes had never been agitated. In this laſt example, Beza is followed by the French and the Engliſh tranſlators, but not by the Italian.

§ 10. Again, in the ſame Epiſtle it is ſaid, Ὁ δε δικαιος εκ πιστεως ζησεται· και εαν ὑποστειληται, ουκ ευδοκει ἡ ψυχη μου εν αυτω, Heb. x. 38. In the Vulgate, rightly, *Juſtus autem meus ex fide vivet: quod ſi ſubtraxerit ſe, non placebit animæ meæ.* In Beza's verſion, *Juſtus autem ex fide vivet; at ſi* QUIS *ſe ſubduxerit, non eſt gratum animo meo.* Here we have two errors. Firſt, the word *quis* is, to the manifeſt injury of the meaning, foiſted into the text. Yet there can be no pretence of neceſſity, as there is no ellipſis in the ſentence. By the ſyntactic order, ὁ δικαιος is underſtood as the nominative to ὑποστειληται; the power of the perſonal pronoun being, in Greek and Latin, ſufficiently expreſſed by the inflection of the verb. Secondly, the conſequent diſpleaſure of God is tranſferred from the perſon to the action; *non eſt gratum;* as though εν αυτω could be explained otherwiſe than as referring to δικαιος. This perverſion of the ſenſe is, in my judgment, ſo groſs, as fully to vindicate from undue ſeverity, the cenſure pronounced by biſhop Pearſon *. *Illa verba a Theodoro Beza haud bona fide ſunt tranſlata.* But this is one of the many paſſages in which this interpreter has judged that the ſacred penmen, having expreſſed themſelves incautiouſly, and given a handle to the patrons of erroneous tenets, ſtood in need of him more as a corrector than as a tranſlator. In this manner Beza ſupports the doctrine of the perſeverance of the ſaints, having been followed, in the firſt of theſe errors, by the French and Engliſh tranſlators, but not in the ſecond: and not by the Italian tranſlator in either, though as much a Calviniſt as any of them. In the old Engliſh Bibles, the expreſſion was, *If he withdraw himſelf.*

§ 11. In order to evade, as much as poſſible, the appearance of regard, in the diſpenſation of grace, to the diſpoſition of the receiver, the words of the Apoſtle, Τον προτερον οντα βλασφημον και διωκτην, και ὑβριστην· αλλ' ηλεηθην, ὁτι αγνοων ἐποιησα εν απιστια, 1 Tim. i. 13. he renders, *Qui prius eram blaſphemus et perſecutor, et injuriis alios afficiens: ſed miſericordia ſum donatus. Nam ignorans id faciebam: nempe fidei expers.* Here I obſerve, firſt, that he divides the ſentence into two, making a full ſtop at ηλεηθην, and thus diſjoins a clauſe which, in Greek, is intimately connected, and had always been ſo underſtood, as appears from all the ancient verſions and commentaries: and, ſecondly, that he introduces this ſentence

* See his Præfatio Parænetica, prefixed to Grabe's Septuagint.

ſentence with *nam*, as if, in Greek, it had been γαρ, inſtead of *quia*, the proper verſion of ὁτι. Both are cauſal conjunctions; but as the former is generally employed in uniting different ſentences, and the latter in uniting the different members of the ſame ſentence, the union occaſioned by the former is looſer and more indefinite than that produced by the latter. The one expreſſes a connection with the general ſcope of what was ſaid, the other with a particular clauſe immediately preceding. This ſecond ſentence, as Beza exhibits it, may be explained as an extenuation ſuggeſted by the Apoſtle, after confeſſing ſo black a crime. As if he had ſaid: "For I would not have acted thus, but I knew "not what I was doing, as I was then an unbeliever." It is evident that the words of the original are not ſuſceptible of this interpretation. Beza has not been followed in this, either by Diodati, or by the Engliſh tranſlators. The Geneva French, and the Geneva Engliſh, have both imitated his manner.

§ 12. I ſhall produce but one other inſtance. The words of the beloved diſciple, Πας ὁ γεγεννημενος εκ τυ Θευ, ἁμαρτιαν ȣ ποιει, 1 John iii. 9.; rendered in the Vulgate, *Omnis qui natus eſt ex Deo, peccatum non facit*, Beza tranſlates, *Quiſquis natus eſt ex Deo, peccato non dat operam;* by this laſt phraſe, endeavouring to elude the ſupport which the original appears to give to the doctrine of the ſinleſs perfection of the ſaints in the preſent life. That this was his view, is evident from what he had urged in defence of the phraſe, in his annotations on the fourth verſe, to which he has ſubjoined theſe words: "Itaque non homines ſed "monſtra hominum (ſuch was his polemic ſtyle) ſunt Pelagiani, "Cathari, Cœleſtiani, Donatiſtæ, Anabaptiſtæ, Libertini, qui ex "hoc loco perfectionem illam ſomniant, a qua abſunt ipſi omnium "hominum longiſſime." His only argument, worthy of notice, is the ſeeming inconſiſtency of this verſe, with what the Apoſtle had advanced a little before, Εαν ειπωμεν ὁτι ἁμαρτιαν ȣκ εχομεν, ἑαυτȣς πλανωμεν, 1 John i. 8. *If we ſay that we have no ſin, we deceive ourſelves.* But he has not conſidered, that if one of theſe human monſters (as he meekly calls them) ſhould render this verſe, *If we ſay that we have never ſinned* (which is not a greater ſtretch than he has made in rendering the other), the reconciliation of the two paſſages is equally well effected as by his method. But as, in fact, neither of theſe expedients can be vindicated, the only fair way is, to exhibit both verſes in as general terms as the inſpired penman has left them in; and thus to put, as nearly as poſſible, the readers of the tranſlation on the ſame footing on which the ſacred writers have put the readers of the original.

There is ſtill another reaſon which ſeems to have influenced Beza in rendering ἁμαρτιαν ποιει *peccato dat operam*, which is kindly to favour ſinners, not exorbitantly profligate, ſo far as to diſpel

all fear about their admiſſion into the kingdom of heaven. This conſtruction may be thought uncharitable. I own I ſhould have thought ſo myſelf, if he had not explicitly ſhown his principles, on this ſubject, in other places. That expreſſion, in the ſermon on the mount, Αποχωρειτε απ' εμου οι εργαζομενοι την ανομιαν, Matt. vii. 23. he renders, *Abſcedite a me qui operam datis iniquitati.* And though he is ſingular in uſing this phraſe, I ſhould not, even from it, have concluded ſo harſhly of his motive, if his explanation in the note had not put it beyond doubt. Οι εργαζομενοι την ανομιαν, "id eſt, OMNIBUS ſceleribus et flagitiis addicti homines—qui ve-"lut artem peccandi exercent, ſicut Latini medicinam, argenta-"riam facere dicunt." Thus, if he wound the ſenſe in the verſion, he kills it outright in the commentary. In another edition, wherein he renders the text ſimply *facitis iniquitatem*, he ſays, ſtill more expreſsly, "Dicuntur ergo *facere iniquitatem*, et a "Chriſto rejiciuntur hoc in loco, non qui *uno et altero* ſcelere ſunt "contaminati, ſed qui hanc velut artem faciunt, ut ſceleſte agen-"do vitam tolerent, et Dei nomine abutantur ad quæſtum, quo "cupiditatibus ſuis ſatisfaciant." Caſtalio, after quoting theſe words, ſays *, very juſtly, and even moderately, "Hæc ſunt "ejus [Bezæ] verba, quibus mihi videtur (ſi modo de habitu "loquitur, ſicut antitheſis oſtendere videtur) nimis latam ſalutis "viam facere: quaſi Chriſtus non rejiciat ſceleratos, ſed dun-"taxat ſceleratiſſimos. Enimvero longe aliter loquuntur ſacræ "literæ."

Not only Scripture in general, he might have ſaid, but that diſcourſe in particular, on which Beza was then commenting, ſpeaks a very different language: *Except your righteouſneſs*, ſays Jeſus, Matt. v. 20. *ſhall exceed the righteouſneſs of the Scribes and Phariſees, ye ſhall in no caſe enter into the kingdom of heaven.* It would have better ſuited Beza's ſyſtem of Chriſtian morality, to have ſaid, *Except your unrighteouſneſs ſhall exceed the unrighteouſneſs of publicans and harlots, ye ſhall in no caſe be excluded from the kingdom of heaven.* But as our Lord's declaration was the reverſe, it is worth while to obſerve in what manner this champion of Geneva eludes its force, and reconciles it to his own licentious maxims. Hear his note upon the place: "Juſtitiæ "nomine intellige ſinceram tum doctrinam tum vitam, cum ver-"bo Dei videlicet, quod eſt juſtitiæ vera norma, congruentem. "Sed, de doctrina potiſſimum hic agi liquet ex ſequenti repre-"henſione falſarum legis interpretationum." And on the laſt clauſe of the ſentence, *nequaquam ingreſſuros in regnum cœlorum*, he ſays, "Id eſt, indignos fore qui in eccleſia doceatis. Nec "enim de quorumvis piorum officio, ſed de ſolis doctoribus agit: "et nomine regni cœlorum, ut alibi ſæpe, non triumphantem "(ut

* Caſ. Defenſ. Adverſarii Errores.

" (ut vulgo loquuntur), ſed adhuc militantem, et miniſterio paſ-
" torum egentem eccleſiam intelligit."

According to this learned commentator, then, *your righteouſneſs* here means, chiefly or ſolely, *your orthodoxy;* I ſay *chiefly* or *ſolely:* for, obſerve his artful climax, in ſpeaking of teachers and teaching. When firſt he obtrudes the word *doctrine*, in explanation of the word *righteouſneſs*, he puts it only on the level with a good life; it is " tum doctrinam tum vitam." When mentioned the ſecond time, a good life is dropt, becauſe, as he affirms, " de doctrina potiſſimum hic agi liquet." When the ſubject is again reſumed, in explaining the latter part of the ſentence, every thing which relates to life and practice is excluded from a ſhare in what is ſaid; for after this gradual preparation of his readers, they are plainly told, " de ſolis doctoribus hic " agit." Now, every body knows, that Beza meant, by orthodoxy, or ſound doctrine, an exact conformity to the Geneveſe ſtandard. The import of our Lord's declaration, then, according to this bold expoſitor, amounts to no more than this, 'If ye be 'not completely orthodox, ye ſhall not be teachers in the church.' In this way of expounding Scripture, what purpoſes may it not be made to ſerve? For my part, I have ſeen nothing, in any commentator or caſuiſt, which bears a ſtronger reſemblance to that mode of ſubverting, under pretence of explaining the divine law, which was adopted by the Scribes, and ſo ſeverely reprehended by our Lord. In the paſſage taken from John's Epiſtle, I do not find that Beza has had any imitators. In the verſion of the like phraſe in the Goſpel, he has been followed by the Geneva French, which ſays, *Vous qui faites le metier d'iniquite.*

§ 13. I might collect many more paſſages, but I ſuppoſe that thoſe which have been given, will ſufficiently verify what has been advanced of this tranſlator's partiality. Any one who critically examines his tranſlation, will ſee how much he ſtrains in every page, eſpecially in Paul's Epiſtles, to find a place for the favourite terms and phraſes of his party. A French projector, Monſieur Le Cene (whoſe project for a new tranſlation was, in what regards one article, conſidered already), ſeems, though of a party in many things oppoſite to Beza's, to have entertained certain looſe notions of tranſlating, which in general coincide with his; but by reaſon of their different parties, would have produced, in the application, contrary effects. As a contraſt to Beza's corrections of the unguarded ſtyle (as he certainly thought it) of the ſacred penmen, I ſhall give a few of Le Cene's corrections, which he propoſed, with the ſame pious purpoſe of ſecuring the unlearned reader againſt ſeduction, (Proj. &c. ch. xiv.) The words of the Apoſtle, rendered by Beza, *Qui credit in eum qui juſtificat impium*, Rom. iv. 5. Le Cene thus tranſlates into French:

Qui

Qui croit en celui qui juſtifie CELUI QUI AVOIT ETE *un impie.* The expreſſion rendered by Beza, *Quem autem vult indurat*, Rom. ix. 18, Le Cene thinks ought to be corrected; and though he does not, in ſo many words, ſay how, it is plain, from the tenor of his remark, that he would have it *permittit ut ſeipſum induret.* He adds, "It behoveth alſo to reform (I uſe his own ſtyle, *Il faudroit auſſi reformer*) what the Vulgate and Geneveſe verſions (he might have added, Moſes and Paul) repreſent God as ſaying to Pharaoh, *In hoc ipſum excitavi te, ut oſtendam in te virtutem meam*, Rom. ix. 17. Exod. ix. 16.; but does not mention the reformation neceſſary.

I cannot help obſerving here, by the way, that though Caſtalio was, in regard to the ſubject of the chapter from which ſome of the foregoing quotations are taken, of ſentiments, as appears from his notes, oppoſite to Beza's, and coincident with Le Cene's, he has tranſlated the whole with the utmoſt fairneſs. Nor has he employed any of thoſe gloſſing arts recommended by Le Cene, and ſo much practiſed by Beza, when encountering a paſſage that appeared favourable to an adverſary. Merely from his tranſlation, we ſhould not diſcover that his opinions of the divine decrees and the freedom of human actions, differed from Beza's. If both interpreters, however, have ſometimes failed in their repreſentations of the ſacred authors, the difference between them lies in this: the liberties which Caſtalio has taken, are almoſt ſolely in what regards their ſtyle and manner; the freedoms uſed by Beza affect their ſentiments and doctrine.

But to return to Le Cene, of whom I ſhall give but one other ſpecimen; the words rendered by Beza, *Quia iterum dixit Eſaias, Excæcavit oculos eorum et obduravit cor eorum; ne videant oculis, et ſint intelligentes corde, et ſeſe convertant et ſanem eos*, John xii. 39, 40.; he propoſes in this manner to expreſs in French: *Ce qui avoit fait dire a Iſaie; ils ont aveugles leurs yeux et endurci leur cœur, pour ne pas voir de leurs yeux, et pour n'entendre point du cœur, et de peur de ſe convertir, et d'etre gueris.* "They have blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart," &c. inſtead of, "He hath blinded, &c." Surely, the difference between theſe interpretations, regards more the ſenſe than the expreſſion. In the later inſtances we have the Arminian uſing the ſame weapons againſt the Calviniſt, which, in the former, we ſaw the Calviniſt employ againſt the Arminian; a conduct alike unjuſtifiable in both.

§ 14. Theſe examples may ſuffice to ſhow, that if tranſlators ſhall think themſelves entitled, with Beza and Le Cene, and the anonymous Engliſh tranſlator above quoted, to uſe ſuch liberties with the original, in order to make it ſpeak their own ſentiments, or the ſentiments of the party to which they have attached themſelves, we ſhall ſoon have as many Bibles as we have ſects, each adapted

adapted to ſupport a different ſyſtem of doctrine and morality; a Calviniſtic Bible, and an Arminian, an Antinomian Bible, a Pelagian, and I know not how many more. Hitherto, notwithſtanding our diſputes, we have recurred to a common ſtandard; and this circumſtance, however lightly it may be thought of, has not been without its utility, eſpecially in countries where the Chriſtian principle of toleration is underſtood and practiſed. It has abated the violence of all ſides, inſpiring men with candour and moderation in judging of one another, and of the importance of the tenets which diſcriminate them. The reverſe would take place, if every faction had a ſtandard of its own, ſo prepared, as to be clearly deciſive in ſupporting all its favourite dogmas, and in condemning thoſe of every other faction. It may be ſaid, that the original would ſtill be a ſort of common ſtandard, whoſe authority would be acknowledged by them all. It no doubt would: but when we conſider how ſmall a proportion of the people, of any party, are qualified to read the original, and how much it would be the buſineſs of the leading partiſans, in every ſect, to preoccupy the minds of the people, in regard to the fidelity of their own verſion, and the partiality of every other, we cannot imagine, that the poſſeſſion of a ſtandard, to which hardly one in a thouſand could have recourſe, would have a ſenſible effect upon the party. Of ſo much conſequence it is, in a tranſlator, to baniſh all party-conſiderations, to forget, as far as poſſible, that he is connected with any party: and to be ever on his guard, leſt the ſpirit of the ſect abſorb the ſpirit of the Chriſtian, and he appear to be more the follower of ſome human teacher, a Calvin, an Arminius, a Socinus, a Pelagius, an Arius, or an Athanaſius, than of our only divine and rightful teacher, Chriſt.

§ 15. Some allowance is, no doubt, to be made for the influence of polemic theology, the epidemic diſeaſe of thoſe times wherein moſt of the verſions, which I have been examining, were compoſed. The imaginations of men were heated, and their ſpirits embittered with continual wranglings, not eaſily avoidable in their circumſtances: and thoſe who were daily accuſtomed to ſtrain every expreſſion of the ſacred writers, in their debates one with another, were ſurely not the fitteſt for examining them with that temper and coolneſs, which are neceſſary in perſons who would approve themſelves unbiaſſed tranſlators. Beſides, criticiſm, eſpecially ſacred criticiſm, was then but in its infancy. Many improvements, through the united labours of the learned in different parts of Europe, have ſince accrued to that ſcience. Much of our ſcholaſtic controverſy on abſtruſe and undeterminable queſtions, well characteriſed by the Apoſtle, *ſtrifes of words, which miniſter not to godly edifying*, 1 Tim. vi. 3. &c. are now happily laid aſide. It may be hoped,

hoped, that ſome of the blunders into which the rage of diſputation has formerly betrayed interpreters, may, with proper care, be avoided; and that the dotage about queſtions, which gender contention, (queſtions than which nothing can be more hollow or unſound *), being over, ſome will dare to ſpeak, and others bear to hear, the things which become ſound doctrine, the doctrine according to godlineſs.

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* See an excellent ſermon on this ſubject, by my learned colleague, Dr Gerard, vol. II. p. 129.

DISSERTATION THE ELEVENTH.

OF THE REGARD WHICH, IN TRANSLATING SCRIPTURE INTO ENGLISH, IS DUE TO THE PRACTICE OF FORMER TRANSLATORS, PARTICULARLY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE LATIN VULGATE, AND OF THE COMMON ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

PART I.

The Regard due to the Vulgate.

In the former Diſſertation *, I took occaſion to conſider what are the chief things to be attended to by every tranſlator, but more eſpecially a tranſlator of holy writ. They appeared to be the three following; firſt, to give a juſt and clear repreſentation of the ſenſe of his original; ſecondly, to convey into his verſion as much of his author's ſpirit and manner as the genius of the language, which he writes, will admit; thirdly, as far as may be in a conſiſtency with the two other ends, to expreſs himſelf with purity in the language of the verſion. If theſe be the principal objects, as in my opinion they are, they will ſupply us with a good rule for determining the preciſe degree of regard which is due to former tranſlators of reputation, whoſe works may have had influence ſufficient to give a currency to the terms and phraſes they have adopted. When the terms and phraſes employed by former interpreters are well adapted for conveying the ſenſe of the author, when they are alſo ſuited to his manner, and do no ſuch violence to the idiom of the language into which they are transferred, as is incompatible with propriety and perſpicuity, they are juſtly preferred to other words equally expreſſive and proper, but which, not having been uſed by former interpreters

* Diſſ. X. Part I.

terpreters of name, are not current in that application. This, in my opinion, is the furtheſt we can go, without making greater account of tranſlations than of the original, and ſhewing more reſpect to the words and idioms of fallible men, than to the inſtructions given by the unerring Spirit of God.

§ 2. If, in reſpect of any of the three ends above mentioned, former tranſlators, on the moſt impartial examination, appear to have failed, ſhall we either copy or imitate their errors? When the queſtion is thus put in plain terms, I do not know any critic that is hardy enough to anſwer in the affirmative. But we no ſooner deſcend to particulars, than we find that thoſe very perſons who gave us reaſon to believe that they agree with us in the general principles, ſo totally differ in the application, as to ſhew themſelves diſpoſed to ſacrifice all thoſe primary objects in tranſlating to the phraſeology of a favourite tranſlator. Even father Simon could admit, that *it would be wrong to imitate the faults of ſaint Jerom, and to pay greater deference to his authority than to the truth* *. How far the verdicts he has pronounced on particular paſſages in the ſeveral verſions criticiſed by him, are conſiſtent with this judgment ſhall be ſhewn in the ſequel.

§ 3. But, before I proceed farther, it may not be amiſs to make ſome remarks on what appears to have been Simon's great ſcope and deſign in the Critical Hiſtory; for, in the examination of certain points ſtrenuouſly maintained by him, I ſhall chiefly be employed in this Diſſertation. His opinions in what regards biblical criticiſm, have long had great influence on the judgment of the learned, both Popiſh and Proteſtant. His profound erudition in Oriental matters, joined with uncommon penetration, and, I may add, ſtrong appearances of moderation, have procured him, on this ſubject, a kind of ſuperiority which is hardly diſputed by any. Indeed, if I had not read the anſwers made to thoſe who attacked his work, which are ſubjoined to his Critical Hiſtory, and commonly, if I miſtake not, thought to be his, though bearing different names, I ſhould not have ſpoken ſo dubiouſly of his title to the virtue of moderation. But throughout theſe tracts, I acknowledge there reigns much of the illiberal ſpirit of the controvertiſt. None of the little arts, however foreign to the ſubject in debate, by which contempt and odium are thrown upon an adverſary, are omitted. And, we may ſay with truth, that by aſſuming too high an aſcendant over Le Clerc and his other antagoniſts, he has degraded himſelf below them, farther, I believe, than by any other method he could have ſo eaſily effected.

§ 4. In

* En effet, il [Pagnin] auroit eu tort d'imiter les fautes de St Jerome, et de deferer plus à l'autorité de ce pere, qu' à la verite. Hiſt. Crit. du Vieux Teſtament, liv. II. ch. xx.

§ 4. In regard to Simon's principal work, which I have ſo often had occaſion to mention, *The Critical Hiſtory of the Old and New Teſtaments*, its merit is ſo well known and eſtabliſhed in the learned world, as to render it ſuperfluous now to attempt its character. I ſhall only animadvert a little on what appear to me, after repeated peruſals, to be the chief objects of the author, and on his manner of purſuing theſe objects. It will ſcarcely admit a doubt, that his primary ſcope throughout the whole performance, is to repreſent Scripture as, in every thing of moment, either unintelligible or ambiguous. His view in this is ſufficiently glaring; it is to convince his readers that, without the aid of tradition, whereof the church is both the depoſitary and the interpreter, no one article of Chriſtianity, with evidence ſufficient to ſatisfy a rational inquirer, can be deduced from Scripture. A ſecond aim, but in ſub-ordination to the former, is to bring his readers to ſuch an acquieſcence in the Latin Vulgate, which he calls the tranſlation of the church, as to conſider the deviations from it in modern verſions, from whatever cauſe they ſpring, attention to the meaning or to the letter of the original, as erroneous and indefenſible.

The manner in which the firſt of theſe aims has been purſued by him, I took occaſion to conſider in a former diſſertation *, to which I muſt refer my reader; I intend now to inquire a little into the method by which he ſupports this ſecondary aim, the faithfulneſs of the Vulgate, and, if not its abſolute perfection, its ſuperiority, at leaſt, to every other attempt that has been made, in the Weſtern churches, towards tranſlating the Bible. This inquiry naturally falls in with the firſt part of my ſubject in the preſent diſſertation, in which I hope to ſhew, to the ſatisfaction of the reader, that Mr Simon might, with equal plauſibility, have maintained the ſuperiority of that verſion over every tranſlation which ever ſhall, or can be made of holy writ.

§ 5. From the view which I have given of his deſign with reſpect to the Vulgate, one would naturally expect, that he muſt rate very highly the verdict of the council of Trent in favour of that verſion, that he muſt derive its excellence, as others of his order have done, from immediate inſpiration, and conclude it to be infallible. Had this been his method of proceeding, his book would have excited little attention from the beginning, except from thoſe whoſe minds were pre-engaged on the ſame ſide by bigotry or intereſt, and would probably long ere now have been forgotten. What perſon of common ſenſe in theſe days ever thinks of the ravings of Harduin the Jeſuit, who, in oppoſition to antiquity and all the world, maintained, that the apoſtles and evangeliſts wrote in Latin, that the Vulgate was the original, and

* Diſſ. III. § 1,—17.

the Greek New Teſtament a verſion, and that conſequently the latter ought to be corrected by the former, not the former by the latter, with many other abſurdities, to which Michaelis has done too much honour, in attempting to refute them in his lectures?

But Simon's method was, in fact, the reverſe. The ſentence of the council, as was hinted formerly, he has explained in ſuch a manner as to denote no more than would be readily admitted by every moderate and judicious Proteſtant. The inſpiration of the tranſlator he diſclaims, and conſequently the infallibility of the verſion. He aſcribes no ſuperiority to it above the original. This ſuperiority was but too plainly implied in the indecent compariſon which Cardinal Ximenes made of the Vulgate as printed in his edition (the Complutenſian) between the Hebrew and the Septuagint, to our Lord crucified between two thieves, making the Hebrew repreſent the hardened thief, and the Greek the penitent. Simon, on the contrary, ſhews no diſpoſition to detract from the merit either of the original, or of any ancient verſion; though not inclinable to allow more to the editions and tranſcripts we are at preſent poſſeſſed of, than the principles of ſound criticiſm appear to warrant. He admits that we have yet no perfect verſion of holy writ, and does not deny that a better may be made than any extant*. In ſhort, nothing can be more equitable than the general maxims he eſtabliſhes. It is by this method that he inſenſibly gains upon his readers, inſinuates himſelf into their good graces, and brings them, before they are aware, to repoſe an implicit confidence in his diſcernment, and to admit, without examining, the equity of his particular deciſions. Now all theſe deciſions are made artfully to conduct them to one point, which he is the ſurer to carry, as he never openly propoſes it, namely, to conſider the Vulgate as the ſtandard, by a conformity to which, the value of every other verſion ought to be eſtimated.

§ 6. In conſequence of this ſettled purpoſe, not declared in words, but without difficulty diſcovered by an attentive reader, he finds every other verſion which he examines either too literal or too looſe, in rendering almoſt every paſſage which he ſpecifies, according as it is more or leſs ſo, than that which he has tacitly made to ſerve as the common meaſure for them all. And though it is manifeſt, that even the moſt literal are not more blameably literal in any place than the Vulgate is in other places, or even the moſt looſe tranſlations more wide of the ſenſe than in ſome inſtances that verſion may be ſhewn to be; he has always the addreſs to bring his readers (at leaſt on their firſt reading his book) to believe with him, that the exceſs, of whatever kind it be,

* Hiſt. Crit. du V. T. liv. III. ch. i.

be, is in the other verſions, and not in the Vulgate. In order to this, he is often obliged to argue from contrary topics, and at one time to defend a mode of interpreting which he condemns at another. And though this inevitably involves him in contradictions, theſe, on a ſingle, or even a ſecond or third peruſal, are apt to be overlooked by a reader who is not uncommonly attentive. The inconſiſtencies elude the reader's notice the more readily, as they are not brought under his view at once, but muſt be gathered from parts of the work not immediately connected; and, as the individual paſſages in queſtion are always different, though the manner in which they are tranſlated, and on which the criticiſm turns, is the ſame. Add to this, that our critic's mode of arguing is the more ſpecious and unſuſpected, becauſe it is remarkably ſimple and diſpaſſionate. It will be neceſſary, therefore, though it may be accounted a bold and even invidious undertaking, to re-examine a few of the paſſages examined by father Simon, that we may, if poſſible, diſcover whether there be reaſon for the charge of partiality and inconſiſtency, which has been juſt now brought againſt him.

§ 7. In his examination of Eraſmus' verſion of the New Teſtament, he has the following obſervation: "Where we have "in the Greek τυ ὁριϛθεντος υἱυ Θευ εν δυναμει, Rom. i. 2. the ancient "Latin interpreter has very well and literally rendered it, *qui* "*prædeſtinatus eſt filius Dei in virtute*, which was alſo the ver- "ſion uſed in the Weſtern churches before Saint Jerom, who has "made no change on this place. I do not inquire whether that "interpreter has read προοριϛθεντος, as ſome believe; for *prædeſti-* "*natus* ſignifies no more here than *deſtinatus*: and one might "put in the tranſlation *prædeſtinatus*, who read ὁριϛθεντος, as we "read at preſent in all the Greek copies; and there is nothing "here that concerns what theologians commonly call *predeſtina-* "*tion*. Eraſmus however has forſaken the ancient verſion, and "ſaid, *qui declaratus fuit filius Dei cum potentia*. It is true, "that many learned Greek fathers have explained the Greek "participle ὁριϛθεντος by δειχθεντος αποφανθεντος; that is, *demonſtrated* "or *declared*; but an explanation is not a tranſlation. One may "remark, in a note, that that is the ſenſe which Saint Chryſoſ- "tom has given the paſſage, without changing the ancient ver- "ſion, as it very well expreſſes the energy of the Greek word, "which ſignifies rather *deſtinatus* and *definitus* than *declaratus* *. Thus far Simon.

Admit

* Ou il y a dans le Grec, τυ ὁριϛθεντος υἱυ Θευ εν δυναμει, l'ancien interprete Latin a fort bien traduit a la lettre, *qui prædeſtinatus eſt filius Dei in virtute*; et c'eſt même la verſion qui étoit en uſage dans les egliſes d'Occident avant Saint Jerome, qui n'y a rien changé en cet endroit. Je n'examine point ſi cet interprete a lu προοριϛθεντος, comme quelques uns le croyent:

Admit that the Vulgate is here literal, ſince this critic is pleaſed to call it ſo; it is at the ſame time obſcure, if not unmeaning. What the import of the word *predeſtinated* may be when, as he ſays, it has no relation to what divines call *predeſtination*, and conſequently cannot be ſynonymous with *predetermined, foreordained*, he has not been ſo kind as to tell us; and it will not be in every body's power to gueſs. For my part, I do not comprehend that curious aphoriſm as here applied, *An explanation is not a tranſlation.* Tranſlation is undoubtedly one ſpecies, and that both the ſimpleſt and the moſt important ſpecies, of explanation; and when a word is found in one language, which exactly hits the ſenſe of a word in another language as uſed in a particular paſſage, though it ſhould not reach the meaning in other places, it is certainly both the proper tranſlation, and the beſt explanation, of the word in that paſſage.

And, for the truth of this ſentiment, I am happy to have it in my power to add, that I have the concurrence of Mr Simon himſelf moſt explicitly declared. Speaking of a Spaniſh tranſlation of the Old Teſtament by a Portugueſe Jew, which is very literal, as all Jewiſh tranſlations are, he ſays *, "This grammatical rigour does not often ſuit the ſenſe. We muſt diſtinguiſh between a dictionary and a tranſlation. In the former, one explains the words according to their proper ſignification, whereas, in the latter, it is ſometimes neceſſary to divert them from their proper and primitive ſignification, in order to adjuſt them to the other words with which they are connected." In another place †, "He (Pagnin) has imagined that, in order to make a

croyent: car *prædeſtinatus* ne ſignifie en ce lieu là que *deſtinatus*; et ainſi l'on a pu traduire *prædeſtinatus* en liſant ἐξισθέντες, comme on lit préſentement dans tous les exemplaires Grecs, et il ne s'agit nullement de ce que les theologiens appellent ordinairment *predeſtination*. Eraſme cependant s'eſt eloigne de cette ancienne verſion, ayant traduit *qui declaratus fuit filius Dei cum potentia*. Il eſt vrai que pluſieurs doctes peres Grecs ont explique le verbe Grec ἐξισθέντες par δειχθέντες ἀποφανθέντες, c'eſt-a dire demontre ou declare: mais une explication n'eſt pas une traduction. L'on peut marquer dans une note que c'eſt la le ſens que Saint Chryſoſtome a donne a ce paſſage, ſans changer pour cela la verſion ancienne, qui exprime tres-bien la force du mot Grec, qui ſignifie plutot *deſtinatus, definitus* que *declaratus*. Hiſt. Crit. des Verſions du N. T. ch. xxi.

* Cette rigeur de grammaire ne s'accorde pas ſouvent avec le ſens. Il faut mettre de la difference entre un dictionaire et une traduction. Dans le premier on explique les mots ſelon leur ſignification propre, au-lieu que dans l'autre il eſt quelquefois neceſſaire de detourner les mots de leur ſignifications propres et primitives, pour les ajuſter aux autres mots avec leſquels ils ſont joints. Hiſt. Crit. du V. T. liv II ch. xix.

† Il s'eſt imagine que pour faire une traduction fidelle de l'Ecriture, il etoit neceſſaire de ſuivre la lettre exactement et ſelon la rigeur de la grammaire; ce qui eſt tout-a-fait oppoſe a cette pretendue exactitude, parce qu'il eſt rare que deux langues ſe rencontrent dans leurs facons de parler:

" a faithful tranſlation of Scripture, it was neceſſary to follow " the letter exactly, and according to the rigour of grammar; a " practice quite oppoſite to that pretended exactneſs, becauſe it " rarely happens that two languages agree in their idioms; and " thus, ſo far from expreſſing his original in the ſame purity " wherein it is written, he diſfigures it, and ſpoils it of all its or- " naments." In the former of theſe quotations, the author ſhews that the literal method is totally unfit for conveying an author's ſenſe, and therefore ill-ſuited for anſwering the firſt great end in tranſlating; and in the latter, that it is no better adapted either for doing juſtice to an author's manner, or for producing a work which can be uſeful or agreeable, and therefore equally unfit for all the primary purpoſes of tranſlating. Had it been this author's declared intention to refute his own criticiſm on the paſſage quoted from Eraſmus, he could have ſaid nothing ſtronger or more pertinent.

I ſhall juſt add to his manner of reaſoning on this ſubject, a particular example, which may ſerve as a counterpart to the remark on Eraſmus above quoted. Speaking of the tranſlators of Port Royal, he ſays *, " They have followed the grammatical " ſenſe of the Greek text in tranſlating John xvi. 13. *Il vous fera* " *entrer dans toutes les verites*, as if this other ſenſe, which is in " the Vulgate, and which they have put into their note, *il vous* " *enſeignera toute verite*, did not anſwer exactly to the Greek. " But John Bois has not thought the new tranſlators worthy of " approbation for changing *docebit*, which is, in our Latin edi- " tion, into another word. *Vetus*, ſays this learned Proteſtant, " *docebit, non male nam et ὁ διδαξων ſuo modo ὁδηγει et ὁ ὁδηγων ſuo* " *modo διδαξει.*" Yet let it be obſerved, that here it is the new interpreters, and not the Vulgate, who very well expreſs the energy of the Greek word, and that without either deſerting the meaning, or darkening it, as the Vulgate, in the former caſe, has not ſcrupled to do. Here he has given, indeed, the moſt ample ſcope for retorting upon the Vulgate, in his own words, that ὁδηγει may indeed be explained by *docebit*, " but an explanation " is not a tranſlation."

§ 8. But this is not all. Our critic objects alſo to the freedom which Eraſmus has taken in tranſlating the Greek prepoſition εν in

parler: et ainſi bien loin d'exprimer ſon original dans la meme purete qu'il eſt ecrit, il le defigure, et le depouille de tous ſes ornemens. Hiſt. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xx.

* Ils ont ſuivi le ſens grammatical du texte Grec en traduiſant, *il vous fera entrer*, &c. comme ſi cet autre ſens qui eſt dans la Vulgate, et qu'ils ont mit dans leur note, *il vous enſeignera*, &c. ne repondoit pas exactement au Grec. Mais Jean Boys n'a pu approuver les nouveaux traducteurs, qui ont change *docebit*, qui eſt dans notre edition Latine en un autre mot. *Vetus*, &c. Hiſt. Crit. de Verſions du N. T. ch. xxxvi.

in the forecited paſſage by the Latin *cum*. " Beſides," ſays he *, " although the Greek particle εν ſignifies, in the ſtyle of the writ- " ers of the New Teſtament, which is conformable to that of the " Seventy, *in* and *cum*, it had been better to tranſlate, as it is in " the Vulgate, *in virtute*, or *in potentia*, and to write on the mar- " gin that *in* ſignifies alſo *cum*, becauſe there is but one ſingle " prepoſition which anſwers to them both in the Hebrew or " Chaldaic language, with which the Greek of the New Teſta- " ment often agrees, eſpecially in this ſort of prepoſitions."

Now it is very remarkable, that there is nothing which he treats as more contemptible and even abſurd in Arias Montanus, than this very attempt at uniformity in tranſlating the Hebrew prepoſitions and other particles. " Can one," ſays he †, " give " the title of a very exact interpreter, to a tranſlator, who almoſt " every where confounds the ſenſe of his text? In effect, all his " erudition conſiſts in tranſlating the Hebrew words literally, ac- " cording to their moſt ordinary ſignification, without minding " whether it agree or not with the context where he employs it. " When the Hebrew words are equivocal, one ought, methinks, " to have ſome regard to that ſignification which ſuits them in " the places where they are found; and it is ridiculous to aſſign " them indifferently every ſort of ſignification ſuitable or unſuit- " able. Yet this fault abounds in every part of the verſion of " Arias Montanus, who has herein diſplayed very little judg- " ment. He has, for example, tranſlated, in almoſt every paſ- " ſage,

* De plus, bien que la particule Grecque εν ſignifie dans le ſtile des ecrivains du Nouveau Teſtament qui eſt conforme a celui des Septante, *in* et *cum*, il eut ete mieux de traduire, comme il y a dans la Vulgate *in virtute* ou *in potentia*, et de mettre a la marge que *in* ſignifie auſſi *cum*; parce qu'il n'y a qu'une ſeule prepoſition qui reponde a ces deux-la dans la langue Ebraique ou Caldaique, a laquelle le Grec du N. T. eſt ſouvent conforme, ſur-tout dans ces ſortes de prepoſitions. N. T. liv. II. ch. xxii.

† Peut on donner la qualite d'interprete tres exact a un traducteur qui renverſe preſque par tout le ſens de ſon texte? En-effet, toute ſon erudition conſiſte a traduire les mots Hebreux a la lettre, ſelon leur ſignification la plus ordinaire, ſans prendre garde ſi elle convient ou non, aux endroits ou il l'employ. Quand les mots Hebreux ſont equivoques. on doit, ce ſemble, avoir egard a la ſignification qui leur eſt propre ſelon les lieux ou ils ſe trouvent, et il eſt ridicule de mettre indifferement toute ſorte de ſignification, ſoit qu'elle convienne, ou qu'elle ne convienne pas. Ce defaut eſt cependant repandu dans toute la verſion d'Arias Montanus, qui a fait paroitre en cela tres-peu de jugement. Il a traduit, par example, preſque en tous les endroits la prepoſition Ebraique *al* par la prepoſition Latine *ſuper*: et cependant on ſait, que cette prepoſition ſignifie dans l'Ebreu tantot *ſuper*, tautot *juxta*, et quelquefois *cum*. Il a fait la meme chofe a l'egard de la lettre *Lamed* laquelle repond au *pour* des Francois, ou elle eſt une marque du datif. C'eſt ainſi qu'au chapitre premier de la Geneſe, verſet fixieme ou Pagnin avoit traduit aſſez nettement *Dividat aquas ab aquis*, il a traduit ſans aucun ſens *Dividat aquas ad aquas*. Hiſt. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xx.

" ſage, the Hebrew prepoſition *al* by the Latin *ſuper*; whereas " it is well known that this prepoſition ſignifies in Hebrew, " ſometimes *ſuper*, ſometimes *juxta*, ſometimes *cum*. He has " done the ſame in regard to the letter *lamed*, which anſwers to " the French *pour*, where it is a mark of the dative. Thus the " words of Geneſis, which Pagnin had rendered clearly enough, " *Dividat aquas ab aquis*, he has tranſlated, without any meaning, " *Dividat aquas ad aquas*."

Here in two parallel caſes, for the queſtion is the ſame in both, whether the ſenſe or the letter merit moſt the attention of the tranſlator, or more particularly, whether or not the prepoſitions of the original ought uniformly to be tranſlated in the ſame way, without regard to the ſenſe, our learned critic has pronounced two ſentences perfectly oppoſite to each other. This oppoſition is the more flagrant, as Arias had actually taken the method which Simon inſiſts that Eraſmus ought to have taken. He followed the letter in the text, and gave the meaning by way of comment, on the margin. The ſecond deciſion, however, we may reaſonably conclude, is the deciſion of his judgment, as neither of the interpreters compared, Pagnin nor Arias, is a favourite with him; whereas the firſt is the deciſion merely of his affection, as Eraſmus was oppoſed to the Vulgate.

§ 9. In further confirmation of the judgment I have juſt now given, it may be obſerved, that in every caſe wherein the Vulgate is not concerned, his verdict is uniform in preferring the ſenſe to the letter. " There is," ſays he *, " in this laſt reviſal of the " verſion of Geneva, *Alors on commenca d'appeller du nom de* " *l'Eternel*, which yields an obſcure and even abſurd meaning. " It is indeed true that Aquila has tranſlated word for word af- " ter the ſame manner; but he has followed literally the gram- " matical ſenſe. Now, with the aid of a very ſlight acquaint- " ance with Hebrew, one might know that this phraſe *appeller* " *du nom* ſignifies to invoke the name, eſpecially when the diſ- " courſe is of God." In like manner, when the Vulgate is concerned in the queſtion, and happens to follow the ſenſe in an inſtance wherein the verſion compared with it prefers the letter, we may be certain that our author's deciſion is then for the ſenſe. " The Seventy," he tells us †, have rendered Επικαταρατος συ απο " παντων

* Il y a dans cette derniere reviſion [de la verſion de Geneve] *Alors on commenca d'appeller du nom de l'Eternel.* Ce qui fait un ſens obſcur, et meme impertinent. Il eſt bien vrai qu' Aquila a traduit mot pour mot de la meme maniere: mais il a ſuivi a la lettre le ſens grammatical, et pour peu qu'on ait lu d'Ebreu, on ſait que cette facon de parler *appeller du nom* ſignifie *invoquer le nom* de quelqu'un, principalement quand il eſt parlé de Dieu. Hiſt. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xxiv.

† Les Septante ont traduit Επικαταρατος συ απο παντων κτηνων, ou il y a dans la Vulgate, *Maledictus es inter omnia animantia*: le mot Grec απο, dont

" παντων των κτηνων, where we have in the Vulgate, *maledictus es* " *inter omnia animantia* : the Greek word απο, uſed by the Sep- " tu gint in this place, is unſuitable and nonſenſical." Such is the ſentence which our author invariably pronounces on this truly ſenſeleſs mode of tranſlating.

But ſtill it is with a ſecret exception of all the inſtances wherein this ſenſeleſs mode of tranſlating has peen adopted by the Vulgate. For this adoption has inſtantly converted it into the only proper method, and the verſion which the plain ſenſe of the paſſage indicates, muſt then be conſigned to the margin ; for *an explanation is not a tranſlation.*

§ 10. To the preceding remarks, I ſhall ſubjoin two more of Father Simon on the verſion of Eraſmus. in which he cannot indeed accuſe that learned interpreter of departing further either from the letter, or from the ſenſe, than the Vulgate itſelf, but merely of leaving the Vulgate, and rendering the Greek word differently. Simon has in this cauſe a powerful ally, John Bois canon of Ely, a man whom, not without reaſon, he extols for his learning and critical ſagacity ; and one who had, beſides, ſuch an attachment to the Vulgate, as exactly tallied with his own. For Bois, in every inſtance wherein the Vulgate is literal, finds a freer method looſe, profane, and intolerable ; and when the Vulgate follows more the ſenſe than the letter, which is not unfrequently the caſe, no perſon can be more deciſive than he, that the literal method is ſervile, barbarous, unmeaning, and ſuch as befits only a ſchool-boy.

But to return to Simon : " Eraſmus," ſays he *, " rendered " not very appoſitely *obſcurant* what in the Vulgate was *ex-* " *terminant*, and in the Greek αφανιζουσι. John Bois, who has " defended in this place the Latin interpreter, by the authority of " Saint Chryſoſtom, who explains the verb αφανιζουσι by διαφθειρουσι, " *they corrupt*, maintains that we ought to give this meaning to " the Latin verb *exterminant*. He condemns the new interpre- " ters who have tranſlated otherwiſe under pretence that this " word is not good Latin. *Parum fortaſſe eleganter*," ſays he, " *verbum αφανιζουσι ſic reddidit, ſed appoſite ut qui maxime.*" But how is the authority of Chryſoſtom concerned in the queſtion? Chryſoſtom,

dont les Septante ſe ſont ſervis en cet endroit, n'y convient point, et ne fait aucun ſens. Hiſt. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. v.

* Il n'etoit pas a propos qu'Eraſme traduiſit *obſcurant*, ou il y a dans la Vulgate *exterminant*, et dans le Grec αφανιζουσι (Mat. vi, 16.) Jean Bois qui a defendu en cet endroit l'interprete Latin par l'autorite de Saint Chryſoſtome, lequel explique le verbe αφανιζουσι par διαφθειρουσι, *corrompent*, pretend qu'on doit doner ce ſens au verbe Latin *exterminant*. Il condamne les nouveaux interpretes qui ont traduit autrement, ſous pretexte que ce mot n'eſt pas aſſez Latin. Si cette expreſſion, dit-il, n'a rien d'elegant, au moins elle eſt tres propre. Hiſt. Crit. des Verſions du N. T. ch. xxii.

Chryſoſtom, indeed, affirms that *αφανιζωσι* is in this place equivalent to *διαφθειρωσι*, but ſays nothing at all of *exterminant*, the only word about which we are in doubt.

For my part, I believe I ſhall not be ſingular in thinking, that it is far from being appoſite in the preſent application. "John "Bois," he ſays, "maintains that we ought to give the ſame "meaning with *διαφθειρωσι* to the Latin verb." But is it in the power of John Bois, or of Richard Simon, or of both, to give what ſenſe they pleaſe to a Latin verb? On this hypotheſis, indeed, they may tranſlate in any way, and defend any tranſlation which they chuſe to patroniſe. But if in Latin, as in all other languages, propriety muſt be determined by uſe, the word *exterminant* is in this place, I ſay not inelegant, but improper. It is not chargeable with inelegance, becauſe uſed by good writers, but is charged with impropriety, becauſe unauthoriſed in this acceptation. And even if it ſhould not be quite unexampled, it muſt be admitted to be obſcure and indefinite, on account of the uncommonneſs of the application.

§ 11. The other example follows*: "Eraſmus' deſertion of "the ancient edition has often ariſen from the belief that the "Latin was not pure enough. For example, inſtead of ſaying "*noluit conſolari*, he has ſaid *noluit conſolationem admittere*. Yet "*conſolari* occurs in the paſſive in ſome ancient authors. Be-"ſides, this great exactneſs about the propriety of the Latin "words in a verſion of the Scriptures is not always ſeaſonable. "The interpreter's principal care ſhould be to expreſs well the "ſenſe of the original." True. But to expreſs the ſenſe well, and to give it in proper words, are, in my apprehenſion, very nearly, if not entirely, coincident. I admit, indeed (if that be the author's meaning), that it would not be ſeaſonable to recur to circumlocution, or to affected and far fetched expreſſions, and avoid ſuch as are ſimple and perſpicuous, becauſe not uſed by the moſt elegant writers. But this is not the caſe here. The expreſſion which Eraſmus has adopted, is ſufficiently plain and ſimple; and, though *conſolari* may ſometimes be found in a paſſive ſignification, there can be no doubt that the active meaning is far the more common. Now, to avoid even the ſlighteſt ambiguity in the verſion, where there is nothing ambiguous in the original, would be a ſufficient reaſon with any man but an Arias

* Cet eloignement vient ſouvent de ce qu'il [Eraſme] a cru que l'ancienne edition n'eſt pas aſſez Latine. Par example (dans Mat. ii. 18.) au lieu de *noluit conſolari*, il a mis *noluit conſolationem admittere*. On trove cependant *conſolari* au paſſif, dans d'anciens auteurs; outre que cette grande exactitude pour la proprieté des mots Latins, dans une verſion de l'Ecriture, n'eſt pas toujours de ſaiſons. L'on doit principalement prendre garde a bien exprimer le ſens de l'original. Hift. Crit. des Verſions du N. T. ch. xxii.

or an Aquila, for a greater deviation from the form of the expreſſion, than this can reaſonably be accounted.

§ 12. This critical hiſtorian is indeed ſo ſenſible of the futility of the greater part of his remarks on the verſion of Eraſmus, that he, in a manner, apologiſes for it. "This ſort of alterations," ſays he *, "ſo frequent in Eraſmus's verſion, is generally of no importance; but it would have been more judicious to alter nothing in the ancient interpreter of the church, "but what it was abſolutely neceſſary to correct, in order to render him more exact: and perhaps it would have been better "to put the corrections in the margin in the form of remarks." This is a topic to which he is perpetually recurring. It was not unſuitable for one who thought as Father Simon ſeems ſometimes to have done, to uſe this plea as an argument againſt making new tranſlations of the Bible into Latin: but it is not at all pertinent to obtrude it upon the readers (as he often does), in the examination of the verſions actually made. The queſtion, in regard to theſe, is, or ought to be, ſolely concerning the juſtneſs of the verſion. Nor is it eaſy to conceive another motive for confounding topics ſo different, but to excite ſuch prejudices in the readers, as may preclude a candid examination.

As to his critique upon the tranſlation made by Eraſmus, it appears to me, I own, exceedingly trifling. I believe every impartial reader will be diſpoſed to conclude as much from the examples above produced. And I cannot help adding, in regard to the whole of his criticiſms on that verſion, with the exception of a very few, that they are either injudicious, the changes made by the interpreter being for the better, or frivolous, the changes being, at leaſt, not for the worſe. I admit a few exceptions. Thus, the *cui ſervio* of the Vulgate, is preferable to the *quem colo* of Eraſmus, as a verſion of ὡ λατρευω, Rom. i. 9. and better ſuited to the ſcope of the paſſage. Λειτουργουντων δε αυτων, Acts xiii. 2. could not have been more juſtly rendered than by the Vulgate, *miniſtrantibus autem illis*. The expreſſion adopted by Eraſmus, *Cum autem illi ſacrificarent*, is like one of Beza's ſtretches, though on a different ſide. Simon's cenſure of this paſſage deſerves to be recorded as an evidence of his impartiality, in his theological capacity at leaſt, however much we may think him ſometimes biaſſed as a critic. "Eraſmus," ſays he †, "has limited to the "ſacrifice,

* Ces ſortes de changemens qui ſont frequents dans la Verſion d'Eraſme, ſont la pluſpart de nulle importance; mais il etoit plus judicieux de ne changer dans l'ancien interprete de l'egliſe, que ce qu'il etoit abſolument neceſſaire de corriger, pour le rendre plus exact: et peut-etre meme etoit il mieux de mettre les corrections a la marge en forme de remarque. Hiſt. Crit. des Verſions du N. T. ch. xxii.

† Il a limite au ſacrifice ou a l'action publique que les Grecs appellent *liturgie*, et les Latins *meſſe*, ce qu'on doit entendre en ce lieu-la generalement

" ſacrifice, or the public action which the Greeks call *liturgy*, " and the Latins *maſs*, that which, in this place, ought to be " underſtood of the miniſtry and functions in general, of the firſt " miniſters of the church. He had, therefore, no reaſon to re- " form the verſion of the ancient interpreter, who expreſſes " agreeably both to the letter and to the ſenſe, the Greek verb " λειτουργειν."

Eraſmus ſoon had his imitators, in this particular, among the Romiſh tranſlators into modern languages. *Corbin*, in his French verſion, rendered that paſſage, *Eux celebrans le ſaint ſacrifice de la meſſe*. After him, Father *Veron*, *Les Apotres celebroient la meſſe au Seigneur*. " The reaſon," ſays Simon *, " which Ve- " ron offers for tranſlating it in this manner, is becauſe the Cal- " viniſts had often aſked him in what paſſage of Scripture it was " mentioned that the Apoſtles ever ſaid maſs." This plea of Veron is not unlike the mode of reaſoning in his own defence, of which I had occaſion formerly to produce ſome examples from Beza †. That father, that he might not again be at a loſs for an anſwer to ſuch troubleſome queriſts as he had found in thoſe diſciples of Calvin, was reſolved that, whether the maſs had a place in the original or not, or even in the Vulgate, it ſhould ſtand forth conſpicuous in his tranſlation, ſo that no perſon could miſtake it. The reader will not be ſurpriſed to learn, that he was a controvertiſt by profeſſion, as appears from his addition in the title of his book, " Docteur en Theologie, Predicateur et " Lecteur du Roi pour les Controverſes, Depute par Noſſeigneurs " du Clerge, pour ecrire ſur icelles." And to ſhow of what conſequence he thought theſe particulars were to qualify him as a tranſlator, he obſerves in the preface ‡, that " the quality of holy " writ well deſerves, on ſeveral important accounts, that its tran- " ſlators ſhould be doctors in theology, and eſpecially well verſed " in controverſies." Simon's obſervation on this ſentiment merits our utmoſt attention: " It is true," ſays he ||, " that it " were

ment du miniſtere et des fonctions des premiers miniſtres de l'egliſe. Il n'a donc pas eu raiſon de reformer la verſion de l'ancien interprete, qui exprime tres-bien a la lettre, et ſelon le ſens, le verbe Grec λειτουργειν. Hiſt. Crit. des Verſions du N. T. ch. xxii.

* La raiſon qu'il apporte de ſa traduction en cet endroit, eſt que les Calviniſtes lui avoient ſouvent demande en quel lieu de l'Ecriture il etoit marque que les apotres euſſent dit la meſſe. Hiſt. Crit. des Verſions du N. T. ch. xxxi.

† Diſſ. X. Part V. § 5, 6, 9.

‡ La qualite de l'Ecriture ſainte merite bien auſſi pour divers chefs que ſes traducteurs ſoient docteurs en theologie, et bien verſez ſpecialement aux controverſes. Ibid.

|| Il eſt vrai qu'il ſeroit a deſirer que ceux qui ſe melent de traduire la Bible fuſſent ſcavans dans la theologie: mais ce doit etre une autre theologie que celle qui regarde la controverſe; car il arrive ſouvent que les controverſiſtes

" were to be wiſhed that thoſe who meddle with tranſlating the " Bible, were learned in theology; but it ſhould be another ſort " of theology than the controverſial; for it frequently happens, " that controvertiſts diſcover in the Bible things not in it, and " that they limit the ſignifications of the words by their own " ideas."

§ 13. But, to return to the detection I have attempted of Simon's partiality as a critic, and of the contradictory arguments in which he is often involved by it; we ſhould think him ſometimes as much attached to the letter, and even to the arrangement of the words in the original, as any devotee of the ſynagogue; and at other times diſpoſed to allow great freedoms in both reſpects. When we examine into the reaſon of this inconſiſtency, we always find that the former is a prelude to the defence of the Vulgate in general, or of ſome obſcure and barbarous expreſſion in that verſion; the latter is often, but not always, in vindication of ſomething in the Vulgate, expreſſed more freely than perhaps was expedient, or, at leaſt, neceſſary; for there are great inequalities in that tranſlation. I ſay, in this caſe, *often*, but not *always*; becauſe, as was hinted before, when there is no ſcope for party-attachment, his own good ſenſe determines him to prefer thoſe who keep cloſe to the meaning before thoſe who keep cloſe to the letter.

" It flows," ſays he *, " from want of reſpect for the writings " of the Apoſtles, to tranſpoſe the order of their words, under " pretence that this tranſpoſition forms a clearer and more natu- " ral ſenſe. This may properly be remarked, but it is not al- " lowable to make ſuch a change in the text." Again†, " Peo- " ple of ſenſe will prefer the barbariſm of the ancient Latin edi- " tion to the politeneſs of Eraſmus, becauſe it is no fault, in an " interpreter of Scripture, to follow cloſely his original, and to " exhibit even its tranſpoſitions of words. If the interpreter of " the church does not employ Latin terms ſufficiently pure, it is " becauſe

controverſiſtes voyent dans la Bible des choſes qui n'y ſont point, et qu'ils en limitent quelquefois les mots ſelon leurs idees. Hiſt. Crit. des Verſions du N. T. ch. xxxi.

* Ce n'eſt pas auſſi avoir aſſez de reſpect pour les ecrits des apotres, que de tranſpoſer l'ordre des mots ſous pretexte que cette tranſpoſition forme un ſens plus net et plus naturel. Il eſt bon de remarquer; mais il ne'eſt pas permis de faire ce changement dans le texte. Hiſt. Crit. des Com. du N. T. ch. lx.

† Le gens de bon ſens prefereront la barbarie de l'ancienne edition Latine a la politeſſe d'Eraſme, parceque ce ne'ſt pas un defaut dans un interprete de l'Ecriture de ſuivre fidelement ſon original, et d'en repreſenter juſqu'aux hyperbates. Si l'interprete de l'egliſe ne s'explique pas en des termes Latins aſſez purs c'ſt qu'il s'eſt attaché a rendre fidelement le mots de ſon original. Il eſt aiſe de remedier a ces pretendus defauts par de petites notes.

" becauſe he is determined to render faithfully the words of his " original. It is eaſy to remedy, by ſhort notes, ſuch pretended " faults."

The preceding obſervations and reaſoning he has himſelf anſwered in another place, in a way that is quite ſatisfactory. " A tranſlator of Scripture," ſays he *, " ought to take care not " to attach himſelf entirely to the order of the words in the ori- " ginal; otherwiſe, it will be impoſſible for him to avoid falling " into ambiguities; becauſe the languages do not accord with " each other in every thing." Again †: "A tranſlator ought " not ſimply to count the words; but he ought, beſides, to exa- " mine in what manner they may be joined together, ſo as to " form a good meaning; otherwiſe his tranſlation will be pue- " rile and ridiculous." In another place he is ſtill more indulgent ‡: " One ought, doubtleſs, to conſider the difference of the " languages: our manners and our expreſſions do not ſuit thoſe " of the ancient Orientals. For this reaſon, I agree with Father " Amelote, that it was not neceſſary that he ſhould employ the " conjunction *and* in all the places where it is found in the New " Teſtament, becauſe this repetition ſhocks us; as do alſo theſe " other particles, *behold*, *now*, *then*, *becauſe*. I am convinced " that Amelote did right in ſubſtituting others in their ſtead."

If it ſhould be aſked, Why does not Simon enjoin rather, in thoſe places, to trace the letter, at all hazards, in the text, and recur to the margin, his never-failing reſource on other occaſions, for what regards the meaning? I know no pertinent anſwer that can be given, unleſs that, in the places juſt now quoted, he is not engaged in defending the obſcurities, and even the nonſenſe, of the Vulgate, againſt the plain ſenſe of other verſions.

§ 14. To thoſe above cited, I ſhall add but a few other ſpecimens.

* Un traducteur de l'Ecriture doi prendre garde a ne s'attacher pas entierement a l'ordre des mots qui eſt dans l'original; autrement il ſera impoſſible qu'il ne tombe dans des equivoques, parce que les langues ne ſe rapportent pas en tout les unes aux autres. Hiſt. Crit. du V. T. liv. III. ch. ii.

† Un traducteur ne doit pas compter ſimplement les mots; mais il doit de plus examiner, de quelle maniere on les peut joindre enſemble pour former un bon ſens; autrement ſa traduction ſera puerile et ridicule. Hiſt. Crit. du V. T. liv. II ch. xx.

‡ On doit a la verite conſiderer la difference de langues, nos manieres et nos expreſſions ne s'accordant point avec celles des anciens peuples d'Orient. Sur ſe pied la je conviens avec le P. Amelote, qu'il n'a pas ete neceſſaire qu'il employat la conjonction *et* das tous les endroits ou elle ſe trouve dans le Nouveau Teſtament, parce que cette repetition nous choque, auſſi bien que ces autres particules, *voilà*, *donc*, *or*, *parce que*. Je ſuis meme perſuade qu'il en a pu ſubſtituer d'autres en leur place. Hiſt. Crit. des Verſions du N. T. ch. xxxiii.

mens. "It is," says he *, "much more proper, in a translation "of the sacred books into the vulgar tongue, to attach one's self, "as much as possible to the letter, than to give meanings too free "in quitting it." Again †, "This respect is due to the sacred "books, which cannot be too literally interpreted, provided they "be made intelligible." This sentiment appears moderate, on a general view; yet, when applied to particular cases, it will not be found to be that author's sentiment. And, what may be thought more extraordinary, this rule of his will be found to require, when judged by his own criticisms, both too much and too little.

First, it requires too much; because it implies that we are never to forsake the letter, unless when, by adhering to it, the expression might be rendered unintelligible. Yet, in a quotation lately given from that author, he admits, that the particles *and, behold, now, then, because*, may be either omitted or changed, and that not on account of their hurting the sense, which they rarely do, but expressly, because the frequent recurrence of such words shocks us, that is, offends our ears. An additional evidence of the same thing is, the exception he takes to Munster's translation, which he declares to be too literal, and consequently rude though, at the same time, he acknowledges it to be sufficiently intelligible ‡. The sacred books, then, may be too literally interpreted, though they be made intelligible. Assertions more manifestly contradictory it is impossible to conceive.

Secondly, the rule he has given us requires too little; because it evidently implies that the letter ought to be deserted, when to do so is necessary for expressing the sense perspicuously. Now, if that had been uniformly our critic's opinion, we should never have had so many recommendations of the margin for correcting the ambiguities, false meanings, and no meanings, which a rigorous adherence to the letter had brought into the text of the Vulgate, and which he will not permit to be changed in other versions.

§ 15. I have already given it as my opinion, that Father Simon's sentiments on this subject, when unbiassed by any special purpose, were rational and liberal. I have given some evidences of this, and intend here to add a few more. Speaking of the Greek

* Il est bein plus a propos dans une traduction des livres sacres en langue vulgaire, de s'attacher a la lettre autant qu'il est possible que de donner des sens trop libres en la quitant. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxv.

† On doit avoir ce respect pour les livres sacres qui ne peuvent etre traduits trop a la lettre, pourveu qu'on se fasse entendre. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxiv.

‡ Quoique sa version soit assez intelligible, elle a neanmoins quelque chose de rude, parce qu'elle suit trop la lettre du texte Ebreu. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xxi.

Greek verſion of the Old Teſtament, by Aquila the Jew, he ſays *, " One cannot excuſe this interpreter's vicious affectation " (which St Jerom has named καχοζηλια or *ridiculous zeal*), in " tranſlating every word of his text entirely by the letter, and " in ſo rigid a manner, as to render his verſion altogether barba- " rous." Again †, " The Seventy, who tranſlate the Hebrew " often too literally, and ſometimes even without minding the " ſenſe, do not always exactly hit the meaning; and they render " themſelves obſcure, by an exceſſive attachment to the letter." Of Arias's tranſlation he ſays ‡: " It is true, that this verſion " may be uſeful to thoſe who are learning Hebrew, becauſe it " renders the Hebrew word for word, according to the gramma- " tical ſenſe; but I do not think that one ought therefore to give " Arias Montanus the character of *a moſt faithful interpreter*: " on the contrary, one will do him much more juſtice, in naming " him *a moſt trifling interpreter*."

Agreeably to this more enlarged, and indeed, more accurate way of thinking, the critic did not heſitate to pronounce this expreſſion of Munſter: *Fructificate et augeſcite, et implete aquas in fretis*, much inferior to that of the Vulgate, *Creſcite et multiplicamini, et implete aquas maris* ||. I am of the ſame opinion as to the paſſages compared, though I have no partiality to the Vulgate. Yet, by Simon's rule, above quoted, Munſter's verſion here ought to be preferred. It is equally intelligible, and more literal. Nor is the word *fructificate* more exceptionable in point of Latinity, than many words in the Vulgate which he ſtrenuouſly defends: accuſing thoſe who object to them, of an exceſs of delicacy, but ill ſuited to the ſubject. His friend, the canon of Ely, if it had been a term of the ancient interpreter, would have told us boldly, and, in my opinion, with better reaſon than when he ſo expreſſed himſelf, *Parum fortaſſe eleganter verbum* פרו *pheru, ſic reddidit; ſed appoſite, ut qui maxime.* The ſame fault, of being too literal, and ſometimes tracing etymologies, he finds

* On ne peut pas excuſer cet interprete d'une affectation vicieuſe (que St Jerome a nomme καχοζηλιαν, ou *zele ridicule*) d'autant qu'il a traduit chaque mot de ſon texte entierement a la lettre, et d'une maniere ſi rigoureuſe, que cela a rendu ſa verſion tout-a-fait barbare. Hiſt. Crit. du V. T. liv. II.

† Les Septante qui traduiſent ſouvent l'Ebreu trop a la lettre, et quelquefois meme ſans prendre garde au ſens, ne ſont pas toujours un choix exact du veritable ſens, et ils ſe rendent obſcurs, pour s'attacher trop a la lettre. Hiſt. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xiii.

‡ Il eſt vrai que cette verſion peut etre utile a ceux qui veulent apprendre la langue Ebraique, parce qu'elle rend l'Hebreu mot pour mot, et ſelon le ſens grammatical: mais je ne croi pas qu'on doive donner pour cela a Arias Montanus la qualité de *fidiſſimus interpres*: au contraire lui fera beaucoup plus de juſtice, en le nommant *ineptiſſimus*. Hiſt. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xx.

* Gen. i. 2. Hiſt. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xxi.

finds in Beza. "What has often deceived Beza," says he *, "and the other translators of Geneva, is their thinking to render "the Greek more literally, by attaching themselves to express "etymologies. They have not considered that it is proper only "for school-boys to translate in this manner." To these let me add the testimony of his apologist, Hieronymus Le Camus †: "When they render the Hebrew word for word, they do not "speak pure Greek. This Simon calls κακοζηλια, or a vicious "affectation familiar to Jewish interpreters, and occurring some-"times in the Septuagint. Thus, when they turn some prepo-"sitions from Hebrew into Greek, they retain the Hebrew idiom; "for example, in Hebrew, the comparative is expressed by the "preposition *min*, which the Seventy, and Aquila, often render "απο, *from*; in which case, this κακοζηλια darkens the sense." Was there none of this κακοζηλια then, in using the preposition *in* (where the idiom of the Latin, and the sense of the expression, required *cum*), in the phrase *in virtute* of the Vulgate ‡?

§ 16. But it is certain that, whatever were his general sentiments on the subject, he no sooner descended to particular instances, than he patronized the free or the literal manner, just as the one or the other had been followed by the Vulgate. If he had said, in so many words, that the example of the ancient interpreter was a sufficient reason, the question would have been more simple. But, whatever weight this sentiment might have had with Romanists, to whom that version serves as a standard, it could not surely have had influence enough on Protestants, to make them sacrifice what they judged to be the sense of the unerring Spirit, in deference to the discovered mistakes of a fallible translator. It was, therefore, of importance to Father Simon, for the conviction of his Protestant readers, to shew, from the authentic principles of criticism, that, in every thing material, the old translator had judged better than any of the latter interpreters: and, in prosecution of this momentous point, I have given a specimen of his wonderful versatility in arguing. That I may

* Ce qui a souvent trompe Beze et les autres traducteurs de Geneve, c'est qu'ils ont cru rendre les mots Grecs plus a la lettre, s'ils s'attachoient a exprimer jusqu'aux etymologies. Ils n'ont pas considere qu'il n'y a que des ecoliers qui soient capables de traduire de cette maniere. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxvi.

† Quando verba Ebraica ita reddunt, ut verbum de verbo exprimant, minus Græce loquuntur; et hoc Simonius vocavit κακοζηλιαν seu pravam affectationem Judæis interpretibus familiarem, quæ etiam interdum in septuaginta interpretibus occurrit. Sic dum quasdam præpositiones ex Ebræo faciunt Græcas, retinent dictionem Ebraicam: exempli causa, sermo Ebraicus comparativum exprimit per *min* quod 70 cum Aquila haud infrequenter reddunt απο *ab*. Tunc ista κακοζηλια sensum efficit obscurum. Hier. le Cam. De Responsione Vossii, edit Edinb. 1655. p. 50.

‡ Rom. i. 2. See § 7. of this Dissertation.

may not be misunderstood, I must, at the same time, add, that he does not carry his partiality so far as to refuse acknowledging, in the Vulgate, a few slips of no consequence, and nowise affecting the sense. To have acted otherwise, would have been too inartificial in that critic, as it would have exposed the great object of his treatise too much. Some concessions it was necessary that he should employ, as an expedient for gaining the acquiescence of his readers in points incomparably more important.

§ 17. I shall now finish what I have to remark upon his criticisms, with some reflections on those words which, in consequence of the frequency of their occurrence, both in the Vulgate, and in ancient ecclesiastical writers, he considers as consecrated, and as therefore entitled to be preferred to other words, which are equally significant, but have not had the same advantage of antiquity and theological use. I readily admit the title claimed in behalf of such words, when they convey exactly the idea denoted by the original terms, and are neither obscure nor ambiguous; nay, I do not object even to their ambiguity, when the same ambiguity is in the original term. And this is, in my opinion, the utmost which ought to be either demanded on one side, or yielded on the other. If, on account of the usage of any former interpreter, I admit words which convey not the same idea with the original, or which convey it darkly, or which convey also other ideas that may be mistaken for the true, or confounded with it; I make a sacrifice of the truths of the Spirit, that I may pay a vain compliment to antiquity, in adopting its phraseology, even when it may mislead. That the words themselves be equally plain and pertinent with any other words which might occur, appears to me so reasonable a limitation to the preference granted in favour of those used in any former version, that I do not know any topic by which I could convince persons of a different opinion, if the bare stating of the matter, as is done above, be not sufficient. But, perhaps, it will answer better to descend to particulars. It is only thus a person can be assured of making himself thoroughly understood.

§ 18. Simon, speaking of the Lutheran and Port Royal versions, says *, "Neither of them retains almost any thing of that venerable

* Les uns et les autres ne retiennent presque rien de cet air venerable et tout divin que l'Ecriture a dans les langues originales. On n'y trouve point cette simplicite de stile qui est repandue dans les ecrits des Evangelistes et des Apotres. Cela paroit des les premiers mots de la traduction de Mons, ou nous lisons, *la genealogie de Jesus Christ*: et en effet ces deux mots Latins, *liber generationis*, qui repondent à deux autres qui sont dans le Grec, signifient *genealogie*. Mais un interprete qui voudra conserver cet air simple que les livres sacres ont dans les langues originales, aimera mieux traduire simplement *le livre de la generation*. Il remarquera en meme tems a la marge, que dans le stile de la bible on appelle βιβλος γενεσεως ce que les Grecs nomment γενεαλογια, *genealogie*: que les Apotres

" venerable and quite divine appearance which Scripture has in " the original languages. One does not find in theſe verſions, " that ſimplicity of ſtyle which is diffuſed through the writings " of the apoſtles and evangeliſts. This appears from the firſt " words of the tranſlation of Mons, where we read, *La genea-* " *logie de Jeſus Chriſt :* in effect, the two Latin words, *liber ge-* " *nerationis*, anſwering to two others in the Greek, ſignify *ge-* " *nealogy*. But an interpreter, who chuſes to preſerve that ſim- " ple air which the ſacred books have in the original tongues, " will rather tranſlate ſimply *the book of the generation.* He will " remark, at the ſame time, on the margin, that in the ſtyle of " the Bible, one calls βιβλος γενεσεως, what the Greeks name γενεα- " λογια, *genealogy ;* that the apoſtles have adopted this expreſſion " from the Greek verſion of the Seventy, who have thus ex- " preſſed the *ſepher toldoth* of the Hebrews."

Now it may be obſerved, that Simon himſelf ſpeaks of it as unqueſtionable, that *genealogie* expreſſes the meaning. But he objects, that it is not ſo ſimple an expreſſion as *le livre de la generation.* If he had called it too learned a term for uſhering in ſo plain a narrative as the Goſpel, I ſhould have thought the objection plauſible. But when he ſpeaks of ſimplicity, I am afraid that he has ſome meaning to that word which I am not acquainted with. I ſhould never imagine, that of different ways of expreſſing the ſame idea, ſuppoſing the expreſſions in other reſpects equal, that ſhould be accounted the leaſt ſimple, which is in the feweſt words. Or if the phraſe, *le livre de la generation*, do not derive its ſuperior ſimplicity from its being more complex; does it derive that quality from its being more obſcure than *la genealogie ?* I have been accuſtomed to conſider plainneſs, rather than obſcurity, as characteriſtic of ſimplicity. And, indeed, the chief fault I find in the former of theſe expreſſions, is its obſcurity. The word *livre* is here uſed in a ſenſe which it never has in French; as much may be ſaid of the word *generation ;* and conſequently the phraſe does not convey intelligibly the idea of the writer, or indeed any idea whatever. Our author's anſwer to this is, 'Give the ſenſe on the margin;' that is, in other words, give the etymology of the phraſe in the text, and the tranſlation in the margin. Is not this the very method taken by Arias Montanus, whom our critic has, nevertheleſs, treated very contemptuouſly ? Is not this hunting after etymological ſignifications, the very thing he condemns ſo ſtrongly in Beza, and ſome other modern interpreters ? And where is the difference, whether the expreſſion to be explained be a phraſe or a compound word; for a

ont pris cette expreſſion de la verſion Grecque des Septante, qui ont ainſi interprete le *ſepher-toldoth* des Ebreux. Hiſt. Crit. des Verſions du N.T. ch. xxxv.

a compound word is no other than a contracted phraſe? Γενεαλογια is but two words, γενεας λογος, contracted into one. This our author admits to be a juſt (and, I add, a literal) verſion of *ſepher toldoth*. Now, if the evangeliſt had employed this, inſtead of βιβλος γενεσεως, Simon would have had the ſame reaſon for inſiſting that it ought to be rendered, in the text, *la parole de la generation*, and that the meaning ſhould be explained in the margin.

Sometimes, indeed, this way of interpreting, by tracing the etymology, is proper, becauſe ſometimes it conveys the ſenſe with ſufficient perſpicuity, and with as much brevity as the language admits; but this is not the caſe always. Every body will allow, that φιλησονοι could not be more juſtly rendered than *lovers of pleaſure*, or φιλοθεοι than *lovers of God*. But συκοφαντοι is much better tranſlated *falſe accuſers*, than *informers concerning figs*; φιλοσοφοι, *philoſophers*, than *lovers of wiſdom*. The apoſtolical admonition, Col. ii. 8. Βλεπετε μη τις υμας εσται ο συλαγωγων δια της φιλοσοφιας, is certainly better rendered, *Beware leſt any man ſeduce you through philoſophy*, than, Beware leſt any man carry you off a prey, through the love of wiſdom; which, though it traces the letter, does not give the ſenſe. Yet, in theſe caſes, the terms may be pertinently explained in the margin, as well as in that mentioned by the critic. Now, to qualify one for the office of interpreter, it is requiſite that he be capable of giving the received uſe of the phraſes, as well as of the compound words, and of the compound words, as well as of the ſimple words.

There are caſes in which I have acknowledged, that recourſe to the margin is neceſſary; but ſuch caſes are totally different from the preſent, as will appear to the ſatisfaction of any one who has attended to what has been ſaid * on that ſubject. But the method ſo often recommended by Simon, is, in my apprehenſion, the moſt bungling imaginable. It is unnaturally to diſjoin two eſſential parts of the tranſlator's buſineſs, the interpretation of words, and the interpretation of idioms, or phraſes, allotting the text, or body of the book, for the one, and reſerving the margin for the other. In conſequence of which, the text will be often no better than a collection of riddles, or, what is worſe, a jargon of unmeaning words; whilſt that which alone deſerves the name of interpretation, will be found in the margin. This naturally ſuggeſts a query, Whether the text might not as well be diſpenſed with altogether, as it would only ſerve to interrupt a reader's progreſs, diſtract his attention, and divide his thoughts? To this let me add another query, Whether there be any thing in the tranſlations of Aquila, Malvenda, Arias Montanus, Pagnin, and Beza (for they all incur this ſtigma from our author,

* Diſſ. II. Part I. § 5. Diſſ. VIII. throughout.

author, when they translate more literally than the Vulgate), which better deserves the denomination of a school-boy's version, than that which the author, in this place, so strongly patronizes?

§ 19. I observed, that compound words are nearly on the same footing with such phrases as βιβλος γενεσεως. This holds more manifestly in Hebrew, where the nouns which are said, by their grammarians, to be *in statu constructo*, are, in effect, compound terms. To combine them the more easily, a change is, in certain cases, made on the letters of the word which we should call the governing word; and when there is no change in the letters, there is often, by the Masoretic reading, a change in the vowel-points to facilitate the pronunciation of them as one word. In this way, *sepher-toldoth* is as truly one compound word in Hebrew, as γενεαλογια is in Greek, and of the same signification. There is a similar idiom in the French language, for supplying names, by what may be termed indifferently, phrases, or compound nouns. Such are, *gens d'armes, jet d'eau, aide de camp.* We should think a translator had much of the κακοζηλια, the vicious affectation so oft above mentioned, who should render them into English, *people of arms, cast of water, help of field.* Another evidence that this may justly be regarded as a kind of composition in Hebrew, is that, when there is occasion for the affix pronouns, though their connection be in strictness with the first of the two terms, they are annexed to the second, which would be utterly repugnant to their syntax, if both were not considered as making but one word, and consequently as not admitting the insertion of a pronoun between them. Thus, what is rendered, Isaiah ii. 20. *his idols of silver*, and *his idols of gold*, if the two nouns in each phrase were not conceived as combined into one compound term, ought to be translated *idols of his silver*, and *idols of his gold*, ואת אלילי זהבו את אלילי כספו, which is not according to the genius of that language, for the affix pronouns are never transposed.

But when the words are considered in this (which I think is the true) light, as one compound name, there is the same reason for rendering them as our interpreters have done, that there would be to render ἡ φιλανθρωπια αυτε, *his love to men*, and not *love to his men.* In the same manner, שם קדשי *shem kodshi*, is *my holy name*, הר קדשי *har kodshi, my holy mountain*, and שמן קדשי *shemen kodshi, my holy oil.* These, if we should follow the letter in translating them, or, which is the same thing, trace the form of the composition, must be, *the name of my holiness*, *the mountain of my holiness*, and *the oil of my holiness.* In translating אלהי צדקי, Psal. iv. 1. *elohe tsidki*, rendered, in the common version, *O God of my righteousness*, I see no occasion with Dr Taylor, to make a stretch to find a meaning to the word an-

answering

ſwering to *righteouſneſs*; the word, agreeably to the Hebrew idiom above exemplified, has there manifeſtly the force of an epithet, and the expreſſion implies no more than *my righteous God.* In this way עם קדשך, Iſa. lxiii. 18. *gham kodſhecha* (which is exactly ſimilar), tranſlated in the Engliſh Bible, after Tremellius, and much in the manner of Arias, *the people of thy holineſs*, is rendered in the Vulgate, and by Houbigant, *populum ſanctum tuum, thy holy people*, and to the ſame purpoſe by the tranſlator of Zuric and Caſtalio. This very thing, therefore, that the Seventy did not render *ſepher-toldoth*, γενεαλογια, to which it literally, and in ſignification, anſwers, but βιβλος γενεσεως is an example of that κακοζηλια of which Jerom juſtly accuſes them, and which Simon never fails to cenſure with ſeverity in every tranſlation where he finds it, except the Vulgate. As this phraſe however, in conſequence of its introduction by theſe interpreters, obtained a currency among the Helleniſt Jews, and was quite intelligible to them, being in the national idiom, it was proper in the evangeliſt to adopt it. The caſe was totally different with thoſe for whom the Latin verſion was made, whoſe idiom the words *liber generationis* did not ſuit, and to whoſe ears they conveyed only unmeaning ſounds.

§ 20. I have never ſeen Mr Simon's French tranſlation of the New Teſtament from the Vulgate, but I have an Engliſh verſion of his verſion, by William Webſter, curate of St Dunſtan's in the Weſt. The Engliſh tranſlator profeſſes, in his dedication, to have tranſlated literally from the French. Yet Matthew's Goſpel begins in this manner: *The genealogy of Jeſus Chriſt.* If Mr Webſter has taken the freedom to alter Simon's phraſe, he has acted very ſtrangely, as it is hardly in the power of imagination to conceive a good reaſon for turning that work (which is itſelf but a tranſlation of a tranſlation) into Engliſh; unleſs to ſhow, as nearly as poſſible, that eminent critic's manner of applying his own rules, and to let us into his notions of the proper method of tranſlating holy writ. And if, on the other hand, Simon has actually rendered it in French, *La genealogie*, it is no leſs ſtrange that, without aſſigning a reaſon for his change of opinion, or ſo much as mentioning, in the preface, or in a note, that he had changed it, he ſhould employ an expreſſion which he had, in a work of high reputation, cenſured with ſo much ſeverity in another *.

§ 21.

* I have, ſince theſe Diſſertations were finiſhed, been fortunate enough to procure a copy of Simon's French tranſlation of the New Teſtament; from which I find that his Engliſh tranſlator has not miſrepreſented him. Without any apology either in the preface or in the notes, he adopts the very expreſſion which he had in ſo deciſive a manner condemned in the Gentlemen of Port Royal. Nay, ſo little does he value the rule which he had ſo often preſcribed to others, to give a literal verſion in the text, and

§ 21. Now if, from what has been ſaid, it be evident, that his own principles, explicitly declared in numberleſs parts of his book, as well as right reaſon, condemn the ſervile method of tracing etymologies in words or phraſes (for there is no material difference in the caſes), to the manifeſt injury of perſpicuity, and, conſequently, of the ſenſe; I know no tolerable plea which can be advanced in favour of ſuch phraſes, unleſs that to which he often recurs in other caſes, *conſecration by long uſe*. "Why," he aſks *, ſpeaking of the Port Royal tranſlation, "have they "baniſhed from this verſion many words which long uſe has "authoriſed, and which have been, ſo to ſpeak, canonized in the "Weſtern churches?" He does not, indeed, plead this in defence of the words *liber generationis*, though in my opinion, the moſt plauſible argument he had to offer. But as it is a principal topic with him, to which he often finds it neceſſary to recur, it will require a more particular examination.

§ 22. Where we have, in the Greek, ſays he †, ευαγγελιζονται, "and in the Vulgate *evangelizantur*, Eraſmus has tranſlated, "*Lætum evangelii accipiunt nuntium*. He explains, by ſeveral "words, what might have been rendered by one only, which is "not, indeed, Latin, but, as the learned John Bois remarks, it is "ancient, and is, beſides, as current as ſeveral other words which "eccleſiaſtic uſe has rendered familiar. He adds, in the ſame "place, that he is not ſhocked with this expreſſion in our Vul-"gate, *qui non fuerit ſcandalizatus*, becauſe he is for allowing "the Goſpel to ſpeak after its own manner. Eraſmus has "tranſlated *Quiſquis non fuerit offenſus*, which is better Latin."

In

and the meaning in the margin, that in moſt caſes, as in the preſent, he reverſes it; he gives the meaning in the text, and the literal verſion in the margin. I think, that in ſo doing, he judges much better; but if further experience produced this alteration in his ſentiments, it is ſtrange that he ſeems never to have reflected that he owed to the public ſome account of ſo glaring an inconſiſtency in his conduct; and to thoſe tranſlators whoſe judgment he had treated with ſo little ceremony, an acknowledgment of his error. Simon's tranſlation, is, upon the whole, a good one, but it will not bear to be examined by his own rules and maxims.

* Pourquoi a-t-on banni pluſiers mots qu'un long uſage a autorizes et qui ont ete, pour ainſi dire, canoniſes dans les egliſes d'Occident. Hiſt. Crit. des Verſions du N. T. ch. xxxiv.

† Ou il y a dans le Grec (Mat. xi. 5.) ευαγγελιζονται, et dans la Vulgate *evangelizantur*, Eraſme a traduit *lætum Evangelii accipiunt nuntium*. Il explique par pluſieurs mots ce qu'il pouvoit rendre par un ſeul, qui n'eſt pas a la verite Latin. mais, comme le docte Jean Bois a remarque, il eſt ancien, et il eſt auſſi bien de miſe que pluſieurs autres mots auxquels l'uſage de l'egliſe a donne cours. Il ajoute au meme endroit, qu'il n'eſt point choque de cette expreſſion qui eſt dans notre Vulgate, *qui non fuerit ſcandalizatus*, parce qu'il ſouffre volontiers que l'Evangile parle a ſa maniere. Eraſme a traduit, *quiſquis non fuerit offenſus*; ce qui eſt plus Latin. Hiſt. Crit. des Verſions du N. T. ch. xxii.

In regard to the laſt expreſſion, he has a ſimilar remark in his critique on the verſion of Mons. "Theſe words," ſays he * "*Si* "*oculus tuus dexter ſcandalizat te*, the gentlemen of Port Royal "have tranſlated, *Si votre œil droit vous eſt un ſujet de ſcandale* "*et de chute*. They ſay that the word *ſcandale*, by itſelf, con- "veys commonly another idea, denoting that which ſhocks us, "not that which makes us fall. But St Jerom, whom they pre- "tend to imitate, was not ſo delicate. We ſhould not, however, "have found fault with their explaining the word *ſcandale*, ſcan- "dal, by the word *chute*, fall: but this explanation ought to "have been in the margin, rather than in the text of the verſion."

§ 23. As to what regards the proper verſion of the words ευαγγελιζω and ευαγγελιον, I have explained myſelf fully in ſome former Diſſertations †, and ſhall only add here a few things ſuggeſted by the remarks above quoted. Frſt, then, Mr Simon condemns it much in a tranſlator, to explain, by ſeveral words, what might have been rendered by one only. I condemn it no leſs than he. But by the examples produced, one would conclude that he had meant, not *what might have been*, but *what could not have been*, rendered by one only; for *evangelizantur* is not a verſion of ευαγγελιζονται, nor *ſcandalizatus fuerit* of σκανδαλισθη. This is merely to give the Greek words ſomething of a Latin form, and ſo evade tranſlating them altogether. A verſion, compoſed on this plan, if without abſurdity we could call it a verſion, would be completely barbarous and unintelligible. There are a very few caſes wherein it is neceſſary to retain the original term. Theſe I have deſcribed already ‡. But neither of the words now mentioned falls under the deſcription. And common ſenſe is enough to ſatisfy us, that when a word cannot be tranſlated intelligibly by one word only, the interpreter ought to employ more. *Verba ponderanda ſunt*, ſays Houbigant §, *non numeranda—Neque enim fieri poteſt, ut duarum linguarum paria ſemper verba paribus reſpondeant.*

Secondly, That a word is familiar to us, is no evidence that we underſtand it, though this circumſtance, its familiarity, often prevents our diſcovering that we do not underſtand it.

Thirdly,

* Ces paroles (Mat. v. 29), *Si oculus tuus dexter ſcandalizat te*, Meſſieurs de Port Royale ont traduit par celles ci, *Si votre œil droit vous eſt un ſujet de ſcandale et de chute*. Ils diſent que le mot de *ſcandale* tout ſeul donne d'ordinaire une autre idee, et qu'ils ſe prend pour ce qui nous choque, et non pas pour ce qui nous fait tomber. Mais St Jerome qu'ils pretendent imiter, n'a point eu cette delicateſſe. On ne trouve pas neanmoins mauvais qu'ils ayent explique le mot de *ſcandale* par celui de *chute*: mais cette explication devoit plutot etre a la marge, que dans le texte de la verſion. Hiſt. Crit. des Verſions du N. T. ch. xxxv.

† Diſſ. V. Part II. Diſſ. VI. Part V.

‡ Diſſ. VIII. paſſim. § Proleg. Cap. V. Art. III.

Thirdly ecclesiastical use is no security that the word, though it be understood, conveys to us the same idea which the original term did to those to whom the Gospels were first promulged. In a former Dissertation, the fullest evidence has been given, that in regard to several words, the meaning which has been long established by ecclesiastic use, is very different from that which they have in the writings of the New Testament.

Fourthly, that to render the plain Greek words σκανδαλιζω and ευαγγελιζω into Latin, by the words *scandalizo* and *evangelizo*, which are not Latin words, is so far from allowing the Gospel to speak after its own manner (as Bois calls it), that it is, on the contrary, giving it a manner of speaking the most different from its own that can be imagined. This I intend soon to evince, even from Simon himself, though, in the passage above referred to, he seems to have adopted the sentiment of the English critic.

Lastly, the argument implied in the remark, that Jerom had not so much delicacy as the translators of Port Royal, because he did not scruple to employ the word *scandalizo*, though not Latin, in his Latin version, admits a twofold answer. The first is, Jerom did wrong in so doing. Simon acknowledges that he was neither infallible nor inspired; he acknowledges, further, that he might, and in a few instances, did mistake, and is, by consequence, not implicitly to be followed. "It would be wrong," says the critic, in a passage formerly quoted, "to imitate the "faults of St Jerom, and to pay greater deference to his autho- "rity than to the truth." The second answer is, that the cases are not parallel. *Scandalum* was not a Latin word; consequently, to those who understood no Greek, it was obscure, or if you will, unintelligible. This is the worst that could be said. Jerom, or whoever first introduced it into the Latin version, had it in his power to assign it, in a note, what sense he pleased. But *scandale* was a French word, before the translators of Mons had a being; and it was not in their power to divert it from the meaning which general use had given it long before. Now, as they justly observe, in their own vindication, the import of the French word did not coincide with that of the original; they were, therefore, by all the rules of interpretation, obliged to adopt another. Jerom, by adopting the word *scandalum*, darkened the meaning; they, by using the word *scandale*, would have given a false meaning. Their only fault, in my opinion, was their admitting an improper word into their version, even though coupled with another which expresses the sense.

§ 24. But, as our author frequently recurs to this topic, the consecration of such words by long use, it will be proper to consider it more narrowly. Some have gone further on this article than

than our author is willing to juſtify. "Sutor," ſays he *, "pre-"tended, that it was not more allowable to make new tranſla-"tions of the Bible, than to change the ſtyle of Cicero into ano-"ther. *Nonne injuriam faceret Tullio, qui ejus ſtylum immutare* "*vellet?* But, by the leave of this Pariſian theologiſt," ſays Si-mon, "there is a great difference between reforming the ſtyle of "a book, and making a verſion of that book. One may make "a tranſlation of the New Teſtament from the Greek, or from "the Latin, without making any change in that Greek or that "Latin." The juſtneſs of this ſentiment is ſelf-evident; and it is a neceſſary conſequence from it, that if the words and phraſes in the verſion convey the ſame ideas and thoughts to the readers, which thoſe of the original convey, it is a juſt tranſlation, what-ever conformity or diſconformity in ſound and etymology there may be between its words and phraſes, and the words and phraſes of the original, or of other tranſlations.

Of this Simon appears, on ſeveral occaſions, to be perfectly ſenſible, inſomuch that he has, on this very article, taken up the defence of Caſtalio againſt Beza, who had attacked, with much acrimony, his innovations in point of language. "It is not, as "Beza very well ſaid," (I quote Beza here as quoted by Si-mon †) "ſo much my opinion, as that of the ableſt eccleſiaſtic "writers, who, when they diſcourſe with the greateſt elegance "concerning ſacred things, make no alteration on the paſſages of "Scripture which they quote." Though this verdict of Beza is introduced with manifeſt approbation, *dit il fort bien*, and though, in confirmation of it, he adds, that both Beza and Caſtalio have taken, in this reſpect, unpardonable liberties, yet it is very ſoon followed by ſuch a cenſure as, in my opinion, invalidates the whole. "There is, nevertheleſs," ſays he ‡, "ſome exaggera-"tion in this reproach. For the queſtion here is about the ver-"ſion of the ſacred books, and not about the original; ſo that "one cannot object to Caſtalio, as Beza does, his having chang-"ed

* Sutor pretendoit qu'il n'etoit pas plus permis de faire de nouvelles traductions de la Bible, que de changer le ſtile de Ciceron en un autre. *Nonne injuriam faceret Tullio, qui ejus ſtylum immutare vellet?* Mais n'en deplaiſe a ce theologien de Paris, il y a bien de la difference entre reform-er le ſtile d'un livre, et faire une verſion de ce meme livre. On peut faire une traduction du Nouveau Teſtament ſur le Grec, ou ſur le Latin, ſans toucher a ce Grec, ni a ce Latin. Hiſt. Crit. des Verſions du N. T. ch. xxi.

† Ce n'eſt pas, dit il fort bien, tant mon ſentiment, que celui des plus habiles ecrivains eccleſiaſtiques, leſquels, quand meme ils parlent avec le plus de politeſſe des choſes ſacrees, ne changent rien dans les paſſages de l'Ecriture qu'ils citent. Hiſt. Crit. des Verſions du N. T. ch. xxiv.

‡ Il y a neanmoins de l'exaggeration dans ce reproche. Car il n'eſt ici queſtion que de la verſion des livres ſacres, et non pas de l'original; et ainſi l'on ne peut pas objecter a Caſtalio, comme fait Beze, d'avoir change

" ed the words of the Holy Spirit, or, as he expreſſes it, *divinam* " *illam Spiritus Sancti eloquentiam.* It is certain to adopt the " ſtyle of the miniſters of Geneva, that the Holy Spirit did not " not ſpeak Latin. Wherefore, Caſtalio might well put, in his " Latin tranſlation, *lotio* and *genii*, inſtead of *baptiſma* and *angeli*, " without changing aught in the expreſſions of the Holy Spirit." The moderation and juſtneſs of his ſentiments here, do not well accord either with the high claims which, in favour of eccleſiaſtic terms, he makes to conſecration, canonization, &c. or with the accuſations brought, on this very article, againſt Erſmus and others.

Wherein does the expreſſion of Theodore Beza, in calling thoſe ancient words and phraſes of the Vulgate, *divinam illam Spiritus Sancti eloquentiam*, differ, in import, from that given by John Bois, who ſays in reference to them, *Libenter audio Scripturam ſuo quidem modo, ſuoque velut idiomate loquentem?* May it not be replied, juſt as pertinently to Bois as to Beza: " The " queſtion here is about the verſion of the ſacred books, and not " about the original. It is certain that as the Holy Spirit did not " ſpeak Latin, the Scriptures were not written in that language." Their phraſes and idioms, therefore, are not concerned in the diſpute; for, if thoſe expreſſions, concerning which we are now enquiring, be not the language of the Holy Spirit, as Simon himſelf maintains that they are not; neither are they the language of the Scriptures. Thus, the ſame ſentiment, with an inconſiderable difference in the expreſſion, is quoted by our author, with high approbation from the canon of Ely, as worthy of being turned into a general rule *, and with no little cenſure from the miniſter of Geneva.

§ 25. I have often had occaſion to ſpeak of the obſcurity of ſuch terms, and I have ſhown† the impropriety of ſeveral of them, as conveying ideas very different from thoſe conveyed by the words of the original, rightly underſtood: and though this alone would be a ſufficient reaſon for ſetting them aſide, ſufficient, I mean, to any perſon who makes more account of obtaining the mind of the Spirit, than of acquiring the dialect of uninſpired interpreters; the very reaſon for which the uſe of them is ſo ſtrenuouſly urged by

les paroles du Saint Eſprit, ou, comme il parle, *divinam illam Spiritus Sancti eloquentiam.* Il eſt certain que le Saint Eſprit, pour me ſervir des termes des miniſtres de Geneve, n'a point parle Latin. C'eſt pourquoi Caſtalio a pu mettre dans ſa traduction Latine *lotio* et *genii* au lieu de *baptiſma* et *angeli*, ſans rien changer pour cela dans les expreſſions du Saint Eſprit. Hiſt. Crit. des Verſions du N. T. ch. xxiv.

* Cette reflexion doit ſervir de regle pour une infinite d'endroits du Nouveau Teſtament, ou les nouveaux traducteurs ont affecte de s'eloigner de l'ancienne edition Latine. Ibid. ch. xxii.

† Diſſ. IX. throughout.

by Simon and others, appears to me a very weighty reaſon againſt employing them. They are, ſay theſe critics, conſecrated words; that is, in plain language, they are, by the uſe of eccleſiaſtic writers, become a ſort of technical terms in theology. This is really the fact. Accordingly, thoſe words hardly enter into common uſe at all. They are appropriated as terms of art, which have no relation to the ordinary commerce of life. Now, nothing can be more repugnant to the character of the diction employed by the ſacred writers; their being, in their language, nothing to which we can apply the words ſcholaſtic or technical. On the contrary, the inſpired penmen always adopted ſuch terms as were in familiar uſe with their readers on the moſt common occurrences. When the Evangeliſt tells us, in Greek, Luke ii. 10. that the angel ſaid to the ſhepherds, Ευαγγελιζομαι υμιν, he repreſents him as ſpeaking in as plain terms to all who underſtood Greek, as one who ſays in Engliſh, *I bring you good news*, ſpeaks to thoſe who underſtand Engliſh. But will it be ſaid, that the Latin interpreter ſpoke as plainly to every reader of Latin, when he ſaid, *Evangelizo vobis?* Or does that deſerve to be called a verſion, which conveys neither the matter nor the manner of the author? Not the matter, becauſe an unintelligible word conveys no meaning; not the manner, becauſe what the author ſaid ſimply and familiarly, the tranſlator ſays ſcholaſtically and pedantically. Of this, however, I do not accuſe Jerom. The phraſe in queſtion was doubtleſs one of thoſe which he did not think it prudent to meddle with.

§ 26. Nor will their method of obviating all difficulties, by means of the margin, ever ſatisfy a reaſonable perſon. Is it proper, in tranſlating an author, to make a piece of patchwork of the verſion, by tranſlating one word, and miſ-tranſlating, or leaving untranſlated, another, with perpetual references to the margin, for correcting the blunders intentionally committed in the text? And if former tranſlators have, from ſuperſtition, from exceſſive deference to their predeceſſors, from fear of giving offence, or from any other motive, been induced to adopt ſo abſurd a method, ſhall we think ourſelves obliged to imitate them? Some ſeem ſtrangely to imagine, that to have, in the tranſlation, as many as poſſible of the articulate ſounds, the letters and ſyllables of the original, is to be very literal, and conſequently, very cloſe. If any chuſe to call this literal, I ſhould think it idle to diſpute with him about the word; but I could not help obſerving that, in this way, a verſion may be very literal, and perfectly foreign from the purpoſe. Nobody will queſtion that the Engliſh word *pharmacy* is immediately derived from the Greek φαρμακια, of which it retains almoſt all the letters. Ought we, for that reaſon, to render the Greek word φαρμακια, *pharmacy*, in the catalogue

logue the apoſtle has given us of the works of the fleſh, Gal. v. 19, 20, 21.? Muſt we render παροξυσμος *paroxyſm*, Acts xv. 39. and παραδοξα *paradoxes?* Luke v. 26. *Idiot* is, by this rule, a literal verſion of the Greek ιδιωτης. But an interpreter would be thought not much above that character, who ſhould render it ſo in ſeveral places of Scripture, Acts iv. 13. 1 Cor. xiv. 16. 23, 24. 2 Cor. xi. 6. Yet, if this be not exhibiting what Beza denominates *divinam illam Spiritus Sancti eloquentiam;* or what Bois, with no better reaſon, calls *Scripturam ſuo quidem modo, ſuoque velut idiomate loquentem*, it will not be eaſy to aſſign an intelligible meaning to theſe phraſes.

But, if ſuch be the proper exhibition of the eloquence of the Spirit, and of the idiom of Scripture, it will naturally occur to aſk, Why have we ſo little, even in the Vulgate, of this divine eloquence? Why do we ſo ſeldom hear the Scripture, even there, ſpeak in its own way and in its native idiom? It would have been eaſy to mutilate all, or moſt of the Greek words, forming them in the ſame manner as *evangelizatus* and *ſcandalizatus* are formed, and ſo to turn the whole into a gibberiſh, that would have been neither Greek nor Latin, though it might have had ſomething of the articulation of the one language, and of the ſtructure of the other. But it is an abuſe of ſpeech, to call a jargon of words, wherein we have nothing but a reſemblance in ſound, without ſenſe, the eloquence of the Holy Spirit, or the idiom of the Scriptures.

It is ſometimes made the pretence for retaining the original word, that it has different ſignifications, and, therefore, an interpreter, by preferring one of theſe, is in danger of hurting the ſenſe. Thus, the Rhemiſh tranſlators, who render αλλον παρακλητον δωσει υμιν, John xiv. 16. *He will give you another paraclete*, ſubjoin this note: "*Paraclete*, by interpretation, is either a com-"forter, or an advocate; and therefore, to tranſlate it by any one "of them only, is, perhaps, to abridge the ſenſe of this place:" to which Fulke, who publiſhes their New Teſtament along with the then common verſion, anſwers very pertinently, in the note immediately following: "If you will not tranſlate any words "that have diverſe ſignifications, you muſt leave five hundred "more untranſlated than you have done." But there is not even this poor pretence for all the conſecrated barbariſms. The verb ευαγγελιζομαι never occurs in the Goſpels in any ſenſe but one, a ſenſe eaſily expreſſed in the language of every people.

§ 27 It may be replied, 'If you will not admit with Beza, 'that this mode of writing is the eloquence of the Spirit, or with 'Bois, that it is the idiom of Scripture, you muſt at leaſt allow, 'with Melancthon, that it is the language and ſtyle of the 'church: *Nos loquamur cum eccleſia. Ne pudeat nos materni 'ſermonis. Eccleſia eſt mater noſtra. Sic autem loquitur eccleſia.*'

This

This comes indeed nearer the point in hand. The language of the Latin church is, in many things, founded in the ſtyle introduced by the ancient interpreters. But it ought to be remembered, that even the Latin church herſelf does not preſent thoſe interpreters to us as infallible, or affirm that their language is irreprehenſible. And if ſhe herſelf has been anyhow induced to adopt a ſtyle that is not well calculated for conveying the mind of the Lord: nay, which in many things darkens, and in ſome miſrepreſents it, ſhall we make leſs account of communicating clearly the truths revealed by the Spirit, than of perpetuating a phraſeology which contributes to the advancement of ignorance, and of an implicit deference in ſpiritual matters to human authority? On the contrary, if the church has, in proceſs of time, contracted ſomewhat of a Babyloniſh dialect, and thereby loſt a great deal of her primitive ſimplicity, purity, and plainneſs of manner; her language cannot be too ſoon cleared of the unnatural mixture, and we cannot too ſoon reſume her native idiom. To act thus is ſo far from being imputable to the love of novelty, that it reſults from that veneration of antiquity which leads men to aſk for the old paths, and makes the votaries of the true religion deſirous to return to the undiſguiſed ſentiments, manner, and ſtyle of holy writ, which are evidently more ancient than the oldeſt of theſe canonized corruptions. This is not to relinquiſh, it is to reſtore the true idiom of Scripture: with as little propriety is ſuch a truly primitive manner charged with the want of ſimplicity. A technical or learned ſtyle is of all ſtyles the leaſt entitled to be called *ſimple*; for it is the leaſt fitted for conveying inſtruction to the ſimple, to *babes* in knowledge, the character by which thoſe to whom the Goſpel was firſt publiſhed, were particularly diſtinguiſhed, Matt. xi. 25. Luke x. 21. Whereas the tendency of a ſcholaſtic phraſeology, is, on the contrary, to hide divine things from babes and ſimple perſons, and to reveal them only to ſages and ſcholars. Never, therefore, was controvertiſt more unlucky in his choice of arguments than our opponents on this article are in urging the plea of ſimplicity and that of Scripture idiom, topics manifeſtly ſubverſive of their cauſe.

§ 28. The impropriety of changing, on any pretext, the conſecrated terms, and the impropriety of giving to the people within the pale of the Roman church, any tranſlation of Scripture into their mother-tongue, unleſs from the Vulgate, are topics to which Father Simon frequently recurs. And it muſt be acknowledged, that on this hypotheſis, which puts the authority of tradition on the ſame foot with that of Scripture, and makes the church the depoſitary and interpreter of both, there appears a ſuitableneſs in his doctrine. He admits, however, that the tranſlation ſhe has adopted, is not entirely exempted from errors, though

though free from such as affect the articles of faith, or rules of practice. The propriety of translating only from the Vulgate, he maintains from this single consideration, its being that which is read for Scripture daily in their churches.

Now this argument is of no weight with Protestants, and appears not to be entitled to much weight even with Roman Catholics. If there be no impropriety in their being supplied with an exact version of what is read in their churches; neither is there any impropriety in their being supplied with an exact version of what was written by the inspired penmen, for the instruction of the first Christians. This appears as reasonable and as laudable an object of curiosity even to Romanists as the other. Nay, I should think this, even on Simon's own principles, defensible. The sacred penmen were infallible, so was not the ancient interpreter. He will reply, 'But ye have not the very 'hand-writings of the Apostles and Evangelists. There are dif-'ferent readings in different Greek copies. Ye are not, there-'fore, absolutely certain of the conformity of your Greek in eve-'ry thing, any more than we are of our Latin to those original 'writings.' This we admit, but still insist that there is a difference. The Latin has been equally exposed with the Greek to the blunders of transcribers. And as, in some things, different Greek copies read differently, we receive that version, with other ancient translations, to assist us in doubtful cases to discover the true reading. But the Vulgate, with every other version, labours under this additional disadvantage, that, along with the errors arising from the blunders of copiers, it has those also arising from the mistakes of the interpreter.

§ 29. But, in fact, the secret reason both for preserving the consecrated terms, and for translating only from the Vulgate, is no other than to avoid, as much as possible, whatever might suggest to the people, that the Spirit says one thing and the Church another. It is not according to the true principles of ecclesiastical policy, that such differences should be exposed to the vulgar. This the true sons of the church have discovered long ago. "Gardiner," says bishop Burnet †, "had a singular conceit. He "fancied there were many words in the New Testament of such "majesty that they were not to be translated, but must stand in "the English Bible as they were in the Latin. A hundred of "these he put into a writing, which was read in convocation. "His design in this was visible, that if a translation must be made, "it should be so daubed all through with Latin words, that the "people should not understand it much the better for its being "in English. A taste of this the reader may have by the first "twenty of them; *ecclesia, pœnitentia, pontifex, ancilla, contritus, "olocaustu,*

* History of the Reformation in England, book iii. year 1542.

" *holocaustu, justitia, justificatio, idiota, elementa, baptizare, mar-*
" *tyr, adorare, scandalum, simplex, tetrarcha, sacramentum, simu-*
" *lacrum, gloria.* The design he had of keeping some of these,
" particularly the last save one, is plain enough, that the people
" might not discover that visible opposition which was between
" the Scriptures and the Roman Church, in the matter of images.
" This could not be better palliated, than by disguising these
" places with words that the people understood not." Thus far the bishop.

§ 30. It would not be easy to conjecture why Gardiner, that zealous opposer of the reformation, selected some of the words above mentioned as proper to be retained, unless by their number and frequent recurrence, to give an uncouth and exotic appearance to the whole translation. In regard to others of them, as the bishop justly remarks, the reason is obvious. And it is to be regretted that that historian has not inserted in his valuable work the whole catalogue. Nothing could serve better to expose the latent but genuine purpose of the consecrated terms. Not that any judicious person can be at a loss to discover it; but the more numerous the examples are the evidence is the stronger. The meaning of common words is learnt solely from common usage, but the import of canonized words can be got only from canonical usage. We all know what an *image* is, it being a word in familiar use; we therefore find no difficulty in discovering what we are forbidden to worship by the command which forbids the worship of images. Whereas, had the word *simulacrum*, quite unused before, been substituted for image, it would have, doubtless, acquired a currency on theological subjects; but, being confined to these, would have been no better than a technical term in theology, for the meaning of which recourse must be had to men of the profession. Nor would it have required of the casuist any metaphysical acuteness in distinguishing, to satisfy those whom he taught to worship *images*, that they were in no danger of adoring a *simulacrum*.

§ 31. To prevent mistakes, it may not be improper to observe that the worh *simulacrum* in the Vulgate itself is no more a term of art than *similitudo* or *imago* are, for they are all words in familiar use in Latin; but *simulacrum* is not in familiar use in English, though *similitude* and *image* are, which are both formed from Latin words of the same signification. It is not, therefore, their affinity, or even identity in respect of sound, but their difference in respect of use, which stamps nearly related words, or what we call convertible terms with these different characters, in different languages. Thus ευαγγελιζω and σκανδαλιζω are common, not technical terms in the Greek New Testament; but *evange-lizo* and *scandalizo* in the Vulgate are the reverse, technical not common. Now it is for this reason, I say, that to adopt, without

out neceſſity, ſuch terms in a language to which they do not belong, and in which conſequently they are unknown, or known merely as profeſſional terms, is to form a ſtyle the very reverſe of what I ſhould call the eloquence of the Holy Spirit, and the proper idiom of the Scriptures. For a greater contraſt to the plain and familiar idiom of Scripture, and the eloquence of the Spirit, addreſſed entirely to the people, than a ſtyle that is juſtly denominated dark, learned and technical, it is impoſſible to conceive.

Let it be obſerved, therefore, that it is the uſe, not the etymology, to which, in tranſlating, we ought to have reſpect, either in adopting, or in rejecting an expreſſion. A word is neither the better nor the worſe for its being of Greek or Latin origin. But our firſt care ought to be, that it convey the ſame meaning with the original term; the ſecond, that it convey it as nearly as poſſible in the ſame manner, that is, with the ſame plainneſs, ſimplicity, and perſpicuity. If this can be done with equal advantage by terms which have obtained the ſanction of eccleſiaſtic uſe, ſuch terms ought to be preferred. For this reaſon, I prefer *juſt* to virtuous, *redeemer* to ranſomer. *faviour* to deliverer. But if the ſame meaning be not conveyed by them, or not conveyed in the ſame manner, they ought to be rejected. Otherwiſe the real dictates of the Spirit and the unadulterated idiom of Scripture, are ſacrificed to the ſhadowy reſemblance, in ſound and etymology, of technical words and ſcholaſtic phraſes.

§ 32. Such, upon the whole, are my ſentiments of the regard which, in tranſlating holy writ into modern languages, is due to the practice of former tranſlators, eſpecially of the authors of the Latin Vulgate. And ſuch, in particular, is my notion of thoſe words which, by ſome critics, are called *conſecrated*, and which, in general, in reſpect of the ſenſe, will not be found the moſt eligible; nay, by the uſe of which, there is greater hazard of deſerting that plainneſs and that ſimplicity which are the beſt characteriſtics of the Scripture ſtyle, than by any other means I know.

PART II.

The Regard due to the Engliſh Tranſlation.

HAVING been ſo particular in the diſcuſſion of the firſt part of this inquiry, namely, the regard which, in tranſlating the Scriptures, is due to the manner wherein the words and phraſes have been rendered by the authors of the Vulgate, it will not be neceſſary

ceſſary to enter ſo minutely into the ſecond part, concerning the regard which an Engliſh tranſlator owes to the expreſſions adopted in the common tranſlation. The reaſons for adopting, or for rejecting, many of them, are ſo nearly the ſame in both caſes, that, to avoid prolixity by unneceſſary repetitions, I ſhall confine myſelf to a few obſervations which the ſpecial circumſtances affecting the common Engliſh verſion naturally give riſe to.

§ 2. That tranſlation, we all know, was made at a time when the ſtudy of the original languages, which had been long neglected, was juſt revived in Europe. To this, the invention of printing firſt, and the reformation ſoon afterwards, had greatly contributed. As it grew to be a received doctrine among Proteſtants, that the word of God, contained in the Scriptures, is the ſole infallible rule which he has given us of faith and manners, the ineffable importance of the ſtudy of Scripture was perceived more and more every day. New tranſlations were made, firſt into Latin, the common language of the learned, and afterwards into moſt European tongues. The ſtudy of the languages naturally introduces the ſtudy of criticiſm, I mean that branch of criticiſm which has language for its object; and which is, in effect, no other than the utmoſt improvement of the grammatical art. But this, it muſt be acknowledged, was not then arrived at that perfection, which, in conſequence of the labours of many learned and ingenious men, of different parties and profeſſions, it has reached ſince. What greatly retarded the progreſs of this ſtudy in the firſt age of the reformation, was the inceſſant diſputes in which the reformers were engaged about the articles of doctrine, eccleſiaſtical polity, and ceremonies, both with the Romaniſts, and among themſelves. This led them inſenſibly to recur to the weapons which had been employed againſt them, and of which they had at firſt ſpoken very contemptuouſly, the metaphyſical and unintelligible ſubtleties of ſchool divinity.

This recourſe was productive of two bad conſequences. Firſt, it diverted them from the critical ſtudy of the ſacred languages, the ſureſt human means for diſcovering the mind of the Spirit; ſecondly, it infuſed into the heads of the diſputants, prepoſſeſſions in favour of ſuch particular words and phraſes as are adapted to the dialect and ſyſtem of the parties to which they ſeverally attached themſelves; and in prejudice of thoſe words and phraſes which ſeem more ſuitable to the ſtyle and ſentiments of their adverſaries. There is, perhaps, but too good reaſon for adding an evil conſequence produced alſo upon the heart, in kindling wrath and quenching charity. It was when matters were in this ſituation, that ſeveral of the firſt tranſlations were made. Men's minds were then too much heated with their polemic ſquabbles, to be capable of that impartial, candid and diſpaſſionate examination, which is ſo neceſſary in thoſe who would approve

themſelves faithful interpreters of the oracles of God. Of an undue bias on the judgment in tranſlating, in conſequence of ſuch perpetual wranglings, I have given ſome ſpecimens in a former Diſſertation *.

§ 3. In regard to the common tranſlation, though not entirely exempted from the influence of party and example, as I formerly had occaſion to ſhew †, it is, upon the whole, one of the beſt of thoſe compoſed ſo ſoon after the Reformation. I may ſay juſtly that, if it had not been for an immoderate attachment, in its authors, to the Geneveſe tranſlators, Junius, Tremellius and Beza, it had been ſtill better than it is; for the greateſt faults with which it is chargeable are derived from this ſource. But ſince that time, it muſt be owned, things are greatly altered in the church. The rage of diſputation on points rather curious than edifying, or, as the apoſtle calls it, 1 Tim. vi. 4. the dotage about queſtions and ſtrifes of words, has, at leaſt among men of talents and erudition, in a great meaſure ſubſided. The reign of ſcholaſtic ſophiſtry and altercation is pretty well over. Now, when to this reflection we add a proper attention to the great acquiſitions in literature which have of late been made, in reſpect not only of languages, but alſo of antiquities and criticiſm, it cannot be thought derogatory from the merit and abilities of thoſe worthy men who formerly beſtowed their time and labour on that important work, to ſuppoſe that many miſtakes, which were then inevitable, we are now in a condition to correct.

To effect this, is the firſt, and ought, doubtleſs, to be the principal motive for attempting another verſion. Whatever is diſcovered to be the ſenſe of the Spirit, ſpeaking in the Scriptures, ought to be regarded by us as of the greateſt conſequence; nor will any judicious perſon, who has not been accuſtomed to conſider religion in a political light, as a mere engine of ſtate, deny, that where the truth appears, in any inſtance, to have been either miſrepreſented, or but obſcurely repreſented, in a former verſion, the fault ought, in an attempt like the preſent, as far as poſſible, to be corrected. To ſay the contrary, is to make the honourable diſtinction of being inſtruments in promoting the knowledge of God of leſs moment, than paying a vain compliment to former tranſlators, or, perhaps, ſhewing an immoderate deference to popular humour, which is always attached to cuſtomary phraſes, whether they convey the true meaning, or a falſe meaning, or any meaning at all. This, therefore, is unqueſtionably a good ground for varying from thoſe who preceded us.

§ 4. It deſerves further to be remarked that, from the changes incident to all languages, it ſometimes happens that words which expreſſed

* Diſſ. X. Part V. § 4, &c. † Ibid.

expreſſed the true ſenſe at the time when a tranſlation was made, come afterwards to expreſs a different ſenſe; in conſequence whereof, though thoſe terms were once a proper verſion of the words in the original, they are not ſo after ſuch an alteration, having acquired a meaning different from that which they had formerly. In this caſe it cannot be doubted that, in a new tranſlation, ſuch terms ought to be changed. I hinted before *, that I look upon this as having been the caſe with ſome of the expreſſions employed in the Vulgate. They conveyed the meaning at the time that verſion was made, but do not ſo now. I ſhall inſtance only in two. The phraſe *pœnitentiam agite* was, in Jerom's time, nearly equivalent in ſignification to the Greek μετανοειτε. It is not ſo at preſent. In conſequence of the uſages which have crept in, and obtained an eſtabliſhment in the churches ſubject to Rome, it no longer conveys the ſame idea; for having become merely an eccleſiaſtic term, its acceptation is regulated only by eccleſiaſtic uſe. Now, in that uſe, it exactly correſponds to the Engliſh words *do penance*, by which indeed the Rhemiſh tranſlators, who tranſlate from the Vulgate, have rendered it in their New Teſtament. Now, as no perſon of common ſenſe, who underſtands the language, will pretend, that to enjoin us to *do penance*, and to enjoin us to *reform*, or *repent*, is to enjoin the ſame thing; both Eraſmus and Beza were excuſable, notwithſtanding the cenſure pronounced by Bois and Simon, in deſerting the Vulgate in this place, and employing the unambiguous term *reſipiſcite*, in preference to a phraſe, now at leaſt become ſo equivocal as *pœnitentiam agite*. We may warrantably ſay more, and affirm, that they would not have acted the part of faithful tranſlators, if they had done otherwiſe.

It was, to appearance, the uniform object of the prieſt of the Oratory (I know not what may have biaſſed the canon of Ely) to put honour upon the church, by which he meant the church of Rome, to reſpect above all things, and at all hazards, her dogmas, her uſages, her ceremonies, her very words and phraſes. The object of Chriſtian interpreters is, above all things, and at all hazards, to convey, as perſpicuouſly as they can, the truths of the Spirit. If the former ought to be the principal object of the tranſlators of holy writ, Simon was undoubtedly in the right; if the latter, he was undoubtedly in the wrong. The other expreſſion in the Vulgate, which may not improbably have been proper at the time when that tranſlation was made, though not at preſent, is *ſacramentum* for μυστηριον, in the ſecond Scriptural ſenſe which I obſerved to be ſometimes given to the Greek word †. But, in conſequence of the alterations which have ſince taken place in eccleſiaſtical uſe, the Latin term has acquired a meaning

* Part III. § 9. † Diſſ. IX. Part I. § 7.

meaning totally different, and is therefore now no ſuitable expreſſion of the ſenſe.

§ 5. Now, what has been obſerved of the Latin words above mentioned, has already happened to ſeveral words employed in the common Engliſh tranſlation. Though this may appear at firſt extraordinary, as it is not yet two centuries ſince that verſion was made, it is nevertheleſs unqueſtionable. The number of changes whereby a living language is affected in particular periods, is not always in proportion to the extent of time. It depends on the ſtage of advancement, in which the language happens to be during the period, more than on the length of the period. The Engliſh tongue, and the French too, if I miſtake not, have undergone a much greater change than the Italian, in the laſt three hundred years; and perhaps as great as the Greek underwent, from the time of Homer to that of Plutarch, which was more than four times as long. It is not merely the number of writings in any language, but it is rather their merit and eminence, which confers ſtability on its words, phraſes and idioms.

Certain it is, that there is a conſiderable change in our own ſince the time mentioned; a change in reſpect of the conſtruction, as well as of the ſignifications of the words. In ſome caſes, we combine the words differently from the way in which they were combined at the time above referred to; we have acquired many words which were not uſed then, and many then in uſe are now either obſolete, or uſed in a different ſenſe. Theſe changes I ſhall here briefly exemplify. As habit is apt to miſlead us, and we are little diſpoſed to ſuſpect that that meaning of a word or phraſe, to which we are familiariſed, was not always the meaning; to give ſome examples of ſuch alterations, may prevent us from raſhly accuſing former tranſlators for improprieties wherewith they are not chargeable; and to ſpecify alterations on our own language, may ſerve to remove the doubts of thoſe who imagine there is an improbability in what I have formerly maintained, concerning the variations which ſeveral words in ancient languages have undergone in different periods. Now, this is a point of ſo great moment to the literary critic and antiquary, that it is impoſſible thoroughly to underſtand, or accurately to interpret, ancient authors, without paying due regard to it. Through want of this regard, many things in eccleſiaſtic hiſtory have been much miſunderſtood, and groſsly miſrepreſented. Unluckily, on this ſubject, powerful ſecular motives interfering, have ſeduced men to contribute to the general deception, and to explain ancient names by uſages and opinions comparatively modern. But this by the way; I proceed to the examples.

§ 6. I intend to conſider, firſt, the inſtances affected by the laſt of the circumſtances above mentioned, namely, thoſe wherein the ſignification

ſignification is changed, though the term itſelf remains. Of ſuch I ſhall now produce ſome examples; firſt, in nouns: The word *converſation*, which means no more at preſent than *familiar diſcourſe* of two or more perſons, did, at the time the Bible was tranſlated, denote *behaviour* in the largeſt acceptation. The Latin word *converſatio*, which is that generally uſed in the Vulgate, anſwering to the Greek ανασροφη, has commonly this meaning. But the Engliſh word has never, as far as I have obſerved, this acceptation in the preſent uſe, except in the law phraſe, *criminal converſation*. And I have reaſon to believe that, in the New Teſtament, it is univerſally miſtaken by the unlearned, as ſignifying no more than familiar talk or diſcourſe. Hence it has alſo happened, that hypocrites and fanatics have thought themſelves authorized, by the words of Scripture, in placing almoſt the whole of practical religion in this alone. Yet I do not remember that the word occurs, ſo much as once, in Scripture in this ſenſe. What we call *converſation* muſt, indeed, be conſidered as included, becauſe it is a very important part of behaviour, but it is not to be underſtood as particularly ſpecified. In one paſſage, it is expreſsly diſtinguiſhed from familiar diſcourſe or converſation, in the modern import of the word. Τυπος γινε των πιςων εν λογω, εν ανασροφη, rendered in the common verſion, "Be an "example of the believers *in word, in converſation*," 1 Tim. iv. 12. That theſe words λογω and ανασροφη, are not ſynonymous, the repeating of the prepoſition ſufficiently ſhews. Though, therefore, not improperly rendered at that time, when the Engliſh term was uſed in a greater latitude of ſignification, they ought manifeſtly to be rendered now, *in converſation*, *in behaviour*; the firſt anſwering to λογος, the ſecond to ανασροφη.

Another inſtance of ſuch a variation we have in the word *thief* which, in the language of Scripture, is confounded with *robber*, and probably was ſo alſo, in common language at that time, but is now invariably diſtinguiſhed. They are always carefully diſtinguiſhed in the original, the former being κλεπτης, the latter λης. The two criminals who were crucified with our Lord, are always called by the two evangeliſts who ſpecify their crime, λησαι, (Mat. xxvii. 38. 44. Mark xv. 27.) never κλεπλαι. Yet our tranſlators have always rendered it *thieves* never *robbers*. This is the more remarkable, as what we now call *theft* was not a capital crime among the Jews. Yet the penitent malefactor confeſſed upon the croſs, that he and his companion ſuffered *juſtly*, receiving *the due reward of their deeds*, Luke xxiii. 41. He probably would not have expreſſed himſelf in this manner, if their condemnation had not been warranted by the law of Moſes. And though, doubtleſs, the Engliſh word, at that time, was uſed with greater latitude than it is at preſent; yet, as they had rendered the ſame original term λης, when applied to Barabbas,

rabbas, *robber*, John xviii. 40. they ought to have given the ſame interpretation of the word, as applied to the two malefactors, who, on the ſame occaſion, were accuſed of the ſame crime. In like manner, in the parable of the compaſſionate Samaritan, the words rendered, *fell among thieves*, Luke x. 30. are, λησαις περιεπεσεν. Hardly would any perſon now confound the character there repreſented, with that of thieves.

Again, the expreſſion, *the uppermoſt rooms*, Matt. xxiii. 6. does not ſuggeſt to men of this age, the idea of the chief places at table, but that of the apartments of the higheſt ſtory. *The good man of the houſe*, Matt. xx. 11. though ſufficiently intelligible, is become too homely (not to ſay ludicrous) a phraſe for the maſter of the family. The word *luſt*, Rom. vii. 7. is uſed in the common tranſlation in an extent which it has not now; ſo alſo is *uſury*, Matt. xxv. 27. Luke xix. 23. *Worſhip*, Luke xiv. 10. for honour, or civil reſpect paid to men, does not ſuit the preſent idiom. The words *lewd* and *lewdneſs* *, in the New Teſtament, convey a meaning totally different from that in which they are now conſtantly uſed. The word *pitiful*, with us, never means, as it does in Scripture, James v. 11. in conformity to etymology, compaſſionate, merciful; but always paltry, contemptible. In the following words, alſo, there is a deviation, though not ſo conſiderable, from the ancient import. *Meat*, Matt. iii. 4. and food, are not now ſynonymous terms, neither are *cunning* (Exod. xxxviii. 23.) and ſkilful, *honeſt* (2 Cor. viii. 21.) and decent or becoming, *more* (Acts xix. 32.) and greater, *quick* (Acts x. 42.) and living, *faithleſs* (John xx. 27.) and incredulous, *coaſts* (Matt. ii. 16.) and territories, or borders not confining with the ſea.

The like variations have happened in verbs. *To prevent*, 1 Theſſ. iv. 15. is hardly ever now uſed in proſe for to go before; *to faint*, Matt. xv. 32. Luke xviii. 1. for to grow faint, to fail in ſtrength; *to enſue*, 1 Pet. iii. 11. for to purſue; *to provoke*, Heb. x. 24. for to excite to what is proper and commendable; *to entreat*, Luke xx. 11. for to treat; and *to learn*, for to teach, Pſal. xxv. 4. Common Prayer. Even adverbs and particles have ſhared the general fate. *Yea* and *nay*, Matt. v. 37. though ſtill words in the language, are not the expreſſions of affirmation and negation as formerly; *inſtantly*, Luke vii. 4. we never uſe for earneſtly, nor *hitherto*, Job xxxviii. 11. for thus far. Yet this was, no doubt, its original meaning, and is more conformable to etymology than the preſent meaning; *hither* being an adverb of place and not of time. More inſtances might be given if neceſſary.

Now

* See an excellent illuſtration of the remark, in regard to theſe two words, in the Diſquiſitions concerning the Antiquities of the Chriſtian urch, p. 4. note.

Now to employ words which, though ſtill remaining in the language, have not the ſanction of preſent uſe for the ſenſe aſſigned to them, cannot fail to render the paſſages where they occur, almoſt always obſcure, and ſometimes ambiguous. But as every thing which may either miſlead the reader, or darken the meaning, ought carefully to be avoided by the interpreter, no example, however reſpectable, will, in ſuch things, authoriſe our imitation. An alteration here implies nothing to the diſadvantage of preceding tranſlators, unleſs it can be ſuppoſed to detract from them, that they did not foreſee the changes which in after-times would come upon the language. They employed the words according to the uſage which prevailed in their time. The ſame reaſon which made them adopt thoſe words then, to wit, regard to perſpicuity, by conforming to preſent uſe, would, if they were now alive, and reviſing their own work, induce them to ſubſtitute others in their place.

§ 7. Another caſe in which a tranſlator ought not implicitly to follow his predeceſſors, is, in the uſe of words now become obſolete. There is little or no ſcope for this rule, when the ſubject is a verſion into a dead language like the Latin, which, except in the inſtances of ſome eccleſiaſtic terms, ſuch as thoſe above taken notice of, is not liable to be affected by the changes to which a living tongue is continually expoſed. The very notion of a dead language refers us to a period which is paſt, whoſe uſages are now over, and may therefore be conſidered as unchangeable. But in living languages, wherein uſe gradually varies, the greateſt attention ought to be given to what obtains at preſent, on which both propriety and perſpicuity muſt depend. Now, with reſpect to our common verſion, ſome words are diſuſed only in a particular ſignification, others are become obſolete in every meaning. The former ought to be avoided, in ſuch acceptations only as are not now favoured by uſe. The reaſon is obvious; becauſe it is only in ſuch caſes that they ſuggeſt a falſe meaning. The latter ought to be avoided in every caſe wherein they do not clearly ſuggeſt the meaning. I admit that there are certain caſes in which even an obſolete word may clearly ſuggeſt the meaning. For, firſt, the ſenſe of an unuſual or unknown word may be ſo aſcertained by the words in connection, as to leave no doubt concerning its meaning; ſecondly, the frequent occurrence of ſome words in the common tranſlation, and in the Engliſh liturgy, muſt hinder us from conſidering them, though not in common uſe, as unintelligible to perſons acquainted with thoſe books. The danger, therefore, from uſing words now obſolete, but frequently occurring in the Engliſh tranſlation, is not near ſo great as the danger ariſing from employing words not obſolete, in an obſolete meaning, or a meaning which they formerly

merly had, but have not at preſent. For theſe rarely fail to miſlead.

Further, a diſtinction ought to be made in obſolete words, between thoſe which in Scripture occur frequently, and whoſe meaning is generally known, and thoſe which occur but rarely, and may therefore be more readily miſunderſtood. The uſe of old words, when generally underſtood, has, in ſuch a book as the Bible, ſome advantages over newer terms, however appoſite. A verſion of holy writ ought, no doubt, above all things, to be ſimple and perſpicuous; but ſtill it ought to appear, as it really is, the exhibition of a work of a remote age and diſtant country. When, therefore, the terms of a former verſion are, by reaſon of their frequent occurrence there, univerſally underſtood, though no longer current with us, either in converſation or in writing, I ſhould account them preferable to familiar terms. Their antiquity renders them venerable. It adds even an air of credibility to the narrative, when we conſider it as relating to the actions, cuſtoms, and opinions of a people very ancient, and in all the reſpects now mentioned, very different from us. There may, therefore, be an exceſs in the familiarity of the ſtyle, though, whilſt we are juſt to the original, there can be no exceſs in ſimplicity and perſpicuity. It is for this reaſon that the interjections *lo* and *behold*, which, though antiquated, are well underſtood, I have retained ſometimes as emphatical; and that the obſolete word *hoſt*, in ſuch phraſes as *the hoſt of heaven*, *the Lord of hoſts*; and that the terms *tribulation*, *damſel*, *publican*, and a few others, are conſidered as of more dignity, than *army*, *trouble*, *girl*, *toll gatherer*; and therefore worthy to be retained. For the like reaſon the term of ſalutation *hail*, though now totally diſuſed, except in poetry, has generally, in the ſacred writings, a much better effect than any modern form which we could put in its place. To theſe we may add words which (though not properly obſolete) are hardly ever uſed, except when the ſubject, in ſome way or other, concerns religion. Of this kind are the words *ſin*, *godly*, *righteous*, and ſome others, with their derivatives. Such terms, as they are neither obſcure nor ambiguous, are entitled to be preferred to more familiar words. And if the plea for conſecrated words extended no further, I ſhould cheerfully ſubſcribe to it. I cannot agree with Dr Heylin, who declares explicitly * againſt the laſt mentioned term, though, by his own explanation, it, in many caſes, conveys more exactly the ſenſe of the original, than the word *juſt* which he prefers to it. The practice of tranſlators into other languages, where they are confined by the genius of their language, is of no weight with us. The French have two words, *pouvoir* and *puiſſance*; The Engliſh word *power* anſwers to both. But, becauſe we muſt make one term ſerve for

* Theol. Lect. vol. i. p. 7.

for both theirs, will they, in complaiſance to us, think they are obliged to confine themſelves to one? And as to thoſe over delicate ears, to which, he ſays, cant and fanaticiſm have tarniſhed and debaſed the words *righteous* and *righteouſneſs*; were this conſideration to influence us in the choice of words, we ſhould ſoon find that this would not be the only ſacrifice it would be neceſſary to make. It is but too much the character of the age to nauſeate whatever, in the intercourſe of ſociety, has any thing of a religious or moral appearance, a diſpoſition which will never be ſatisfied, till every thing ſerious and devout be baniſhed, not from the precincts of converſation only, but from the language.

But to return: when words totally unſupported by preſent uſe, occur in Scripture but rarely, they are accompanied with a degree of obſcurity which renders them unfit for a book intended for the inſtruction of all men, the meaneſt not excepted. Of this claſs are the words *leaſing*, for lies; *ravin*, for prey; *bruit*, for rumour; *marvel*, for wonder; *worth*, for be; *wot* and *wiſt*, for know and knew; *to bewray*, for to expoſe; *to eſchew*, for to avoid: *to ſkill*, for to be knowing in, or dexterous at; *to wax*, for to become; *to leaſe*, for to loſe; and, *to lack*, for to need or be wanting. Terms ſuch as ſome of theſe, like old veſſels, are, I may ſay, ſo buried in ruſt, as to render it difficult to diſcover their uſe. When words become not entirely obſolete, but fall into low or ludicrous uſe, it is then alſo proper to lay them aſide. Thus *folk*, for people; *trow*, for think; *ſeethe*, for boil; *ſod* and *ſodden*, for boiled; *ſcore*, for twenty; *twain*, for two; *clean* and *ſore*, when uſed adverbially, for entirely and very much; *all to*, *albeit*, and *howbeit*, may eaſily be given up. To theſe we may add the words that differ ſo little from thoſe which have ſtill a currency, that it would appear like affectation to prefer them to terms equally proper and more obvious. Of this kind is *mo*, for more; *ſtrait* and *ſtraitly*, for ſtrict and ſtrictly; *dureth*, for endureth; *camp*, for encamp; *miniſh*, for diminiſh; *an hungred*, for hungry; *garner*, for granary; *trump*, for trumpet; *ſith*, for ſince; *fet*, for fetched; *enſample*, for example; *mids*, for midſt. I ſhall only add, that when old words are of low origin, harſh ſound, or difficult pronunciation; or when they appear too much like learned words, familiar terms, if equally appoſite, are more eligible. For this reaſon, the nouns *backſlidings*, *ſhamefacedneſs*, *jeopardy*, and *concupiſcence*, may well be diſpenſed with.

Upon the whole, there is ſtill ſome danger in retaining words which are become obſolete, though they continue to be intelligible. Words hardly ſooner contract the appearance of antiquity, by being abandoned by good uſe, than they are picked up as lawful prize by writers in burleſque, who, by means of them, often add much poignancy to their writings. This proſtitution, when frequent, produces an aſſociation in the minds of readers,

the reverſe of that which originally accompanied them. Hence it is, that though nothing is better ſuited to the ſeriouſneſs and importance of the ſubject of holy writ, than ſolemnity of ſtyle; nothing is, at the ſame time, more hazardous, as no ſpecies of diction borders on the ludicrous oftener than the ſolemn. Let it ſuffice, therefore, if without venturing far from the ſtyle of converſation, in queſt of a more dignified elocution, we can unite gravity with ſimplicity and purity, which commonly ſecure perſpicuity. With theſe qualities there can be no material defect in the expreſſion. The ſprightly, the animated, the nervous, would not, in ſuch a work, be beauties, but blemiſhes. They would look too much like meretricious ornaments, when compared with the artleſs, the free, yet unaſſuming manner of the ſacred writers.

§ 8. But if it be of conſequence to avoid antiquated words, it is not leſs ſo to avoid antiquated phraſes, and an antiquated conſtruction. No writing in our language, as far as I know, is leſs chargeable with idiomatical phraſes, vulgariſms, or any peculiarities of expreſſion, than the common tranſlation of the Bible; and to this it is, in a great meaſure imputable, that the diction remains ſtill ſo perſpicuous, and that it is univerſally accounted ſuperior to that of any other Engliſh book of the ſame period. But though remarkably pure in reſpect of ſtyle, we cannot ſuppoſe that no idiomatical phraſes ſhould have eſcaped the tranſlators, eſpecially when we conſider the frequency of ſuch phraſes in the writings of their contemporaries. Yet, in all the four Goſpels, I recollect only two or three which come under that denomination. Theſe are, *the goodman of the houſe, they laughed him to ſcorn*, and *they caſt the ſame in his teeth*; expreſſions for which the interpreters had not the apology that may be pleaded in defence of ſome idioms in the Old Teſtament hiſtory, that they are literal tranſlations from the orignal, (Matt. xx. 11. οικοδεσποτου. Matt. ix. 24. κατεγελων αυτου. xxvii. 44. Το αυτο ωνειδιζον αυτω.). That the Engliſh conſtruction has undergone ſeveral alterations ſince the eſtabliſhment of the Proteſtant religion in England, it would be eaſy to evince. Some verbs often then uſed impersonally, and ſome reciprocally, are hardly ever ſo uſed at preſent. *It pitieth them*, (Pſal. cii. 14. Common Prayer,) would never be ſaid now. *It repented him*, Gen. vi. 6. may poſſibly be found in modern language, but never *he repented himſelf*, Matt. xxvii. 3. There is a difference alſo in the uſe of the prepoſitions. *In* (Matt. vi. 10.) was then ſometimes uſed for *upon*, and *unto* inſtead of *for*, John xv. 7. *Of* was frequently uſed before the cauſe or the inſtrument, where we now invariably uſe *by*, Matt. i. 18.; *of* was alſo employed in certain caſes where preſent uſe requires *off* or *from*, Matt. vii. 16. Like differences might be obſerved in the pronouns. One thing is certain, that the old uſages in conſtruction,

ſtruction, oftener occaſioned ambiguity than the preſent, which is an additional reaſon for preferring the latter.

§ 9. Finally, in regard to what may be called *technical*, or, in Simon's phraſe, *conſecrated* terms, our tranſlators, though not entirely free from ſuch, have been comparatively ſparing of them. In this they have acted judiciouſly. A technical ſtyle is a learned ſtyle. That of the Scriptures, eſpecially of the hiſtorical part, is the reverſe; it is plain and familiar. If we except a few terms, ſuch as *angel*, *apoſtle*, *baptiſm*, *hereſy*, *myſtery*, which, after the example of other Weſtern churches, the Engliſh have adopted from the Vulgate; and for adopting ſome of which, as has been obſerved, good reaſons might be offered; the inſtances are but few wherein the common name has been rejected, in preference to a learned and peculiar term.

Nay, ſome learned terms, which have been admitted into the liturgy, at leaſt into the rubric, the interpreters have not thought proper to introduce into the Scriptures. Thus, the words, *the nativity*, for Chriſt's birth, *advent*, for his coming, *epiphany*, for his manifeſtation to the Magians by the ſtar, do very well in the titles of the ſeveral diviſions in the Book of Common Prayer, being there a ſort of proper names for denoting the whole circumſtantiated event, or rather the times deſtined for the celebration of the feſtivals, and are convenient as they ſave circumlocution; but would by no means ſuit the ſimple and familiar phraſeology of the ſacred hiſtorians, who never affect uncommon and eſpecially learned words. Thus, in the titles of the books of Moſes, the Greek names of the Septuagint, *Geneſis*, *Exodus*, *Leviticus*, *Deuteronomy*, are not unfitly preſerved in modern tranſlations, and are become the proper names of the books. But where the Greek word *geneſis*, which ſignifies generation, occurs in that ancient verſion of the book ſo named, it would have been very improper to transfer it into a modern tranſlation, and to ſay, for example, "This is the *geneſis* of the heavens and the earth," Gen. ii. 4. In like manner, *Exodus*, which ſignifies departure, anſwers very well as a proper name of the ſecond book, which begins with an account of the departure of the Iſraelites out of Egypt; but it would be downright pedantry to introduce the term *exodus*, *exody*, or *exod* (for in all theſe ſhapes ſome have affected to uſher it into the language), into the body of the hiſtory.

I remember but one paſſage in the New Teſtament, in which our tranſlators have preferred a ſcholaſtic to the vulgar name, where both ſignified the ſame thing; ſo that there was no plea from neceſſity. The expreſſion alluded to is, "to whom he "ſhowed himſelf alive after his *paſſion*," Acts i. 3. Paſſion, in ordinary ſpeech, means ſolely a fit of anger, or any violent commotion of the mind. It is only in theological or learned uſe that it

it means the ſufferings of Chriſt. The Evangeliſt wrote to the people in their own dialect. Beſides, as he wrote for the conviction of infidels, as well as for the inſtruction of believers, it is not natural to ſuppoſe that he would uſe words or phraſes, in a particular acceptation, which could be known only to the latter. His expreſſion, μετα το παθειν αυτον, which is literally, *after his ſuffering*, is plain and unambiguous, and might have been ſaid of any man who had undergone the like fate. Such is conſtantly the way of the ſacred writers; nor is any thing in language more repugnant to their manner, than the uſe of what is called conſecrated words. I admit, at the ſame time, that *poſt paſſionem ſuam*, in the Vulgate, is unexceptionable, becauſe it ſuits the common acceptation of the word *paſſio* in the Latin language. Juſt ſo, the expreſſion *accipiens calicem*, in the Vulgate, Mat. xxvi. 27. is natural and proper. *Calix* is a common name for cup, and is ſo uſed in ſeveral places of that verſion: whereas, *taking the chalice*, as the Rhemiſh tranſlators render it, preſents us with a technical term not ſtrictly proper, inaſmuch as it ſuggeſts the previous conſecration of the veſſel to a ſpecial purpoſe, by certain ceremonies, an idea not ſuggeſted by either the Greek ποτηριον, or the Latin *calix*. I do not mean, however, to controvert the propriety of adopting an unfamiliar word, when neceſſary for expreſſing what is of an unfamiliar or, perhaps, ſingular nature. Thus, to denote the change produced on our Saviour's body, when on the mount with the three diſciples, Peter and the two ſons of Zebedee, a more appoſite word than *transfigured* could not have been found. The Engliſh word *transformed*, which comes neareſt, and is more familiar than the other, would have expreſſed too much.

§ 10. To conclude, the reaſons which appear ſufficient to juſtify a change of the words and expreſſions of even the moſt reſpectable predeceſſors in the buſineſs of tranſlating, is when there is ground to think, that the meaning of the author can be either more exactly or more perſpicuouſly rendered; or even when his manner, that is, when the eſſential qualities of his ſtyle, not the ſound or the etymology of his words, can be more adequately repreſented. For, to one or other of theſe three, all the above caſes will be found reducible.

DIS-

DISSERTATION THE TWELFTH.

AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT IS ATTEMPTED IN THE TRANSLATION OF THE GOSPELS, AND IN THE NOTES HERE OFFERED TO THE PUBLIC.

THE things which will be treated in this Diſſertation may, for the ſake of order, be claſſed under the five following heads: the firſt comprehends all that concerns the eſſential qualities of the verſion; the ſecond, what relates to the readings (where there is a diverſity of reading in the original) which are here preferred; the third contains a few remarks on the particular dialect of our language employed in this verſion; the fourth, what regards the outward form in which it is exhibited; and the fifth, ſome account of the notes with which it is accompanied.

PART I.

The eſſential Qualities of the Verſion.

THE three principal objects to be attended to, by every tranſlator, were explained in a former Diſſertation *. It is, perhaps, unneceſſary to ſay, that to them I have endeavoured to give a conſtant attention. It is not, however, to be diſſembled, that even thoſe principal objects themſelves ſometimes interfere. And though an order, in reſpect of importance, when they are compared together, has been alſo laid down, which will, in many caſes, determine the preference, it will not always determine it. I may find a word, for example, which hits the ſenſe of the author preciſely, but which, not being in familiar uſe, is obſcure. Though, therefore, in itſelf a juſt expreſſion of the ſentiment, it may not clearly convey the ſentiment to many readers, becauſe they

* Diſſ. X. Part I.

they are unacquainted with it. It is, therefore, but ill fitted, to repreſent the plain and familiar manner of the ſacred writers, or, indeed, to anſwer the great end of tranſlation, to convey diſtinctly, to the reader, the meaning of the original. Yet there may be a hazard, on the other hand, that a term more perſpicuous, but leſs appoſite, may convey ſomewhat of a different meaning, an error more to be avoided than the other. Recourſe to circumlocution is ſometimes neceſſary; for the terms of no two languages can be always made to correſpond: but, frequent recourſe to this mode of rendering, effaces the native ſimplicity found in the original, and in ſome meaſure disfigures the work. Though, therefore, in general, an obſcure is preferable to an unfaithful tranſlation, there is a degree of preciſion in the correſpondence of the terms, which an interpreter ought to diſpenſe with, rather than involve his verſion in ſuch darkneſs, as will render it uſeleſs to the generality of readers. This ſhows ſufficiently, that no rule will univerſally anſwer the tranſlator's purpoſe; but that he muſt often carefully balance the degrees of perſpicuity on one hand, againſt thoſe of preciſion on the other, and determine, from the circumſtances of the caſe, concerning their comparative importance. I acknowledge that, in ſeveral inſtances, the counterpoiſe may be ſo equal, that the moſt judicious interpreters may be divided in opinion; nay, the ſame interpreter may heſitate long in forming a deciſion, or even account it a matter of indifference to which ſide he inclines.

§ 2. I ſhall only ſay, in general, that however much a word may be adapted to expreſs the ſenſe, it is a ſtrong objection againſt the uſe of it, that it is too fine a word, too learned, or too modern. For, though there ſhould be a ſuitableneſs, in the import of the term, to the principal idea intended to be conveyed, there is an unſuitableneſs in the aſſociated or ſecondary ideas, which never fail to accompany ſuch terms. Theſe tend to fix on the Evangeliſts the imputation of affecting elegance, depth in literature or ſcience, or at leaſt, a modiſh and flowery phraſeology, than which nothing can be more repugnant to the genuine character of their ſtyle, a ſtyle eminently natural, ſimple, and familiar. The ſentiment of *Jacques le Fevre* *, which ſhows, at once, his good taſte and knowledge of the ſubject, is here entirely appoſite: "What many think elegance, is, in God's account, "inelegance and painted words."

§ 3. On the other hand, a bad effect is alſo produced by words, which are too low and vulgar. The danger here is not, indeed, ſo great, provided there be nothing ludicrous in the expreſſion, which

* An old French tranſlator, who publiſhed a verſion of the Goſpels into French in 1523; his words are: "Ce que pluſieurs eſtiment elegance, eſt "inelegance et parolle fardee devant Dieu."

which is ſometimes the caſe with terms of this denomination. When things themſelves are of a kind which gives few occaſions of introducing the mention of them into the converſation of the higher ranks, and ſtill fewer of naming them in books, their names are conſidered as partaking in the meanneſs of the uſe, and of the things ſignified. But this ſort of vulgarity ſeems not to have been minded by the inſpired authors. When there was a juſt occaſion to ſpeak of the thing, they appear never to have been aſhamed to employ the name by which it was commonly diſtinguiſhed. They did not recur, as modern delicacy prompts us to do, to periphraſis, unuſual, or figurative expreſſions, but always adopted ſuch terms as moſt readily ſuggeſted themſelves. There is nothing more indelicate, than an unſeaſonable diſplay of delicacy; for which reaſon, the naked ſimplicity wherewith the ſacred penmen expreſs themſelves on particular ſubjects, has much more modeſty in it than the artificial, but tranſparent, diſguiſes which, on like occaſions, would be employed by modern writers *.

A certain correctneſs of taſte, as well as acuteneſs of diſcernment, taught a late ingenious author † to remark this wonderful union of plainneſs and chaſtity in the language of the Bible, which a compoſer of theſe days, in any European tongue, would in vain attempt to imitate. Yet it is manifeſt, that it is not to juſtneſs of taſte, but to purity of mind in the ſacred authors, that this happy ſingularity in their writings ought to be aſcribed. This, however, is an evidence that they did not conſider it as mean or unbecoming, to call low or common things by their common names. But there are other ſorts of vulgariſms in language, with which they are never chargeable, the uſe of ſuch terms as we call cant words, which belong peculiarly to particular

* I can ſcarcely give a better illuſtration of this remark than in the correction propoſed by Dr Delany, of the phraſe *him that piſſeth againſt the wall*, which occurs ſometimes in the Old Teſtament, and which, he thinks, ſhould be changed into *him that watereth againſt the wall*. I am ſurpriſed that a correction like this ſhould have the approbation of ſo excellent a writer as the biſhop of Waterford. (See the preface to his Verſion of the Minor Prophets.) To me the latter expreſſion is much more exceptionable than the former. The former may be compared to the ſimplicity of a ſavage who goes naked without appearing to know it, or ever thinking of clothes; the other is like the awkward and unſucceſsful attempt of an European, to hide the nakedneſs of which, by the very attempt, he ſhews himſelf to be both conſcious and aſhamed. The ſame offenſive idea is ſuggeſted by the word which Delany propoſes, as is conveyed by the common term; but it is ſuggeſted in ſo affected a manner, as neceſſarily fixes a reader's attention upon it, and ſhows it to have been particularly thought of by the writer. Can any critic ſeriouſly think that more is neceſſary in this caſe than to ſay, *Every male*?

† Rouſſeau.

lar profeſſions, or claſſes of men, and contemptuous or ludicrous expreſſions, ſuch as are always accompanied with ideas of low mirth and ridicule.

§ 4. Of both the extremes in language above mentioned, I ſhall give examples from an anonymous Engliſh tranſlator in 1729, whoſe verſion, upon the whole, is the moſt exceptionable of all I am acquainted with in any language; and yet it is but doing juſtice to the author to add, that in rendering ſome paſſages, he has been more fortunate than much better tranſlators. For brevity's ſake I ſhall here only mention the words I think cenſurable. Of learned words the following are a ſpecimen: *verboſe*, Mat. vi. 7.; *loquacioufneſs*, Ibid.; *advent*, xxiv. 27; *chaſm*, Luke xvi. 26; *grumes*, xxii. 44.; *ſteril*, i. 17.; *phenomena*, xii. 56.; *conſolated*, Acts xv. 32.; *inveſtigate*, xvii. 22.; *innate*, Eph. iv. 18.: *ſaliva*, John ix. 6.; concerning which, and ſome others of the ſame kind, his critical examiner, Mr Twell, ſays juſtly, that they are unintelligible to the ignorant, and offenſive to the knowing. His fine words and faſhionable phraſes, which, on account of their affinity, I ſhall throw together, the following may ſerve to exemplify: *detachment*, Mat. ii. 16. *foot-guards*, xxvii. 27.; *parade*, 2 Theſſ. ii. 9.; *brigue*, 1 Theſſ v. 13.; *chicanery*, 1 Tim. vi. 4. *Zacharias*, we are told, Luke i. 67. *vented his divine enthuſiaſm*; that is, when tranſlated into common ſpeech, *propheſied*. A later tranſlator, or rather paraphraſt, is not much happier in his expreſſion, *he was ſeized with a divine afflatus*, here ſpoken of as a diſeaſe. *Zaccheus*, for chief of the publicans, is made *collector-general of the cuſtoms*, Luke xix. 2. *Simon Magus*, in his hands, becomes *the plenipotentiary of God*, Acts viii. 10. Jeſus Chriſt is titled *guarantee of the alliance*, Heb. vii. 22. and the Lord of hoſts, *the lord of the celeſtial militia*, James v. 4. And, to avoid the flatneſs of plain proſe, he ſometimes gives a poetical turn to the expreſſion. *Before the cock crow*, becomes in his hands, *Before the cock proclaims the day*, Luke xxii. 34.

The foppery of theſe laſt expreſſions is, if poſſible, more unſufferable than the pedantry of the firſt. They are, beſides, ſo far from conveying the ſenſe of the author, that they all, leſs or more, miſrepreſent it. As to low and ludicrous terms, there is ſometimes a greater coincidence in theſe with quaint and modiſh words, than one at firſt would imagine. It would not be eaſy to aſſign a motive for rendering οικοδεσποτης *yeoman*, Mat. xiii. 27. but it is ſtill worſe to tranſlate ὁσοι την θαλασσαν ἐργαζονται *ſupercargoes*, Rev. xviii. 17., ἁρπαξιν *raparees*, 1 Cor. v. 10, which he explains in the margin to mean *kidnappers*, and μεθυοντων *ſots*, Mat. xxiv 49. I am ſurpriſed he has not found a place for *ſharpers*, *gamblers*, and *ſwindlers*, fit company in every ſenſe for his ſots and raparees. Γλωσσοκομον is diſtended into a *bank*, John xii. 6.

and

and κλεπτης dwindles into a *pilferer*, Ibid : την χαραν τε κυριε σε is degraded into *thy maſter's diverſions*, Mat. xxv. 21. and αινος is ſwoln into a *conſort of praiſe*, xxi. 16. The laudable and ſucceſsful importunity of the two blind men, who, notwithſtanding the checks they received from the multitude, perſiſted in their application to Jeſus for relief, is contemptuouſly denoted *bawling out*, Mat. xx 31. When we are told that our Lord *ſilenced*, εφιμωσε, the *ſadducees*, this author acquaints us that he *dumbfounded* them, xxii. 34. In ſhort, what by magnifying, what by diminiſhing, what by diſtorting and diſfiguring, he has, in many places, burleſqued the original For anſwering this bad purpoſe, the extremes of cant and bombaſt are equally well adapted. The exceſs in the inſtances now given is ſo manifeſt, as entirely to ſuperſede both argument and illuſtration.

§ 5. But in regard to the uſe of what may be called learned words, it muſt be owned after all, that it is not eaſy, in every caſe, to fix the boundaries We ſometimes find claſſed under that denomination, all the words of Greek and Latin etymology, which are not current among the interior orders of the people. Yet I acknowledge, that if we were rigidly to exclude all ſuch terms, we ſhould be too often obliged either to adopt circumlocution, or to expreſs the ſentiment weakly and improperly. There are other diſadvantages to be remarked afterwards, which might reſult from the excluſion of every term that may be comprehended in the definition above given. The common tranſlation, if we except the conſecrated terms, as ſome call them, which are not many, is univerſally admitted to be written in a ſtyle that is not only natural, but eaſily underſtood by the people : yet, in the common tranſlation, there are many words which can hardly be ſuppoſed ever to have been quite familiar among the lower ranks. There is, however, one advantage poſſeſſed by that verſion, over every other book compoſed at that period, which is, that from the univerſality of its uſe, and (we may now add) its long continuance, it muſt have greatly contributed to give a currency to thoſe words which are frequently employed in it. Now, it would be abſurd in an interpreter of this age, to expect a ſimilar effect from any private verſion. A new tranſlation, even though it were authoriſed by the public, would not have the ſame advantage at preſent, when our language is in a more advanced ſtage.

§ 6 I ſhould not be ſurpriſed that a reader not accuſtomed narrowly to attend to theſe matters, were diſpoſed, at firſt hearing, to queſtion the fact, that there are many words in the vulgar tranſlation which were not in common uſe at the time among the lower orders. But I am perſuaded that a little reflection muſt ſoon convince him of it ; abſtracting from thoſe terms which have been transferred from the original languages, becauſe there

were no correſponding names in our tongue, ſuch as *phylactery*, *tetrarch*, *ſynagogue*, *proſelyte*, *centurion*, *quaternion*, *legion*, there are many in the Engliſh Bible, which cannot be conſidered as having been at that time level to the meaneſt capacities. They are ſcarcely ſo yet, notwithſtanding all the advantage which their occurring in that tranſlation has given them. Of ſuch words I ſhall give a pretty large ſpecimen in the margin *. Nor can it be ſaid of thoſe there ſpecified, that more familiar terms could not have been found equally expreſſive. For though this may be true of ſome of them, it is not true of them all. *Calling* is equivalent to vocation, *comfort* to conſolation, *deſtruction* to perdition, *forgiveneſs* to remiſſion, *defilement* to pollution, *almighty* to omnipotent, *enlightened* to illuminated, *watchful* to vigilant, *delightful* to delectable, *unchangeable* to immutable, *heavenly* to celeſtial, and *earthly* to terreſtrial. Nay, the firſt ſix in the marginal liſt might have been not badly ſupplied by the more homely terms, *writer ſcholar*, *compariſon*, *letter*, *unbeliever*, *womb*. Yet I would not be underſtood by this remark, as intending to throw any blame upon the tranſlators for the choice they have ſometimes made of words, which, though not obſcure, were not the moſt familiar that it was poſſible to find. There are ſeveral reaſons to be given immediately, which may juſtly determine the tranſlator, on ſome occaſions, to deſert the common rule of adopting always the moſt obvious words. At the ſame time there are certain exceſſes in this way, whereof I have alſo given examples, into which a judicious interpreter will never be in danger of falling. The reaſons which ought, on the other hand, to determine a tranſlator, not to confine himſelf to the words which are current in the familiar tattle of the lower ranks in ſociety, are as follows:

§ 7. Firſt, in all compoſitions not in the form of dialogue, even the

Firſt, of nouns: ſcribe, diſciple, parable, epiſtle, infidel, matrix, lunatic, exile, exorciſt, ſuppliant, reſidue, genealogy, appetite, audience, pollution, perdition, partition, potentate, progenitor, liberality, occurrent, immutability, pre-eminence, remiſſion, diverſity, fragment, abjects, frontier, tradition, importunity, concupiſcence, redemption, interceſſion, ſuperſcription, inquiſition, inſurrection, communion, inſtructor, mediator, exactor, interceſſor, benefactor, malefactor, prognoſticator, ambaſſador, ambaſſage, ambuſhment, meditation, miniſtration, adminiſtration, abomination, conſummation, convocation, conſtellation, conſolation, conſultation, acceptation, communication, diſputation, cogitation, eſtimation, operation, divination, vocation, deſolation, tribulation, regeneration, propitiation, juſtification, ſanctification, ſalutation, interpretation, ſupplication, exaction, unction. *Second, of adjectives:* barbed, circumſpect, converſant, extinct, vigilant, inordinate, delectable, tributary, impotent, magnifical, immutable, innumerable, celeſtial, incorruptible, terreſtrial, omnipotent. *Third, of verbs and participles:* laud, diſtil, remit, adjure, implead, eſtimate, aſcend, deſcend, fruſtrate, diſannul, meditate, premeditate, predeſtinate, conſort, amerce, transferred, transfigured, illuminated, conſecrated, tranſlated, incenſed, mollified.

he ſimpleſt, there is ſome ſuperiority in the ſtyle to the language of converſation among the common people; and even the common people themſelves underſtand many words which, far from having any currency among them, never enter into their ordinary talk. This is particularly the caſe with thoſe of them who have had any ſort of education, were it but the loweſt. One ought, therefore, to conſider accurately the degree of the uncommonneſs of the term, before it be rejected; as it may not be eaſy to ſupply its place with one more familiar and equally appoſite. Unneceſſary circumlocutions are cumberſome, and ought always to be avoided. They are unfriendly alike to ſimplicity and to energy, and ſometimes even to propriety and perſpicuity.

§ 8. Secondly, there are caſes wherein ſome things may be done, nay, ought to be done, by a tranſlator for the ſake of variety. I acknowledge that this is a ſubordinate conſideration, and that variety is never to be purchaſed at the expence of either perſpicuity or ſimplicity. But even the ſacred hiſtorians, though eminently ſimple and perſpicuous, do not always confine themſelves to the ſame words in expreſſing the ſame thoughts. Not that there appears in their manner any aim at varying the expreſſion; but it is well known that, without ſuch an aim, the ſame ſubject, even in converſation, is hardly ever twice ſpoken of preciſely in the ſame words. To a certain degree, this is a conſequence of that quality I have had occaſion, oftener than once, to obſerve in them, a freedom from all ſolicitude about their language. Whereas an unvarying recourſe to the ſame words for expreſſing the ſame thoughts, would, in fact, require one to be ſolicitous about uniformity, and uncommonly attentive to it. But in the uſe of the terms of principal conſequence, in which the aſſociation between the words and the ideas is much ſtronger, they are pretty uniform in recurring to the ſame words, though they are not ſo in matters of little moment. Yet, in theſe, the variety is no greater than is perfectly natural in men, whoſe thoughts are engroſſed by their ſubject, and who never ſearch about in queſt of words. Now it is only in conſequence of ſome attention to language in a tranſlator, that he is capable of doing juſtice to this inattention, if I may ſo denominate it, of his author.

§ 9. Thirdly, it was remarked before *, that though there is a ſameneſs of idiom in the writers of the New Teſtament, particularly the evangeliſts, there is a diverſity in their ſtyles. Hence it ariſes, that different terms are ſometimes employed by the different hiſtorians in relating the ſame fact. But as this circumſtance has not much engaged the attention of interpreters, it often happens that in the tranſlations of the Goſpels (for this is not peculiar

* Diſſ. I. Part II.

peculiar to any one tranſlation), there appears in the verſion a greater coincidence in the ſtyle of the evangeliſts, than is found in the original. Now there are very good reaſons to determine us to avoid, as much as poſſible, a fameneſs which is not authorized by the original. There are caſes, I own, in which it is unavoidable. It often happens that two or more words, in the language of the author, are ſynonymous, and may therefore be uſed indiſcriminately for expreſſing the ſame thing, when it is impoſſible to find more than one, in the language of the tranſlator, which can be uſed with propriety. When our Lord fed the five thouſand men in the deſert, the order he gave to the people immediately before, was, as expreſſed by Matthew, ch. xiv. 19. ανακλιθηναι επι τους χορτους; as expreſſed by Mark, ch. vi. 39. ανακλιναι επι τω χλωρω χορτω; as expreſſed by Luke, ch. ix. 14. κατακλιναται αυτους; and, as expreſſed by John, ch. vi. 10. ποιησατε αναπεσειν. Here every one of the evangeliſts conveys the ſame order in a different phraſe, all of them, however, both naturally and ſimply. This variety it would be impoſſible to imitate in Engliſh, without recurring to unnatural and affected expreſſions. The three laſt evangeliſts uſe different verbs to expreſs the poſture, namely ανακλινω, κατακλινω, and αναπιπτω. And even in the firſt, the expreſſion is, I may ſay, equally varied, as one of the two who uſe that verb employs the paſſive voice, the other the active. Now, in the common tranſlation, the phraſe *to ſit down*, ſignifying the poſture, is the ſame in them all. I do not here animadvert on the impropriety of this verſion. I took occaſion formerly *, to obſerve that thoſe Greek words denote always *to lie*, and not *to ſit*. My intention at preſent is only to ſhew, that the ſimplicity of the ſacred writers does not entirely exclude variety. Even the three terms above mentioned, are not all that occur in the Goſpels for expreſſing the poſture then uſed at table. Ανακειμαι, and κατακειμαι, are alſo employed. It would be in vain to attempt, in modern tongues, which are comparatively ſcanty, to equal the copiouſneſs of Greek; but, as far as the language which we uſe will permit, we ought not to overlook even theſe little variations.

§ 10. The evangeliſts have been thought, by many, ſo much to coincide in their narratives, as to give ſcope for ſuſpecting that ſome of thoſe who wrote more lately, copied thoſe who wrote before them. Though it muſt be owned, that there is often a coincidence, both in matter and in expreſſion, it will not be found ſo great in the original, nor ſo frequent as, perhaps, in all tranſlations ancient and modern. Many tranſlators have conſidered it as a matter of no moment, provided the ſenſe be juſtly rendered, whether the differences in the manner were minded

* Diſſ. VIII. Part III. § 3, &c.

minded or not. Nay, in certain cases wherein it would have been easy to attain, in the version, all the variety of the original, some interpreters seem studiously to have avoided it. Perhaps, they did not judge it convenient to make the appearance of a difference between the sacred writers in words, when there was none in meaning. In this, however, I think they judged wrong. An agreement in the sense is all that ought to be desired in them; more especially, as they wrote in a language different from that spoken by the persons whose history they relate. When this is the case, the most tenacious memory will not account for a perfect identity of expression in the witnesses. Their testimony is given in Greek. The language spoken by those whose story they relate, was a dialect of Chaldee. They were themselves, therefore, at least three of them, the translators of the speeches and conversations recorded in their histories. The utmost that is expected from different translators, is a coincidence in sense; a perfect coincidence in words, in a work of such extent as the Gospel, is, without previous concert, impossible. Consequently, an appearance of difference, arising solely from the use of different expressions, is of much less prejudice to the credibility of their narration, than the appearance of concert or copying would have been.

When, therefore, the language of the interpreter of the Gospels will admit an imitation of such diversities in the style, it ought not to be overlooked. If possible, their narratives should be neither more nor less coincident in the version than they are in the original. And to this end, namely, that the phraseology may nearly differ as much in English as it does in Greek, I have, on some occasions, chosen not the very best word which might have been found, satisfying myself with this, that there is nothing in the word I have employed, unsuitable, dark, or ambiguous. But, as was signified before, it is not possible so to diversify the style of a version, as to make it always correspond, in this respect, to the original. Nor ought a correspondence of this kind ever to be attempted, at the expence of either perspicuity or propriety. I shall only add, that a little elevation of style may naturally be expected in quotations from the Prophets, and the Psalms, and in the short Canticles which we have in the two first chapters of Luke; for in these, though not written in verse, the expression is poetical.

§ 11. Fourthly, not only the differences in the styles of the different evangelists ought not to pass entirely unnoticed, but the same thing may be affirmed of the changes sometimes found in the terms used by the same evangelist. Here again I must observe, that it were in vain to attempt an exact correspondence in this respect. There is a superior richness in the language of the sacred writers, which even their style, though simple and unaffected,

fected, (for they never ſtep out of their way in queſt of ornament), cannot entirely conceal. They uſe conſiderable variety of terms for expreſſing thoſe ordinary exertions for which our modern tongues hardly admit any variety. I have given one ſpecimen of this, in the words whereby they expreſs the poſture then uſed at meals. I ſhall here add ſome other examples. The following words occur in the New Teſtament, λεγω, επω, φημι, φασκω, φραζω, ξεω, ειπω, ερεω, all anſwering to the Engliſh verb *ſay*. Of theſe we may affirm with truth, that it is but rarely that any of them admits a different rendering in our language. The words κοινοω, μολυνω, μιαινω, σπιλοω, ρυποω, correſpond to the Engliſh verb *defile*, by which they are commonly rendered. The greater part of the words ſubjoined are, in the common tranſlation, rendered always, and the reſt occaſionally, by the Engliſh verb *ſee*; ειδω, απειδω, οπτομαι, οπτανω, βλεπω, εμβλεπω, οραω, καθοραω, θεαομαι, θεωρεω, ισοπω. Yet, in none of the liſts afore mentioned are the words perfectly ſynonymous, nor can they be ſaid to be always uſed promiſcuouſly by the inſpired penmen. They are conſequently of uſe, not only for diverſifying the ſtyle, but for giving it alſo a degree of preciſion which poorer languages cannot ſupply.

The ſame thing may be exemplified in the nouns, though not perhaps in the ſame degree as in the verbs. Αρς, αρνιον, αμνος, are uſed by the evangeliſts, the firſt by Luke, the other two by John; and are all rendered, in the common tranſlation, *lamb*: δικτυον, αμφιβληστρον, σαγηνη, in the Goſpels, are all tranſlated *net*. And though the latter might have been varied in the verſion, the other could not with propriety. Sometimes we are obliged to render different words which occur pretty often, but are not entirely ſynonymous, by the ſame Engliſh word, for want of diſtinct terms adapted to each meaning. Thus the words παιδια and τεκνα are, if I miſtake not, uniformly rendered *children*; though the former word particulary reſpects the age and ſize, the latter ſolely the relation. The firſt anſwers to the Latin *pueruli*, the ſecond to *liberi*. The Engliſh word *children* is well adapted to the former, though ſometimes but awkwardly employed to denote the latter. Yet, for want of another term to expreſs the offſpring, without limiting it to either ſex, we find it neceſſary to uſe the Engliſh word in this application. The word ὁ πλησιον, uſed by the evangeliſts Matthew, Mark, and Luke, γειτων by Luke and John, and περιοικος only by Luke, are all rendered *neighbour*. And though they are evidently not of the ſame ſignification, it would be difficult, in our language, to expreſs the ſenſe of any of them in one word, which would anſwer ſo well as this. Yet, that they are not ſynonymous, every one who underſtands Greek muſt be ſenſible on reflection. For if, inſtead of πλησιον, in the commandment, Αγαπησεις τον πλησιον σε ως σεαυτον, *Thou ſhalt love*

love thy neighbour as thyself, we should substitute either γειτονα, or πλησιον, we should totally alter the precept; for these terms would comprehend none but those who live within what is strictly called the neighbourhood. The translation, indeed, into English ought to be the same; and, to say the truth, it would be a more exact version of that precept, than it is of the precept, as we actually find it in the Gospel. For let it be observed, that the word *neighbour*, is one of those which, for want of more apposite terms, we are obliged to admit, in Scripture, in a meaning not perfectly warranted by common use.

I shall add but one other example. The word φιλος, used by Matthew, Luke, and John, and εταιρος, used only by Matthew, are both rendered *friend*, yet in their genuine signification, there is but little affinity between them. The former always implies affection and regard, the latter does not. The latter, not the former, was employed as a civil compellation to strangers and indifferent persons. It is that which is given, in the parable of the labourers in the vineyard, Matt. xx. 13. to the envious and dissatisfied labourer; in the parable of the marriage feast, ch. xxii. 12. to the guest who had not the wedding-garment; and it was given by our Lord to the traitor Judas, ch. xxvi. 50. when he came to deliver him up to his enemies. I do not say that εταιρε is not rightly translated *friend* in these instances; for common use permits us to employ the word in this latitude. But it is to be regretted, that we have not a word better adapted to such cases, but are obliged to prostitute a name so respectable as that of *friend*. Besides, it is manifest that, for this prostitution, we cannot plead the example of the evangelists. I make this remark the more willingly, as I have heard some unlearned readers express their surprise that our Lord should have paid so much deference to the insincere modes of civility established by the corrupt customs of the world, as to denominate a man *friend*, whom he knew to harbour the basest and the most hostile intentions. But defects of this kind are not peculiar to our language. They are, on the contrary, to be found in every tongue. All the Latin translations render the word, in the passages above mentioned, *amice*; and all the versions into modern tongues, with which I am acquainted, except one, act in the same manner. The exception meant is the Geneva French, which says not *mon ami*, as others, but *compagnon*, in all the three places mentioned. This is more literal, for εταιρος is, strictly, *socius*, or *sodalis*, not *amicus*. But it may be questioned whether such a compellation suits the idiom of that tongue, as it appears to have been adopted by no other French interpreter.

§ 12. I shall now give, from the first list of verbs above mentioned, an instance or two of the uniformity commonly observed in the use of this variety, a uniformity which sufficiently evinces, that

that the terms were not conceived by the writers to be perfectly ſynonymous. Our Lord ſays, in his ſermon on the mount, Matt. v. 21, 22. Ηκουσατε ότι ΕΡΡΕΘΗ τοις αρχαιοις· Ου φονευσεις— Εγω δε ΛΕΓΩ ύμιν, ότι—ός αν ΕΙΠΗ τω αδελφω αυτου, Ρακα :—In the common tranſlation, *Ye have heard that it was* SAID *by them of old time, Thou ſhalt not kill—But I* SAY *unto you, that—whoſoever ſhall* SAY *to his brother, Raca*—In the Engliſh, the verb *ſay* occurs thrice in this ſhort paſſage; in the Greek, there are three different verbs employed. Yet ſo little does there appear in the author a diſpoſition to change, for the ſake of changing, that wherever the caſe is perfectly ſimilar to that wherein any of the three verbs above mentioned is uſed in this quotation, the word will be found to be the ſame throughout the whole diſcourſe. Thus, through the whole of this diſcourſe, what our Lord authoritatively gives in charge as from himſelf, is ſignified by the ſame phraſe, εγω λεγω ύμιν; whatever is mentioned as ſtanding on the foot of oral tradition, is expreſſed by ερρεθη, part of the verb ρεω; and what is mentioned as neither precept nor maxim of any kind, but as what may paſs incidentally in converſation, is denoted by the verb επω. Another example of the different application of ſuch words, we have in our Lord's converſation with the chief prieſts and elders, in relation to the authority by which he acted, Matt. xxi. 25. 27. Οι δε διελογιζοντο παρ' εαυτοις, ΛΕΓΟΝΤΕΣ, Εαν ΕΙΠΩΜΕΝ, εξ ουρανου, ΕΡΕΙ ημιν· Διατι ουν ουκ επιστευσατε αυτω; A little after, ΕΦΗ αυτοις και αυτος. In the common tranſlation, *And they reaſoned with themſelves*, SAYING, *If we ſhall* SAY *from heaven, he will* SAY *unto us, Why did ye not then believe him?* Afterwards, *And he* SAID *unto them.* Here the ſame repetition in the verſion is contraſted with a ſtill greater variety in the original; for we have no fewer than four different words in the Greek, rendered into our language, by repeating the ſame Engliſh verb four times. The ſenſe of επω is the ſame in both paſſages; the word λεγω is uſed here more indefinitely than in the former; the verb φημι approaches in meaning to the word *retort*, and ſeems to preclude reply.

On comparing, we muſt perceive, that there is not only an awkwardneſs in the repetitions which modern languages ſometimes render neceſſary, but even a feebleneſs in the enunciation of the ſentiment. This conſideration, when attended to, will be found to warrant our taking the greater liberty in diverſifying the expreſſion wherever our language permits it. For if we are often obliged to repeat the ſame, where the original employs different words, and if we alſo retain the ſame words, where the original retains the ſame, though our own tongue would allow a change, the ſtyle of the verſion muſt be a bad repreſentation of that of the original. It will have all the defects of both languages, and none of the riches of either. I have, therefore, taken

ken the liberty to vary the expreſſion a little, where the genius of our tongue, in a conſiſtency with ſimplicity, propriety, and perſpicuity, permitted it; as it was only thus I could compenſate for the reſtraints I was obliged to ſubmit to, in caſes wherein the ſacred penmen had taken a freer range.

§ 13. Concerning the diverſity of ſtyles in the different evangeliſts, which I cannot help conſidering as entitled to more attention than tranſlators ſeem to have given it, I ſhall beg leave to make a few more obſervations. Of the words which I have mentioned as nearly ſynonymous, or at leaſt as rendered by moſt interpreters in the ſame manner, ſome, though common in ſome of the Goſpels, do not occur in others; yet, in no verſion that I know, is this always to be diſcovered. The verb λεγω, *I ſay*, is uſed by Matthew often, by Mark once, but never by either Luke or John. The ſynonyme ειπω is uſed by all except John, and εἰπεῖν by all except Mark. Ανακλινω, *I lay down*, occurs in all the Goſpels except John's; κατακειμαι, *I lie down*, in all except Matthew's. Every one of the evangeliſts has alſo many words to be found in none of the reſt; and that not only when peculiar things are mentioned by him, but when the ſame things the ſame actions, the ſame circumſtances, which are taken notice of by other evangeliſts are related. Theſe it is ſometimes impoſſible to tranſlate juſtly in different words. Luke ſometimes, in addreſſing God, uſes the word δεσποτης, which is not in any of the other evangeliſts, and can hardly be rendered otherwiſe than *Lord*, the term whereby κυριος, which occurs in them all, is commonly tranſlated. Luke is alſo peculiar in giving Jeſus Chriſt the title επισατης, which cannot well be rendered otherwiſe than *maſter*, the common rendering of διδασκαλος, though, as Grotius obſerves, the words are not perfectly equivalent. Matthew has, in one paſſage, applied to our Lord a title not uſed by any other, καθηγητης, which our tranſlators have alſo rendered *maſter*, and have thereby impaired the ſenſe. In like manner, the multiplicity of inflections in the tenſes, moods, and voices of their verbs, ſupplies them with a variety of expreſſions which ſerves to diverſify their ſtyle in a manner not to be imitated in modern tongues, and leſs perhaps in Engliſh, which has very few inflections, than in any other. Add to the aforeſaid advantages, in reſpect of variety, which the writers of the New Teſtament derived from their language, the derivatives and compounds with which that copious tongue ſo remarkably abounds.

Now, I do not know any ſtronger indications of a native difference of ſtyle than thoſe above mentioned, and in part exemplified. And, as this difference conveys ſome evidence of the authenticity of the writings, it ought not to be always diſregarded by tranſlators, merely becauſe it is not poſſible always to preſerve it in their verſions. It is then in effect preſerved, when

they give such a turn to the expression, as renders the difference of phraseology nearly equal upon the whole. This, however, ought never to be attempted, when either the sense may be ever so little altered by it, or the simplicity and perspicuity of the sentence may be injured. What has been now observed will account for my employing words sometimes, which, though not unusual or obscure, are not the most obvious, and for giving such a turn to the expression, as renders it less literal than it might otherwise have been.

§ 14. I have avoided, as much as possible, the use of circumlocution: yet there are certain cases where we cannot avoid it entirely, and do justice to our author. I do not mean barely, when there is not a single word in the language of the translation which conveys the sense of the original term; but when there is something, either in the application or in the argument, that cannot be fully exhibited without the aid of some additional terms. It has been often observed that, in no two languages, do the words so perfectly correspond, that the same terms in one will always express the sense of the same terms in the other. There is a difference of extent in meaning which hinders them from suiting exactly, even when they coincide in the general import. The epithet ἀχρεῖος, as applied in the Gospel of Luke, ch. xvii. 10. is so far from suiting the sense of the English word *unprofitable*, by which it is rendered in the common translation, that if we were to give a definition of an unprofitable servant, we should hardly think of another than the reverse of the character given in that passage, but should say, 'he is one who does not 'that to his master which is his duty to do.' From the context, however, no person can be at a loss to see, that the import of the word is, "We have conferred no favour, we have only fulfilled "the terms which we were bound to perform." I know that because the sentiment is not expressed with the brevity of the original, many would call this a comment, or rather a paraphrase, and not a version. It is expressed, I acknowledge, by a periphrasis; but periphrasis and paraphrase are not synonymous terms. The former is in every translation sometimes necessary, in order to transmit the genuine thought and reasoning of the author: it is only when more than this is attempted, and when other sentiments are introduced or suggested, for the sake of illustrating an author's thoughts, or enforcing his arguments, that men employ paraphrase. It is not denied, that periphrasis in translating, ought to be avoided, if possible; but it is not always possible to avoid it, and periphrasis is preferable to single words, which either convey no meaning, or convey a meaning different from the author's.

The word βαπτισμα, in the question put by our Lord, Το βαπ-

τισμα

βαπτισμα Ιωαννου ποθεν ην *; does not answer the word *baptism*, as used by us; nor does αναστασις, in the account given of the Sadducees †, correspond entirely to the English word *resurrection*: the word επαγγελια is, for the most part, rendered *promise*, and means neither more nor less. In a few cases, however, it does not signify the promise itself, but the thing promised. Now the English word is never so applied. Hence the obscurity, not to say impropriety, of that expression, *I send the promise of my Father upon you* ‡, which, if it can be said to suggest any thing to an English reader, suggests awkwardly, *I give you a promise on the part of my Father*. Yet this is not the sense. What is here meant is the fulfilment of a promise formerly given them by his Father, and is therefore properly rendered, *I send you that which my Father hath promised*. Through not attending to this difference, our translators have thrown great darkness on some passages in the Epistle to the Hebrews. *These all* (says the writer, speaking of Abraham, Sarah, and others) *died in the faith, not having received the promises*, μη λαβοντες τας επαγγελιας, Heb. xi. 13. Yet this way interpreted, the assertion is contradictory, not only to the patriarchal history, but to what is said expressly of Abraham in the same chapter, Heb. xi. 14. The words, therefore, ought to have been rendered, *not having received the promised inheritance*; for it is the land of Canaan promised to Abraham and his posterity, to which the writer particularly refers, giving as an evidence that they had not received it, their acknowledging themselves to be *strangers and sojourners in the land*; not *on the earth*, as it is, particularly in this place, very improperly translated.

§ 15. Again, suppose, which is not uncommon, that the original word has two different, but related senses, and that the author had an allusion to both. Suppose also that in the language of the interpreter there is a term adapted to each of those senses, but not any one word that will suit both. In such cases perspicuity requires somewhat of periphrasis. If we abruptly change the word in the same sentence, or in the same argument, there will appear an incoherence in the version, where there appears a close connection in the original; and if we retain the same term, there will be both obscurity and impropriety in the version. I shall explain my meaning by examples, the only way of making such criticisms understood.

In one place in Matthew, ch. xv. 4, 5. the verb τιμαω is employed, as usual, to express the duty which children owe to their parents. *To honour* is that commonly used in English. Yet this word is not equivalent in import to the Greek verb, much less

* Mat. xxi. 25. † Mat. xxii 23. ‡ Luke xxiv. 49. See all these passages in this translation, and the notes upon them.

leſs to the Hebrew כבד *chabad*, tranſlated τιμαω by the Seventy in the place quoted by the Evangeliſt. This is one of the cauſes of the obſcurity and apparent inconſequence of that paſſage in the Goſpel. I have, therefore, rendered the word, where it occurs the ſecond time in the argument uſed by our Lord, *honour by his aſſiſtance*; for the original implies no leſs.

The Apoſtle Paul, writing to the Romans (for it is not neceſſary here to confine myſelf to the Goſpels), ſays, Rom. x. 16, 17. as it is expreſſed in the common verſion, *But they have not all obeyed the Goſpel; for Eſaias ſaith, Lord, who hath believed our report? So then, faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God.* What the Apoſtle introduces here with *So then*, as a direct concluſion from the words of the Prophet, cannot fail to appear remote to an Engliſh reader, and to require ſome intermediate ideas to make out the connection. The incoherency diſappears entirely, when we recur to the original, where the words are: Αλλ' ου παντες υπηκουσαν τω ευαγγελιω. Ησαιας γαρ λεγει, Κυριε, τις επιστευσε τη ακοη ημων; Αρα η πιστις εξ ακοης· η δε ακοη δια ρηματος Θεου. Nothing can be more clearly conſequential, than the argument as expreſſed here. Iſaiah had ſaid, complaining of the people, Τις επιστευσε τη ακοη ημων; from which the Apoſtle infers, that it commonly holds ΠΙΣΤΙΣ εξ ΑΚΟΗΣ, otherwiſe there had been no ſcope for complaint. But, by the change of the term in Engliſh, from *report* to *hearing*, however nearly the ideas are related, the expreſſion is remarkably obſcured. It muſt be owned, that we have no word, in Engliſh, of equal extent, in ſignification, with the Greek ακοη, which denotes both the *report*, or the thing heard, and the ſenſation of hearing; though, in regard to the ſenſe of ſeeing, the Engliſh word *ſight* is of equal latitude; for it denotes both the thing ſeen, and the perception received by the eye *. But, when ſuch a difference as this happens, between the import of their words and ours, one does more juſtice to the original, and interprets more ſtrictly, by giving the ſentence ſuch a turn as will preſerve the verbal alluſion, than by ſuch a change of the terms as our tranſlators have adopted, to the no ſmall injury of perſpicuity. The paſſage may, therefore, properly be rendered thus: *For Iſaiah ſaith, "Lord, who believeth what he "heareth us preach?" So then, belief cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God preached.* Nor is the addition of the participle *preached*, to be conſidered as a ſupply, from conjecture, of what is not expreſſed in the original; for, in fact, the word ακοη here implies it. Diodati has not badly tranſlated it *preaching. Signore, chi a creduto alla noſtra predicatione? La fede adunque e dalla predicatione.* This is better than the Engliſh

* See an excellent illuſtration of this in Dr Beattie's Eſſay on Truth, Part II. Ch. II. Sect. I.

gliſh verſion, as it preſerves clearly the connection of the two verſes. It is, nevertheleſs, of importance, not to ſuppreſs the other ſignification of ακοη, to wit, *hearing*, as, by means of it, the connection is rendered clearer, both with the preceding words, *How ſhall they believe in him of whom they have not heard?* Rom. x. 14. and with the following, *But, I ſay, Have they not heard?* ver. 18. I ſhall only add, that where the coincidence in the ſenſe is very clear, the grammatical relation between the words is of leſs importance. There is, in this paſſage, a verbal connection, not only between the words ακουω and ακοη, but alſo between πιστευω and πιστις. But the Engliſh word *faith*, being fully equivalent to the Greek word πιστις, and its connection with believing being evident, it is not of great moment to preſerve in Engliſh the affinity in ſound. As ſuch reſemblances, however, always in ſome degree aſſiſt attention, and add a ſort of evidence, it is rather better to retain them, where it can be done without hurting the ſenſe. For this reaſon, I prefer the word *belief*, here, to the word *faith*.

I ſhall give but one other example, which, though not requiring the aid of circumlocution, is of a nature ſomewhat ſimilar to the former. A verb, or an epithet, in the original, is ſometimes conſtrued with a noun, uſed figuratively, and is alſo conſtrued, becauſe uſe permits the application, with that which is repreſented by the figure; whereas, in the tranſlator's language, the term, by which the verb or epithet is commonly rendered, is not equally ſuſceptible of both applications. In ſuch caſes, it is better, when the thing is practicable, to change the word for one which, though leſs common, ſuits both. The following paſſage will illuſtrate my meaning. 1 Pet. ii. 6, 7.: Περιεχει εν τη γραφη· "Ιδε τιθη-
"μι εν Σιων λιθον ακρογωνιαιον, εκλεκτον, εντιμον· και ὁ πιστευων επ' αυτω, ου μη
"καταισχυνθη." Υμιν ουν ἡ τιμη τοις πιστευουσιν· απειθουσι δε, λιθον ὁν απεδοκιμασαν οἱ οικοδομουντες, ὁυτος εγενηθη εις κεφαλην γωνιας: which our tranſlators render thus: *It is contained in the Scripture,* "*Behold, I*
"*lay in Sion a chief corner ſtone, elect, precious: and he that be-*
"*lieveth on him ſhall not be confounded.*" *Unto you, therefore, which believe, he is precious: but unto them which be diſobedient, the ſtone which the builders diſallowed, the ſame is made the head of the corner.* Here the type and the antitype are ſo blended, as to hurt, alike, both perſpicuity and propriety. To ſpeak of *believing in a ſtone, an elect ſtone,* and to apply the pronoun *him* to a ſtone, ſound very oddly in our language; but πιστευω επι, in the Helleniſtic idiom, and εκλεκτος, admit an application either to perſons or to things. The Apoſtle ſaid, επ' αυτω, becauſe λιθος is of the maſculine gender: for the like reaſon he would have ſaid, επ' αυτη, had he uſed πετρα inſtead of λιθος. Would our tranſlators in that caſe, have rendered it, *He who believeth on her?* Now, the Engliſh verb *to confide,* and the participle *ſelected,* are ſuſceptible

tible of both applications. Let the paſſage, then, be rendered thus: *It is ſaid in Scripture,* "*Behold, I lay in Sion a chief cor-*" *ner-ſtone, ſelected and precious: whoſoever confideth in it ſhall* "*not be aſhamed.*" *There is honour, therefore, to you who confide; but to the miſtruſtful, the ſtone which the builders rejected, is made the head of the corner.* I may remark, in paſſing, that ἡ τιμη is here evidently oppoſed to ἡ αισχυνη, the import of which is included in the verb καταισχυνθη; inſtead of *ſhame* ye ſhall have *honour;* but by no rule, that I know, can it be tranſlated, *he is precious.* Απειθουσι, though often juſtly rendered *diſobedient*, rather ſignifies here, *miſtruſtful, incredulous*, being contraſted to πιστευουσι. All the above examples are calculated to ſhow, that it is as impoſſible for a tranſlator, if he preſerve that uniformity in tranſlating ſo much inſiſted on by ſome, to convey perſpicuouſly, or even intelligibly, the meaning of the author, and to give a juſt repreſentation of his manner, as it is to retain any regard to purity in the language which he writes: and that, therefore, this abſurd κακοζηλια ſubverts, alike, all the principal ends which he ought to have in view.

§ 16. It was admitted, that it is neceſſary to employ more words than one in the verſion, when the original term requires more for conveying the ſenſe into the language of the tranſlator. Nobody doubts the propriety of rendering προσωποληπτης, *reſpecter of perſons*, φιλαργυρια, *love of money*, or αποσυναγωγος, *expelled the ſynagogue;* and it is hardly poſſible to give the meaning in another language without the aid of ſome ſuch periphraſis. Yet even this rule, however general it may appear, does not hold invariably. There are caſes wherein it is better to leave part of the meaning unexpreſſed, than, by employing circumlocution, not only to deſert ſimplicity, but to ſuggeſt ſomething foreign to the intention of the author. That this will ſometimes be the conſequence of an over-ſcrupulous ſolicitude to comprehend every thing that may be implied in the original term, will be evident on reflection. Zaccheus, the publican, ſaid to our Lord, Luke xix. 8. Ει τινος τι ἐσυκοφαντησα, αποδιδωμι τετραπλουν, which our tranſlators have rendered, *If I have taken any thing from any man by falſe accuſation, I reſtore him fourfold.* In this they have followed Beza, and Leo Juda, who ſay, *Si quid cuipiam per calumniam eripui, reddo quadruplum.* Admitting the juſtneſs of the note ſubjoined by the latter, in regard to the artifices of the publicans, I approve much more the verſion of the word in the Vulgate and Eraſmus, *Si quid aliquem defraudavi*, or in Caſtalio, to the ſame purpoſe, *Si quem ulla re fraudavi*, "If in aught I have "wronged any man;" than thoſe anxious attempts, by tracing little circumſtances, to reach the full import of the original. My objection to ſuch attempts, is not ſo much becauſe they render the expreſſion unneceſſarily complex, but becauſe ſomething foreign

reign to the intention of the author, rarely fails to be ſuggeſted by them. However paradoxical it may at firſt appear, it is certainly true, that to expreſs a thing in one word, and to expreſs it in ſeveral, makes ſometimes a difference, not only in the ſtyle, but in the meaning. I need not go further for an example than the words on which I am remarking. For a man, in the ſtation of Zaccheus, who was probably not liable to the charge of being injurious in any other way than that to which his buſineſs expoſed him, nothing could be more natural, or more appoſite, than the expreſſion which the Evangeliſt repreſents him as having uſed, ει τινος τι συκοφαντησα. On the contrary, it would not have been natural in him to ſay, ει τι εκλεψα, or ει τι ηρπασα, becauſe his manner of life, and his circumſtances, ſet him above the ſuſpicion of the crimes of theft and robbery. Such things, therefore, are not ſuppoſed to enter the perſon's mind. But when we ſubſtitute a circumlocution, that is, a definition, for the name of the crime, other kindred crimes are neceſſarily conceived to be in view; becauſe it is always by the aid of the genus, and the difference, ſomehow ſignified, that the ſpecies is defined. Now, in a caſe like the preſent, wherein the purpoſe of reſtitution is explicitly declared, to introduce mention of the genus, with the limitation denoted by the ſpecific difference, is an implicit declaration, that the promiſe of reparation ſhall not be underſtood to extend to any other ſpecies of injuries. Had our language been that ſpoken in Judea, and had this humble publican, when he made his penitent declaration to his Lord, ſaid in Engliſh, *I will reſtore fourfold, if in aught I have wronged any man;* can we imagine, that he would have clogged his pious purpoſe, with the reſerve which the additional words, *by falſe accuſation*, manifeſtly imply? Who ſees not that, in this manner introduced, they are ſuch a reſtriction of the promiſe, as is equivalent to the retracting of it in part, and ſaying, 'Let it be obſerved, that as to any other ſort 'of wrong I may have committed, I promiſe nothing?' But when the thing is expreſſed in one word, as in the Greek, no ſuch effect is produced. Much, therefore, of the meaning, depends on the form of the expreſſion, as well as on the import of the words.

§ 17. But this is not the only bad conſequence which reſults from the exceſſive ſolicitude of interpreters, to comprehend in their tranſlation, by the aid of periphraſis, every thing ſuppoſed to be included in the original term. A ſingle word is ſometimes uſed, with energy and perſpicuity, as a trope. But if we ſubſtitute a definition for the ſingle word, we deſtroy the trope, and often render the ſentence nonſenſical. To ſay, *The meek ſhall inherit the earth*, Mat. v. 6. is to employ the word *inherit* in a figurative ſenſe, which can hardly be miſunderſtood by any body as denoting the facility with which they ſhall obtain poſſeſſion, and the ſtability of the poſſeſſion obtained. But, if

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we employ circumlocution, and say, in the manner of some interpreters, *The meek shall succeed to the earth by hereditary right*; by so explicit, and so formal a limitation of the manner, we exclude the trope, and affirm what is palpably inapplicable, and therefore ridiculous; for, *to obtain by hereditary right*, is to succeed, in right of consanguinity, to the former possessor, now deceased. In such cases, if the translator's language cannot convey the trope, in one word, with sufficient clearness, a plain and proper term is much preferable to such attempts at expressing, in several words, a figure, whose whole effect results from its simplicity and conciseness.

§ 18. It is proper also to observe, that the idiom of one language will admit, in a consistency with elegance and energy, redundancies in expression, which have a very different effect, translated into another language. A few examples of this occur in the New Testament. Ὑποποδιον των ποδων αυτε, Mat. v. 35. is adequately rendered, in the common translation, *his footstool*, but is literally *footstool of his feet*. It is the version given by the Seventy of the Hebrew phrase רגלו הדם, in which there is no pleonasm. Our translators have imitated them in rendering ποιμην των προβατων *shepherd of the sheep*, John x. 2.; for here the redundancy is only in the version. The words ανηρ and ανθρωπος, are often by Greek authors, especially the Attic, construed with other substantives which, by a peculiar idiom, are used adjectively *. Matthew joins ανθρωπος with εμπορος, Mat. xiii. 45.; with οικοδεσποτης, Mat. xiii. 52.; with βασιλευς, Mat. xviii. 23.; and John prefixes it to ἁμαρτωλος, John ix. 16. Luke, in similar cases, employs ανηρ, joining it to αμαρτωλος, Luke v. 8. xix. 7.; προφητης, Luke xxiv. 19.; φονευς, Acts iii. 14. In some instances our translators have very properly dropt the redundant term; in others, for I know not what reason, they have retained it. Thus dropping it, they say *a prophet*, *a murderer*, and *a certain king*. On another occasion, in order to include both words, they say a *merchant-man*. But use, whose decisions are very arbitrary, has long appropriated this name to *a trading ship*. They say also *a man that is an householder*, *a man that is a sinner*, Luke xix. 7. John ix. 16. and in one place, not badly, *a sinful man*, Luke v. 8. In these, however, we must acknowledge, there is no deviation from the meaning. Such superfluous words as some of those now mentioned, enfeeble the expression, but without altering or darkening the sense.

But there is one case wherein this use of the noun ανηρ, has, in the common version, occasioned a small deviation from the meaning.

* This idiom is not peculiarly Greek. In Genesis, xiii. 8. *We are brethren*, is, in Hebrew, אנשים אחים אנחנו, in the Septuagint, ανθρωποι αδελφοι ημεις εσμεν, *We are men brethren*. Other examples might be produced.

ing. The words ανδρες αδελφοι frequently occur in the Acts, and are always rendered, by our translators, *Men and brethren*, as if the phrase were ανδρες και αδελφοι, thereby making two distinct appellations. This I once thought peculiar to English translators, but have since found that the same method is in one place adopted by Luther. in his German translation, who says, *Thr manner und bruder*, Acts i. 16. Some foreign versions have scrupulously preserved the pleonastic form; one says *hommes freres*, another *huomini fratelli;* which are equally awkward in French and Italian, as *men brethren* would be in English; but into none of the versions in these languages which I have seen is the conjunction inserted. Our interpreters must have proceeded on the supposition, that the Apostles, by such compilations, divided their hearers into two classes, one of whom they barely denominated *men*, the other they more affectionately saluted *brethren* But that there is no foundation for this conceit is manifest; first, in that case by the syntatic order, the copulative και must have been inserted between the titles. Yet, though ανδρες αδελφοι occurs in the Acts no fewer than thirteen times, no example of ανδρες και αδελφοι is to be found. Secondly, it is, as was signified above, entirely in the Greek idiom. Ανδρες στρατιωται *soldiers*, ανδρες δικασαι *judges*, in like manner as ανδρες Αθηναιοι *Athenians*, are warranted by the example of Demosthenes, and the best writers in Greece. Thirdly, there is the same reason to introduce the copulative in the other examples above quoted, and to render ανθρωπος εμπορος *a man and a merchant*, ανηρ αμαρτολος *a man and a sinner*, and so of the rest, as ανδρες αδελφοι *men and brethren*. It may be thought that in the address Ανδρες αδελφοι και πατερες, as no conjunction is needed in the version but what is expressed in the original, the word *men* ought to be preserved. But the use above examined sufficiently shows that, in all such cases, the word ανδρες is to be considered, not as a separate title, but as an idiomatic supplement to αδελφοι και πατερες, the only titles given, and that, therefore, in translations into modern tongues, it ought to be dropped as an expletive which does not suit their idiom. The above criticism will also serve as one of the many evidences, that what is vulgarly called the most literal translation, is not always the most close.

§ 19. It may be proper also to observe, that the import of diminutives is not always to be determined by the general rules laid down by grammarians. Βιβλιον is only in form a diminutive of βιβλος, οικια of οικος, δαιμονιον of δαιμων; the same may be said of εριφιον as used in the Gospel. It cannot be understood as expressing littleness; for what is called εριφια in the only place where the word occurs, Mat. xxv. 33. is εριφοι in the verse immediately preceding. The like may be said of οναριον and ονος. And the application in that passage shows sufficiently, that it is not an

expreſſion of affection or tenderneſs. Πινακιδιον in Luke, ch. i. 63, denotes a thing differing rather in kind and uſe, than in dimenſions from πιναξ, as uſed by the ſame Evangeliſt, Luke xi. 39. Some diminutives are intended to mark a diſtinction only in age or in ſize, as θυγατριον, βιβλαριδιον, ὀψαριον, ιχθυδιον, κλινιδιον, πλοιαριον, παιδιον, παιδαριον; and may be rendered into Engliſh by the aid of the epithet *little*, as *little daughter*, *little book*, *little fiſh*, or by a ſingle word adapted to the meaning in the paſſage where it occurs, as *couch*, *boat*, *child*, *boy*, *infant*. Τεκνιον appears, on the contrary, more expreſſive of affection than of ſize; τεκνα is therefore better rendered *dear children* than *little children*, which, when addreſſed to grown perſons, ſounds very oddly. Sometimes the diminutive expreſſes contempt. In this way the word γυναικαρια is uſed by Paul, 2 Tim. iii. 6. and is not badly tranſlated *ſilly women*. But in many caſes it muſt be acknowledged that the difference which a diminutive makes, though real, is of too delicate a nature to be transfuſed into a verſion. For when a tranſlator, becauſe the language which he writes, does not afford a term exactly equivalent, makes a ſtretch for a word; that word often farther exceeds the import of the original, than the common term would have fallen below it. For example, in the check which our Lord at firſt gave to the application of the Syrophenician woman, I conſider the diminutive κυναρια as more emphatical in that place than κυνες: yet I think it is incomparably better rendered in the common verſion *dogs*, than in that of the anonymous tranſlator *puppies*.

Nay, in the few caſes (for they are but few) in which our language has provided us in diminutives, it is not always proper to render the Greek diminutive by the Engliſh. Αρνιον, for example, is in Greek the diminutive of αρης, ſo is *lambkin* of *lamb* in Engliſh, which is the only proper verſion of αρης. To tranſlate αρνιον *lambkin*, muſt therefore be entirely agreeable to the laws of literal interpretation. Yet who, that underſtands Engliſh, would heſitate to affirm that a tranſlator who ſhould ſo render the word, wherever it occurs in the New Teſtament, would betray a great defect both of taſte and of judgment? This is one of the many evidences we have, that without knowing ſomewhat of the ſentiments and manners of a people, with which the genius of their language is intimately connected, we may, in tranſlating their works, exhibit an uncouth repreſentation of the dead letter, but are not qualified for transfuſing the ſenſe and ſpirit of their writings into the verſion. The Greek abounds in diminutives of every kind, though uſed but ſparingly in the Goſpels; nay, even in the diminutives of diminutives. They are admitted into all kinds of compoſition, both proſaic and poetical, the moſt ſolemn as well as the moſt ludicrous. It is quite otherwiſe with us. We have but few of that denomination, and thoſe few are hard-

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ly ever admitted into grave diſcuſſions. They are, in a manner, confined to paſtoral poetry, and romance, or at beſt, to performances whoſe end is amuſement rather than inſtruction. It is only in theſe that ſuch words as *lordling*, *baby*, *manikin*, could be tolerated. Ἀγαθὸν, in Greek, is a word of ſufficient dignity, which *lambkin* in Engliſh is not. This term ſhows rather a playful than a ſerious diſpoſition in the perſon who uſes it. I have been the more particular here in order to ſhow, that if we would tranſlate with propriety, more knowledge is requiſite, than can be furniſhed by lexicons and grammars. So much for what, in tranſlating, concerns the juſtneſs of expreſſion neceſſary for promoting the author's intention, and conveying his ſentiments.

§ 20. Next to the juſtneſs, the perſpicuity of what is ſaid, will be univerſally admitted to be, of all the qualities of ſtyle, the moſt eſſential. Some indeed ſeem to think that this is peculiarly the author's province, and no farther the tranſlator's, than he has the warrant of his original. Such was the opinion of Le Clerc, a man of conſiderable name in literature. "Quamvis "Latina lingua," ſays he *, "perſpicuitate multo magis quam "Hebraica gaudeat, imo vero obſcuritatem, quantum poteſt, vi"tare ſoleat; ubi Hebraica obſcura ſunt, tranſlationem noſtram "obſcuriorem eſſe non diffitemur. Sed ut ea demum effigies "laudatur, non quæ vultum formoſum ſpectandum, ſed qualis "eſt revera, ſpectantium oculis offert; ſic tranſlatio, ubi arche"typus ſermo clarus eſt, clara; ubi obſcurus obſcura eſſe debet." This judgment he qualifies with the following words: "Obſcu"ra autem hic vocamus, non quæ Hebraicæ linguæ neſciis ob"ſcura ſunt, ſic enim pleræque loquutiones ſcripturæ obſcuræ "eſſent, ſed quæ a linguæ non imperitis hodie non ſatis intelli"guntur. Contra vero clara eſſe dicimus, non ea tantum quæ "omnibus, etiam imperitis aperta ſunt, ſed quæ linguæ peritiori"bus nullum negotium faceſſunt." But even with this qualification the ſentiment does not appear defenſible. It makes the ſtandard of perſpicuity what it is impoſſible for any perſon exactly to know, namely, the degree of knowledge in the original attained (not by the tranſlator, but) by the learned in general in the Oriental languages at the time. "Obſcura vocamus quæ a "linguæ non imperitis *hodie*, non ſatis intelliguntur." In conſequence of which the Scriptures ought to be tranſlated more perſpicuouſly at one time than at another, becauſe the original is better underſtood at one time than at another. That in fact they will be ſo, when in the hands of a tranſlator of ſuperior capacity and knowledge cannot be queſtioned. But by this critic's rule, if I underſtand him right, the interpreter ought not to avail himſelf of greater abilities, if he have greater abilities; but, however

* Proleg. in Pent. Diſſ. II. § 4.

ver clear the ſentiments are to him, he ought to render them obſcurely, if the original appear obſcure to the critics of the age. In this caſe, it would be of little conſequence, whether the tranſlator were profoundly ſkilled in the languages or not. The only thing of importance would be, that he were well verſed in the interpretations and comments of others. This is ſo abſurd, that I cannot allow myſelf to think that it was the fixed opinion of that critic, or the rule by which he conducted himſelf in tranſlating; yet it is hardly poſſible to put another conſtruction upon his words.

§ 21. Houbigant, without minding the qualification above quoted, ſeverely cenſures the general poſition, that the obſcurities of an author ought to be rendered obſcurely. "Obſcurus," ſays he *, "eſt non ſemel Horatius; num igitur laudanda ea erit Ho-"ratii Gallica interpretatio, quæ Horatium faciet Gallico ſer-"mone, ubi clarus eſt, clare, ubi obſcurus, obſcure loquentem?" I muſt, however, ſay ſo much for Le Clerc, as to acknowledge, that the caſes compared by Houbigant are not parallel. Greater freedom may reaſonably be uſed with profane authors than with the ſacred. If the general tenor and connection be preſerved in the thoughts of a Greek or Latin poet, and if the diction be harmonious and elegant, a few miſtakes about the import of words, by which the ſcope of the whole is little affected, will be thought, even by the moſt faſtidious critics, a more pardonable fault than ſuch obſcurity as interrupts a reader, and makes it difficult for him to divine the ſenſe. But it is otherwiſe with a book of ſo great authority as the Scriptures. It is better that in them the reader ſhould ſometimes be at a loſs about the ſentiment, than that he ſhould have a falſe ſentiment impoſed upon him for a dictate of the Spirit of God. I approve much more what follows in Houbigant: "Humani ingenii eſt, non linguæ "cujuſcunque obſcuritas, divini ſermonis dos perpetua, ut digni-"tas, ita etiam perſpicuitas. Ut quanquam obſcura nunc eſſet "Hebraica lingua, tamen dubitandum non eſſet, quæ ſacri autores "ſcripſerunt, perſpicue ſcripſiſſe: nobis igitur eſſe maxime ela-"borandum, ut quæ nunc nobis obſcura eſſe videantur, ad priſti-"nam nativamque perſpicuitatem, quoad fieri poteſt, revocemus; "non autem nos nobis contentos eſſe debere, ſi quæ prima ſpecie "obſcura erant, obſcure converterimus." I have already given my reaſons † for thinking that the hiſtorical ſtyle of the Scriptures, in conſequence of its greater ſimplicity, is naturally more perſpicuous than that of moſt other writings. But it is impoſſible that their ſenſe ſhould appear, even to men of profound erudition, with the ſame facility and clearneſs, as it did to the countrymen and contemporaries of the inſpired writers, men familiarized

* Proleg. Cap. V. Art. III. † Diſſ. III.

ized to their idiom, and well acquainted with all the cuſtoms and manners to which there are, in thoſe writings, incidental alluſions. If then, to adopt Le Clerc's ſimilitude, we prefer likeneſs to the original before beauty, we muſt endeavour to make our tranſlation as perſpicuous to our readers as we have reaſon to think the writings of Moſes were, not to modern linguiſts, but to the ancient Iſraelites, and the writings of the evangeliſts to the Helleniſt Jews. This is the only way, in my judgment, in which, conſiſtently with common ſenſe, we can ſay that a reſemblance in perſpicuity is preſerved in the tranſlation.

§ 22. But it may be aſked, Is there then no caſe whatever, wherein it may be pardonable, or even proper, to be, in ſome degree, obſcure? I acknowledge that there are ſuch caſes, though they occur but ſeldom in the hiſtorical books. Firſt it is pardonable to be obſcure, or even ambiguous, when it is neceſſary for avoiding a greater evil. I conſider it as a greater evil in a tranſlator, to aſſign a meaning merely from conjecture, for which he is conſcious he has little or no foundation. In ſuch caſes, the method taken by Caſtalio is the only unexceptionable method, to give a literal tranſlation of the words, and acknowledge our ignorance of the meaning. For the ſame reaſon, there will be a propriety in retaining even ſome ambiguities in the verſion. But this method ought to be taken only when the interpreter, uſing his beſt judgment, thinks there is ground to doubt which of the two ſenſes, ſuggeſted by the words is the meaning of the author. If the language of the verſion be ſuſceptible of the ſame ambiguity which he finds in the original, it ought to be preſerved; but if the language be not ſuſceptible of it, which often happens, the tranſlator ſhould inſert the meaning he prefers in the text, and take notice of the other in the notes, or on the margin.

I ſhall give ſome examples of both. The evangeliſt John ſays, i. 9. Ην το φως το αληθινον ο φωτιζει παντα ανθρωπον ερχομενον εις τον κοσμον. Here we have an ambiguity in the word ερχομενον, which may be either the nominative neuter, agreeing with φως, or the accuſative maſculine, agreeing with ανθρωπον. Our tranſlators have preferred the latter meaning, and ſaid, *That was the true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.* It was hardly poſſible to preſerve the native ſimplicity of the expreſſion, and retain the ambiguity in Engliſh. I have, therefore, as I preferred the former meaning, rendered the verſe, *The true light was he, who coming into the world, enlighteneth every man,* and mentioned the other ſenſe in the note, aſſigning the reaſons which determined my choice.

Another evangeliſt repreſents our Lord as ſaying, Mat. xix. 28. Λεγω υμιν, οτι υμεις οι ακολουθησαντες μοι, εν τη παλιγγενεσια, οταν καθιση ο υιος του ανθρωπου επι θρονου δοξης αυτου, καθισεσθε και υμεις επι δωδεκα θρονους, κρινοντες

κρινοντες τας δωδεκα φυλας τω Ισραηλ. Here the clauſe, εν τη παλιγγενεσια, may be conſtrued either with the preceding words, or with the following. In the former of theſe ways our tranſlators have underſtood them, and have, therefore, rendered the verſe, *I ſay unto you, that ye which have followed me in the regeneration; when the Son of man ſhall ſit in the throne of his glory, ye alſo ſhall ſit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Iſrael.* I think, on the contrary, that the words ought to be underſtood in the latter way, and have, therefore, tranſlated them in this manner: *I ſay unto you, that at the renovation, when the Son of man ſhall be ſeated on his glorious throne, ye my followers, ſitting alſo upon twelve thrones, ſhall judge the twelve tribes of Iſrael.* For this choice I have aſſigned my reaſons in the note on the paſſage.

§ 23. But it ſometimes happens, that the preference of one of the meanings of an equivocal word or phraſe, cannot be determined with probability ſufficient to ſatisfy a candid critic. In this caſe, when the verſion can be rendered equally ſuſceptible of the different meanings, candour itſelf requires, that the interpreter give it this turn. By ſo doing, he puts the unlearned reader on the ſame footing on which the learned reader is put by the author. It does not often happen that this is poſſible, but it happens ſometimes. The word αιων may denote, either the world, in the largeſt acceptation, or the age, ſtate, or diſpenſation of things, anſwering nearly to the Latin *ſeculum*. There are ſome paſſages in the New Teſtament, on which probable arguments may be advanced in favour of each interpretation. Nay, ſome have plauſibly contended, that in the prophetic ſtyle, there is no impropriety in admitting both ſenſes. Now, by rendering αιων, in thoſe doubtful caſes, *ſtate*, the ſame latitude is given the ſentiment in Engliſh, which the words have in the original. See the note on this paſſage in Matthew, ch. xii. 32. ουκ αφεθησεται αυτω, ουτε εν τω νυν αιωνι, ουτε εν τω μελλοντι, which I have rendered, *will never be pardoned, either in the preſent ſtate, or in the future.*

§ 24. There are, moreover, a few inſtances, in which it cannot be doubted that there is an intentional obſcurity. In theſe it is plain, that the ſame degree of darkneſs which is found in the original ought, as far as poſſible, to be preſerved in the verſion. Predictions are rarely intended to be perfectly underſtood till after their fulfilment, and are intended to be then underſtood by means of their fulfilment. When our Lord ſaid to his diſciples, in his laſt conſolatory diſcourſe, John xvi. 16. *Within a little while ye ſhall not ſee me, a little while after ye ſhall ſee me, becauſe I go to the Father*, we learn, from what follows, that they did not underſtand him. Yet, though he perceived they were puzzled, he did not think proper to clear up the matter; but, that his words might make the deeper impreſſion upon their minds, he mentioned ſome additional circumſtances, the triumph of

of the world, the ſorrow of the diſciples at firſt, and joy afterwards. He knew that his death and reſurrection, which were ſoon to follow, would totally diſſipate all doubts about his meaning. It muſt be injudicious, therefore, to render the verſe in ſuch a manner as to leave no room, to perſons in their circumſtances, for doubt and perplexity. Yet in one verſion it is thus tranſlated: "In a very little time you will not ſee me—in a "very little time you will ſee me again—for I am going to the "Father, ſhortly to return." The laſt clauſe, *ſhortly to return*, for which there is no warrant in the original, removes the difficulty at once, and, conſequently, makes the diſciples appear, in the ſubſequent verſes, in a very ſtrange light, as being at a loſs to underſtand what is expreſſed in the cleareſt manner. It holds, therefore, true in general, that in tranſlating prophecy, we ought to avoid giving the verſion either more or leſs light than is found in the original. The anonymous tranſlator often errs in this way. Thus, in the prophecy on mount Olivet, where our Lord ſays, Mat. xxiv. 6. *Theſe things muſt happen, but the end is not yet*, the laſt clauſe, ουπω εστι το τελος, he renders, *the end of the Jewiſh age is not yet*. There is nothing anſwering to the words *of the Jewiſh age* in the goſpel. It is not certain that the word τελος here relates to the ſame event which is called συντελεια του αιωνος a little before, ver. 3. At any rate, there is no mention of *Jews*, or *Jewiſh*, in the whole prophecy. Nay, if it were abſolutely certain, that the meaning is what this interpreter has expreſſed, it would be wrong to render it ſo, becauſe we have reaſon to conclude, that it was not without deſign that our Lord, on that occaſion, employed more general terms.

§ 25. In ſome caſes, it is particularly unſuitable to be more explicit than the ſacred authors, how certain ſoever we be that we expreſs the meaning. A little reflection muſt ſatisfy every reaſonable perſon, that events depending on the agency of men, cannot, with propriety, be revealed, ſo as to be perfectly intelligible to thoſe on whoſe agency they depend. For, if we ſuppoſe that the things predicted, are ſuch as they would not knowingly be the inſtruments of executing, either it will be in their power to defeat the intention of the prophecy, or they muſt be over ruled in their actions by ſome blind fatality, and conſequently cannot be free agents in accompliſhing the prediction. Neither of theſe ſuits the methods of Providence. God does not force the wills of his creatures; but he makes both their errors and their vices conduce to effect his wiſe and gracious purpoſes. This conduct of Providence was never more eminently diſplayed, than in what related to the death and ſufferings of the Son of God. The predictions of the ancient Prophets are ſo appoſite, and ſo clearly explained by the events, that we are at no loſs to apply them; nay, we find ſome difficulty in conceiving how they could fail

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of being underſtood by thoſe who were the inſtruments of their accompliſhment. Yet, that they were miſunderſtood by them, we have the beſt authority to affirm: *I wot*, ſays Peter, Acts iii. 17. 18. to the people of Jeruſalem, who had, with clamour, demanded of Pilate the crucifixion of Jeſus, *that through ignorance ye did it, as did alſo your rulers; but thoſe things which God before had ſhowed by the mouth of all his Prophets, that Chriſt ſhould ſuffer, he hath ſo fulfilled.* The predictions in the Goſpel are conveyed in the ſame idiom, and under the like figurative expreſſions, as are thoſe of the Old Teſtament. And though many of the events foretold, which are now accompliſhed, have put the meaning of ſuch prophecies beyond all queſtion, we ought not, in tranſlating them, to add any light borrowed merely from the accompliſhment. By ſo doing, we may even materially injure the hiſtory, and render thoſe miſtakes incredible, which, on a more exact repreſentation of things, as they muſt have appeared at the time, were entirely natural.

§ 26. The commentator's buſineſs ought never to be confounded with the tranſlator's. It is the duty of the latter to give every thing to his readers, as much as poſſible, with the ſame advantages, neither more nor fewer, with which the ſacred author gave it to his contemporaries. There were ſome things that our Saviour ſaid, as well as ſome things that he did to his diſciples, which it was not intended that they ſhould underſtand then, but which, if taken notice of then, and remembered, they would underſtand afterwards. *Theſe things*, ſaid our Lord, John xvi. 25. *I have ſpoken to you in figures; the time cometh when I ſhall no longer ſpeak to you in figures; but inſtruct you plainly concerning the Father.* It was, therefore, not intended that every thing in the Goſpel ſhould be announced, at firſt, with plainneſs. It is, withal, certain, that the veil of figurative language thrown over ſome things, was employed to ſhade them only for a time, and, in the end, to conduce to their evidence and greater luſtre. *For there* was *no ſecret that* was *not to be diſcovered; nor* was *aught concealed which was not to be divulged*, Mark iv. 22. Now, juſtice is not done to this wiſe conduct of the Spirit, unleſs things be repreſented in this reſpect alſo, as nearly as poſſible, in his own manner. And thoſe tranſlators who have not attended to this, have ſometimes, by throwing more light than was proper on particular expreſſions, involved the whole paſſage in greater darkneſs, and made it harder to account for the facts recorded.

§ 27. At the ſame time, let it be remembered, that the caſe of prophecy is in a great meaſure peculiar; and we have reaſon to think, that there is hardly any other caſe in which we are in danger of exceeding in perſpicuity. Even in thoſe places of the Goſpel, about the meaning of which expoſitors are divided, there is ground to believe, that there is no intended obſcurity in the original;

original; but that the difficulty arises merely from an allusion to some custom, or an application of some term at that time familiar, but at present not easily discovered. Where the translator is in the dark, his version ought not to be decisive. But where he has rational grounds for forming a judgment, what he judges to be the sense, he ought to express with clearness.

§ 28. I have oftener than once had occasion to observe, that wherever propriety, perspicuity, and the idiom of the tongue employed, permit an interpreter to be *close*, the more he is so, the better. But what it is to be *literal*, I have never yet seen defined by any critic or grammarian, or even by any advocate for the literal manner of translating. A resemblance in sound, by the frequent use of derivatives from the words of the original, cannot, where there is no coincidence in the sense, confer on a translator, even the slight praise of being literal. Who would honour with this denomination one who, in translating Scripture, should render συμφωνια *symphony*, ὑπερβολη *hyperbole*, παροξυσμος *paroxysm*, φαρμακεια *pharmacy*, συκοφαντειν *to play the sycophant*, παραδοξα *paradoxes*, and ιδιωτης *idiot*? Yet some of the consecrated words have no better title to this distinction.

I once met with a criticism, I do not remember where, on a passage in the Epistle of James, ch. i. 17. in which God is called the *Father of lights*, παρ ὡ ουκ ενι παραλλαγη, η τροπης αποσκιασμα. The critic profoundly supposes, that the sacred penman, though writing to the Christian converts of the dispersed Jews, amongst whom there certainly were not many noble, or rich, or learned, addressed them in the language of astronomy; and therefore renders παραλλαγη *parallax*, and τροπη *tropic*. If this be to translate very literally, it is also to translate very absurdly. And surely the plea is not stronger, that is urged in favour of those interpreters who, without regard to usage in their own language, scrupulously exhibit, in their versions, the etymologies of their author's words, especially compound words. Such, if they would preserve consistency, ought to translate ευηθης *well-bred*, ραδιουργια *easy work*, σπερμολογος *seed gatherer*, πανουργος *all-working*, γλωσσοκομον *tongue-case*, and παμπολυς *all-many*. The similar attempts of some, at analysing phrases, or idiomatical expressions, in their version, which are but a looser sort of composition, fall under the same denomination. Both the above methods, though differing greatly from each other, are occasionally patronised, as literal, by the same persons. There is a third particular, which is considered as perhaps more essential to this mode of interpreting, than either of the former, and which consists in tracing, as nearly as possible, in the version, the construction and arrangement of the original. This, if not carried to excess, is less exceptionable than either of the former.

§ 29. But it deserves our notice, that translators attempting, in

this way, to keep closely to the letter, have sometimes failed, through their attending more to words and particles, considered separately, than to the combination and construction of the whole sentence. Thus, the words of our Lord *, Πας γαρ ὁ αιτων λαμβανει, και ὁ ζητων ευρισκει, as rendered in the common translation, *For every one that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh, findeth;* err in this very way. Ὁ ζητων ευρισκει, taken by itself as a separate sentence, cannot be better rendered than *he that seeketh, findeth.* But in this passage it is only a clause of a sentence. The words πας γαρ, wherewith the sentence begins, relate equally to both clauses. The version here given, *For whosoever asketh, obtaineth; whosoever seeketh, findeth,* is, in fact, therefore, more close to the letter as well as to the sense: for, by the syntactic order, the second clause evidently is πας ὁ ζητων ευρισκει. The Vulgate is both literal and just, *Omnis enim qui petit, accipit; et qui quærit, invenit.* Here *omnis,* like πας, belongs to both members. Had our translators, in the same manner, said, *Every one that asketh, receiveth; and that seeketh, findeth;* leaving out the pronoun *he,* they would have done justice both to the form and to the sense. But they have chosen rather to follow Beza, who says, *Quisquis enim petit, accipit; et qui quærit, invenit;* where, though the second member is the same as in the Vulgate, the expression in the Gospel is in effect differently translated, as *quisquis* cannot, like *omnis,* be supplied before *qui.* I acknowledge that there is not a material difference in meaning. Only the second clause in Beza is expressed more weakly, and appears not to affirm so universally as the first clause. The clause, as expressed in Greek, has no such appearance.

§ 30. For a similar reason, the words, ὁπου ὁ σκωληξ αυτων ου τελευτα, και το πυρ ου σβεννυται, Mark ix. 44. 46. 48. are, in my opinion, more strictly rendered, *where their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched,* than as in the common version, *the fire is not quenched.* The manner in which the clauses are here connected, rendered the repetition of the pronoun in the second clause unnecessary, because in Greek it is in such cases understood as repeated. Whereas in English, when *the fire* is said, the pronoun cannot be understood. It is excluded by the article, which is never by us joined with the possessive pronoun. Could we, with propriety, imitate the Greek manner entirely, making the personal pronoun supply the possessive, and saying, *where the worm of them dieth not, and the fire is not quenched,* the pronoun might be understood in English as well as in Greek. But such an idiom with us would be harsh and unnatural. It gives an additional probability to this explanation, that in the passage in the Old Testament referred to, Isa. lxvi. 24. it is expressly *their fire* as well as *their*

* Matt. vii. 8. See the note on that verse.

their worm. In Hebrew the affixes are never left to be supplied. This remark regards only the exhibition of the construction, for the sense is not affected by the difference.

§ 31. The words of John, Ὁ ποιων την δικαιοσυνην δικαιος εστι, καθως εκεινος δικαιος εστι, 1 John iii. 7. are, in my judgment, more literally rendered, *He that doth righteousness is righteous, even as God is righteous*, than as it stands in the English translation, *even as he is righteous.* The English pronoun *he* does not correspond to the Greek εκεινος so situated. In English the sentence appears to most readers a mere identical proposition; in Greek it has no such appearance, εκεινος plainly referring us to a remote antecedent. As no pronoun in our language will here answer the purpose, the only proper recourse is to the noun whose place it occupies. The intention of the three examples just now given, is to show that, when the construction of the sentence is taken into the account, that is found a more literal (if by this be meant *closer*) translation, which, to a superficial view, appears less so.

§ 32. I shall here take notice of another case in which we may translate literally, nay, justly and perspicuously, and yet fail greatly in respect of energy. This arises from not attending to the minute, but often important differences in structure, between the language of the original and that of the version. Of many such differences between Greek and English, I shall mention at present only one. We find it necessary to introduce some of the personal pronouns almost as often as we introduce a verb. Not only does our idiom require this, but our want of inflections constrains us to take this method for conveying the meaning. In the ancient languages this is quite unnecessary, as the inflection of the verb, in almost every case, virtually expresses the pronoun. There are certain cases, nevertheless, wherein the pronoun is also employed in those languages. But in those cases it has, for the most part, an emphasis, which the corresponding pronoun with us, because equally necessary in every case, is not fitted for expressing. Thus our Lord says to his disciples, John xv. 16. Ουχ υμεις με εξελεξασθε, αλλ' εγω εξελεξαμην υμας, which is rendered in the common version, *Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.* This version is at once literal, just, and perspicuous; yet it has not the energy of the original. The stress laid on υμεις and εγω, which are here contrasted with manifest intention, because the words are otherwise superfluous, is but feebly, if at all, represented by the pronouns *ye* and *I*, which are, in English, necessary attendants on the verbs. Our translators could not have rendered differently, had the words been Ου με εξελεξασθε, αλλ' εξελεξαμην υμας. Yet every reader of taste will perceive that this expression is not nearly so emphatical. I might add that such a reader will be sensible, that even so slight a circumstance as beginning the sentence with the negative particle, adds to the emphasis, and that υμεις would

would not have been so expressive as οὐχ ὑμεῖς. To do justice, therefore, to the energy, as well as to the sense of the original, it is necessary, in modern languages, to give the sentence a different turn. The Port Royal, and after them Simon, and other French translators, have done this successfully by rendering it, *Ce n'est pas vous qui m'avez choisi, mais c'est moi qui vous ai choisi.* The like turn has been given by some very properly to the words in English, *It was not you who chose me, but it was I who chose you.*

I recollect one instance in the Old Testament, wherein our translators have taken this method. Joseph, after he had discovered himself to his brethren, observing that the remembrance of their guilt overwhelmed them with terror and confusion; in order to compose their spirits, says to them, Gen. xlv. 8. *It was not you that sent me hither, but God.* The expression in the Greek translation is perfectly similar to that above quoted from the Gospel. Οὐχ ὑμεῖς με ἀπεστάλκατε ὧδε, ἀλλ', ἢ ὁ Θεός. In the original Hebrew it is not less so: חנהכי האלהים לא אתם שלחתם אתי. I do not say, however, that the pronoun, when mentioned, is in every case emphatical, or that, in every case, it would be proper to deviate from the more simple manner of translating.

§ 33. Thus much shall suffice for what regards those leading rules in translating, which may be judged necessary for securing propriety, perspicuity, and energy; and, as far as possible, in a consistency with these, for doing justice to the particular manner of the author translated; and for bestowing on the whole that simple kind of decoration, which is suited to its character. This finishes the first part of this Dissertation relating to the matter or principal qualities to be attended to in translating.

PART II.

The Readings of the Original here followed.

I SHALL now subjoin a few remarks on the readings, where there is, in the original, a diversity of reading, which are here preferred.

Were it in our power to recur to the autographies of the sacred penmen, that is, to the manuscripts written by themselves, or by those whom they employed to whom they dictated, and whose work they supervised, there could be no question that we ought to recur to them, as the only infallible standards of divine truth. But those identical writings, it is acknowledged on all hands, are nowhere now to be found. What we have, in their stead

ſtead, are the copies of copies (through how many ſucceſſions, it is impoſſible to ſay), which were originally taken from thoſe autographies. Now, though Chriſtians are generally agreed in aſcribing infallibility to the ſacred penmen, no Chriſtian ſociety, or individual, that I know, has ever yet aſcribed infallibility to the copiers of the New Teſtament. Indeed, ſome Chriſtians appear abſurd enough to admit thus much in favour of thoſe who have tranſcribed the Old Teſtament; about which they ſeem to imagine that Providence has been more ſolicitous than about the New. For, in regard to the New Teſtament, nothing of this kind has ever been advanced. Now, what has been ſaid of the tranſcribers of the New Teſtament may, with equal certainty, be affirmed of the editors and printers. It is, nevertheleſs, true, that ſince the invention of printing, we have greater ſecurity than formerly, againſt that incorrectneſs which multiplies the diverſities of reading; inaſmuch as now, a whole printed edition, conſiſting of many thouſand copies, is not expoſed to ſo many errors, as a ſingle written copy was before. But this invention is comparatively modern. Beſides, the effect it had, in point of correctneſs, was only to check the progreſs, or more properly, to prevent the encreaſe of the evil, by giving little ſcope for new variations. But it could have no retroſpective effect in rectifying thoſe already produced.

§ 2. It behoved the firſt editors of the New Teſtament in print, to employ the manuſcripts of which they were poſſeſſed, with all their imperfections. And who will pretend that Cardinal Ximenes, Eraſmus, Robert Stephens, and the other early publiſhers of the New Teſtament, to whom the republic of letters is indeed much indebted, were under an infallible direction in the choice of manuſcripts, or in the choice of readings in thoſe paſſages wherein their copies differed from one another? That they were not all under infallible guidance, we have ocular demonſtration, as, by comparing them, we ſee that, in many inſtances, they differ among themſelves. And if only one was infallibly directed, which of them, ſhall we ſay, was favoured with this honourable diſtinction? But, in fact, though there are many well-meaning perſons, who appear diſſatisfied with the bare mention of various readings of the ſacred text, and much more with the adoption of any reading to which they have not been accuſtomed, there is none who has yet ventured to aſcribe infallibility, or inſpiration, to any ſucceſſion of copieſts, editors, or printers. Yet, without this, to what purpoſe complain? Is it poſſible to diſſemble a circumſtance clear as day, that different copies read ſome things differently? a circumſtance of which every perſon who, with but a moderate ſhare of knowledge, will take the trouble to reflect, muſt be convinced that it was inevitable: Or, if it were poſſible to diſſemble it, ought this truth to be diſſemble[d]?

bled? If, in any inſtance wherein the copies differ, there appear, upon enquiry, ſufficient reaſon to believe, that the reading of one copy, or number of copies, is the dictate of inſpiration, and that the reading of the reſt, though the ſame with that of the printed edition moſt in uſe, is not, will the cauſe of truth be better ſerved by diſſimulation, in adhering to a maxim of policy, merely human, or by conveying, in ſimplicity, to the beſt of our power, the genuine ſenſe of the Spirit? The former method favours too much of thoſe pious frauds which, though excellent props to ſuperſtition in ignorant and barbarous ages, ought never to be employed in the ſervice of true religion. Their aſſiſtance ſhe never needs, and diſdains to uſe. Let us then conclude, that as the ſacred writings have been immenſely multiplied, by the copies which have been taken from the original manuſcripts, and by the tranſcripts ſucceſſively made from the copies; the intruſion of miſtakes into the manuſcripts, and thence into the printed editions, was, without a chain of miracles, abſolutely unavoidable.

§ 3. It may be thought that the tranſmiſſion, through ſo many ages, merely by tranſcribing, in order to ſupply the place of thoſe copies which, from time to time, have been deſtroyed or loſt, muſt have, long before now, greatly corrupted the text, and involved the whole in uncertainty. Yet, in fact, the danger here is not near ſo great as at firſt it would appear. The multiplication of the copies, the very circumſtance which occaſions the increaſe of the evil, has, in a great meaſure, as it began very early, brought its own remedy along with it, namely, the opportunity it affords, of collating thoſe which have been made from different ancient exemplars. For, let it be obſerved, that different tranſcribers from a correct ſtandard, rarely fall into the ſame errors. If, therefore, which is highly probable, as almoſt all thoſe writings were originally intended for the uſe of multitudes, ſeveral copies were made directly from the writings of the ſacred penmen, thoſe tranſcripts, when the common archetype was loſt, would ſerve, when collated, to correct one another; and, in like manner, the copies taken from one would ſerve to correct the copies taken from another. There are ſeveral conſiderations, ariſing from external circumſtances, from which, among the different readings of different manuſcripts, the preference may, with probability, be determined; ſuch are the comparative antiquity, number, and apparent accuracy of the copies themſelves. There are conſiderations, alſo, ariſing from internal qualities in the readings compared; ſuch as, conformity to the grammatical conſtruction, to the common idiom of the language, to the ſpecial idiom of the Helleniſts, to the manner of the writer, and to the ſcope of the context. Need I ſubjoin the judgments that may be formed, by a ſmall change in the pointing, or even in dividing the words? for in theſe things the critic is entitled to ſome latitude,

tude, as, in the moſt ancient manuſcripts there were neither points nor accents, and hardly a diviſion of the words.

Next to the aid of manuſcripts, is that of the Greek commentators, who give us, in their commentaries, the text as they found it at the time; and, next to this, we have that of ancient tranſlations. I do not mean the aid they give for diſcovering the import of the original terms; for in this reſpect, modern verſions may be equally profitable; but their leading to the diſcovery of a different reading in the manuſcripts from which they were made. In this way, modern verſions are of no uſe to the critic, the world being ſtill in poſſeſſion of their originals. Next to ancient tranſlations, though very far from being of equal weight, are the quotations made by the fathers, and early eccleſiaſtical writers. Of the degrees of regard due reſpectively to the ſeveral aſſiſtances above named, it would be ſuperfluous here to diſcourſe, after what has been written by Walton, Mill, Wetſtein, Simon, Michaelis, Kennicott, and many others. As we can aſcribe to no manuſcript, edition, or tranſlation, abſolute perfection, we ought to follow none of them implicitly. As little ought we to reject the aid of any. On theſe principles I have proceeded in this verſion. Even the Engliſh tranſlators have not ſcrupled, in a few inſtances, to prefer a manuſcript reading to that of the printed editions, and the reading of the Vulgate to that of the Greek. Of the former, I remember two examples * in the Goſpels, wherein our tranſlators have adopted a reading different from the reading of the common Greek, and alſo different from that of the Vulgate; and not a few †, wherein they have preferred the latter to the former, ſometimes, in my opinion, raſhly. The paſſages are mentioned in the margin; the reader may compare them at his leiſure, and conſult the notes relating to them, ſubjoined to this tranſlation.

§ 4. Bengelius, though he conſulted manuſcripts, declares that he has followed none in the edition he has given of the New Teſtament, unleſs where they ſupported the reading of ſome one, at leaſt, of the printed editions. "This," ſays Boyer ‡, "is the "greateſt deference that was ever paid to the preſs." But, with all due reſpect to the judgment of that worthy and learned printer, I do not think it evidence of a deference to the preſs, but of an extravagant deference to the firſt editors of the ſacred books in print. The Scriptures of the New Teſtament had been conveyed by manuſcript for about fourteen hundred years before the art of printing exiſted. As it has never been pretended that the

* Matt. x. 10. John xviii. 20.

† Matt. xii. 14. xxv. 39. xxvi. 15. Mark vi. 56. Luke i. 35. ii. 22. xi. 13. John xvi. 2. xviii. 1. 15.

‡ Preface to his Critical Conjectures.

the firſt printers, or the firſt publiſhers were inſpired, or ought to be put on the footing of prophets, we conclude, that if their editions contain things not warranted by the manuſcripts or ancient verſions then extant, ſuch things muſt be erroneous, or at leaſt apocryphal. And, if every thing they contain may be found in ſome manuſcripts or verſions of an older date, though not in all, our giving ſuch a preference to the readings copied into the printed editions can proceed from nothing but a blind deference to the judgment of thoſe editors, as always ſelecting the beſt. Whether they merited this diſtinction, the judicious and impartial will judge. But no reaſonable perſon can heſitate a moment to pronounce, that if, of all the readings they had met with, they had ſelected the worſt, the preſs would have conveyed them down to us with equal fidelity. We may then have a prejudice in favour of the printed editions, becauſe we are accuſtomed to them, but have no valid reaſon for preferring them to manuſcripts, unleſs it ariſe from a well-founded preference of the firſt editors of the New Teſtament, to all other Scriptural critics, as men who had the beſt means of knowing what was preferable in the manuſcripts, and who were the moſt capable of making a proper choice. But hardly will either be admitted by thoſe who are acquainted with the ſtate of this ſpecies of literature, at that time, and ſince.

§ 5. Though not the firſt publiſhed, the firſt prepared for publication was the Complutenſian Polyglot, by Cardinal Ximenes, a Spaniard. The ſentence formerly quoted from him, relating to the place he had aſſigned the Vulgate in his edition, between the Hebrew and the Greek, and his indecent compariſon of its appearance there, to our Lord crucified between the two malefactors, do not ſerve to raiſe our opinion, either of his judgment or of his impartiality. He boaſted of the uſe he had made of the Vatican, and other manuſcripts of great antiquity, as to which Wetſtein is not ſingular in expreſſing doubts of his veracity.

Eraſmus is conſidered as the ſecond editor. His New Teſtament was publiſhed, but not printed, before the Complutenſian. He made uſe of ſome manuſcripts of Baſil, and others, which he had collected in different parts; but he was ſo little ſcrupulous, in regard to the text, that what was illegible in the only Greek copy, he ſeems to have had of the Apocalypſe he ſupplied, by tranſlating back into Greek from the Vulgate. He publiſhed ſeveral editions of this work, the two or three laſt of which he brought to a greater conformity to the Complutenſian printed at Alcala, than his three firſt were.

The third editor of note, (for I paſs over thoſe who did little other than republiſh either Ximenes or Eraſmus), was Robert Stephens. He allowed himſelf, in a great meaſure, to be directed by the two former editors; but not without uſing, on ſeveral occaſions,

occaſions, the readings which he found in ſome of the beſt manuſcripts he had collected. Many of the later editions of the New Teſtament are formed from ſome of his.

Beza, indeed, who was himſelf poſſeſſed of ſome valuable manuſcripts, and was ſupplied by Henry Stephens, with the various readings which had been collected by his father, ſometimes introduced them into the text. But his choice was directed by no principle of criticiſm. His great rule of preference, (as might be expected from the manner in which he conducted his tranſlation), was conformity to his own theological ſyſtem. This led him to introduce variations, ſometimes on the authority of a ſingle manuſcript of little or no account, ſometimes without even that, in ſo much, that ſeveral of his alterations muſt be conſidered as conjectural. Yet his edition has been much followed by Proteſtants. Curcellæus * complains of him for having, by his own acknowledgment, ſuppreſſed many readings he was poſſeſſed of. Simon takes notice of the ſame thing †. And, it muſt be owned, that Beza's conduct, in other particulars, gives ground to ſuſpect, that his impartiality in a matter of this kind was not to be relied on.

The only other editor I know, who has had recourſe to gueſſing, for the improvement of the text, is the Engliſh tranſlator in 1729, often before mentioned. He has, along with his verſion, republiſhed the Greek text, corrected, as he pretends, from authentic manuſcripts It does not, however, appear, that he has been guided by critical principles, in judging of manuſcripts, or of the preference due to particular readings. His chief rule ſeems to have been their conformity to his own notions, which has led him to employ a boldneſs in correcting altogether unwarrantable.

§ 6. What follows, may ſerve as evidence of this. Dr Mill was ſo much pleaſed with a correction propoſed by Bentley ‡, as to ſay, "Mihi tantopere placet hæc lectio, ut abſque unanimi "codicum in altera iſta lectione conſenſu, genuinam eam intrepide "pronunciarem;" to which our editor gives this brief and contemptuous reply, "As if there was any manuſcript ſo old as "COMMON SENSE." The greateſt regard is doubtleſs due to *common ſenſe;* but, where the ſubject is matter of fact, the proper province of common ſenſe lies in comparing and judging the proofs brought before it, not in ſupplying from invention any deficiency in theſe. Common ſenſe, or rather reaſon, is the judge in the trial. Manuſcripts, verſions, quotations, &c. are the teſtimonies.

* Pref. to his edition of the N. T. Neſcio quo conſilio, plurimas quas præ manibus habebat, publico invideriť.

† Hiſt. Crit. du N. T. lib. ii. cap. 29.

‡ The paſſage on which the correction was propoſed, is Gal. iv. 25.

timonies. It would be a bad ſcheme in civil matters to ſuperſede the examination of witneſſes, on pretence that the ſagacity of the judge rendered it unneceſſary. Yet it might be pretended, that his penetration is ſuch, that he can diſcover at a glance the truth or the falſity of the charge, from the bare phyſiognomy of the parties. But can ye imagine, that people would think their lives, liberties, and properties, ſecure in a country where this were the method of trial? Or will this method, think ye, be found to anſwer better in critical than in judicial matters? If, under the name of COMMON SENSE, we ſubſtitute the critic's fancy, in the room of teſtimony and all external evidence, we ſhall find that we have eſtabliſhed a teſt of criticiſm which is infinitely various, not in different ſects only, but in different individuals. The common ſenſe of the aforeſaid Engliſh editor, and the common ſenſe of Beza, (yet neither of them was deſtitute of this quality), would, I am afraid, have not very often coincided.

§ 7. Shall we then ſet aſide reaſon or common ſenſe in ſuch inquiries? On the contrary, no ſtep can properly be taken without it. The judge is neceſſary in the trial; ſo are the witneſſes: but there will be an end of all fairneſs, and an introduction to the moſt arbitrary proceedings, if the former be made to ſupply the place of both. In caſes of this kind, we ought always to remember that the queſtion, wherever any doubt ariſes, is a queſtion of fact, not a queſtion of right, or of abſtract truth. It is, 'What was ſaid;' not 'What ſhould have been ſaid;' or 'What we ourſelves would have ſaid,' had we been in the author's place. This is what we never miſtake in the explanation of any pagan writer, or of any modern, but are very apt to miſtake in the explanation of the Bible. If a Chriſtian of judgment and knowledge were tranſlating the Alcoran, there would be no riſk of his confounding things ſo manifeſtly diſtinct. The reaſon is, ſuch a tranſlator's concern would only be to give the meaning of his author, without either enquiring or minding whether it were agreeable or contrary to his own ſentiments.

Whereas, it is a thouſand to one that the Chriſtian, of whatever denomination be be, has, previouſly to his entering on the interpretation, gotten a ſet of opinions concerning thoſe points about which Scripture is converſant. As theſe opinions have acquired a certain firmneſs through habit, and as a believer in Chriſtianity cannot conſiſtently maintain tenets which he ſees to be repugnant to the doctrines contained in Scripture, he will find it eaſier, unleſs poſſeſſed of an uncommon ſhare of candour and diſcernment, to bring, by his ingenuity, eſpecially when aided by conjectural emendations, the dictates of revelation to a conformity to his opinions, than to bring his opinions to a conformity to the dictates of revelation. This tendency is the real cauſe of ſo much ſtraining as is ſometimes to be found in the manner of criticizing

criticizing holy writ; ſtraining, let me add, to a degree which we never ſee exemplified in interpreting any claſſical author. In the latter we are comparatively little intereſted, and are therefore ready to admit, on many occaſions, that ſuch are the ſentiments expreſſed in his writings, though very different from our ſentiments. But as Chriſtians will not admit this with regard to the Bible, they have often no other reſource, but either to wreſt its words or to change their own opinions. Which of theſe ways will be oftener taken it is not difficult to ſay.

§ 8. I have often wiſhed (if ſuch a perſon could be found) that an infidel of ſufficient learning, penetration, coolneſs, and candour, would, merely for the ſake of illuſtrating what muſt be allowed to be curious pieces of ancient literature, undertake the tranſlation of the ſacred books. Such a man would have no bias upon his mind to induce him to wreſt the words, in order to make them ſpeak his own ſentiments. And if he had the genuine ſpirit of the philoſopher, hiſtorian, or antiquary, he would be ſolicitous to exhibit the manners, opinions, cuſtoms, and reaſonings of thoſe early ages fairly, as he found them, without adding any thing of his own, either to exalt or to depreſs the original. I ſhould not think it impoſſible to find ſo much fairneſs in a Chriſtian, who having reſided long in India, and underſtood their ſacred language, ſhould undertake to tranſlate to us the Scriptures of the Bramins; but ſuch impartiality in an infidel living in a Chriſtian country, would be, I fear, a chimerical expectation.

There is, however, I acknowledge, a conſiderable difference in the caſes. We view with different eyes the opinions of remote ages and diſtant nations, from thoſe wherewith we contemplate the ſentiments of the times in which, and the people amongſt whom we live The obſervation of our Lord, Mat. xii. 30. holds invariably, *He who is not for us, is againſt us; and he who gathereth not with us, ſcattereth.* We find no examples of neutrality in this cauſe. Whoever is not a friend is an enemy; and for this reaſon, without any violation of charity, we may conclude that the interpretation of Scripture is ſafer in the hands of the bigotted ſectary, than in thoſe of the opinionative infidel, whoſe underſtanding is blinded by the moſt inflexible and the moſt unjuſt of all paſſions, an inveterate contempt. Hatred, when alone, may be prevailed on to enquire, and in conſequence of enquiry, may be ſurmounted; but when hatred is accompanied with contempt, it ſpurns enquiry as ridiculous.

§ 9 But, it may be ſaid, though this may be juſtly applied to the confirmed infidel, it is not applicable to the ſceptic, who, becauſe he finds difficulties on both ſides of the queſtion which he is not able to ſurmount, is perplexed with doubts in relation to it. I am ſenſible of the difference, and readily admit that what

I ſaid of the infidel does not apply to the laſt mentioned character. At the ſame time I muſt obſerve, that thoſe juſt now deſcribed appear to be a very ſmall number, and are not the people whom the world at preſent commonly calls ſceptics. This, on the contrary, like the term freethinker, is become merely a ſofter and more faſhionable name for infidel; for, on all thoſe points wherein the ſceptics of the age differ from Chriſtians, they will be found to the full as dogmatical as the moſt tenacious of their adverſaries *. Such, at leaſt, is the manner of thoſe who, in modern Europe, affect to be conſidered as philoſophical ſceptics.

§ 10. But, to return to the conſideration of the firſt printed editions, from which it may be thought I have digreſſed too far: what has been ſaid ſufficiently ſhews that they are not entitled to more credit than is due to the manuſcripts from which they were compiled. Nobody aſcribes inſpiration, or any ſupernatural direction to the firſt editors. And as to advantages merely natural, they were not on an equal footing with the critics of after-times. The moſt valuable manuſcripts, far from being generally known, remained ſcattered throughout the world. A few might fall under the notice of one curious enquirer, another few under that of another. But there had not been any number of them yet collated, and conſequently their various readings had not been collected and publiſhed. Nay, that the judgment of thoſe editors, concerning the antiquity and correctneſs of the manuſcripts which they uſed, cannot be implicitly relied on, may warrantably be concluded from this circumſtance, that this ſpecies of criticiſm was but in its infancy, and that even learned men had not

* The only exception which has appeared in this age (if we can account one an exception who has done ſo much to undermine in others a belief, with which at times he ſeems himſelf to have been ſtrongly impreſſed) is that eminent but anomalous genius, Rouſſeau. He had the ſenſibility to feel ſtrongly, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, the force of the internal evidence of our religion reſulting from the character, the life, and the death of its Author, the purity and the ſublimity of his inſtructions; he had the ſagacity to diſcern, and the candour to acknowledge, that the methods employed by infidels in accounting for theſe things are frivolous, and, to every rational enquirer, unſatisfactory. At the ſame time, through the unhappy influence of philoſophical prejudices, inſenſible of the force of the external evidence of prophecy and miracles, he did not ſcruple to treat every plea of this kind as abſurd, employing againſt the ſame religion, even the pooreſt cavils that are anywhere to be found in the writings of infidels. Nay, for this purpoſe, he muſtered up a world of objections, without ever diſcovering that he miſtook the ſubject of diſpute, and confounded the doctrine of particular ſects or denominations of Chriſtians with the doctrine of Chriſt. The articles againſt which his artillery is generally pointed, are the comments of later ages, and not the pure dictates of holy writ. See the character of this extraordinary man (whom I here conſider only as a ſceptic) as delineated by the maſterly pen of Dr Beattie. Eſſay on Truth, Part III. ch. 2.

not then, as now, the neceſſary means of qualifying themſelves for judging of the antiquity and correctneſs of manuſcripts. Beſides, thoſe publiſhers themſelves were not unanimous. Nor were the alterations made by thoſe of them who were poſterior in time, always for the better. "I am amazed," ſays Michaelis *, very juſtly, "when I hear ſome vindicate our common "readings, as if the editors had been inſpired by the Holy "Ghoſt."

Is it poſſible then to aſſign a ſatisfactory reaſon for the determination of Bengelius, not to admit any reading which had not the ſupport of ſome former printed edition? "Ne ſyllabam qui-"dem, etiamſi mille MSS. mille critici juberent, antehac [in "editionibus] non receptam, adducar ut recipiam †." He has not indeed confined himſelf, in his choice of readings, to any one edition, but has excluded entirely from his text, thoſe readings which, however well ſupported, no preceding editor had adopted. This rule which he laid down to himſelf, is manifeſtly indefenſible, inaſmuch as the authority of the printed editions muſt ultimately reſt on that of the manuſcripts from which they are taken. Whereas it can give no additional value to the manuſcripts, that ſome of the firſt publiſhers have thought fit to prefer them, perhaps injudiciouſly, to others; or, to ſpeak more properly, have thought fit to copy them as the beſt they had. Their merit depends entirely on the evidences we have of their own antiquity, accuracy, &c. For none, ſurely, will be hardy enough to ſay, that errors, by being printed, will be converted into truths.

§ 11. The only cauſe which I can aſſign for the reſolution taken by Bengelius, though of no weight in the ſcales of criticiſm and philoſophy, may merit ſome regard, viewed in a prudential and political light. The printed copies are in every body's hands; the manuſcripts are known to very few: and though the eaſy multiplication of the copies, by the preſs, will not be conſidered, by any perſon who reflects, as adding any authority to the manuſcripts from which they were taken, it has nevertheleſs, the ſame effect on the generality of mankind. Cuſtom, the duration and the extent of their reception, are powerful ſupports with the majority of readers. The reaſon, therefore, which has influenced that learned editor, is, at bottom, I ſuppoſe, the ſame that influenced Jerom, when reviſing the old Latin verſion, not to correct every thing which he was ſenſible ſtood in need of correction, that he might not, by the number and boldneſs of his alterations, ſcandalize the people. But this is a motive of a kind totally different from thoſe which ariſe from critical conſiderations, and ought not to be confounded with them.

§ 12. I do not mean to ſay, that this is a motive to which no regard

* Introduc. Lect. ſect. 34. † Prodromus.

regard ſhould be ſhown. There are two caſes in which, in my opinion, it ought to determine the preference; firſt, when the arguments in favour of one reading, appear exactly balanced by thoſe in favour of another; ſecondly, when the difference in reading cannot be ſaid to affect either the ſenſe or the perſpicuity of the ſentence. In the former caſe, when no better rule of deciſion can be diſcovered, it is but reaſonable that cuſtom ſhould be allowed to decide. In the latter, as we ought to avoid, eſpecially in a verſion, introducing alterations of no ſignificance, it might be juſtly accounted trifling, to take notice of ſuch differences. In other caſes we ought to be determined by the rules of criticiſm; that is, in other words, by the evidence impartially examined. As to which, I ſhall only add, that though much regard is due to the number of manuſcripts, editions, verſions, &c. yet, in aſcertaining the preference, we ought not to be determined ſolely by the circumſtance of number. The teſtimony of a few credible witneſſes, outweighs that of many who are of doubtful character. Beſides, there are generally internal marks of credibility or incredibility in the thing teſtified, which ought always to have ſome influence on the deciſion.

§ 13. At the ſame time, I cannot help diſapproving the admiſſion of any correction (where the expreſſion, as it ſtands in the text, is not downright nonſenſe), merely on conjecture: for, were ſuch a method of correcting to be generally adopted, no bound could be ſet to the freedom which would be uſed with ſacred writ. We ſhould very ſoon ſee it a perfect Babel in language, as various in its ſtyle, in different editions, as are the dialects of our different ſects and parties. This is an extreme which, if it ſhould prevail, would be of much more pernicious conſequence than the other extreme, of adhering implicitly and inflexibly, with or without reaſon, to whatever we find in the common edition. We know the worſt of this error already; and we can ſay with aſſurance, that though the common editions are not perfect, there is no miſtake in them of ſuch a nature, as materially to affect either the doctrines to be believed, or the duties to be practiſed by a Chriſtian. The worſt conſequences, which the blunders of tranſcribers have occaſioned, are their hurting ſometimes the perſpicuity, ſometimes the credibility of holy writ, affording a handle to the objections of infidels, and thereby weakening the evidences of religion. But as to the extreme of correcting on mere conjecture, its tendency is manifeſtly to throw every thing looſe, and to leave all at the mercy of ſyſtem builders, and framers of hypotheſes: for who ſhall give law to the licentiouſneſs of gueſſing?

It is not enough to anſwer, that the claſſics have ſometimes been corrected on conjecture. The caſes are not parallel. A freedom may be taken with the latter with approbation, which cannot,

cannot, with propriety, be taken with the former *. Houbigant, though a critic of eminence in Oriental literature, and a good tranſlator, has, in my judgment, taken moſt unjuſtifiable liberties in

* Part I. § 21. Since theſe Diſſertations were written, I have ſeen Dr Geddis' PROSPECTUS, wherein, among many things which I entirely approve, I obſerved the following words, p. 55 which appear to ſtand in direct contradiction to the opinion given above: "When the corruptions "of the text cannot be removed, either by the collation of manuſcripts, "or the aid of verſions, internal analogy, or external teſtimony, the laſt "reſource is conjectural criticiſm." In oppoſition to this doctrine, he produces a popular objection, which he examines and anſwers. And in this anſwer, he goes ſtill further, affirming that there are caſes in which the text may be reſtored by *mere critical conjecture*. I have attentively conſidered his anſwer, and am led by it to regret, that, through the imperfection of all languages, ancient and modern, it often happens, that writers agree in ſentiments who differ in words, and agree in words who differ in ſentiments. Though that author and I have, on this head, expreſſed ourſelves very differently, I am apt to conclude, from the explanation he has given, the inſtances he has produced, and the canons he has laid down, that the difference between us is moſtly, if not entirely, verbal. It lies chiefly in the ſenſe affixed to the word *conjecture*. He has applied it to caſes to which I ſhould not think it applicable. When any paſſage contains in itſelf ſuch indications as are always accounted ſufficient evidence of a particular alteration it has undergone, I never call the diſcovery of that alteration conjecture.

Now this is preciſely the caſe in ſome of the inſtances given by Dr Geddis. When, in one edition of the Engliſh Bible we read *to ad daſſiction to my bonds*, how do we reaſon from it? We perceive at once that *ad* is not Engliſh, neither is *daſſiction*. Hence we conclude with perfect aſſurance, that this is not the true reading, or the reading intended by the tranſlators. A very little attention ſhews us, that if, without altering the order of the letters, we take the *d* from the beginning of *daſſiction*, and annex it to *ad* immediately preceding, which is the ſmalleſt alteration poſſible, the expreſſion is juſt in itſelf, and the meaning is ſuited to the context. As it ſtands, it is nonſenſe. No evidence can be more convincing. We may venture to ſay, that if there were fifty other editions of the Engliſh Bible at hand, no reaſonable perſon would think of conſulting any of them for further ſatisfaction. Now I ſubmit it to this critic himſelf, whether to ſay of any thing, "It is a matter of the utmoſt certainty," and to ſay, "It is a mere conjecture," be not conſidered as rather oppoſite in ſignification than coincident. There are ſome other of the learned gentleman's examples, in which there is hardly more ſcope for conjecture than in that now examined; ſuch as that wherein *terited*, which is no word, is uſed for *retired* (a word remarkably ſimilar), and that wherein *well*, which in that place has no meaning, is uſed for *dwell*. In all ſuch caſes, we are determined by the internal evidence reſulting from the ſimilarity of the letters, from the ſcope of the place, and from the conſtruction of the words. In a few of the caſes put, there is, I own, ſomething of conjecture; but the correction is not merely conjectural. Of this kind is that *verſed in the politer of learning*, where *parts* or *branches*, or ſome word of like ſignification, muſt be ſupplied. If it be aſked, What then ought to be denominated a matter of mere conjecture? I anſwer, the reader will find an example of this in § 14. to which I refer him. We have but too many examples in ſome late critical productions of great name,

in his conjectural emendations, and has been but too much followed by critics, commentators, or paraphraſts amongſt ourſelves. I am far from thinking that, in ſome of his gueſſes, he may not be right; it is, however, much more probable, that in the greater part of them, he is wrong.

A mere conjecture may be mentioned in a note; but if, without the authority of copies, tranſlations, or ancient eccleſiaſtical writers, it may be admitted into the text, there is an end of all reliance on the Scriptures as the dictates of the divine Spirit. Manuſcripts, ancient tranſlations, the readings of the moſt early commentators are, like the witneſſes in a judicial proceſs, direct evidence in this matter. The reaſonings of conjecturers are but like the ſpeeches of the pleaders. To receive on the credit of a ſagacious conjecture, a reading not abſolutely neceſſary to the conſtruction, and quite unſupported by poſitive evidence, appears not leſs incongruous, than it would be, in a trial, to return a verdict founded on the pleading of a plauſible ſpeaker, not only without proof, but in direct oppoſition to it. For let it be obſerved that the copies, ancient verſions, and quotations, which are conformable to the common reading, are poſitive evidence in its favour, and therefore againſt the conjecture. And even if the readings of the paſſage be various, there is, though leſs, ſtill ſome weight

rame, wherein the authors, without any warrant from manuſcripts or verſions, and without any reaſon from the ſcope of the place, or the import of the paſſage, are perpetually propoſing emendations on the text, and that by tranſpoſing, changing, adding or diſmiſſing, not only words, but clauſes, when the paſſage does not, as it ſtands, perfectly ſuit their notions.

That the text has ſometimes been interpolated, and otherwiſe corrupted by tranſcribers and interpreters, cannot be queſtioned. Of this it is doubtleſs the critic's buſineſs to clear it as much as poſſible. But we ought ever to remember, that the greater part of thoſe corruptions were originally no other than conjectural corrections. And if we go to work in the ſame way, with ſuch freedom of gueſſing as has ſometimes been employed, it is ten to one that we ourſelves corrupt the text inſtead of mending it, and that we ſerve only to furniſh more work for future critics. I obſerve in the Monthly Review [Auguſt 1786] of Reed's late edition of Shakeſpeare, in a note on the expreſſion *knowledge ill inhabited*, which has given great plague to the critics, the following remark —"At all events, we "beg leave to enter our proteſt againſt putting *inhibit* into the text. How "many plauſible conjectures which their ill-adviſed predeceſſors (former "publiſhers) had advanced into the body of the page, have the late edi-"tors, in conſequence of their more extenſive reſearches, been obliged to "degrade to their proper place, the margin? Can they then be too ſcru-"pulous in admitting their own corrections?" Upon the whole, from the way wherein Dr Geddis qualifies his ſentiments, I am convinced, that the difference between him and me on this article is more in the words than in the thought. His verdict in regard to every one of the particular caſes, ſuppoſed by him, is unexceptionable; but his manner of expreſſing the general poſition is, in my opinion, unguarded, and conſequently may miſlead.

weight in their evidence againſt a reading merely conjectural' and conſequently, deſtitute of external ſupport, and different from them all. It muſt, however, be acknowledged, that the variety itſelf, if it affect ſome of the oldeſt manuſcripts and tranſlations, is a preſumption that the place has been early corrupted in tranſcribing.

§ 14. I cannot avoid, here, taking notice of a correction, merely conjectural, propoſed by the late Dr Kennicott, a man to whoſe pious and uſeful labours, the learned in general, and the ſtudents of the divine oracles in particular, are under the greateſt obligations. The correction he propoſes *, is on theſe words, במתיו ויתן את רשעים קברו ואת עשיר E. T. *And he made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death*, Iſa. liii. 9. This ingenious critic ſuppoſes, that the words קברו and במתיו have, by ſome means or other, changed places. He would have them, therefore, tranſpoſed, or rather reſtored, each to its proper place, in conſequence of which the import will be (I give it in his own words), *And he was taken up with wicked men in his death, and with a rich man was his ſepulchre.* He adds: "Since "the preceding parts of the prophecy ſpeak ſo indiſputably of "the ſufferings and death of the Meſſiah, theſe words ſeem evi- "dently meant, as deſcriptive of the Meſſiah's being put to "death in company with wicked men, and making his grave, or "ſepulchre (not with rich men, but) with one rich man."

Now, let it be obſerved, that of all the vaſt number of manuſcripts which that gentleman had collated, not one was found to favour this arrangement; that neither the Septuagint nor any other old tranſlation, is conformable to it, that no ancient author, known to us, in any language, quotes the words, ſo arranged, either from the original, or from any verſion; and conſequently, that we cannot conſider the conjecture otherwiſe, than as oppoſed by ſuch a cloud of witneſſes, as in enquiries of this kind, muſt be accounted ſtrong poſitive evidence. Had the words, as they are read in Scripture, been ungrammatical, ſo as to yield no meaning, that we could diſcover, and had the tranſpoſition of the two words added both ſenſe and grammar to the ſentence, and that in perfect conſiſtency with the ſcope of the context, I ſhould have readily admitted, that the criticiſm ſtood on a firmer foundation than mere conjecture, and that the external proofs, from teſtimony, might be counterbalanced by the intrinſic evidence ariſing from the ſubject. But this is not pretended here. To be aſſociated with the rich in death, is equally grammatical, and equally intelligible, as to be aſſociated with the wicked; the like may be ſaid in regard to burial. Where then is the occaſion for a change? The only anſwer that can be given, is certainly a very bad one.

* Diſſ. II. chap. IV. 2d period.

The occaſion is, that the words may be adjuſted to an event which, in our opinion, is the fulfilment of the prophecy.

But, if ſuch liberties may be taken with the prophets, there will be no difficulty in obtaining from them proofs in ſupport of any interpretation. The learned Doctor takes notice, that the preceding part of this chapter ſpeaks indiſputably of the ſufferings and death of the Meſſiah. I am as much convinced as any man, that the ſubject of the prophecy is as he repreſents it; but to ſay that it is indiſputably ſo, ſeems to inſinuate that it is univerſally admitted. Now this is far from being the fact. It is diſputed by the whole Jewiſh nation, and is allowed by ſome Chriſtian expoſitors, to be only, in a ſecondary ſenſe, prophetical of Chriſt. Suppoſe a Chriſtian, after the paſſage ſhall have been in the Chriſtian Bibles new modelled in the way propoſed, to urge it on a Jew, as an argument from prophecy, that Jeſus, the ſon of Mary, is the perſon in whom the prediction was fulfilled, and therefore the Meſſiah; in as much as the words exactly repreſent what, in ſo ſignal a manner, happened to him—he ſuffered with malefactors, and was buried in a rich man's ſepulchre; would not the other have reaſon to retort, 'Ye Chriſtians have 'a wonderful dexterity in managing the argument from prophe-'cy; ye firſt, by changing and tranſpoſing the prophet's words, 'accommodating them to your purpoſe, make him ſay, what we 'have direct evidence that he never ſaid; and then ye have the 'confidence to argue, this muſt infallibly be the event intended 'by the prophet, it ſo exactly anſwers the deſcription. Ye your-'ſelves make the prophecy reſemble the event which ye would 'have to be predicted by it, and then ye reaſon from the reſem-'blance, that this is the completion of the prophecy.'

Let us judge equitably of men of all denominations. Should we diſcover that the Maſorets had made ſo free with the declaration of any prophet, in order to adapt it to what they take to be the accompliſhment, would we heſitate a moment to call the words ſo metamorphoſed a corruption of the ſacred text? In an enlightened age, to recur to ſuch expedients will be always found to hurt true religion inſtead of promoting it. The detection of them, in a few inſtances, brings a ſuſpicion on the cauſe they were intended to ſerve, and would go far to diſcredit the argument from prophecy altogether. I cannot conclude this remark, without adding, that this is almoſt the only inſtance wherein I differ in critical ſentiments from that excellent author, from whoſe labours, I acknowledge with gratitude, I have reaped much pleaſure and inſtruction.

§ 13. To conclude what relates to various readings; thoſe variations, which do not affect either the ſenſe or the connection, I take no notice of, becauſe the much greater part of them would occaſion no difference in tranſlating; and even of the few of

theſe

theſe which might admit ſome difference, the difference is more in words than in meaning. Again, ſuch variations as even alter the ſenſe, but are not tolerably ſupported by either external or internal evidence, eſpecially when the common reading has nothing in it apparently irrational or unſuitable to the context, I have not judged neceſſary to mention. Thoſe, on the contrary, which not only in ſome degree affect the ſenſe, but, from their own intrinſic evidence, or from the reſpectable ſupport of manuſcripts and verſions, have divided the critics about their authenticity, I have taken care to ſpecify. When the evidence in their favour appeared to me clearly to preponderate, I have admitted them into the text, and aſſigned my reaſon in the notes. Wherever the matter ſeemed dubious, I have preferred the common reading, and ſuggeſted, in the notes, what may be advanced in favour of the other. When the difference lay in the rejection of a clauſe commonly received, though the probability were againſt its admiſſion, yet, if the ſentence or clauſe were remarkable, and if it neither conveyed a ſentiment unſuitable to the general ſcope, nor brought obſcurity on the context, I have judged it better to retain it, than to ſhock many readers by the diſmiſſion of what they have been accuſtomed to read in their Bible. At the ſame time, to diſtinguiſh ſuch clauſes, as of doubtful authority, I incloſe them in crotchets. Of this the doxology, as it is called, in the Lord's prayer, is an example. In other caſes, I have not ſcrupled to omit what did not appear ſufficiently ſupported.

PART III.

The Dialect employed.

As to what concerns the language of this verſion, I have not much to add to the explanations I have given of my ſentiments on this article, in the latter part of the preceding Diſſertation, and the firſt part of the preſent. When the common tranſlation was made, and (which is ſtill earlier) when the Engliſh liturgy was compoſed, the reigning dialect was not entirely the ſame with that which prevails at preſent. Now, as the dialect, which then obtained, does very rarely, even to the readers of this age, either injure the ſenſe, or affect the perſpicuity, I have judged it proper, in a great meaſure, to retain it. The differences are neither great nor numerous. The third perſon ſingular of the preſent of the verb terminates in the ſyllable *eth*, in the old dialect, not in the letter *s*, as in that now current. The participles are very

very rarely contracted; nor is there ever any eliſion of the vowels. Indeed, theſe eliſions, though not entirely laid aſide, are become much leſs frequent now, than they were about the beginning of the laſt century. The difference is, in itſelf, inconſiderable; yet, as all ranks and denominations of Chriſtians are, from the uſe of either the Bible, or the Book of Common Prayer, or both, habituated to this dialect, and as it has contracted a dignity favourable to ſerioufneſs, from its appropriation to ſacred purpoſes, it is, I think, in a verſion of any part of holy writ, entitled to be preferred to the modern dialect.

§ 2. The gayer part of mankind will doubtleſs think, that there is more vivacity in our common ſpeech, as, by retrenching a few unneceſſary vowels, the expreſſion is ſhortened, and the ſentiment conveyed with greater quickneſs. But vivacity is not the character of the language of the ſacred penmen. Gravity here, or even ſolemnity, if not carried to exceſs, is much more ſuitable. "I bid this man," ſays the centurion, in the anonymous tranſlation, Matt. viii. 9. "Go, and he's gone; another, "Come, and he's here; and to my ſervant, Do this, and it is "done." And in the parallel place in Luke, ch. vii. 6. "Lord, "don't give yourſelf the trouble of coming; I don't deſerve you "ſhould honour my houſe with your preſence." There are, I believe, not a few who would prefer this manner to that of the common verſion, as being much ſmarter, as well as more genteel. Surely, if that interpreter had given the ſmalleſt attention to uniformity, he would never have rendered αμην αμην λεγω υμιν, as he ſometimes does, by the antiquated phraſe, *Verily, verily, I ſay unto you.* It would have been but of a piece with many paſſages of his verſion, to employ the more modiſh, and more gentlemanlike aſſeveration, "Upon my honour." With thoſe who can reliſh things ſacred in this dreſs (diſguiſe rather), I ſhould think it in vain to diſpute.

§ 3. Another criterion of that ſolemn dialect, is the recourſe, when an individual is addreſſed, to the ſingular number of the ſecond perſonal pronoun *thou* and *thee*, and conſequently to the ſecond perſon ſingular of the verb, which being, in common language, ſupplied by the plural, is in a manner obſolete. This alſo is, from Scriptural uſe, and the conſtant uſe of it in worſhip, in the Britiſh dominions, both by thoſe of the eſtabliſhment, and by diſſenters, univerſally intelligible, and now conſidered as the proper dialect of religion. Immediately after the Reformation, the like mode, in uſing the pronoun, was adopted by all Proteſtant tranſlators into French, Italian and German, as well as into Engliſh. But as, in Roman Catholic countries, thoſe tranſlations were of no authority, and as the Scriptures are read in their churches, and their devotions and ceremonies performed in a language not underſtood by the people; the cuſtoms of diſſenters, as all

all Proteſtants are in thoſe countries, could not introduce into the language of religion, ſo great a ſingularity of idiom. And as there was nothing to recommend this manner to the people, but ſeveral things to prejudice them againſt it, we do not find that it has been employed by any late Popiſh tranſlators into French.

What tended to prejudice them againſt it, is, firſt, the general diſuſe of it in the ordinary intercourſe of men; and, ſecondly, the conſideration that the few exceptions from this diſuſe, in common life, inſtead of ſhewing reſpect or reverence, ſuggeſts always either pity or contempt; no perſon being ever addreſſed in this way, but one greatly inferior, or a child. This being the caſe, and they not having, like us, a ſolemn, to counterbalance the familiar uſe, the practice of Proteſtants would rather encreaſe than diminiſh their diſlike of it. For theſe reaſons, the uſe of the ſingular pronoun, in adoration, has the ſame effect nearly on them, which the contrary uſe of the plural has on us. To a French Catholic, *Tu es notre Dieu, et nous te benirons*, and to an Engliſh Proteſtant, *You are our God, and we will bleſs you*, equally betray an indecent familiarity *. In conſequence of this difference in the prevailing uſages, it muſt be acknowledged, that French Romaniſts have a plauſible pretext for uſing the plural. We have, however, a real advantage in our manner, eſpecially in worſhip. Theirs, it is true, in conſequence of the prevalent uſe, has nothing in it diſreſpectful or indecent; but this is merely a negative commendation: ours, on account of the peculiarity of its appropriation in religious ſubjects, is eminently ſerious and affecting. It has, beſides, more preciſion. In worſhip, it is a more explicit declaration of the unity of the Godhead; and even when, in holy writ, addreſſed to a creature, it ſerves to remove at leaſt

* The way in which *Saci*, who appears to have been a pious worthy man, tranſlates from the Vulgate the Lord's prayer, rendered literally from French into Engliſh, is a ſtriking example of the difference of manner: "Our Father who are in heaven, let your name be ſanctified, let "your reign arrive, let your will be done," &c. Yet the earlier Popiſh tranſlators choſe to uſe the ſingular number as well as the reformed. It had been the univerſal practice of the ancients, Greeks, Romans, and Orientals. It was uſed in the Engliſh tranſlation of Rheims, though compoſed by Papiſts in oppoſition to the Proteſtant verſion then commonly received. In the latter verſions of French Proteſtants, this uſe of the ſingular number of the ſecond perſon is given up entirely, except in addreſſes to God; the formularies read in their meetings having, in this particular, eſtabliſhed among them a different uſage. Beauſobre and Lenfant [ſee Preface Generale ſur le Nouveau Teſtament] ſtrenuouſly maintain the propriety of their not uſing the ſingular of the ſecond perſonal pronoun, except in worſhip. I admit their arguments to be concluſive with reſpect to French; but, for the reaſons above mentioned, they are inconcluſive applied to Engliſh. Yet in this ſome Engliſh tranſlators have followed the French manner, but not uniformly.

leaſt one ambiguous circumſtance, conſequent on modern uſe, which does not rightly diſtinguiſh what is ſaid to one from what is ſaid to many. And though the ſcope of the place often ſhew the diſtinction, it does not always.

§ 4. A few other particulars of the ancient dialect I have alſo retained, eſpecially in thoſe inſtances wherein, without hurting perſpicuity, they appeared to give greater preciſion; but thoſe, on the contrary, which might, in ſome inſtances, darken the expreſſion, or render it equivocal, I have rejected altogether. For I conſider no quality of elocution as more eſſential than perſpicuity, and nothing more conducive to this, than as much uniformity and preciſion as the language will admit in the application of words. For this reaſon, though I have retained *whether* for which of two, *whoſo* for whoever, and a few others little uſed at preſent, I have not employed *which*, as in the old dialect, for who, or whom, *his* or *her* for its, *that* for that which, or what. For theſe, though they do not often occaſion ambiguity, ſometimes occaſion it; and there is no way of preventing doubt in every caſe, but by obſerving uniformity, when practicable, in all caſes. In ſuch an expreſſion, for example, as that of the apoſtle Peter, 1 Ep. i. 23. *Being born again by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever;* if the relative *which* were applied, indiſcriminately, to perſons or to things, it might be queſtioned, whether what is affirmed, be affirmed of the word of God, or of God himſelf. But if, according to preſent uſe, it be confined to things, there is no queſtion at all.

§ 5. Another point, in which the Scriptural differs from the modern dialect, is in the manner ſometimes uſed in expreſſing the future. In all predictions, prophecies or authoritative declarations, the auxiliary *ſhall* is uſed, where, in common language, it would now be *will*. This method, as adding weight to what is ſaid, I always adopt, unleſs when it is liable to be equivocally interpreted, and ſeems to repreſent moral agents as acting through neceſſity, or by compulſion. In the graver ſorts of poetry, the ſame uſe is made of the auxiliary *ſhall*. As to the prepoſitions, I obſerved, in the preceding Diſſertation *, that the preſent uſe gives them more preciſion, and ſo occaſions fewer ambiguities, than the uſe which prevailed formerly. I have, therefore, given it the preference. There is one caſe however wherein I always obſerve the old method. *Called of God, choſen of God,* and other the like phraſes, are, for an obvious reaſon, more agreeable to Chriſtian ears, than if we were to prefix to the name of God the prepoſition *by*. The pronouns *mine* and *thine*, I have alſo, ſometimes, after the ancient manner, in order to avoid a diſagreeable hiatus, ſubſtituted for *my* and *thy*.

§ 6. To the foregoing remarks on the ſubject of dialect, I ſhall ſubjoin a few things on the manner of rendering proper names. Upon

* Part II.

Upon the revival of letters in the Weſt, Pagnin firſt, and after him ſome other tranſlators, through an affectation of accuracy in things of no moment, ſo juſtly cenſured by Jerom, ſeem to have conſidered it as a vaſt improvement, to convey, as nearly as poſſible, in the letters of another language, the very ſounds of the Hebrew and Syriac names which occur in Scripture. Hence the names of ſome of the moſt eminent perſonages in the Old Teſtament, were, by this new dialect, ſo much metamorphoſed, that thoſe who were accuſtomed to the ancient tranſlation, could not, at firſt hearing, recognize the perſons with whoſe hiſtory they had been long acquainted. The *Heva* of the Vulgate was tranſformed into *Chauva*, the *Iſaia* into *Jeſabiahu*, the *Jeremia* into *Irmeiahu*, and the *Ezechiel* into *Jechezechel*, and ſimilar changes were made on many others. In this Pagnin ſoon had, if not followers, at leaſt imitators. The trifling innovations made by him, after his manner, have ſerved as an example to others to innovate alſo after theirs. Junius and Tremellius, though they ſay, with Pagnin, *Chauva*, do not adopt his *Jeſabiahu*, *Irmeiahu*, and *Jechezechel*; but they give us what is no better of their own, *Jiſchahja*, *Jirmeja*, and *Jechezkel*. Munſter's deviations are leſs conſiderable, and Caſtalio went no further (except in tranſforming the name of God into *Javo*), than to give a Latin termination to the names formerly uſed, that he might thereby render them declinable.

§ 7. A deviation purely of this laſt kind, as it ſerved to prevent ambiguities, otherwiſe inevitable, in the Latin, where there was no ambiguity in the original, did, in my opinion, admit a good apology. For, what was expreſſed in Hebrew, by the aid of the *ſtatus conſtructus*, as their grammarians call it, or by prepoſitions, was expreſſed with equal clearneſs, in Latin, by means of declenſion; whereas, by making the names indeclinable, in this language, that advantage had been loſt, in regard to many names; and ambiguities, of which there was not a trace in the original, introduced into the tranſlation. The declenſion of proper names was not, however, equally eſſential to perſpicuity in Greek as in Latin. Their want of caſes, the Greeks could ſupply by the caſes of the article, which the idiom of their tongue permitted them to prefix. But the Latins had no article. It was, therefore, very injudicious in the firſt Latin tranſlators to imitate the Seventy in this particular; the more ſo, as it had been the common practice of Latin authors, to decline the foreign names they adopted, in order the more effectually to fit them for uſe in their tongue. Thus they ſaid, *Hannibal Hannibalis*, *Juba Jubæ*, and *Hanno Hannonis*. The inconveniences of the other manner appear from many equivocal paſſages in the Vulgate, which, without ſome previous knowledge of the ſubject, it would be

be difficult to underſtand *. Caſtalio, in like manner, introduced into his verſion patronymics formed on the Grecian model, as *Jacobida* and *Davidides*, in which, as he has not been followed, we may conclude that he is generally condemned; and, in my opinion, not undeſervedly, becauſe the departure from the Hebrew idiom, in this inſtance, is both unneceſſary and affected.

§ 8. But, though it be excuſable to alter the names in common uſe, ſo far as to make them admit inflections in languages which uſe inflections, ſince this alteration anſwers a neceſſary purpoſe; to alter them, for the ſake of bringing them nearer the ancient orthography, or for the ſake of aſſiſting us to produce a ſound in pronouncing them, that may reſemble the ſound of the ancient names, is no better than arrant pedantry. The uſe of proper names is, as that of appellatives, to ſerve as ſigns, for recalling to the mind what is ſignified by them. When this purpoſe is attained, their end is anſwered. Now, as it is uſe alone which can convert a ſound into a ſign, a word that has been long uſed (whether a proper name or an appellative) as the ſign of perſon or thing, genus, ſpecies, or individual, muſt be preferable to a new invented, and therefore unauthoriſed ſound. If there is generally in proper names a greater reſemblance to the original words than in appellatives, this difference nowiſe affects the argument. Appellatives are the ſigns of ſpecies and genera, with the more conſiderable part of which the people are acquainted in all civilized countries. Common things have conſequently names in all languages; and the names in one language have often no affinity to thoſe in another. Proper names are the ſigns of individuals, known originally only in the neighbourhood of the place of their exiſtence, whence the name is transferred with the knowledge of the individual into other languages.

But the introduction of the name is not becauſe of any peculiar propriety in the ſound for ſignifying what is meant by it; but merely becauſe, when the language we write does not ſupply a ſuitable term, this is the eaſieſt and moſt natural expedient. It is in this way alſo we often provide appellatives, when the thing ſpoken of, which ſometimes happens, has no name in our native idiom. But when an individual thing is of a nature to be univerſally

* Several inſtances occur in the prophetical benediction which Moſes gave to the twelve tribes, immediately before his death, Deut. xxxiii. In verſe 4. *Legem præcepit nobis Moyſes, hæreditatem multitudinis Jacob.* To one unacquainted with Scripture, it would not be obvious that *Moyſes* here is in the nominative, and *Jacob* in the genitive. Hardly could it be ſuſpected, that in the following verſes, 8. *Levi quoque ait;* 12. *Et Benjamin ait* (and ſo of the reſt), the names are in the dative. The form of the expreſſion in Latin could not fail to lead an ordinary reader to underſtand them as in the nominative. Yet nothing can be more unequivocal than the words in Hebrew.

verſally known, and to have a name in every language, as the ſun, the moon, and the earth, we never, in tranſlating from an ancient tongue, think of adopting the name we find there, but always give our own. Yet the things now mentioned are as really individuals, as are Peter, James, and John. And when, in the caſe of appellatives, we have been obliged at firſt to recur for a name, to the language whence we drew our knowledge of the thing, we never think afterwards of reforming the term, becauſe not ſo cloſely formed on the original, as it might have been. It has, by its currency, produced that aſſociation which confers on it the power of a ſign, and this is all that the original term itſelf ever had, or could have. Who would think of reforming flail into *flagel*, meſſenger into *meſſager*, and nurſe into *nourrice*, that they may be nearer the firſt to the Latin, or perhaps the German, and the ſecond and third to the French originals?

§ 9. Beſides, in tranſlating Hebrew names, the attempt was the more vain, as little or nothing was known about their pronunciation. The manner of pronouncing the conſonants is judged of very differently by the critics; and as to the vowels, who has not heard what conteſts they have occaſioned among the learned? But what rendered this attempt, at giving the exact pronunciation, completely ridiculous is, that it was made in Latin, a dead language, of whoſe pronunciation alſo we have no ſtandard, and in the ſpeaking or reading of which, every different nation follows a different rule. Harmony among themſelves, therefore, was not to be expected in men who had taken this whim. Accordingly, when they once began to innovate, every one innovated after his own faſhion, and had a liſt of names peculiar to himſelf. This, with reaſonable people, has ſufficiently expoſed the folly of the conceit.

§ 10. Now, though our tranſlators have not made the violent ſtretches made by Pagnin and others, for the ſake of adjuſting the names to the original ſounds, and have not diſtreſſed our organs of ſpeech with a colliſion of letters hardly utterable; there is one article on which I do not think them entirely without blame. The names of the ſame perſons, and in effect the ſame names, are ſometimes rendered differently by them in the New Teſtament, from what they had been rendered in the Old; and that on account of a very inconſiderable difference in the ſpelling, or perhaps only in the termination in Hebrew and in Greek. By this the ſenſe has been injured to ordinary readers, who are more generally ignorant than we are apt to imagine, of the perſons in the Old Teſtament, meant by the names in the New. Now this is a ſpecies of κακοζηλια, from which the authors of the Vulgate were free.

The old Italic had been made from the Greek of the Seventy. The names by conſequence were more accommodated to the

Greek orthography than to the Hebrew. But as that was a matter of no conſequence, when Jerom undertook to tranſlate from the Hebrew, he did not think it expedient to make any changes in the proper names to which the people had been habituated from their infancy. He knew that this might have led ſome readers into miſtakes, and, as appearing awkward and affected, would be diſagreeable to others: at the ſame time there was no conceivable advantage from it to compenſate theſe inconveniences. For, to tell the Latin reader more exactly how the Hebrew proper names ſounded (if that could have been done), was of no more ſignificance to him, than to acquaint him with the ſound of their appellatives. He therefore judged rightly, in preſerving in the Old Teſtament, though he tranſlated from the Hebrew, the names to which the people were accuſtomed, as Elias, and Eliſeus, and Eſdras, and Nebuchodonoſor, which were formed immediately from the Greek. By this means there was an uniformity in the manner of tranſlating both Teſtaments. The Prophets, and other eminent ancients, were not diſtinguiſhed by one name in one part of the ſacred text, and by another in the other. Whereas the attempt at tracing ſervilely the letter in each part, has given us two ſets of names for the ſame perſons, of which the inconveniencies are glaring, but the advantages inviſible.

§ 11. It may be thought indeed a matter of little conſequence, and that the names, if not the ſame, do at leaſt ſo cloſely reſemble, that they can hardly be miſtaken for the names of different perſons. But I have had occaſion to diſcover that many of the unlearned, though neither ignorant nor deficient in underſtanding, know not that *Elias*, ſo often mentioned in the New Teſtament, is the Elijah of the Old, that *Eliſeus* is Eliſha, that *Oſee* is Hoſea, and that the *Jeſus*, mentioned once in the Acts, ch. vii. 45. and once in the Epiſtle to the Hebrews, ch. iv. 8. is Joſhua. Had the names been totally different in the original, there might have been ſome reaſon for adopting this method. The old Oriental names are often of uſe for pointing out the founders of nations, families, and tribes, and the more recent Greek names ſerve to connect thoſe early notices with the later accounts of Greek and Roman hiſtorians. If they had, therefore, in the tranſlation of the Old Teſtament, given, as in the original, the name *Mizraim* to Egypt, *Aram* to Syria, and *Javan* to Greece, much might have been urged in defence of this manner. But when all the difference in the word reſults from an inſignificant alteration in the ſpelling, in order to accommodate the Hebrew name to Grecian ears; to conſider them on that account as different names, and tranſlate them differently, does not appear ſuſceptible of a rational apology.

What ſhould we think of a tranſlator of Polybius, for example,

ple, who ſhould always call Carthage *Karchedon*, and Hannibal *Annibas*, becauſe the words of his author are Καρχηδὼν and Ἀννίβας, or, to come nearer home, ſhould, in tranſlating from French into Engliſh, call London *Londres*, and the Hague *La Haye*. It can be aſcribed ſolely to the almoſt irreſiſtible influence of example, that our tranſlators, who were eminent for their diſcernment as well as their learning, have been drawn into this frivolous innovation. At the ſame time their want of uniformity in uſing this method, ſeems to betray a conſciouſneſs of ſome impropriety in it, and that it tended unneceſſarily to darken what in itſelf is perfectly clear. Accordingly, they have not thought it adviſable to exhibit the names in moſt frequent uſe, differently in different parts of Scripture, or even differently from the names by which the perſons are known in profane hiſtory. Thus he whom they have called Moſes in the New Teſtament, is not in the Old Teſtament made *Moſheh*, nor Solomon *Shelomeh*; nor is Artaxerxes rendered *Artachſhaſta*, nor Cyrus *Choreſh*, agreeably to the Hebrew orthography, though the names of the two laſt mentioned, are not derived to us from the New Teſtament, but from pagan hiſtorians.

§ 12. Not that I think it of any moment whether the names be derived from the Greek, or from the Hebrew, or from any other language. The matters of conſequence here are only theſe two. Firſt, to take the name in moſt current uſe, whether it be formed from the Hebrew, from the Greek, or from the Latin; ſecondly, to uſe the ſame name in both Teſtaments, when the difference made on it in the two languages, is merely ſuch a change in the ſpelling and termination, as commonly takes place in tranſplanting a word from one tongue into another. Nothing can be more vain than the attempt to bring us, in pronouncing names, to a ſtronger reſemblance to the original ſounds. Were this, as it is not, an object deſerving the attention of an interpreter, it were eaſy to ſhow that the methods employed for this purpoſe, have often had the contrary effect. We have in this moſtly followed German and Dutch linguiſts.

Admitting that they came near the truth, according to their rule of pronouncing, which is the utmoſt they can aſk, the powers of the ſame nominal letters are different in the different languages ſpoken at preſent in Europe; and we, by following their ſpelling, even when they were in the right, have departed farther from the original ſound than we were before. The conſonant *j*, ſounds in German like our *y* in the word *year*, *ſch* with them ſounds like our *ſh*, like the French *ch*, and like the Italian *ſc*, when it immediately precedes *i* or *e*; whereas *ſch* with us has generally the ſame ſound with *ſk*, and the conſonant *j* the ſame with *g* before *i* or *e*. Beſides, the letters which with us have different ſounds in different ſituations, we have reaſon to believe, were ſounded uniformly

uniformly in ancient languages, or, at leaſt, did not undergo alterations correſpondent to ours Thus the brook called *Kidron*, in the common verſion in the Old Teſtament, is, for the ſake, I ſuppoſe, of a cloſer conformity to the Greek, called *Cedron* in the New. Yet the *c* in our language, in this ſituation, is ſounded exactly as the *ſ*, a ſound which we have good ground to think that the correſponding letter in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, never had.

§ 13. The rules, therefore, which I have followed in expreſſing proper names, are theſe: Firſt, when the name of the ſame perſon or thing is, in the common tranſlation, both in the Old Teſtament and in the New, expreſſed in the ſame manner, whether it be derived from the Hebrew or from the Greek, I uniformly employ it, becauſe in that caſe it has always the ſanction of good uſe. Thus *Moſes* and *Aaron*, *David* and *Solomon*, *Jeruſalem* and *Jericho*, *Bethlehem* and *Jordan*, and many others remain in the places of which they have had immemorial poſſeſſion; though of theſe *Moſes* and *Solomon* are directly from the Greek, the reſt from the Hebrew. Secondly, when the name of the ſame perſon or thing is expreſſed, in the common tranſlation, differently in the Old Teſtament and in the New (the difference being ſuch as reſults from adapting words of one language to the articulation of another), I have, except in a very few caſes, preferred the word uſed in the Old Teſtament. This does not proceed from the deſire of coming nearer the pronunciation of the Hebrew root: for that is a matter of no conſequence; but from the deſire of preventing, as far as poſſible, all miſtakes in regard to the perſons or things ſpoken of. It is from the Old Teſtament, that we have commonly what is known of the individuals mentioned in it, and referred to in the New. By naming them differently, there is a danger leſt the perſon or thing alluded to be miſtaken.

For this reaſon, I ſay *Elijah*, not Elias; *Eliſha*, not Eliſeus; *Iſaiah*, not Eſaias; *Kidron*, not Cedron. For this reaſon, alſo, in the catalogues of our Lord's progenitors, both in Matthew and in Luke, I have given the names as they are ſpelt in the common verſion of the Old Teſtament. From this rule I admit ſome exceptions. In a few inſtances the thing mentioned is better known, either by what is ſaid of it in the New Teſtament, or by the information we derive from Pagan authors, than by what we find in the Old. In this caſe, the name, in the New Teſtament, has a greater currency than that uſed in the Old, and conſequently, according to my motion of what ought to regulate our choice, is entitled to the preference. For this reaſon, I ſay *Sarepta* and *Sidon*, not Zarephath and Zidon; as the former names are rendered, by claſſical uſe, as well as that of the New Teſtament, more familiar than the latter. Thirdly, when the ſame name is given, by the

the ſacred writers, in their own language, to different perſons, which the Engliſh tranſlators have rendered differently in the different applications, I have judged it reaſonable to adopt this diſtinction, made by our old interpreters, as conducing to perſpicuity. The name of Jacob's fourth ſon is the ſame with that of two of the Apoſtles. But as the firſt rule obliges me to give the Old Teſtament name *Judah* to the Patriarch, I have reſerved the term *Judas*, as uſed in the New, for the two Apoſtles. This alſo ſuits univerſal and preſent uſe: for we never call the Patriarch Judas, or any of the Apoſtles Judah. The proper name of our Lord is the ſame with that of *Joſhua*, who is, in the Septuagint, always called Ιησους, and is twice ſo named in the New Teſtament. Every body muſt be ſenſible of the expediency of confining the Old Teſtament name to the captain of the hoſt of Iſrael, and the other to the Meſſiah. There can be no doubt that the name of Aaron's ſiſter, and that of our Lord's mother, were originally the ſame. The former is called, in the Septuagint, Μαριαμ, the name alſo given to the latter by the Evangeliſt Luke. The other Evangeliſts commonly ſay, Μαρια. But as uſe with us has appropriated *Miriam* to the firſt, and *Mary* to the ſecond, it could anſwer no valuable purpoſe to confound them. The name of the father of the twelve tribes is, in the Oriental dialects, the ſame with that of one of the ſons of Zebedee, and that of the ſon of Alpheus. A ſmall diſtinction is, indeed, made by the Evangeliſts, who add a Greek termination to the Hebrew name, when they apply it to the Apoſtles, which, when they apply it to the Patriarch, they never do. If our tranſlators had copied as minutely, in this inſtance, as they have done in ſome others, the Patriarch they would indeed have named *Jacob*, and each of the two Apoſtles *Jacobus*. However, as in naming the two laſt, they have thought fit to ſubſtitute *James*, which uſe alſo has confirmed, I have preſerved this diſtinction.

§ 14. Upon the whole, in all that concerns proper names, I have conformed to the judicious rule of king James the firſt, more ſtrictly, I ſuppoſe, than thoſe tranſlators to whom it was recommended: "The names of the Prophets, and the holy writers, "with the other names in the text, are to be retained, as near as "may be, according as they are vulgarly uſed."

PART IV.

The outward Form of the Verſion.

I AM now to offer a few things on the form in which this tranſlation is exhibited. It is well known, that the diviſion of the books of holy writ, into chapters and verſes, does not proceed from

from the inſpired writers, but is a contrivance of a much later date. Even the punctuation, for diſtinguiſhing the ſentences from one another, and dividing every ſentence into its conſtituent members and clauſes, though a more ancient invention, was, for many ages, except by grammarians and rhetoricians, hardly ever uſed in tranſcribing; inſomuch, that whatever depends merely on the diviſion of ſentences, on points, aſpirations, and accents, cannot be ſaid to reſt ultimately, as the words themſelves do, upon the authority of the ſacred penmen. Theſe particulars give free ſcope for the ſagacity of criticiſm, and unreſtrained exerciſe to the talent of inveſtigating; inaſmuch, as in none of theſe points is there any ground for the plea of inſpiration.

§ 2. As to the diviſion into chapters and verſes, we know that the preſent is not that which obtained in primitive ages, and that even the earlieſt diviſion is not derived from the Apoſtles, but from ſome of their firſt commentators, who, for the conveniency of readers, contrived this method. The diviſion into chapters that now univerſally prevails in Europe, derived its origin from Cardinal Caro, who lived in the twelfth century: the ſubdiviſion into verſes is of no older date than the middle of the ſixteenth century, and was the invention of Robert Stevens. That there are many advantages which reſult from ſo minute a partition of the ſacred oracles, cannot be denied. The facility with which any place, in conſequence of this method, is pointed out by the writer, and found by the reader, the eaſy recourſe it gives, in conſulting commentators, to the paſſage whereof the explanation is wanted, the aid it has afforded to the compilers of concordances, which are of conſiderable aſſiſtance in the ſtudy of Scripture; theſe, and many other accommodations, have accrued from this contrivance.

§ 3. It is not however without its inconveniencies. This manner of mincing a connected work into ſhort ſentences detached from one another, not barely in appearance, by their being ranked under ſeparate numbers, and by the breaks in the lines, but in effect, by the influence which the text, thus parcelled out, has inſenſibly had on copiers and tranſlators, both in pointing and in tranſlating, is not well ſuited to the ſpecies of compoſition which obtains in all the ſacred books, except the Pſalms and the Book of Proverbs. To the epiſtolary and argumentative ſtyle it is extremely ill adapted, as has been well evinced by Mr Locke *; neither does it ſuit the hiſtorical. There are inconveniencies which would reſult from this way of dividing, even if executed in the beſt manner poſſible; but though I am unwilling to detract from the merit of an expedient, which has been productive

* *Eſſay for the underſtanding of St Paul's Epiſtles*, prefixed to his paraphraſe and notes on ſome of the Epiſtles.

ductive of ſome good conſequences, I cannot help obſerving that the inventors have been far too haſty in conducting the execution.

The ſubject is ſometimes interrupted by the diviſion into chapters. Of this I might produce many examples, but, for brevity's ſake, ſhall mention only a few. The laſt verſe of the fifteenth chapter of Matthew is much more cloſely connected with what follows in the ſixteenth, than with what precedes. In like manner, the laſt verſe of the nineteenth chapter, *Many ſhall be firſt that are laſt, and laſt that are firſt*, ought not to be disjoined, (I ſay not from the ſubſequent chapter, but even) from the ſubſequent paragraph, which contains the parable of the labourers hired to work in the vineyard, brought merely in illuſtration of that ſentiment, and beginning and ending with it. The firſt verſe of the fifth chapter of Mark is much more properly joined to the concluding paragraph of the fourth chapter, as it ſhews the completeneſs of the miracle there related, than to what follows in the fifth. The like may be remarked of the firſt verſe of the ninth chapter. Of the diviſion into verſes, it may be obſerved, that it often occaſions an unnatural ſeparation of the members of the ſame ſentence *; nay, ſometimes, which is worſe, the ſame verſe comprehends a part of two different ſentences.

That this diviſion ſhould often have a bad effect upon tranſlators is inevitable. Firſt, by attending narrowly to the verſes, an interpreter runs the riſk of overlooking the right, and adopting a wrong diviſion of the ſentences. Of this I ſhall give one remarkable example from the goſpel of John, ch. x. 14, 15. Our Lord ſays, in one of his diſcourſes, Εγω ειμι ὁ ποιμην ὁ καλος· και γινωσκω τα ἐμα, και γινωσκομαι ὑπο των ἐμων, καθως γινωσκει με ὁ πατηρ, καγω γινωσκω τον πατερα· και την ψυχην μα τιθημι ὑπερ των προβατων. When the ſentence is thus pointed, as it manifeſtly ought to be, and exhibited unbroken by the diviſion into verſes, no perſon can doubt that the following verſion is equally cloſe to the letter and to the ſenſe. *I am the good Shepherd; I both know my own, and am known by them, even as the Father knoweth me, and I know the Father; and I lay down my life for the ſheep.* But its being divided into two ſentences, and put into ſeparate verſes, has occaſioned the disjointed and improper verſion given in the common tranſlation. 14. *I am the good Shepherd and know my ſheep; and am known of mine.* 15. *As the Father knoweth me, even ſo know I the Father: and I lay down my life for the ſheep.* In this artificial diſtribution, which ſeems to have originated from Beza, (for he acknowledges that before him, the fifteenth verſe included

* In Matt. xi. 2. we have a verſe without a verb, and ending with a comma.

included only the laſt member, *and I lay down*, &c.) the ſecond ſentence is an abrupt, and totally unconnected interruption of what is affirmed in the preceding words, and in the following. Whereas, taking the words as they ſtand naturally, it is an illuſtration by ſimilitude quite in our Lord's manner, of what he had affirmed in the foregoing words. But though the tranſlator ſhould not be miſled in this manner, a deſire of preſerving, in every verſe of his tranſlation, all that is found in the correſponding verſe of his original, that he may adjuſt the one to the other, and give verſe for verſe, may oblige him to give the words a more unnatural arrangement in his own language, than he would have thought of doing, if there had been no ſuch diviſion into verſes, and he had been left to regulate himſelf ſolely by the ſenſe.

§ 4. Influenced by theſe conſiderations, I have determined neither entirely to reject the common diviſion, nor to adopt it in the manner which is uſually done. To reject it entirely, would be to give up one of the greateſt conveniencies we have in the uſe of any verſion, for every purpoſe of occaſional conſultation and examination, as well as for comparing it with the original and with other verſions. Nor is it enough that a more commodious diviſion than the preſent may be deviſed, which ſhall anſwer all the uſeful purpoſes of the common verſion without its inconveniencies. Still there are ſome advantages which a new diviſion could not have, at leaſt for many centuries. The common diviſion, ſuch as it is, has prevailed univerſally, and does prevail, not in this kingdom only, but throughout all Chriſtendom. Concordances in different languages, commentaries, verſions, paraphraſes; all theological works, critical, polemical, devotional, practical, in their order of commenting on Scripture, and in all their references to Scripture, regulate themſelves by it. If we would not then have a new verſion rendered in a great meaſure uſeleſs, to thoſe who read the old, or even the original, in the form wherein it is now invariably printed, or who have recourſe to any of the helps above mentioned, we are conſtrained to adopt, in ſome ſhape or other, the old diviſion.

§ 5. For theſe reaſons, I have judged it neceſſary to retain it; but, at the ſame time, in order to avoid the diſadvantages attending it, I have followed the method taken by ſome other editors, and confined it to the margin. This anſwers ſufficiently all the purpoſes of reference and compariſon, without tending ſo directly to interrupt the reader, and divert him from perceiving the natural connection of the things treated. I have alſo adopted ſuch a new diviſion into ſections and paragraphs, as appeared to me better ſuited than the former both to the ſubject of theſe hiſtories, and to the manner of treating it. Nothing ſurely can be more incongruous, than to cut down a coherent narrative into ſhreds,

and

and give it the appearance of a collection of aphorisms. This, therefore, I have carefully avoided. The sections are, one with another, nearly equal to two chapters; a few of them more, but many less. In making this division, I have been determined, partly by the sense, and partly by the size. In every section, I have included such a portion of Scripture as seemed proper to be read at one time by those who regularly devote a part of every day to this truly Christian exercise. To make all the portions of equal length, or nearly so, was utterly incompatible with a proper regard to the sense. I have avoided breaking off in the middle of a distinct story, parable, conversation, or even discourse, delivered in continuance.

The length of three of the longest sections in this work was occasioned by the resolution not to disjoin the parts of one continued discourse. The sections I allude to are *the sermon on the mount*, and *the prophecy on Olivet*, as recorded by Matthew, together with our Lord's *valedictory consolations* to his disciples, as related by John. The first occupies three ordinary chapters, the second two long ones, and the third four short chapters. But, though I have avoided making a separation, where the scope of the place requires unity, I could not, in a consistency with any regard to size, allot a separate section to every separate incident, parable, conversation or miracle. When these, therefore, are briefly related, insomuch that two or more of them can be included in a section of moderate length, I have separated them only by paragraphs. The length of the paragraph is determined merely by the sense. Accordingly, some of them contain no more than a verse of the common division, and others little less than a chapter. One parable makes one paragraph. When an explanation is given separately, the explanation makes another. When it follows immediately, and is expressed very briefly, both are included in one. Likewise one miracle makes one paragraph; but when the narrative is interrupted, and another miracle intervenes, as happens in the story of the daughter of Jairus, more paragraphs are requisite. When the transition, in respect of the sense, seems to require a distinction more strongly marked, it has been judged expedient to begin the next paragraph with a word in capitals.

§ 6. It was not thought necessary to number the paragraphs, as this way is now, unless in particular cases, and for special purposes, rather unusual, and as all the use of reference and quotation may be sufficiently answered by the old division on the margin. In the larger distribution into sections, I have, according to the most general custom, both numbered and titled them. But as to this method of dividing, I will not pretend that it is not, in a good measure, arbitrary, and that it might not, with equal propriety, have been conducted otherwise. As it was necessary

to comprehend distinct things in the same section, there was no clear rule by which one could, in all cases, be directed where to make the separation. It was indeed evident, that wherever it could occasion an unseasonable interruption in narration, dialogue or argument, it was improper; and that this was all that could be ascertained with precision. The titles of the sections I have made as brief as possible, that they may be the more easily remembered; and have, for this purpose, employed words as we find some employed in the rubric of the common prayer, which have not been admitted into the text. To these I have added, in the same taste, the contents of the section, avoiding minuteness, and giving only such hints of the principal matters, as may assist the reader to recal them to his remembrance, and may enable him at first glance to discover whether a passage he is looking for, be in the section or not. I have endeavoured to avoid the fault of those who make the contents of the chapters supply, in some degree, a commentary, limiting the sense of Scripture by their own ideas. Those who have not dared to make so free with the text, have thought themselves entitled to make free with these abridgments of their own framing. To insert thus, without hesitation, into the contents prefixed to the several chapters, and thereby insinuate, under the shelter of inspiration, doubtful meanings which favour their own prepossessions, I cannot help considering as one way of handling the word of God deceitfully. I have therefore avoided throwing any thing into those summaries which could be called explanatory, and have, besides, thought it better to assign them a separate place in this work, where the reader may consult them, when he chuses, than to intermix them with the truths we have directly from the sacred writers.

§ 7. Most translators have found it necessary to supply some words for the sake of perspicuity, and for accommodating the expression to the idiom of the language into which the version is made, who, at the same time, to avoid even the appearance of assuming an undue authority to themselves, have visibly distinguished the words supplied from the rest of the sentence. Thus the English translators, after Beza and others, always put the words in Italics by which an ellipsis in the original, that does not suit our idiom, is filled up. Though I approve their motives in using this method, as they are strong indications of fairness and attention to accuracy, I cannot help thinking that, in the execution, they have sometimes carried it to excess. In consequence of the structure of the original languages, several things are distinctly, though implicitly expressed, which have no explicit signs in the sentence. The personal pronouns, for example, both in power and in number, are as clearly, though virtually, expressed in their tongue by the verb alone, as they are in ours by a separate

rate ſign. Thus *amo*, in Latin, is not leſs full and expreſſive than *I love* in Engliſh, or *amaviſtis* than *ye have loved*. And it would be exceedingly improper to ſay that in the former language there is an ellipſis of the pronoun, ſince the verb actually expreſſes it. For *amo* can be ſaid of none but the firſt perſon ſingular, and *amaviſtis* of none but the ſecond perſon plural. The like holds in other inſtances. The adjective ſometimes includes the power of the ſubſtantive. *Bonus* is a good man, *bona* a good woman, and *bonum* a good thing. Yet to mark an ellipſes ariſing from ſuch a want as that of a word correſponding to *man*, *woman*, and *thing*, in the above expreſſions, the Italic character has ſometimes been introduced by our tranſlators.

§ 8. I remember, that when I firſt obſerved this diſtinction of character in the Engliſh Bible, being then a ſchool-boy, I aſked my elder brother, who had been at college, the reaſon of the difference. He told me that the words in Italics were words to which there was nothing in the original that correſponded. This made me take greater notice of the difference afterwards, and often attempt to read, paſſing over thoſe words entirely. As this ſometimes ſucceeded, without any appearance of deficiency in the ſentence, I could not be ſatisfied of the propriety of ſome of the inſertions. Theſe words particularly attracted my attention, Matt. xxiv. 40, 41. *Two* women *ſhall be grinding at the mill*, where the word *women* is in Italics. I could not conceive where the occaſion was for inſerting this word. Could it be more improper to ſay barely, *two ſhall be grinding at the mill*, than to ſay, as in the former verſe, *two ſhall be in the field*, without limiting it to either ſex? And ſince the evangeliſt expreſſed both in the ſame manner, was any perſon entitled to make a difference? On having recourſe again for information, I was anſwered that the evangeliſt had not expreſſed them both in the ſame manner; that, on the contrary, the firſt, as written by him, could be underſtood only of men, the ſecond only of women; as all the words ſuſceptible of gender were in the fortieth verſe in the maſculine, and in the forty-firſt in the feminine. I underſtood the anſwer, having before that time learnt as much Latin as ſufficiently ſhewed me the effect produced by the gender on the ſenſe. What then appeared to me unaccountable in the tranſlators was, firſt, their putting the word *women* in Italics, ſince, though it had not a particular word correſponding to it, it was clearly comprehended in the other words of the paſſage; and, ſecondly, their not adding *men* in the fortieth verſe, becauſe, by theſe two ſucceſſive verſes, the one in the maſculine, the other in the feminine gender, it appeared the manifeſt intention of the author to acquaint us, that both ſexes would be involved in the calamities of the times ſpoken of.

This is but one inſtance of many which might be given to ſhew

ſhew how little dependence we can have on thoſe marks; and that if the unlearned were to judge of the perſpicuity of the original (as I once did) from the additions which it ſeems by the common verſion to have required, their judgment would be both unfavourable and erroneous. The original has, in many caſes, a perſpicuity as well as energy, which the ableſt interpreters find it difficult to convey into their verſions. The evangeliſt John ſays of our Lord, ch. i. 11. εις τα ιδια ηλθε, και οι ιδιοι αυτον ου παρελαβον. I have expreſſed the ſentiment, but not ſo forcibly, in this manner: *He came to his own land, and his own people did not receive him.* On the principles on which the Engliſh tranſlation is conducted, the words *land* and *people* ought to be viſibly diſtinguiſhed, as having no correſponding names in the original. That the old interpreters would have judged ſo, we may fairly conclude from their not admitting them, or any thing equivalent, into their verſion. Yet that their verſion is, on this account, leſs explicit than the original, cannot be doubted by thoſe that underſtand Greek, who muſt be ſenſible, that by the bare change of gender in the pronoun, the purport of thoſe names is conveyed with the greateſt clearneſs. See the note on that paſſage in the Goſpel.

§ 9. Our tranſlators have not however obſerved uniformly their manner of diſtinguiſhing by the aid of Italics. Indeed, if they had, their work muſt have made a very motley appearance. On many occaſions, the Hebrew or Greek name requires more than one word in our language to expreſs a meaning which it often bears, and which alone ſuits the context. There was no reaſon, in rendering γλωσσα, (1 Cor. xiv. 2.) to put *unknown* in Italics before the word *tongue*, a ſtrange or unknown tongue being one very common ſignification of the word in the beſt authors. Πνευματα (1 Cor. xiv. 12.) is very properly rendered *ſpiritual gifts*; it means no leſs in the apoſtle Paul's language; but there was no propriety in diſtinguiſhing the word *gifts* by the Italic letter; for πνευματα, a ſubſtantive, can in no inſtance be rendered barely by the adjective *ſpiritual*. Sometimes the word in Italics is a mere intruder, to which there is not any thing in the import of the original, any more than in the expreſſion, either explicitly or implicitly correſponding; the ſenſe which in effect it alters, being both clear and complete without it. For an example of this, I ſhall recur to a paſſage on which I had occaſion formerly to remark *, "The juſt ſhall live by faith; but if *any man* draw back"—where *any man* is foiſted into the text, in violation of the rules of interpreting, which compel us to admit the third perſonal pronoun *he* as clearly, though virtually, expreſſed by the verb. I do not remember ſuch another inſtance in the Engliſh tranſlation

* Diſſ. X. Part V. § 10.

tranſlation, though I had occaſion to obſerve ſomething ſtill more flagrant, in the verſion of the Old Teſtament by Junius and Tremellius *.

§ 10. It muſt be acknowledged, however, that the inſertion of a word, or of a few words, is ſometimes neceſſary, or at leaſt convenient, for giving a ſufficiency of light to a ſentence. For let it be obſerved, that this is not attempting to give more perſpicuity to the ſacred witings in the tranſlation, than was given them by the inſpired penmen in the original. The contemporaries, particularly Helleniſt Jews, readers of the original, had many advantages, which, with all our aſſiſtances, we cannot attain. Incidental alluſions to rites, cuſtoms, facts, at that time recent and well known, now little known, and known only to a few, render ſome ſuch expedient extremely proper. There are many things which it would have been ſuperfluous in them to mention, which it may nevertheleſs be neceſſary for us to ſuggeſt. The uſe of this expedient has accordingly never been conſidered as beyond the legitimate province of the tranſlator. It is a liberty indeed which ought to be taken with diſcretion, and never but when the truth of what is ſupplied, and its appoſiteneſs, are both unqueſtionable. When I recur to this method, which is but ſeldom, I diſtinguiſh the words inſerted by encloſing them in crotchets.

§ 11. It is proper to add a few things on the uſe I have made of the margin. And firſt of the ſide margin. One uſe has been already mentioned, to wit, for marking the chapters and verſes of the common diviſion. Beſide theſe, and a little further from the text, I have noted, in the outer margin, the parallel places in the other Goſpels, the paſſages of the Old Teſtament quoted or alluded to, and alſo the places in Scripture, and thoſe in the apocryphal writings, where the ſame ſentiment occurs, or the like incident is related. In this manner I have endeavoured to avoid the oppoſite extremes into which editors have fallen, either of crowding the margin with references to places whoſe only reſemblance was in the uſe of a ſimilar phraſe or identical expreſſion, or of overlooking thoſe paſſages wherein there is a material coincidence in the thought. To prevent, as much as poſſible, the confuſion ariſing from too many references and figures in the margin, and at the ſame time to omit nothing uſeful, I have, at the beginning of every paragraph, referred firſt to the parallel places, when there are ſuch places, in the other Goſpels. As generally the reſemblance or coincidence affects more than one verſe, nay, ſometimes runs through the whole of a paragraph, I have made the reference to the firſt verſe of the correſponding paſſage

* Diſſ. X. Part V. § 4.

paſſage ſerve for a reference to the whole; and, in order to diſtinguiſh ſuch a reference from that to a ſingle verſe or ſentence, I have marked the former by a point at the upper corner of the figure, the latter by a point at the lower corner, as is uſual at the end of a ſentence. I have adopted the ſame method in references to the Old Teſtament, to mark the difference between thoſe where one verſe only is quoted or alluded to, and thoſe wherein the alluſion is to two or more in ſucceſſion.—Theſe are the only purpoſes to which I have appropriated the ſide-margin.

To give there a literal verſion of the peculiarities of idiom, whether Hebraiſms or Greciſms, of the original, and all the poſſible ways in which the words may otherwiſe be rendered, has never appeared to me an object deſerving a tenth part of the attention and time which it requires from a tranſlator. To the learned, ſuch information is of no ſignificancy. To thoſe who are juſt beginning the ſtudy of the language, it may indeed give a little aſſiſtance. To thoſe who underſtand only the language of the tranſlation, it is, in my judgment, rather prejudicial than uſeful, ſuggeſting doubts which readers of this ſtamp are not qualified for ſolving, and which often a little knowledge in philology would entirely diſſipate. All that is requiſite is, where there is a real ambiguity in the text, to conſider it in the notes. As therefore the only valuable purpoſe that ſuch marginal information can anſwer, is to beginners in the ſtudy of the ſacred languages, and as that purpoſe ſo little coincides with the deſign of a tranſlation of the Scriptures into the vulgar tongue, I could not diſcover the ſmalleſt propriety in giving it a place in this work.

§ 12. The foot-margin I have reſerved for different purpoſes; firſt, for the explanation of ſuch appellatives as do not admit a proper tranſlation into our language, and as, by conſequence, render it neceſſary for the tranſlator to retain the original term. This I did not conſider as a proper ſubject for the notes, which are reſerved chiefly for what requires criticiſm and argument; whereas all the explanations requiſite in the margin, are commonly ſuch as do not admit a queſtion among the learned. Brief explanations, ſuch as thoſe here meant, may be juſtly conſidered as eſſential to every tranſlation into which there is a neceſſity of introducing foreign words. The terms which require ſuch explanations, to wit, the names of peculiar offices, ſects, feſtivals, ceremonies, coins, meaſures, and the like, were conſidered formerly *. Of certain terms, however, which come under ſome of theſe denominations, I have not judged it neceſſary to give any marginal explanation. The reaſon is, as they frequently occur in the ſacred books, what is mentioned there concerning them, ſufficiently

* Diſſ. VIII.

ſufficiently explains the import of the words. The diſtinction of Phariſee and Sadducee, we learn chiefly from the Goſpel itſelf; and in the Old Teſtament, we are made acquainted with the ſabbath, circumciſion, and paſſover.

Thoſe things which ſtand moſt in need of a marginal explanation, are offices, coins, meaſures, and ſuch peculiarities in dreſs as their phylacteries and tufts or taſſels at the corners of their mantles. In like manner, their diviſion of time, even when it does not occaſion the introduction of exotic terms, is apt to miſlead the unlearned, as it differs widely from the diviſion which obtains with us. Thus we ſhould not readily take the third hour of the day to mean nine o'clock in the morning, or the ſixth hour to mean noon. Further, when to Hebrew or Syriac expreſſions an explanation is ſubjoined in the text, as is given of the words, *Talitha cumi*, *immanuel*, *ephphatha*, and of our Lord's exclamation on the croſs, there is no occaſion for the aid of the margin. When no explanation is given in the text, as in the caſe of the word *hoſanna*, I have ſupplied it on the margin. Of the etymological ſignification of proper names, I have given an account only when there is in the text an alluſion to their etymology, in which caſe, to know the primitive import of the term is neceſſary for underſtanding the alluſion.

§ 13. There is only one other uſe to which I have applied the foot-margin. The Greek word κυριος was employed by the Seventy, not only for rendering the Hebrew word *adon*, that is, *lord* or *maſter*, but alſo to ſupply the word JEHOVAH, which was uſed by the Jews as the proper name of God, but which a ſpecies of ſuperſtition, that by degrees came generally to prevail among them, hindered them from tranſplanting into the Greek language. As the name *Jehovah*, therefore, was peculiarly appropriated to God; and, as the Hebrew *adon* and the Greek *kyrios*, like the Latin *dominus*, and the Engliſh *lord*, are merely appellatives, and uſed promiſcuouſly of God, angels and men, I thought it not improper, when a paſſage in the New Teſtament is quoted or introduced from the Old, wherein the word rendered in Greek *kyrios*, is in Hebrew *Jehovah*, to mark this name in the margin. At the ſame time let it be obſerved, that I have made no difference in the text of the verſion, in as much as no difference is made in the text of the evangeliſts my original, but have uſed the common Engliſh name *Lord* in addreſſing God, where they have employed the common Greek name *kyrios*.

PART

PART V.

The Notes.

I SHALL now conclude with laying a few things before the reader, for opening more fully my deſign in the notes ſubjoined to this verſion. I have, in the title, denominated them critical aud explanatory; *explanatory*, to point out the principal intention of them, which is to throw light upon the text, where it ſeems needful for the diſcovery of the direct and grammatical meaning; *critical*, to denote the means principally employed for this purpoſe, to wit, the rules of criticiſm on manuſcripts and verſions, in what concerns language, ſtyle and idiom. I have called them *notes* rather than annotations, to ſuggeſt that, as much as poſſible, I have ſtudied brevity, and avoided expatiating on any topic. For this reaſon, when the import of the text is ſo evident as to need no illuſtration, I have purpoſely avoided diverting the reader's attention, by an unneceſſary diſplay of quotations from ancient authors, ſacred or profane. As I would withhold nothing of real utility, I recur to claſſical authority, when it appears neceſſary, but not when a recourſe to it might be charged with oſtentation. A commentary was not intended, and therefore any thing like a continued explanation of the text is not to be expected. The criticiſms and remarks here offered are properly *ſcholia*, or gloſſes on paſſages of doubtful or difficult interpretation, and not comments. The author is to be conſidered as merely a *ſcholiaſt*, not a commentator. Thus much may ſuffice as as to the general deſign. In regard to ſome things, it will be proper to be more particular.

§ 2. From the ſhort account of my plan here given, it may naturally and juſtly be inferred, that I have ſhunned entirely the diſcuſſion of abſtract theological queſtions, which have afforded inexhauſtible matter of contention, not in the ſchools only, but in the church, and have been the principal ſubject of many commentaries of great name. To avoid controverſy of every kind is, I acknowledge, not to be attempted by one who, in his remarks on Scripture, often finds himſelf obliged to ſupport controverted interpretations of paſſages concerning the ſenſe of which there are various opinions. But queſtions of this kind, though ſometimes related to, are hardly ever coincident with the ſpeculative points of polemic theology. The latter are but deduced, and for the moſt part indirectly, from the former. Even controvertiſts have ſometimes the candour (though a claſs of men not remarkable for candour) to admit the juſtneſs of a grammatical interpretation which appears to favour an antagoniſt;

no doubt believing, that the deduction made by him from the text, may be eluded otherwiſe than by a different verſion.—But my reaſons for keeping as clear as poſſible of all ſcholaſtic diſputes are the following:

§ 3. Firſt, if, in ſuch a work as this, a man were diſpoſed to admit them, it is impoſſible to ſay how far they would, or ſhould carry him. The different queſtions which have been agitated, have all, as parts of the ſame ſyſtem, ſome connection, natural or artificial, among themſelves. The explanation and defence of one draws in, almoſt neceſſarily, the explanation and defence of another on which it depends. Beſides, thoſe converſant in ſyſtematic divinity, ſcarcely read a verſe in the Goſpel, which they do not imagine capable of being employed plauſibly, or which, perhaps, they have not ſeen or heard employed, either in defending, or in attacking ſome of their dogmas. Whichſoever of theſe be the caſe, the ſtaunch polemic finds himſelf equally obliged, for what he reckons the cauſe of truth, to diſcuſs the controverſy. I know no way ſo proper for eſcaping ſuch endleſs embarraſſments, as to make it a rule to admit no queſtions but thoſe which ſerve to evince either the authentic reading, or the juſt rendering of the text.

§ 4. My ſecond reaſon is, I have not known any interpreter who has meddled with controverſy, whoſe tranſlation is not very ſenſibly injured by it. Diſputation is a ſpecies of combat; the deſire of victory is natural to combatants, and is commonly, the further they engage, found to become the more ardent. Will the fairneſs and impartiality of a profeſſed diſputant, who being, at the ſame time, a tranſlator, has, in ſome meaſure, in the latter capacity, the moulding of the arguments to which, in the former, he muſt recur, be deemed, in the office of tranſlating, greatly to be depended on? A man, however honeſt in his intentions, ought not to truſt himſelf in ſuch a caſe. Under ſo powerful a temptation, it is often impoſſible to preſerve the judgment unbiaſſed, though the will ſhould remain uncorrupted. And I am ſtrongly inclined to think that, if Beza had not accompanied his tranſlation with his controverſial commentary, he would not have been capable of ſuch flagrant wreſting of the words, and perverſion of the ſenſe of his author, as he is ſometimes juſtly chargeable with. But in rendering a paſſage in the verſion to be preſently converted into an argument in the annotations, it was not eaſy for a tranſlator of ſo great ardour, to refrain from giving it the turn that would beſt ſuit the purpoſe, of which, as annotator, he never loſt ſight, and for which both verſion and commentary ſeem to have been undertaken, the defence of the theology of his party.

§ 5. My third reaſon for declining all ſuch diſputes, is, becauſe the much greater part of them, even thoſe which are treated by

the diſputants on both ſides as very important, have long appeared to me in no other light than that of the fooliſh queſtions which the apoſtle warns Titus to avoid as unprofitable and vain, ch. iii. 9. or of the profane babblings and oppoſitions of ſcience, falſely ſo called, againſt which he repeatedly cautioned Timothy, 1 Ep. i. 4. vi. 20 2 Ep. ii. 23. If we may judge of them by their effects, as of the tree by its fruits, we ſhall certainly be led to this concluſion For, from the marks which the apoſtle has given of the *logomachies*, or ſtrifes of words, then beginning to prevail, we have the utmoſt reaſon to conclude, that a great proportion of our ſcholaſtic diſputes come under the ſame denomination. What character has he given of the vain janglings of his day, which is wanting in thoſe of ours? Do not the latter gender contention as ſucceſsfully as ever the former did? Cannot we ſay, with as much truth of theſe, as Paul did of thoſe, *whereof cometh envy, ſtrife, revilings, evil ſurmiſings, perverſe diſputings of men of corrupt minds?* Do our babblings any more than theirs miniſter godly edifying? Do they not, on the contrary, with equal ſpeed, when they are encouraged, encreaſe unto more ungodlineſs? Have our polemic divines, by their abſtruſe reſearches and metaphyſical refinements, contributed to the advancement of charity, love to God, and love to man? Yet this is, in religion, the great end of all; for charity is the end of the commandment, and the bond of perfectneſs. Theſe queſtions I leave with every conſiderate reader. The proper anſwers will, with the aid of a little experience and reflection, be ſo quickly ſuggeſted to him, that he will need no prompter.

§ 6 Laſtly, though I am far from putting all queſtions in theology on a level, the province of the tranſlator, and that of the controvertiſt are ſo diſtinct, and the talents requiſite in the one ſo different from thoſe requiſite in the other, that it appears much better to keep them ſeparate. I have therefore in this work, confined myſelf entirely to the former.

§ 7 Further, I do not attempt, in the notes, to remove every kind of textuary difficulty in the books here tranſlated; ſuch, for example, as ariſe from apparent contradictions in the accounts of the different evangeliſts, or from the ſuppoſed contradiction of contemporary authors, or ſuch as are merely chronological or geographical. Not that I conſider theſe, like the dogmas of the controvertiſt, as without the ſphere of a critic on the ſacred text; not that I make it, as in the former caſe, a rule to exclude them, if any thing new and ſatisfactory ſhould occur to me to offer; but becauſe, on moſt queſtions of this nature, all the methods of ſolution known to me, are either trite or unſatisfactory. Much has been written for ſolving the difficulty ariſing from the different accounts given of our Lord's genealogy by Matthew and Luke; and different hypotheſes have been framed for this purpoſe.

poſe. Though I do not pretend to have reached certainty on this queſtion, I incline moſt to the opinion of thoſe who make the one account the pedigree of Joſeph, the other that of Mary. But having nothing to advance which has not been already ſaid over and over by others, and the evidence not being ſuch as to put the matter beyond doubt, I ſee no occaſion for a note barely to tell my opinion, which is entitled to no regard from the reader, unleſs ſo far as it is ſupported by evidence.

For ſimilar reaſons, I have avoided entering upon the examination of the difficulties occaſioned by the different accounts given of our Lord's reſurrection, and his appearances to his diſciples after it. On ſome of theſe points there is a danger leſt an interpreter be too haſty in deciding. A judgment raſhly formed may give his mind ſuch a bias as ſhall affect his tranſlation, and lead him to make ſtretches in ſupport of his opinion, which the laws of criticiſm do not warrant. I acknowledge, on the other hand, that there are inſtances wherein a ſmall variation, very diſcernible in the pointing, or in rendering a particular expreſſion, may totally remove a difficulty or apparent contradiction. In ſuch a caſe, it would be both uncandid and injudicious, not to give that, of all the interpretations whereof the words are ſuſceptible, which is attended with the leaſt difficulty; and, if the interpretation be uncommon, to aſſign the reaſons in the notes. But to do violence to the rules of conſtruction, and diſtort the words, for the ſake of producing the ſolution of a difficulty, is, in effect, to ſubſtitute our own conjectures for the word of God, and thus to put off human conceit for celeſtial verity. It is far better to leave the matter as we found it. In ſolving difficulties to which we find ourſelves unequal, future expoſitors may be more ſucceſsful.

§ 8. One great fault, far too common with ſcriptural critics, is, that they would be thought to know every thing: and they are but too prone to think ſo concerning themſelves. This tends to retard (inſtead of accelerating) their progreſs in true knowledge. Men are unwilling to part with what they fancy they have gotten a ſure hold of, or to be eaſily ſtript of what has coſt them time and painful ſtudy to acquire. Cuſtom ſoon ſupplies the place of argument; and what at firſt may have appeared to be reaſon, ſettles into prejudice. It is neceſſary, in our preſent ſtate, that habit ſhould have influence even on our opinions. But it is particularly fortunate when the habit, in matters of judgment, extends not barely to the concluſions, but to the premiſes; not to the opinions only, but to the reaſons on which we have founded them. When this is the caſe, we experience all the advantages derived from an habitual aſſociation, without much danger of bigotry or blind attachment. Now it is well known, that opinions haſtily formed, preclude all the advantage which may afterwards redound from better information. The truth of this

remark

remark is, even in the ordinary affairs of life, too well ſeen and felt in its unhappy conſequences, every day.

§ 9. Again, I have, in theſe notes, avoided meddling with queſtions relating to the order in which the different miracles were performed, and the diſcourſes ſpoken, and alſo ſettling the doubts which have been raiſed concerning the identity or diverſity of ſome of the facts and ſpeeches recorded by the different Evangeliſts. I have ſhunned, in like manner, all enquiry about the time occupied by our Lord's miniſtry, and about ſeveral other hiſtorical queſtions which have been much canvaſſed. I do not ſay that ſuch enquiries are uſeleſs. A connection with the evidence of other points, which may be of great importance, may confer on ſome of them a conſequence, much beyond what at firſt we ſhould be apt to imagine. But, in general, I do not heſitate to affirm, that though I have occaſionally attended to ſuch enquiries, I have not been able to diſcover that their conſequence is ſo great as ſome ſeem to make it They are ſtill, upon the whole, rather curious than uſeful. Beſides, on the greater part of them, little is to be expected beyond uncertainty and doubt.

Some people have ſo ſtrong a propenſity to form fixt opinions on every ſubject to which they turn their thoughts, that their mind will brook no delay. They cannot bear to doubt or heſitate. Suſpenſe in judging is to them more inſufferable than the manifeſt hazard of judging wrong: and therefore, when they have not ſufficient evidence they will form an opinion from what they have, be it ever ſo little; or even from their own conjectures, without any evidence at all. Now, to believe without proper evidence, and to doubt when we have evidence ſufficient, are equally the effects, not of the ſtrength, but of the weakneſs of the underſtanding. In queſtions, therefore, which have appeared to me either unimportant, or of very dubious ſolution, I have thought it better to be ſilent, than to amuſe the reader with thoſe remarks in which I have myſelf found no ſatisfaction. In a very few caſes, however, I have, in ſome meaſure, departed from this rule; and, in order to prevent the reader from being miſled in a matter of conſequence, by explanations more ſpecious than ſolid, have even attempted to refute thoſe ſolutions given by others, which appeared to pervert the ſenſe, though I had nothing ſatisfactory of my own to ſubſtitute in their place *. Having ſaid thus much of the purpoſes for which the notes are not, it is proper now, to mention thoſe for which they are, intended.

§ 10. Firſt, then, as was hinted before, ſuch different readings as affect the ſenſe, and are tolerably ſupported by manuſcripts, verſions, or their own intrinſic evidence, inſomuch, that the judgments of the learned are divided concerning them, are commonly given

* See the note on Mark x. 30.

given in the notes; their evidence briefly ſtated, and the reaſon aſſigned for the reading adopted in the tranſlation. In this I carefully avoid all minuteneſs, having no intention to uſurp the province, or ſuperſede the labours, of thoſe who have, with ſo much laudable care and diligence, collected thoſe variations, and thereby facilitated the work of other critics. Indeed, as the variations are comparatively few, which are entitled to a place here; and as in thoſe few I do not enter into particulars, but only give what appears the reſult of the evidence on both ſides, I cannot be ſaid, in any reſpect, to interfere with the departments of ſuch critics as Mill and Wetſtein. The little which occurs here ought, on the contrary, to ſerve as a ſpur to the learned reader, to the more aſſiduous ſtudy of this important branch of ſacred literature. In like manner, variations of conſequence, affecting the ſenſe, in verſions of ſuch venerable antiquity as the Syriac and the Vulgate, though not accompanied with correſpondent readings in any Greek copies, are not often paſſed over unobſerved. In all dubious caſes, I give my reaſon for the reading preferred in this tranſlation, whether it be the common reading or not; and, after mentioning the other, with what may be urged in its favour, leave the reader to his choice.

§ 11. The other, and the principal end of theſe notes, is to aſſign the reaſons for the way wherein the words or ſentences of the original are rendered in this tranſlation. As it would have been improper, becauſe unneceſſary, to give a reaſon for the manner wherein every word, or even ſentence is tranſlated, I ſhall here mention the particular caſes in which it has been judged expedient to offer ſomething in the notes in vindication of the verſion. The firſt is, when the rendering given to the words does not coincide in meaning with that of the common verſion. Where the difference is manifeſtly and only in expreſſion, to make remarks muſt generally appear ſuperfluous; the matter ought to be left to the taſte and diſcernment of the reader. To attempt a defence of every alteration of this kind, would both extend the notes to an unmeaſurable length, and render them, for the moſt part, very inſignificant.

But, ſecondly, there are a few inſtances wherein all the difference in the verſion may, in fact, be merely verbal, though not manifeſtly ſo; and therefore as to the generality of readers, they will at firſt appear to affect the ſenſe, it may be of conſequence to take notice of them. The difference between ſound and ſenſe, the words and the meaning, though clearly founded in the nature of things, is not always ſo obvious as we ſhould imagine. That, in language, the connection between the ſign and the thing ſignified, is merely artificial, cannot admit a queſtion. Yet, the tendency of the mind, when much habituated to particular ſounds, as the ſigns of certain conceptions, is to put both on the footing

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of things naturally connected. In conſequence of this, a difference only in expreſſion may appear to alter the ſentiment, or, at leaſt very much to enervate and obſcure it. For this reaſon, in a few caſes wherein the change made on the place is, in effect, merely verbal, I have, to obviate miſtakes, and to ſhow, that in alterations even of this kind, I have been determined by reaſons which appear to me weighty, attempted a brief illuſtration in the notes.

Thirdly, in certain caſes wherein there is no difference between the common tranſlation and the preſent, either in thought or in expreſſion, but wherein both differ from that of other reſpectable interpreters, or wherein the common verſion has been combated by the learned critics, I have aſſigned my reaſons for concurring with the Engliſh tranſlators, and for not being determined by ſuch criticiſms, though ingenious, and though ſupported by writers of character. This is the more neceſſary, as there has been of late, both abroad and at home, a profuſion of criticiſms on the ſacred text; and many new verſions have been attempted, eſpecially in France and England. As theſe muſt be ſuppoſed to have had ſome influence on critical readers, it would have been improper to overlook entirely their remarks. Such, therefore, as ſeem to be of moment, and have come to my knowledge, or occurred to my memory, I have occaſionally taken notice of. This I have done, with a view ſometimes to confirm their reaſoning, ſometimes to confute it, or at leaſt, to ſhow that it is not ſo deciſive as a ſanguine philologiſt (for even philologiſts are ſometimes ſanguine in deciding) is apt to imagine. In this article, the learned reader will find many omiſſions, ariſing partly from forgetfulneſs, and partly from the different judgments which are inevitably formed, by different perſons, concerning the importance of particular criticiſms. When the deciſion of any point may be ſaid to depend, in whole or in part, on what has been diſcuſſed in the Preliminary Diſſertations, I always, to avoid repetitions, refer to the paragraph or paragraphs of the Diſſertation, where ſuch a diſcuſſion is to be found.

§ 12. Another purpoſe for which I have ſometimes employed the notes, is the explanation of a name or word which, though from ſcriptural uſe it be familiar to our ears, has little currency in converſation, becauſe rarely or never applied to any common ſubject. Of this kind are the words *parable*, *publican*, *ſcribe*, of which I have attempted an explanation in the notes: add to theſe all the terms, which, though current in converſation, have ſomething peculiar in their ſcriptural application. I have generally avoided employing words in meanings which they never bear in ordinary uſe. As it is from the prevailing uſe that words, as ſigns, may be ſaid to originate, and by it that their import is aſcertained, ſuch peculiarities rarely fail to create ſome obſcurity.

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There are, nevertheleſs, inſtances in all languages, in which, on certain ſubjects, (for religion is not ſingular in this) common terms have ſomething peculiar in their application. In ſuch caſes, we cannot avoid the peculiarity of meaning, without having recourſe to circumlocution, or ſuch other expedients as would injure the ſimplicity of the expreſſion, and give the appearance of affectation to the language. When, therefore, I have thought it neceſſary to employ ſuch words, I have endeavoured to aſcertain the ſcriptural acceptation in the notes; or, if the explanation has been anticipated in theſe Diſſertations, I have referred to the place. Of ſuch peculiarities, which are far from being numerous in this verſion, the following will ſerve as examples:

The firſt ſhall be the word *lawyer*, which I have, after the old tranſlators, retained as the verſion of νομικος; not that it entirely anſwers in the Goſpel to the Engliſh uſe, but becauſe it has what I may call an analogical propriety, and bears nearly the ſame relation to their word νομος, that the word *lawyer* bears to our word *law*. The deviation from common uſe is at moſt not greater than that of the words *patron* and *client* in the tranſlation of any Roman hiſtorian. Some, indeed, have choſen to render νομικος *ſcribe*, and others, for the ſame reaſon, to render γραμματευς *lawyer*, becauſe in one inſtance, a perſon called νομικος in one Goſpel, Mat. xxii. 35. is named in another γραμματευς, Mark xii. 28. But this argument is not concluſive. *Jonathan, David's uncle*, we are told, 1 Chron. xxvii. 32. *was a counſellor, a wiſe man, and a ſcribe*. Can we infer from this, that theſe are ſynonymous words? The contrary, I think, may be concluded with much greater reaſon. If then, Jonathan had been called by one hiſtorian barely a *counſellor*, and by another barely a *ſcribe*, it would not have been juſt to infer that *counſellor* and *ſcribe*, though both, in this inſtance, applicable to the ſame perſon, are words of the ſame import. Yet the argument is no better in the preſent caſe. That there is, however, an affinity in their ſignifications can hardly be doubted, as both belonged to the literary profeſſion, which was not very extenſive among the Jews. But that they are not entirely coincident, may be inferred from a paſſage in Luke, ch. xi. 45. where we are informed that our Lord, after ſeverely cenſuring the practices of the Scribes, γραμματευς, and Phariſees, is addreſſed in this manner by one of the νομικοι, who happened to be preſent, *Maſter, thus ſaying, thou reproacheſt us alſo*. That the reproach extended to them he infers from the thing ſaid, *thus ſaying*, but there had been no occaſion for inference, if they had been addreſſed by their common appellation, and if *ſcribe* and *lawyer* had meant the ſame thing. Neither, in that caſe, could he have ſaid *us alſo*, that is, *us* as well as thoſe whom thou haſt named, the Scribes and Phariſees. Our Lord's reply makes it, if poſſible, ſtill more evident, that though what he had ſaid did indeed

indeed comprehend them, the title which he had uſed did not neceſſarily imply ſo much. *Wo unto* YOU ALSO, *ye lawyers*, KAI ΥΜΙΝ τοις νομικοις υαι, Luke xi. 46. which could not have been ſo expreſſed, if the denunciation immediately preceding had been addreſſed to them by name. Others think νομικος equivalent to νομοδιδασκαλος, rendering both *Doctor of the law*. But as we have not ſufficient evidence that there is in theſe a perfect coincidence in meaning, and as they are differently rendered in the Syriac verſion, it is better to preſerve the diſtinction which the original makes, at leaſt in the names.

Another example of a ſmall deviation from familiar language, is in the word *ſinner*, which in common uſe, is applicable to every rational being not morally perfect, but frequently in Scripture denotes a perſon of a profligate life. Now, as the frequency of this application, and the nature of the occurrences, remove all doubt as to the meaning, it may be conſidered as one of thoſe Hebrew idioms, which it is proper in a tranſlator to preſerve. Neither *deſert* nor *wilderneſs* exactly correſponds to ερημος in the New Teſtament; but they are near enough to anſwer the purpoſe better than a periphraſis. The like may be ſaid of *neighbour*, which, in familiar language, is never uſed with ſo great latitude as in holy writ. And, in general, when words in ſcriptural uſe are accompanied with perſpicuity, they ought to be preferred to words in greater currency, which are not uſed in the common tranſlation; and that even though the import of theſe more familiar words ſhould be ſufficiently appoſite. It is for this reaſon alone, that in relation to human characters, we ſhould reckon it more ſuitable to the language of the Spirit, to ſay *righteous* than virtuous, *juſt* than honeſt.

§ 13. The only other uſe I have made of the notes, and that but ſeldom, is to remark paſſingly what may ſerve either to illuſtrate the character of the ſtyle of thoſe writings or to diſplay the ſpirit which every where animates them: for in theſe we diſcover the intrinſic evidences they carry of a divine original. This has induced me ſometimes to take notice alſo of the moral leſſons to which ſome things naturally lead the attention of the ſerious reader. There is not on this ground the ſame hazard, as on the ſpeculative queſtions of ſchool-divinity, of rouſing even among Chriſtians a whole hoſt of opponents, or ſtirring up unedifying and undeterminable diſputes. Practical obſervations, though too little minded, are hardly ever controverted. Beſides, they are not of that kind of queſtions which genders ſtrife, but are moſt evidently of that which miniſters godly edifying. On this article ſome will think that I have been too ſparing. But, in my judgment, it is only in very particular caſes, that the introduction of ſuch hints is pertinent in a ſcholiaſt. When the ſcope of the text is manifeſtly practical, it is enough that we attend to the

the ſacred authors. To enforce what they ſay by obtruding on the reader remarks to the ſame purpoſe, might appear a ſuperfluous, or even officious, interruption. The effect is fully as bad when the obſervation, however good in itſelf, appears far-fetched: for the beſt things do not anſwer out of place. Perhaps the leaſt exceptionable account that can be given of ſuch remarks as are at once pertinent and efficacious, is, that they ariſe naturally, though not obviouſly, out of the ſubject.

§ 14. To conclude; as I do not think it the beſt way of giving an impartial hearing to the ſacred authors, to interrupt the reading of them every moment, for the ſake of conſulting either the gloſſes or the annotations of expoſitors, I have avoided offering any temptation to this practice, having placed the notes at the end. When a portion of Scripture, ſuch as one of the ſections of this verſion, is intended to be read, it is better to read it to an end without interruption. The ſcope of the whole is in this way more clearly perceived, as well as the connection of the parts. Whereas, when the reader finds the text and the notes on the ſame page, and under his eye at once, the latter tend, too evidently, to awake his curioſity, and, before he has proceeded in the former far enough to have a diſtinct view of the ſcope of the paſſage, to call off his attention; but when they are ſeparated, as in this work, it may be ſuppoſed, that a reader will finiſh at leaſt a paragraph, before he turn over to a diſtant part of the book. This method gives this advantage even to the notes, if judicious, that as the argument there uſed in favour of a particular reading, or of a particular rendering of a ſentence, is often drawn from the ſcope and connection of the place, he will be better qualified to judge of the juſtneſs of the criticiſm. It ought always to be remembered that an acquaintance with the text is the principal object. Recourſe to the notes may be had only occaſionally, as a man when he meets with ſome difficulty, and is at a loſs how to determine, recurs to the judgment of a friend. For the ſame reaſon I have alſo avoided inſerting any marks in the texts referring to them. The reference is ſufficiently aſcertained in the notes themſelves, by the common marks of chapter and verſe.

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